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Introduction: 
Inside poverty and development in Africa 
 
Marcel Rutten & André Leliveld 
 
 
Introduction 
Mary Muli was forced to sit it out inside the Nakumatt supermarket for four 
hours on 31st May 2008 following a management order to lock all the doors 
when riot police started firing teargas to try to disperse a crowd of protesters 
outside. They had taken to the streets of Nairobi to vent their anger at the 
rapidly rising cost of living, in particular food and fuel prices. And it is not just 
the urban poor who have been experiencing tough times. Last year Mary sold 
all her cows and goats after an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever and two vets who 
had been checking the meat of an infected goat had died. Prices were then 
fetching as little as Ksh 600 for a mature goat compared to the normal Ksh 
2,500. Now prices have gone up to at least Ksh 1,000 for a young goat. But, 
more importantly, the prices of staple foods have skyrocketed since the 2007 
elections. As a result of the post-election violence and a long-running land 
conflict in the country’s food basket in western Kenya, the price of maize has 
gone up from Ksh 10 to Ksh 35 per kg. Maize meal (unga) now costs Ksh 75 
per 2 kg (up from Ksh 35). The burning of rice fields in Mwea has doubled rice 
prices but beans topped the list, going up to Ksh 95 per kg from Ksh 20. To 
make matters worse, the long rains have failed to mature Mary’s Katumani 
maize that should be ready for harvesting by late June, and army worms have 
attacked it too. The price of fertilizer, needed to boost the growth of sukuma 
wiki (kales), has tripled in price and due to the poor soils in Mary’s area, fertil-
izer has to be added twice every three weeks in order to harvest a good crop. 
However, nowadays, many people cannot afford to buy fertilizer so there will 
be lower outputs. Higher petrol prices have also prevented the hiring of a tractor 
to plough the field this year. And the cost of kerosene, which is used for cook-
ing and lightning, has doubled too. In addition, Mary’s kids had to go back to 
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school and although the Kenyan government declared that primary education 
would be free, the influx of extra students and the higher cost of living have 
forced government-run schools to demand a foundation fee (Ksh 2,000/annum) 
and a development fee (Ksh 6,000/annum) to supplement the Ksh 10,000 the 
government donates per student annually. Kenya has experienced impressive 
growth figures in the last five years but ordinary Kenyans are still wondering 
how to escape the poverty trap. 
The rising cost of staple foods across Africa has already caused food riots in 
a number of countries (Somalia, Cameroon and South Africa). The African 
Development Bank and the World Bank are setting aside billions of dollars for 
interventionist loans for poor countries, while the UN is calling for a New Deal 
for Africa and its agriculture (Daily Nation, 18/05/08). World stocks of grain 
have fallen in the last decade from 6 months to 40 days and the global food 
shortage has caused the price of food to rise. Increased wealth in China and 
India, which is fuelling greater demands for meat that in turn demands more 
grain, are among the reasons mentioned for this. Other factors include a growth 
in the world’s population, a cut in farmers’ subsidies in industrialized countries, 
severe droughts and flooding that have reduced crop yields, market speculation, 
and higher demands for crops to be set aside for biofuels. Higher food prices 
affect the poor in particular. The Kenyan government, in partnership with the 
Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa, the Equity Bank and the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development have signed an agreement to supply loans to 
needy farmers, rural input suppliers, seed wholesalers and food traders. Other 
countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa have put in place or 
raised cash transfer programmes. And Cameroon has slashed its import duty 
and reduced or dropped taxes on certain goods, like rice, fish, flour and cooking 
oil (Daily Nation 18/05/08).  
The above narrative shows the complex mix of factors that for many Afri-
cans still determines whether or not one will be able to afford at least one meal 
a day. Over the years, policy makers in decision-making entities from a local to 
international level have been struggling to stimulate economic growth and com-
bat poverty in Africa. Their efforts have been guided by an outspoken mixture 
of simple concrete ideas and, especially after World War II, grand theories. 
Results in steering development and reducing poverty have varied over the 
years and across and within countries. The uneven, unstable and irregular 
development patterns on the African continent have puzzled development 
planners and scholars for decades and the introduction of terms like ‘arrested 
development’ (Fieldhouse 1986) and ‘stalled development’ (Leonard & Straus 
2003) are examples of their attempts to classify these development trajectories. 
The search for the ‘African dummy’ that could explain growth and development 
patterns of African countries has received attention in academic research on 
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Africa.1 Among the media and (western) policy makers the spotlight has, how-
ever, been on the natural and manmade disasters that have resulted in poverty, 
famine, civil strife and corrupt regimes and the emphasis has been, at least until 
recently, on the failures in Africa rather than the successes and achievements. 
The thinking behind this Afro-pessimism includes the perception of hopeless-
ness and tragedy that seems to pervade the continent despite years of interna-
tional support (see, for example, Chabal & Deloz 1999, Calderisi 2006, Ellis 
2005, Kaplan 1996). However, a careful analysis of African countries destroys 
this myth of an all-encompassing bankruptcy. The divergence of African growth 
paths is clearly shown in the World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators 
publications. A review of average annual GDP growth for the 1997-2006 period 
divides African countries into four categories ranging from under- to out-per-
formers2 and underlines the diversity in economic progress in time and place for 
Africa, like other continents. Other historical and micro-survey evidence, how-
ever, supports less pessimistic conclusions (Sender 1999). For example, in areas 
such as life expectancy, infant mortality, female literacy and secondary school-
ing, access to drinking water, communications infrastructure, electricity pro-
duction, and networks of transport and power substantial improvements over the 
last four decades can be observed.3 Africa is also realizing rapid growth in food 
crops, and the expansion of the newer, higher-value commodities produced in 
the agricultural sector has been even faster.4 And the agricultural workforce in 
                                                 
1  Examples can be found in Chabal & Deloz (1999), Ghura & Hadjimichael (1996), 
Gunning & Collier (1999), Kamarck (1977, 2000), Ndulu & O’Connell (1999) and 
Ndulu et al. (2008). 
2  These groups are countries with no or little growth, slow growth, sustained growth, 
and oil-exporting countries. The bottom group comprises 13 African countries where 
some 20% of all Africans live and averaged a 1.3% growth rate. Some of these 
countries (Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, DRC) have underperformed for various 
reasons but each of them has huge potential and has shown better scores in the past 
as well as in recent years. The nine ‘slow growers’, accounting for 16% of all 
Africans, averaged a 3.4% growth rate. In the group of sustained growth (5.5% 
average), Mozambique (8.4%) and Rwanda (7.9%) performed the best. The average 
score for oil-producing countries is 7.4% but again there is a mixed picture ranging 
from Gabon (1.7%) through Nigeria (4.0) to Equatorial Guinea (20.9%) (World Bank 
2006). 
3  Some of the successes, such as higher life expectancy, are being threatened due to 
the rise in HIV/AIDS that has hit the continent more than any other region in the 
world. 
4  Sender (1999: 97-98) argues that African agricultural growth has been as rapid as 
could reasonably be expected. For example, the compound growth rate of agricul-
tural production in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole over the period from 1965 to 1995 
was 2.34%, whereas the rate of growth in agricultural output in now-advanced 
capitalist economies (including Japan) during the early stages of their industriali-
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Africa has achieved significant productivity gains.5 Yet all of these achieve-
ments need to be balanced against the economic and environmental hardships 
that are around the corner in Africa and in the wider global setting of which 
Africa is a part. 
Thinking about development in Africa requires an appreciation of at least 
two sets of ideas. Africa is ‘the land of our civilization and of rich natural re-
sources’ as well as the land of the most perplexing issues of our time: slavery, 
famine, refugees, ethnic conflict, repressive and lethargic systems of govern-
ance’ (Veit et al. 1998: 1). Both counts are true. It is not sufficient to stress the 
ubiquity of failure, malnutrition, disease, predatory states and war to be over-
whelmed by revulsion at the misery still being experienced by so many Afri-
cans. In addition, one also has to recognize that important aspects of the lives of 
millions of ordinary people have been transformed over the last five decades, 
showing that Africa has great human and material strengths that justify a greater 
interest on the part of public and private investors in its economy and its people. 
It is on the basis of a clear perception of the complexity and unevenness of all 
these processes, as well as a critical analysis of the consequences of (economic) 
policies in the past, that politically realistic development strategies can be for-
mulated (Bernstein 1990, Kilby 2003, Sender 1999).  
                                                                                                                       
zation was generally below 1.5% per annum for long periods. Disaggregated figures 
show that over the same period maize production increased by 3.25% per annum and 
rice production increased by 3.4% per annum. Unsurprisingly, the growth rate for 
some of the newer, higher-value commodities produced in the agricultural sector has 
been even faster. For example, poultry production (4.6% per annum), tea production 
(5.6%), fruit and vegetable exports (over 5%) and, most spectacularly, paper and 
cardboard production (over 9%). 
5  The figures in Sender (1999: 98-99) could be illustrative here. Between 1980 and 
1995, the growth of the economically active population in agriculture was, on 
average, considerably slower than the growth in agricultural production: 2.2% versus 
2.8% annually. Further evidence of rising productivity and technological change in 
the agricultural sector can be seen at both the macro and micro levels. African 
agricultural output has not increased simply because of an extension in the area 
cultivated, although such an expansion has certainly occurred. For example, there 
was a 25% expansion in the area under permanent cropping between 1965 and 1995 
(FAOSTAT 1997 cited in Sender 1999). In the countries for which data is available, 
the per-hectare yields of a range of crops, including maize, rice, wheat, potatoes, 
cassava and tea, have increased significantly. Of course, grain output per hectare was 
very much higher and has increased at a much faster rate in many other developing 
regions, particularly in East Asia, in recent decades. However, the recent agricultural 
performance of these developing economies was achieved on the basis of initial 
structural conditions that cannot legitimately be compared to those in rural Sub-
Saharan Africa in the second half of the 20th century. In East Asia, for example, more 
than a third of arable land is irrigated compared to about 7% in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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This book aims to contribute to a clearer perception of the complexity and 
variety of development processes in Sub-Saharan Africa. The contributions in it 
are rooted in extensive empirical research at local, regional and/or national level 
in different African countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, South 
Africa and Uganda, while some take a pan-African perspective. All however 
give insight, from different analytical perspectives, into the heterogeneity of 
poverty and development processes and draw their conclusions based on current 
and past development policies in their particular field. The authors have not 
analyzed development policies in terms of their effects and impact on poverty 
reduction – as is done in evaluation studies – but instead confronted the ideas, 
concepts and assumptions that lie behind pro-poor policies with their empirical 
findings. 
By way of background here, a brief historical overview of the development 
policy agenda in Africa and the ideas and theories that have been influential in 
the formulation and implementation of these policies is presented. Then we 
introduce the specific contributions and summarize the main findings.  
Development policies in Africa 
Africa has a long history of policies aimed at reducing poverty and improving 
the living conditions of its population. Many of these policies show a remark-
able uniformity across the continent and over time, though their effects and im-
pact differ widely, ranging from no effect at all to the structural transformation 
of economies and societies. This remarkable uniformity has much to do with 
Africa’s colonial history and its aid dependency, which led to the West’s export 
of blueprint models of development to Africa in the post-colonial era. Of 
course, looking in detail reveals subtle differences among countries but, gener-
ally, several generations of policies – with their different underlying ideas and 
theories – have been widely and well received in Africa. As Easterly (2001) 
points out, policy formulation and implementation have followed an iterative 
process: ideas and theories inform policies, whose implementation leads to 
results, of which the evaluation and analyses give rise to new insights, new 
policies and new results. 
 
Policies though time 
During the early colonial days, improvements in the living conditions of local 
Africans were not the primary objective of most governments. They mainly 
concentrated on making themselves financially self-supporting by taxing the 
local population and transferring resources such as land to European settlers at 
cheap prices, especially in the British colonies. From the 1920s onwards, a few 
plans for socio-economic development were put together and revenue was put 
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into establishing social services in health, education, infrastructure and agricul-
ture, notably improved crops and breeds (Iliffe 1999: 212).6 The Great Depres-
sion in the 1930s disrupted these initiatives7 and government revenue all over 
Africa subsequently eroded.  
It was only after World War II that, with booming prices and financial 
support from overseas, more substantial development efforts could be put in 
place, including economic support for the ‘African regions’. Oliver & Atmore 
(1977: 214) explained this increase in financial support from the colonial 
powers as being primarily a result of western governments’ taxation policies. 
During the war they had taken a much larger proportion of their citizens’ 
incomes and this continued in the post-war years to create the new welfare state 
in industrialized countries, including subsidized housing, unemployment and 
social security benefits and national health schemes. A proportion of this tax 
revenue was set aside for overseas development. Oliver & Atmore (1977) also 
mention self-interest as a reason for the growing increase in development sup-
port, with international criticism forcing the colonial powers to improve the 
living conditions of the local population if colonialism was to continue. New 
legislation in the United Kingdom and France released funds to support devel-
opment plans in their colonial territories. And it should be noted that local 
demands by Africans in countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Uganda as 
early as the 1910s and 1920s also added to this change in policy.  
Independence brought freedom for African countries but also the challenge 
of how to promote growth and development in their own countries. The experi-
ences of industrialized countries showed that rapid development and sustained 
economic growth had involved a process of late industrialization in which the 
production structure shifted from the primary sector to manufacturing, along-
side a progressive move from less to more technology and capital-intensive 
activities within and across sectors. The engine of this process of structural 
change and growth in productivity was rapid capital accumulation (Akyüz & 
Gore 2001: 266-267). The basic challenge of most post-colonial governments 
was, therefore, to promote agricultural growth and encourage structural trans-
formation towards manufacturing (Akyüz & Gore 2001: 273). Investments in 
                                                 
6  In addition, some of the new inputs did not demand any investment at all. Allowing 
the African population to engage in certain activities (for example, growing cash 
groups like coffee or marketing livestock) that had previously been forbidden to 
protect the white settler economy stimulated economic performance. Missionaries, 
some of whom were responsible for the training of Africa’s political leaders, played 
an important role and they also spread ideas and even crops (see Burgman 1990).  
7  Severe weather conditions, droughts in particular, added to these problems, affecting 
the local population and the white settlers alike. In spite of strong local government 
support, many of entrepreneurs went bankrupt. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa in this post-independence period were in three sectors: cash 
crops (coffee, tea, cocoa); mining (copper, oil, diamonds); and industry and 
manufacturing. Especially in the latter fields Africa lagged behind the rest of the 
world (see Mkandawire 1992: 87). 
Based on the Harrod-Domar growth model, policies were aimed at promot-
ing capital accumulation, which was considered the key to prosperity. This 
capital accumulation was to be achieved through increased (domestic and inter-
national) savings and incoming capital flows (international aid, external debt, 
Foreign Direct Investment and workers’ remittances), which should be trans-
formed then into productive investment.8 Bilateral and multilateral donor 
organizations translated this simple and easily understood plan into Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which was focused on physical investment 
(machinery, equipment and other intermediate imports) as well as big infra-
structure projects (dams, roads, railways). The Cold War context largely deter-
mined where this development assistance came from and influenced govern-
ment choices when it came to adopting a more socialist or more capitalist road 
to industrialization. In both cases, however, the state had a strong role in pro-
moting growth and development.  
In the late 1970s, it was clear that the optimistic prospects for development 
had not materialized in large parts of Africa. Trends in capital accumulation and 
exports heavily depended on economic activity in the agricultural sector for 
most African economies. A few, notably oil-exporting countries, were able to 
increase savings and earn foreign exchange through mineral exploitation but the 
economies of the majority were still predominantly agricultural. Policies de-
signed to increase the contribution of agriculture to the rest of the economy had, 
however, to deal with the predominant pattern of agrarian production in most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which – apart from some large-scale capitalist farming in 
the former ‘settler economies’ – was and still is peasant agriculture.9 Experi-
ences in East Asia have shown that it is possible to promote industrialization on 
the basis of farm household production but, as Karshenas (2001) pointed out, 
certain initial structural conditions made the policy dilemma particularly diffi-
cult in Africa. For instance, agricultural production in Africa takes place in 
                                                 
8  The Harrod-Domar model was introduced in the 1950s and claimed that capital accu-
mulation would lead to economic growth. 
9  Typically in peasant agriculture, work is organized around diverse household rela-
tions through a gender division of labour in which women do the major part of the 
work, access to land is organized through indigenous tenure systems, membership of 
the local community is the primary source of land-use rights, and farm households 
meet their consumption needs through self-provisioning, the production of export or 
food crops for sale or off-farm employment. Patterns vary between richer and poorer 
households.  
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risky and fragile natural environments, the agricultural economy is generally 
labour constrained, and basic food staples act as non-tradables in much of 
Africa. These constraints have several consequences. For example, food prices 
are highly variable because of the rain-fed nature of most agricultural produc-
tion, the non-tradability of food crops prevents revenues from exports, and 
taking labour out of agriculture decreases agricultural output which, in turn, can 
frustrate the capital accumulation needed for structural transformation. 
Not only questionable domestic policies but also worsening exogenous 
circumstances, such as falling commodity prices and high interest rates imposed 
on debt service payments, called for a radical change in policies in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Countries had no alternative other than adjusting but the 
debt crisis in the 1980s severely limited their room for manoeuvre, which made 
their growth and development policies increasingly dependent on the ideas and 
blueprints provided by those who could financially help them out: international 
financial institutions and multilateral and bilateral donors. Conditionality en-
tered the arena of ODA and increasingly started to co-determine the develop-
ment agenda of African governments.  
The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) was the next 
landmark in development policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic growth 
was still thought to be the key to overcoming poverty but where policies were 
first characterized by an embedded liberalism, with a Keynesian acceptance of 
state intervention in the rich economies and the corresponding (total or partial) 
developmental state notion of the modernization theory, there was a shift to a 
clearly non-embedded liberalism. Though the theoretical foundations of SAPs 
can be questioned (see Stein 2001, Meilink 2003), drastic neo-liberal stabiliza-
tion and economic restructuring became the conditionality of structural adjust-
ment lending to indebted developing countries, typically as a condition of debt 
rescheduling under rules dictated by Paris or London. The World Bank claims 
some successes (see Javarajah & Branson 1995) but its programmes have 
unquestionably failed to bring about wide-reaching changes. However, the 
programmes of the 1980s did not solve the huge debt problem, and by 1991 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt exceeded its annual Gross National Product, 
by more than twice that of any other region (Iliffe 1995: 253). The repayment of 
loans to foreign creditors took precedence over the social costs of subsidy 
removal or the political risks of drastic economic disruption. The implementa-
tion of SAPs also led to the erosion of social services and reduced health and 
education expenditures (see Cornia et al. 1987, Mensah 2006). International 
ODA became the only (and no longer an additional) way of supporting poorly 
planned welfare programmes, as aid was designed to support general invest-
ments and current public expenditure.  
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The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to the emer-
gence of a new development agenda for African national policies: the promo-
tion of democracy and good governance. This meant better public-sector 
management and accountability, the dismantling of the neo-patrimonial struc-
ture, and the promotion of human rights and was swiftly followed by the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) that forced national govern-
ments to formulate so-called PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) if they 
wanted to benefit from the HIPC. Some of these PRSPs are the sector plans in 
which governments have to present detailed plans of the sectors they want ODA 
and debt relief to be spent on. Social services, like education, water and health, 
were popular and some countries included sectors like agriculture, the environ-
ment, road infrastructure and decentralization. The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were instrumental in selecting these sectors.10 PRSPs are sup-
posed to be formulated by the recipient government after rounds of consultation 
with the general population to improve ‘national ownership’. This does not 
mean that the new PRSPs replaced SAPs, in fact, the new PRSPs have not 
significantly altered the traditional structural adjustment conditions, which are 
still being implemented (Stein 2004, Zupi 2007).  
Since the 9/11 attacks, the global war on terror has increasingly stressed 
international priorities. This has affected the development agenda of African 
countries through an increased international focus on post-conflict situations 
and so-called ‘complex emergencies’ (see Zupi 2007: 39) and has led to higher 
financial flows to fund emergency (containment) interventions rather than 
development. An ambiguous contamination of ODA actions with military 
conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement initiatives has oc-
curred, with uncertain implications in terms of international law (for example, 
restoring state legitimacy through military intervention).  
This overview suggests that ODA has played a significant role in financing 
and formulating policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Anyemedu (2006) makes the 
case that Sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the world most subject to condi-
tionality due to its relatively high ODA dependency and also to the direct influ-
ence of the donor community in assisting centralized African authorities. He 
claims that aid flows to developing countries increased from the 1960s and 
peaked in 1992. The level of ODA from the Development Assistant Committee 
(DAC) countries then followed a bumpy road and decreased in the 1995-2000 
period until a revival culminated in the highest level ever recorded in 2005. 
                                                 
10  In September 2000, world leaders ushered in the new millennium by adopting the 
Millennium Declaration. Endorsed by 189 countries, it was then translated into a 
road map setting out eight major goals to be reached by 2015. The eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) build on agreements made at UN conferences in the 
1990s. 
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However, that year was special due to extra pledges to debt relief. Monitoring 
its Millennium Development Goals in 2007, the World Bank bitterly admitted 
that:  
Progress with scaling up aid to Africa has been disappointing. Five years after the 
Monterrey Conference and two years since the G-8 pledges at Gleneagles, coun-
try examples of programs to scale up aid to support the MDG agenda are lacking. 
Beyond debt relief (important to improving future growth opportunities), most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are seeing stagnant or declining aid inflows. 
Excluding Nigeria (a recipient of exceptional debt relief) real bilateral ODA from 
DAC members to the region fell in 2005 and was unchanged in 2006.11  
The reasons mentioned for the decline since the early 1990s are the end of the 
Cold War, budgetary problems in the developed world, a dwindling belief in the 
effectiveness of aid that has resulted in reduced willingness to provide ODA, 
and the ‘trade not aid’ propagandists that march alongside neo-liberals who 
promote the market as the way of solving Africa’s problems. 
In spite of this, Anyemedu (2006) acknowledges that an emphasis on aid is 
the only realistic source of significant finance to initiate a process of rapid 
growth for Africa. The other options – FDI, domestic savings, external debt and 
remittances – all play a role in the process of capital accumulation but the 
importance of each differs with time and location. In our view, although Sub-
Saharan African countries should not put all their eggs in the one ODA basket, 
ODA dependency might work in certain sectors if it is guaranteed for long 
enough and comes with reasonable and workable conditions. In the end, how-
ever, donor countries will determine where, how, at what level and in which 
fields their taxpayers’ money is allocated. Domestic savings and remittances are 
less risky in these aspects. A sound combination of financial resources is con-
sidered a more viable approach to lifting African economies. For example, 
remittances sent home from the African diaspora are becoming increasingly 
important and sometimes even overtaking ODA and FDI levels.12 Although 
                                                 
11  It should be mentioned that ODA from non-traditional donors is on the rise. Non-
DAC OECD donors are expected to double their assistance to over US$2 billion by 
2010; Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries provided nearly US$2.5 
billion in assistance in 2005; and other emerging donors, in particular China, are 
dramatically increasing their levels of aid and becoming significant foreign creditors. 
Much of this aid targets infrastructure and the productive sectors that DAC donors 
have moved out of (see World Bank 2007: 15). 
12  On average, remittances in SSA are about 2.5% of GDP, compared to almost 5% in 
other developing countries. Remittances were almost 28% of GDP in Lesotho, and 
more than 5% in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. In absolute terms, coun-
tries like Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda receive substantial 
amounts of money (as much as US$2 billion). For some countries, remittances are 
also an important source of foreign exchange. Lesotho, Cape Verde, Uganda and the 
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these remittances are meant to support family members, some of the money is 
used in the productive sectors. African governments are playing a more active 
role in linking their countrymen in national development efforts (see, for exam-
ple, de Haas 2008, Rutten & Muli 2008, Wabgou 2008). This growing willing-
ness to invest directly in their country of origin challenges claims by some 
scholars that Africans themselves are not willing to spend money in their local 
economy (Ellis 2005). 
FDI has grown in importance since the early 1990s (see Figure 1.1). 
Between 2004 and 2006, FDI into Africa even doubled to a record US$36 
billion, spurred on by the search for primary resources, mainly oil, gas and 
minerals, increased profits and a generally improved business climate  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Inflows to Sub-Saharan African countries, 1975-2004  
(millions of US dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gupta et al. 2007  
                                                                                                                       
Comoros, for instance, saw remittances since 2000 amount to more than 25% of ex-
port earnings (Gupta et al. 2007). 
12 Rutten & Leliveld 
(UNCTAD 2007).13The service sector, particularly transport, storage and com-
munications, also continued to attract FDI but no significant manufacturing FDI 
occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2000, many African countries have in-
corporated measures into their policy and regulatory frameworks to ensure 
steady inflows of FDI and increase flows that have the most impact on the 
development of their economies. Prospects for FDI into Africa continue to be 
positive because of high global commodity prices that continue to provide in-
centives for Transnational Companies (TNCs), particularly from Asia (and es-
pecially China), to take advantage of good returns on investment.14 
 
Are policies to blame?  
It can be concluded that the policy palette is now much more diverse than in 
colonial times. Today, besides ODA-related development efforts, national 
development policies, domestic investments, remittances and FDI are all play-
ing their part, directly or indirectly, in triggering economic growth. Still, one 
cannot escape the impression that over the last 60 years the development agenda 
of African countries appears to have been increasingly influenced and set by the 
agendas of multilateral and bilateral donor organizations. Zupi (2007) claims, 
for example, that no specific instrument or purpose of ODA has been com-
pletely supplanted by new instruments and aims. Instead, a proliferation of 
objectives has emerged as a structural characteristic of ODA, with a lot of dif-
ferent instruments and approaches that have created problems of coherence 
because they represent different visions and are not simple instruments.  
The different visions and African development policies have been based on 
the economic theories of growth and development in industrialized countries. 
Development policies have adopted subsequent developments in the neo-classi-
cal growth theory, focusing on the introduction of technical progress. Zupi 
(2007: 35) spells out the pattern: from being initially exogenous (Solow 1956, 
1957), then linked to learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962) followed by the intro-
                                                 
13  The search for new resource reserves has led to increased FDI inflows, after a two-
year decline, to the tune of US$8 billion to Africa’s least-developed countries 
(LDCs). As a result, they have received 23% of FDI inflows to the region. The most 
significant increases took place in Burundi, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Gambia and Sudan, where FDI inflows for new 
oil exploration and mining activities, as well as those in the service sector, have 
increased. FDI inflows exceeded US$1 billion in eight African countries and rose in 
33 countries in 2006. In Sub-Saharan Africa, FDI inflows climbed in all sub-regions 
except Southern Africa due to large investments in oil and mining.  
14  Despite these absolute increases, the region’s share of the global FDI declined to 
2.7% in 2006 from 3.1% in 2005. Africa’s share of global FDI remains low when 
compared to figures for South, East and South-East Asia (15% of the world’s total) 
and Latin America and the Caribbean (6%). 
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duction of growing yield (Romer 1987) to investments in human capital (Lucas 
1988) and the endogenous production of new technology (Romer 1990). 
Easterly (2001) describes economists’ efforts to discover how developing 
countries in the tropics could become like the rich countries as an ‘Elusive 
Quest’. Many of their recipes have been proposed and applied in practice to 
Africa, starting with foreign aid to fill the gap between ‘necessary’ investment 
and savings. For a long time it was thought that investment in machines was the 
key to growth. Supplementing this idea was the notion that education was a 
form of accumulating ‘human machinery’ (human capital) that would bring 
growth. Then, concerned about how ‘excess’ population might overwhelm the 
productive capacity of the economy, population control was promoted. It was 
subsequently realized that government policies hindered growth and official 
loans were promoted to induce countries to make policy reforms. Finally, when 
countries had trouble repaying their loans, they were encouraged to make fur-
ther policy reforms, and debt forgiveness was offered in exchange for nation-
wide Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs). Currently we seem to be back where 
we started, with more aid to fill the gap, an idea recently re-introduced by 
another influential economist, Jeffery Sachs. His 2005 book The End of Poverty 
– Economic Possibilities for Our Time advocates doubling foreign aid to fill the 
gap between investment and savings to attain the UN Millennium Development 
Goals by 2015.15  
                                                 
15  Some have criticized the ‘take off’ reasoning that Sachs seems to promote. Tim 
Congdon (The Spectator, 7 May 2005) claims that Sachs’s geographical and histo-
rical facts are wrong and that ‘the problem here is governance, not geography. Has 
the man never seen The African Queen or read Heart of Darkness?’ These references 
stress Congdon’s opinion that Africa does have rivers like the Congo and the Niger 
that are navigatable. This is a rather simplistic translation of geographical factors. 
Econometrist Dani Rodrik also criticizes Sachs’s interest in geography. Referring to 
a regression analysis crossing per capita income and three causal variables (institu-
tions, market integration and geography) of some 80 countries, he concluded that it is 
neither the market nor geography that matter. It is the institutions that are important 
and this showed a positive causal relationship to income levels. The crucial question 
though is how this model-based analysis was executed and in which way geography 
was operationalized. Rodrik et al. (2004) used ‘distance to the equator’ as the best 
variable to measure the impact of geography. Exchanging this distance for access to 
the sea, malaria, mean temperature or days with frost was said not to affect the con-
clusion that geography at best would indirectly, i.e. through institutions, provide an 
explanatory contribution for the world’s divergent income levels. Even more ques-
tionable is the claim that geography, as opposed to market integration and institu-
tions, should be considered an exogenous factor, meaning that no return linkage is 
thought to exist when levels of wealth change. This is a very dubious claim. Geo-
graphers over the years have shown the importance and changes of relative distance 
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The dominance of (neo-classical and neo-institutional) economics in devel-
opment thinking has led to a rather narrow view of development, which can also 
be traced in African development policies, and is frequently limited to the 
‘Washington Consensus’, i.e., the IMF/World Bank-led policy often character-
ized as an unembedded neo-liberal, market-driven development trajectory 
linked to neo-classical growth theory. However, as Cowen & Shelton (1996) 
explained, development is both an intentional practice and an immanent pro-
cess. Fire, iron tools, the domestication of animals, the steam engine, electri-
fication and artificial fertilizers are all key development markers in the history 
of mankind. Technological inventions have speeded up with modern science 
and as the formal education of the wider population became common practice. 
Gillian Hart (2001) differentiates between ‘Big D’ Development, meaning post-
WWII intervention in the Third World, and ‘little d’ development, referring to 
the development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, contradictory set of 
historical processes. In this chapter, we prefer to stay closer to the Cowen/-
Shenton dichotomy and widen Hart’s definition of ‘little d’ development to 
include non-capitalist developments as well, or more precisely, the intrinsic 
drive of the ordinary citizen to improve their lives in an ever-changing context.  
This introduction has referred to the mixed outcomes of development in 
Africa over the last sixty years. Poverty is still rampant in many parts of the 
continent but substantial improvements in some areas can also be observed. Is 
this all thanks to or in spite of the policies that have been implemented? Many 
explanations for Africa’s poverty have been suggested in the debate: its colonial 
heritage, the lack of savings, technology, (human) capital and well-functioning 
markets, bad governance, insufficient access to and integration in a globalizing 
world, adverse terms of trade, risk-averse livelihoods, ecological and climatic 
conditions, a lack of physical infrastructure, clientism and patronalism, wars 
and civic strive, and recently even ‘luck’ and ‘bad luck’ (see Easterly 2001).  
Fieldhouse (1986: 235) proposed a dichotomy of possible explanations. 
First, a ‘non-policy’ interpretation that puts the blame for Africa’s failed devel-
opment on factors beyond the control of African governments because of such 
issues as the ‘colonial inheritance’, the exigencies of the international capitalist 
economy and endogenous African obstacles like climate, geology and socio-
logical conditions. Such interpretations can, for instance, be heard from John 
Iliffe who blames the sudden and rapid population growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for this different economic scenario because the need for capital to 
‘provide millions of new children with food, housing, dispensaries, and primary 
                                                                                                                       
in economic activities. Wealthy and technologically innovative countries are able to 
increasingly reduce the relative distance.  
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schools absorbed the surplus available for investment before there could be any 
thought of development’ (Iliffe 1999: 253). Other causes mentioned by Iliffe 
include the oil crises of the 1970s that resulted in much higher costs of oil 
imports than on any other continent because of a lack of rail and water trans-
port. Deteriorating terms of trade for many African export products (e.g. cop-
per) added more problems from the late 1970s onwards. The second interpreta-
tion Fieldhouse distinguished is a policy approach concerned with the actions of 
African governments and although he does not provide a final answer on causa-
tion, he seems to favour the policy explanation, i.e. that African governments 
are to blame for their misfortune. John Loxley (1990) criticized this view be-
cause it ‘forgets’ about crucial international and non-policy factors like terms of 
trade and the role of foreign policy makers in Africa (see also Easterly 2006).  
What differentiates between poverty and development in Africa is still hotly 
debated. In our view, more efforts are needed to answer this specific question. 
To be able to do so, in-depth regional and/or country studies will need to be 
undertaken because Africa’s economies are, in spite of being primarily agricul-
turally oriented, still very diverse, as recently shown by Ndulu et al. (2008). 
And so are the specific peculiarities of their populations, climatic conditions, 
internal political systems and external trade relations. A broad palette of differ-
ent causes will probably be presented (see, for instance, Ndulu et al. 2008, 
Collier 2007), as other scholars have done at a more general level for Africa as a 
whole. The key challenge is to weigh country-specific causes, if at all possible, 
to explain Africa’s socio-economic performance. With the chapters in this book 
we hope to add to an in-depth understanding of the processes of impoverish-
ment and development in Africa, and the intended and unintended effects of 
development policies on these processes. The final section of this introduction 
describes the background of the studies presented here and their main conclu-
sions. 
Background to the book 
Between 2002 and 2006 the Economy, Ecology & Exclusion (EEE) research 
group at the African Studies Centre (Leiden, the Netherlands) tried to contribute 
to a clearer perception of the complexities and unevenness of development 
processes in Africa by conducting research on questions of access to resources 
(factors of production, manufactured products, services) and to the institutions 
through which resources are allocated. As other research has shown, the oppor-
tunities available to rural and urban people to command resources are a major 
determinant of poverty or wealth rates. Fluctuating economic parameters, such 
as prices, markets and institutions as well as ecological conditions and their 
variability are determinants of people’s welfare and income situation and play 
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an important role in whether they can command resources or not. However, 
Africa is obviously a far from homogeneous continent. Countries are affected 
differently by global economic transformations, and local economic conditions 
and policies differ as well. The group’s research into these economic aspects 
was, therefore, continent wide and country specific.  
Likewise, ecological conditions have a differential impact at a geographical 
level. Energy policies in the North resulting in an increase in greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere are leading to global climatic changes and El Niño-like 
events are influencing rainfall patterns in large parts of Africa. Regionally and 
nationally, recurrent climatic irregularities such as droughts are having a huge 
negative impact on agricultural production. Small temporal and spatial varia-
tions in rainfall can have a substantial effect on production levels of local pro-
ducers and the market prices of agricultural products. Population growth and the 
degradation of resources, both natural and manmade, will lead to more intense 
competition between population groups but also between wildlife and nature 
conservation, forestry and other uses of resources.  
Sender & Smith (1986) state that continued commoditization and related 
changes in social relations of production constitute the central dynamic process 
in a wide range of African societies. These changes fuel structural processes of 
social and economic differentiation that cannot only be understood in terms of 
poor and rich. Many other studies have shown the heterogeneity of the poor and 
the rich by applying the (sustainable) livelihoods framework (for example, 
Bebbington 1999, Ellis 1998, Scoones 1998). In addition, people move in and 
out of poverty as a result of fluctuating economic and ecological conditions that 
change their position in the social relations of production and their access to and 
command of resources. The patron of today can become the casual agricultural 
worker of tomorrow and vice versa. Whether or not this happens depends, on 
the one hand, on the individual’s vulnerability to poverty, which is determined 
by risk exposure and the available strategies and means to deal adequately with 
(the consequences of) risks and uncertainties, and, on the other hand, on their 
opportunities to invest in education, find employment or investment possibili-
ties, have access to microfinance and/or be able to migrate.  
In the EEE research programme, the concept of exclusion was used to under-
stand the consequences of the poverty dynamics as described above. Exclusion 
can simply mean ‘denied access’ to, for example, resources, services and 
markets. Exclusion takes place at different politico-geographical levels and in 
different socio-economic spheres, and affects different social categories in 
different ways and to different degrees. The concept of exclusion is related to 
that of Sen’s ‘entitlement’ (Sen 1981, 1987).
 
Originally, entitlement referred 
only to the right of access to food but over time has been broadened to include 
other fields such as natural resources. The main difference with exclusion is that 
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entitlement refers to the right of access, while exclusion and, by definition, 
inclusion concerns access itself, i.e. the question of whether the entitlement can 
be effected into access to specific resources. The term ‘resources’ here refers to 
the five vital resources required to achieve a sustainable livelihood: natural 
capital, human capital, physical capital, financial capital and social capital. The 
degree of vulnerability of actors in relation to economic and ecological risks is 
largely dependent on access to these resources. This, in turn, is determined by 
the actor’s position in social, economic and political hierarchies and networks.  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) used the term ‘social exclu-
sion’
 
to refer to a lack of social security, employment, safety and human rights, 
in short, to a sustainable livelihood. Exclusion in the EEE research programme 
had a much wider meaning in the sense that it is not only related to the lowest 
levels of analysis (individual, household) but to higher levels too, including the 
state and even (Sub-Saharan) Africa as a whole. At the continental level, private 
international investments largely bypass Africa (with the exception of a few 
countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and Angola). Depending on their export 
package, some countries have easier access to foreign markets than others, and 
some receive less foreign aid than others, depending on the criteria set by 
donors. Within states, some regions receive limited support from national re-
sources and national laws with respect to land tenure, and resource management 
and environmental protection may work out to be differential and sometimes 
even discriminatory for certain categories of local producers. In general, there is 
a bias towards urban areas, which tend to receive a disproportionately large 
share of state resources. 
Laws, rules and norms are instrumental in determining who is included in or 
excluded from the use of all kinds of resources. In Africa, local and statutory 
legal systems coexist and interact, creating confusion over the precise applica-
tion of specific laws and rules. The administration of law is subject to the same 
logic of inclusion and exclusion, and people lacking resources have minimal or 
no access to legal mediation in cases of conflict. Moreover, in many countries 
the legal apparatus is far from being independent of politics, thus giving it an 
even more exclusive character. And some social categories are more excluded 
than others. Exclusion applies particularly to the poor who are confronted with 
being denied access to all the spheres described here. But unequal access occurs 
in other types of social categories as well. Some ethnic groups have readier 
access to natural and/or state resources than others, which can lead to serious 
conflict. Women and youth are groups that too often miss out in access to re-
sources.  
The research questions that guided much of the EEE research from 2002 
until 2006 were: why do some actors have access to certain resources while 
others do not? Under what circumstances and conditions (economic, ecological, 
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political, legal, social and cultural) and by what mechanisms (decision-making 
processes) do some actors become excluded from certain resources (lost access) 
whereas others do not or may even become better off (acquired access)? And 
what does this mean for people’s struggle for survival and their attempts to 
escape poverty? Research included the fields of coastal ecology, fisheries, urban 
agriculture, livestock keeping, plantation economics, labour markets, eco-
tourism, maize marketing, social-security arrangements and food insecurity. 
The projects departed from disciplinary backgrounds and empirical work was 
conducted among different societies and communities in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
rural and urban areas and in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
Results from the research programme formed the major input for a confer-
ence organized by the research group entitled ‘The End of Poverty in Africa?’ 
that was held at the ASC from 6-7 March 2006. Both EEE researchers and 
invited scholars from outside the ASC attended the conference and were asked 
to critically consider poverty alleviation strategies on the basis of their own 
empirical research on (the relationship between) the economy, ecology and 
processes of exclusion and inclusion and/or make an assessment of the meaning 
of their research for current policy frameworks as laid out in the MDGs, PRSPs 
and the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp). This contributed to further insights 
into why the elixirs that have been provided in the last fifty years by policy 
makers have often resulted in increasing inequality in access to livelihood 
resources and why economic growth has failed to reach (different categories of) 
the poor. The conference papers have been brought together in this book and its 
contents form a representative sample of the results of the EEE’s research pro-
gramme and related research being undertaken by scholars elsewhere.  
Contributions to this book 
On a continent where livelihoods are still largely based on agriculture and re-
lated activities, it is no surprise that many of this volume’s contributions address 
the issue of access to land for the poor and how this is influenced by national 
policies and legislation (see contributions by van Dijk, Foeken, Leliveld, 
Rutten, Spierenburg, Steenkamp & Wels, and Woodhouse). At the same time, 
an increasing number of poor people in Africa have become fully or partly 
dependent on (casual) wage labour for survival (see contributions by Johnston 
& Sender, Leliveld, and Woodhouse). For this group among the poor, and 
primarily women, access to labour markets and the implementation of policies 
promoting employment opportunities have become far more relevant than 
access to land. For reproductive activities and in case of contingencies, access 
to (mostly unpaid) labour and the social networks through which this labour is 
provided are essential for poor people to survive, as is shown in the chapter by 
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Dekker. And for another group – often ignored in discussions on African liveli-
hoods – access to fishing waters is more important for survival than access to 
land, as is discussed by Hoorweg, Wangila & Degen who considered the posi-
tion of fishers on the Kenya Coast. Their well-being largely depends on multi-
ple access to multiple resources and on a chain of successful conversions of 
resources. And Klaver & Nubé demonstrate how access to resources for the 
poor, or exclusion from them, is reflected in people’s nutritional status. 
The contributions are surprisingly similar in their comments on the policies 
discussed, be they policies on specific resources like land and labour, sector 
policies on the environment, education, health, tourism and agriculture, and 
national policies like Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Although many of the 
policies discussed claim to be pro-poor, the empirical evidence shows that it is 
mainly the less poor and richer people who benefit from them. One of the main 
conclusions is that the capacity to take advantage of opportunities that are 
created by development policies tends to be unevenly spread among households 
and individuals. Generally the less poor and richer people have a better capacity 
to grasp opportunities and this has led to a growing inequality between richer 
and poorer people. Although in poor economies terms like ‘rich’ and ‘better off’ 
are relative, policies seem to benefit richer people more than poorer people, 
notwithstanding the pro-poor rhetoric of those who develop and implement the 
policies. In some cases, as illustrated in the chapters by Foeken, Johnston & 
Sender, Spierenburg, Steenkamp & Wels, and Woodhouse, so-called pro-poor 
policies and legislation are actually preventing the poor from escaping poverty.  
The reason why pro-poor policies do not or only partly benefit poor people 
has much to do with the assumptions in policy plans about who and where the 
poor are. The contributions in the book show that the heterogeneity among the 
poor at grassroots level is large but this is seldom reflected in pro-poor policies. 
Poor people are often conceptualized as a homogeneous group – the poor – with 
common characteristics and a position determined by conditions and develop-
ments that are unique to the group. It would appear from most of the analyses in 
this book that not only poorer and less-poor households and individuals have 
different trajectories of change but that several trajectories can be distinguished 
within these groups. Johnston & Sender conclude that the poor operate within 
markets and social structures and that their prospects should be analyzed within 
these specific contexts. Woodhouse found something similar and claims that 
any understanding of the distribution of poverty will need a characterization of 
the local socio-economic dynamics of the rural economy. For instance, in areas 
with a booming economy, poorer people will tend to be the losers amid in-
creasing competition for access to land, water and other resources, and increas-
ingly subject to ‘adverse integration’ as poor agricultural wage labourers (see 
Woodhouse and Leliveld). Policy makers have to decide how far pro-poor poli-
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cies should take into account regional and local contexts and the specific groups 
of poor people. This may pose real dilemmas. And when a large percentage of a 
population are defined as poor, it still has to be remembered that the poor are 
likely to be a heterogeneous group. In such circumstances, it can be predicted 
that general measures presented in national or sector development plans will 
only benefit specific categories of the poor, and exclude others.  
The heterogeneity among the poor is – as indicated above – the result of 
processes of agrarian change that lead to social and economic differentiation 
and processes of inclusion and exclusion. Many policy frameworks lack an 
adequate understanding of processes of agrarian change and the related changes 
in social relations of production, This has much to do with the theoretical and 
analytical perspectives that underlie policy frameworks and predominantly 
originate from neo-classical and neo-institutional economics. Woodhouse (this 
volume) critically analyzes the small-farm model or ‘agricultural development’ 
approach to rural poverty, which has been one of the strongest influences on 
policy since the 1950s and 1960s. Its is associated with a view of ‘rural’ society 
being relatively homogeneous, static and defined above all by being non-urban: 
a rural society of ‘small farmers’.  
The alternative analytical frameworks that are applied in this book include 
the sustainable livelihood discourse (see contributions by Foeken, and Hoor-
weg, Wangila & Degen) and perspectives rooted in political economy (see 
Johnston & Sender, Leliveld, Rutten, and Woodhouse). The analysis of the 
sustainable livelihood approach is mostly at individual and household level, and 
its methodology is designed to capture and reveal the wide spectrum of liveli-
hood trajectories that can be found among the poor. This occasionally also leads 
to myth busting, as in the contribution by Hoorweg, Wangila & Degen that 
shows that households engaged in fishing are not necessarily the poorest in 
society as is often assumed in other literature on fisher communities. While 
political economy in the past used to discuss general trends and use aggregates, 
the new political economy has incorporated context, diversity and locality into 
discussions to capture the complex dynamics of commoditization and how it 
affects the social relations of production and reproduction. Several contributions 
in this volume take this perspective to examine the role of state policies and 
economic processes in questions of access of the poor to resources in relation to 
the multiple, contested and overlapping practices and negotiations at local level.  
As indicated earlier, researchers, and in particular economists, have consid-
erable influence in shaping development policies through the analyses and 
analytical frameworks they provide. Easterly (2001) shows how one-dimen-
sional these analyses can be, leading to policies that have no relation to the 
complex realities in the lives of poor people. The elixirs against poverty that 
policies provide mostly consist of one ingredient, while the complexities of the 
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lives of poor people demand policies that are more comprehensive and inclu-
sive. If it is true that intervention logics behind policies are influenced and 
steered by the results of academic studies, the challenge for researchers is then 
to provide analytical frameworks and studies that reveal and unravel the hetero-
geneity of poverty and development processes. With this book, we hope to have 
contributed to this challenge. Taken seriously by policy makers, it could well be 
that pro-poor policies will become successful. The contextual analyses found in 
this book may help to provide better insights into the incentives and trajectories 
of specific groups of poor people and how these incentives are shaped by the 
social and economic contexts in which people live. In this sense, this book 
could contribute to a different perception of African realities and induce policy 
makers to make more realistic policy prescriptions that are increasingly respon-
sive to incentives that could move people out of poverty. They need to start by 
assessing what is available and not by looking at what is lacking. 
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Natural resource management  
and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Philip Woodhouse 
 
 
This chapter examines the opportunities and limitations of 
poverty reduction in Africa based on strategies of natural 
resource use. It argues that the small-farmer model of rural 
society that dominates policy-making fails to take account of 
key local dynamics. In particular, African use of land, water 
and other natural resources needs to be understood from a per-
spective that recognizes the integration of many rural people 
within broader national and international labour markets and 
its effects in terms of migration and distribution of labour. 
While new markets are being created by urbanization and by 
technological change, the capacity to take advantage of such 
opportunities tends to be unevenly spread among households, 
so that aggregate increases in investment and income are often 
accompanied by growing inequality between rural households. 
The chapter concludes by considering the implications of these 
economic dynamics for current policies favouring the decen-
tralization of the management of natural resources. 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the relevance of agriculture, in 
particular, and natural resource management more generally, to strategies to 
reduce poverty in Africa. It focuses upon access to and the use of natural re-
sources, particularly in rural areas where household expenditure ‘poverty line’ 
measures typically show a higher percentage of poor households than in urban 
areas. In doing so, however, it leaves open the possibility that the distinction 
between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ livelihoods may be difficult to define in practice 
(Bernstein 1992a, Ashley & Maxwell 2001). Long-term ‘chronic’ poverty is 
more likely among people who are particularly vulnerable due to their ‘life 
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stage’ (e.g. children, older people), or who are discriminated against at national 
or local level because of caste, ethnicity, or refugee/migrant status, or who are 
disadvantaged through illness or disability (Hulme & Shepherd 2003). To these 
general categories we may add that, in the rural context, the poor are likely to be 
those lacking access to natural resources, of which land, livestock, fisheries, 
forest or pasture are commonly the most important.  
The chapter draws principally on recent literature on natural resource 
management in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which it is estimated that 46% 
of people are living on less than US$1 per day (Hulme & Shepherd 2003), al-
though many of its themes have wider relevance to debates about how natural 
resource management can be harnessed to improve the well-being of the poor. 
As its starting point, the chapter uses the ‘small-farmer’ model of economy and 
society which has for many years underpinned development agencies’ vision for 
poorer countries (Mellor 1976, Delgado et al. 1998, Ellis & Biggs 2001). It 
begins by summarizing this model as set out by one of its recent proponents 
(IFAD 2001) and then considers an alternative interpretation of rural poverty 
and its uneven distribution, and the implications it has for policy prescriptions 
such as agricultural intensification and diversification, the decentralization of 
natural resource governance and market engagement of small-scale farming.  
The small-farmer model 
IFAD (2001) claims that 75% of the poor live in rural areas and that 60% are 
expected to do so even in twenty years’ time. The review by Bird et al. (2001) 
also concludes that people living in rural areas are more likely to be poor than 
those living in urban areas. IFAD goes on to claim that ‘six in ten of the world’s 
extremely poor earn their living mainly from farming or farm labour’ (IFAD 
2001: 4). From this follows advocacy of a small-farmer model of poverty re-
duction in which smallholder production of food staples is expected to ‘play a 
critical role in the livelihoods of the rural poor’ (IFAD 2001: 4). 
Within this model, the key to poverty reduction is perceived as increased 
productivity on ‘small, private farms’ through technological change, particu-
larly improved seeds, fertilizer, and ways of ensuring more reliable moisture 
availability. While the model argues that technological change should be 
‘labour-intensive’, it also asserts that productivity should increase faster than 
output prices fall, so that food producers and food consumers both gain. This, it 
is argued, will release labour for non-farm diversification to meet the growing 
consumption demands of smallholder households. Factors supporting this 
poverty-reducing transformation are identified as market liberalization, more 
control over assets (land, water, technology) and institutions by the poor (espe-
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cially disadvantaged groups such as women), and decentralized and participa-
tory methods (IFAD 2001: 4-6). 
Four key premises of this model are:  
• the problem of ‘rural’ poverty is primarily a problem of low farm produc-
tivity; 
• increases in productivity of resource use by the poor are possible using 
scale-neutral technology in the form of improved seeds and water control; 
• access to natural resources for the poor will be improved by decentralized 
and participatory methods and ‘land reform to create small, not-too-
unequal family farms’ (IFAD 2001: 9); and 
• the engagement of small farms in (global) markets will enable income 
growth as well as subsistence security for smallholders. 
The small-farm model or ‘agricultural development’ approach to rural 
poverty has been one of the strongest influences on policy since the 1950s and 
1960s (Ellis 2000: 21, Ellis & Biggs 2001) when it formed the core of colonial 
administration projects to create a stable class of ‘yeoman farmers’ as a stabi-
lizing element in rural society in the face of deepening rural poverty and in-
creasingly radical anti-colonial political movements in Africa. Kenya’s Swyn-
nerton Plan, South Africa’s ‘betterment’ planning, and Rhodesia’s Native Land 
Husbandry Act were all explicitly underpinned by a small-farmer model of 
development. This was no less the case, though more implicitly, for the large 
colonial investment programmes in agricultural infrastructure, such as the 
Office du Niger irrigation schemes, and in cash crop marketing, such as the 
Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Textiles in the French West 
African colonies. As exemplified by IFAD (2001), the small-farmer model 
continues to dominate ideas of rural poverty reduction half a century later, 
despite the means originally identified for its delivery – the agencies of the state 
– having been to some extent substituted in more recent formulations by 
market-based processes.  
One important aspect of this model is its association with a view of rural 
society as relatively homogeneous – defined above all by its character of being 
‘non-urban’ – and relatively static: a rural society of ‘small farmers’. This is not 
to say that social differentiation and change are not acknowledged, but they are 
located within an overall view of ‘small-farmer’ society as a stable social and 
economic formation whose main processes of changing material wealth are 
dependent upon household labour, and thus are perceived in cyclical, demo-
graphic, Chayanovian (Chayanov 1986) terms: younger households having 
fewer assets becoming wealthier as children increase their workforce, and less 
wealthy again as children leave home to set up new households. Where small-
farmer models of rural society, such as that advocated by IFAD (2001), do 
acknowledge differentiation between small farmers and farm labourers, the 
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potential conflict of interest within the relationship between employer and 
employee tends to be played down by an emphasis on processes that will benefit 
or disadvantage both groups. Thus, it is argued that change (e.g. through new 
technology) needs to benefit both farmers and labourers by prioritizing labour-
intensive initiatives. Conversely, impoverishment affects both when the profit-
ability of small-scale farming is undermined – a problem most frequently attrib-
uted to external causes: formerly to ‘urban bias’ in government policy (Lipton 
1977) and more recently to globalization.  
Where attempts are made within this perspective to discriminate between 
degrees of rural poverty, the ‘poorest’ or ‘resource-poor farmers’ are charac-
terized in terms of the (less-favourable) agro-ecological conditions in which 
they must make a living, as in the case of the farmers in diverse, risk-prone 
environments prioritized by ‘Farmer First’ approaches to technology develop-
ment (Chambers et al. 1989). These emphasize small-scale farmers’ capacities 
to adapt and innovate to overcome adverse natural resource conditions, such as 
drought and low soil fertility, as exemplified in the seminal study by Tiffen et 
al. (1994) that showed over a sixty-year period there had been large increases in 
production alongside environmental conservation in Machakos, Kenya, as a 
consequence of hillside terracing by farmers. However, the case of Machakos 
also illustrates two aspects that small-farmer approaches tend to neglect. The 
first of these is the linkage of the farm household to wider markets, particularly 
for labour: in their Machakos study, Tiffen et al. concluded that much of the 
investment for building terraces was financed by wage income from family 
members with jobs in Nairobi. Effectively, higher productivity was dependent 
on investment from non-farm income sources, and understanding the potential 
for improvement in farming incomes required an analysis that included flows of 
capital and labour between farm and non-farm components of the economy. The 
second aspect neglected in small-farmer models is illustrated not by Tiffen et 
al.’s aggregate analysis of changes in production but by Murton’s (1999) more 
detailed study of changes experienced by Machakos households with different 
levels of wealth. This showed a majority of households in Machakos unable to 
invest in cash crop production, and an increasing share of land being purchased 
by the wealthiest households while the share of land held by the poorest was in 
decline.  
To address the wider market linkages of small-scale farming and their differ-
ential consequences for different types of farming households, we turn in the 
next two sections to an exploration of the dynamics of small-scale farming, and 
their variation in different economic scenarios.  
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Dynamics of small-scale farming 
The observation in Machakos of different trajectories of change for poorer and 
less-poor farming households underlines the importance of understanding 
heterogeneity and change in the analysis of poverty. An approach that gives 
greater prominence to these dimensions of agrarian systems is that of political 
economy (Bernstein 1992b: 27-32, Byres 1996), which argues that small-farmer 
or peasant forms of production are inherently unstable: the more successful 
farmers tend to accumulate control over resources (notably land) at the expense 
of the less successful, creating a class of property-owning farmers and a class of 
landless labourers. The pace and specific forms of such changes depend on the 
particularities of local markets (e.g. those for agricultural products, for technol-
ogy and for labour) and do not preclude the possibility of new forms of small-
scale production coming into being, as changing markets create new opportuni-
ties (for example in peri-urban horticulture as a result of urbanization). How-
ever, one general implication of this view is that the very poor and less poor 
cohabit the same communities, and, as labourers on the one hand and employers 
of labour on the other, have livelihoods that are not only interconnected but in 
certain respects (wage rates) in conflict.  
Where labour wage rates are low (due to a lack of alternative work opportu-
nities), it is entirely possible that large numbers of the poor will be living in the 
more agriculturally productive areas, and their relationship with better-off 
neighbours will be influenced by changing markets and technology. This is a 
common observation in the ‘green revolution’ areas of South Asia (Pearse 1980, 
Ravnborg 1992: 55-56) but also in Africa, as illustrated by Murton’s (1999) 
study in Kenya, and Peters’s (2006) longitudinal study of rural incomes in 
southern Malawi in which the difference between richest and poorest income 
quartiles grew threefold in 1986 to eleven-fold in 1997, as poorer households 
resorted increasingly to temporary wage work on neighbours’ farms: 
The better-off households who, on average, have more land, bigger maize harvest, 
more agricultural and non-agricultural income, disproportionately hired neighbours 
as well as temporary labourers coming from other areas. A primary use of the large 
surplus maize stores held by the better-off households was to hire workers in the 
peak agricultural season. The vicious cycle for the poor is tightly bound to the virtu-
ous cycle of accumulation by the better-off. (Peters 2006: 327) 
If it is the case that small-scale farmers have, over time, an inherent tendency 
to split into employers and sellers of labour, then it is important to identify 
factors that will influence this process. Three that we can identify immediately 
are: the availability of markets; the existence of productivity-raising technology; 
and the availability of land to expand the scale of production. We will consider 
each briefly in turn. 
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The existence of a market for agricultural output is a basic requirement for 
any farm-based development, and it is the absence of strong agricultural 
markets that has prompted some authors to conclude that large numbers of rural 
people will continue to leave farming, resulting in a ‘deagrarianization’ in many 
parts of rural Africa (Bryceson 1999). However, this is clearly not the case 
everywhere, and the Kenyan and Malawi cases cited above both provide exam-
ples of changing markets providing opportunities for increased production. In 
the case of Machakos, the initial impetus to increase output, from opening the 
coffee market to small-scale African producers, was followed by an increased 
demand for fruit and vegetables from the Nairobi urban market. In the case of 
southern Malawi, the opportunity to increase agricultural income came from the 
opening of burley tobacco markets in 1990 (previously reserved for estate pro-
duction) to small-scale producers. 
It is essential to note that in both of these cases access to non-farm income 
was a critical element in allowing small-scale farmers to invest in more produc-
tive technology – terracing hillside fields in Machakos, tobacco nurseries and 
curing sheds in Malawi – as well as providing the working capital to meet 
increased input costs of seed, fertilizer and labour. The association of higher 
farm productivity with higher non-farm income has been observed more gene-
rally in southern and eastern Africa (Berry 1993, Ellis & Freeman 2005, 
Bahiigwa et al. 2005). We consider further the effects of such investments on 
productivity below. Here, it is important to emphasize that a close linkage 
between farm productivity and non-farm (including urban) income implies a 
connection between failure of farm productivity growth and the broader dy-
namics of African economies, many of which have for decades experienced 
political and economic instability and an underlying ‘failure of industrialization’ 
(Lawrence 1986: 7), with negative effects for non-farm labour markets. The role 
of non-farm income in agricultural investment also underlines the insignificance 
of credit from financial agencies in raising small-farm productivity in Africa, a 
view supported by Mortimore’s (2003) observation that 81% of the substantial 
investment underlying increased agricultural production in six West African 
countries had been made by direct purchases by small-scale farmers without 
recourse to credit. This implies that returns on non-farm work – and the effect 
on these of mobility and the education of household members – are likely to be 
a critical factor differentiating rural households’ ability raise farm productivity. 
The third factor identified above, availability of land for agricultural expan-
sion, is dependent upon the density of occupation of land but (as discussed in 
the next section), where agricultural market opportunities are favourable it is 
likely that land will be scarce and access to more land for some will come at the 
expense of reduced land access for others. Berry (1993) argued that in Sub-
Saharan Africa the negotiation between those controlling land and those supply-
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ing labour is influenced by a tendency for markets for land to be more ambi-
guous than markets for labour: ‘access to rural land remains contested and 
negotiable. Contests are fought with money and influence, in the name of 
customary rules and prerogatives’ (Berry 1993: 132). Berry argues that in the 
prevailing economic context of generally low returns on labour, many people 
try to diversify their income sources, often investing in a multiplicity of social 
networks in order to do so, but with diminishing returns: ‘The result is a high 
degree of mobility of people and resources but little tendency for institutions to 
coalesce into stable frameworks for collective action, resource management, or 
the consolidation of capital and knowledge’ (ibid. 1993: 196). This analysis, 
suggesting an indeterminacy of outcome, a ‘negotiability’ of access to land that 
offers sufficient scope for the disadvantaged to avoid deepening poverty, has 
been questioned, notably by Peters (2004), and I will return to discuss this later 
in the chapter. First, however, it is necessary to consider how the dynamics of 
small-scale farming may differ, producing uneven patterns of agricultural 
growth and rural poverty.  
Temporal and spatial variation in rural poverty 
While neglecting socio-economic differentiation within the same area, the 
small-farmer model tends to emphasize differentiation between farmers (and 
other resource users) in different areas, with poverty attributed to the lower 
potential of ‘diverse, risk-prone environments’ (Chambers 1989). This emphasis 
on the natural resource base has implications for how we understand relation-
ships between poverty and environmental degradation. These are dominated by 
neo-Malthusian explanations of poverty in terms of population growth outstrip-
ping the available land resource, and counter-arguments of those, such as Tiffen 
et al. (1994), who support Boserup’s (1965) argument that population pressure 
is a stimulus for technological innovation to achieve greater productivity from a 
given amount of land. Despite the narrative power of these simple population-
resource models, more detailed empirical study has suggested a more nuanced 
understanding of historical change and geographical difference. Most obvious is 
the observation that population growth is much more rapid in some areas than in 
others, and in some cases the population is in decline (Raynaut 1997a), together 
with a related observation that differences in population growth rates (and 
resulting differences in population density) are – in Africa at least – often the 
result of population migration.  
A second observation in much recent research on natural resource use and 
rural poverty is recognition of the importance of a historical perspective to an 
understanding of current patterns of resource use. Not only has this led to a re-
evaluation of whether rural poverty is the result of environmental degradation 
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(Leach & Mearns 1996, Fairhead & Leach 1996) but it has shown that existing 
patterns of landscape and settlement are the result of many interacting factors. 
Raynaut (1997a), for example, traces the existing population density and distri-
bution in West Africa back not only to the zones of economic activity (mining, 
cash crop production, infrastructure development) established under colonial 
administration but also to areas of stable administration (and population con-
centration) or insecurity (and consequent depopulation) under pre-colonial 
states. Such studies have also identified situations where the ecology of disease 
vectors creates a threshold of minimum human population density below which 
the challenge of diseases such as onchocerciasis (Raynaut 1997a) and trypano-
somiasis (Kjekshus 1977, Richards 1985) makes continued settlement unsus-
tainable. In this way, disruption or insecurity of economic activity can translate 
into permanent abandonment of otherwise productive agricultural lands. Con-
versely, a priority for refuge in times of insecurity may prompt communities to 
settle and farm otherwise inhospitable areas, as in the case of the 200-year 
settlement of the Bandiagara plateau by the Dogon people in pre-colonial Mali 
(Gallais 1975, Woodhouse et al. 2000a). In such cases, existing settlement 
patterns may be seen as contingent on discrete historical events rather than a 
product of a linear trajectory of development.  
From the perspective of mapping the role of natural resource endowments in 
rural poverty, two important conclusions can be identified. Firstly, social and 
economic dynamics providing security or market opportunities may be as, or 
more, important than ecological characteristics in determining the population 
density of an area. The path-dependence of development patterns cautions 
against trying to ‘read off’ the quality of natural resources (and hence their role 
in the determination of poverty) from their remoteness or economic marginality. 
As Wiggins & Proctor (2001) point out, agricultural activities in peri-urban 
areas are not primarily influenced by the underlying quality of soil or climatic 
conditions but by the strength of (urban) demand. One can add that, since urban 
areas originate from a variety of historical circumstances (mineral extraction, 
trade, military, administrative), there is no more reason to associate urban 
centres with favourable agro-ecology than there is to associate remote areas 
with unfavourable natural resource conditions. Indeed, Scoones & Toulmin 
(1999: 51) argue that, in absence of access to markets for agricultural goods 
and/or labour, farming areas with otherwise favourable rainfall and soil con-
ditions would provide only low levels of income, vulnerability to food deficit, 
and the exposure of soils to increasing exhaustion. The extent of attenuation of 
demand (through the geographical-friction effects of poor transport etc) in 
remote areas can therefore be argued to be of more importance than the under-
lying natural resource base in remote areas. This is certainly the conclusion to 
which Raynaut’s (1997a, 1997b) work in the Sahel would lead. It is further rein-
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forced by the observation that today’s remote rural areas can become tomor-
row’s centres of highly productive agriculture. The development of irrigated 
horticulture in Maasailand (Southgate & Hulme 2000) is a case of an agricultur-
ally marginal area being transformed in response to changing market opportu-
nities.  
A second important conclusion is that uneven development is often charac-
terized by the migration of people into areas of economic growth and away 
from areas of decline or stagnation. In economically growing rural areas, immi-
gration will be an important element of population growth, increasing compe-
tition for resources such as land, water, pasture etc. In areas of economic 
decline, emigration by the more able-bodied leaves those left behind – typically 
mothers with young children, the old and the infirm – with reduced capacity to 
maintain productivity on the land, as a lack of labour restricts the timeliness of 
planting and weeding, or the ability to bring fallow land back into cultivation. 
It should be evident that this constraint would be further exacerbated by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Very poor people may therefore be living in both grow-
ing and declining rural economies, although the mechanisms creating their 
poverty may be quite different. In economically stagnant or declining areas, 
lack of access to markets and the emigration of farm labour in search of better 
income translate into low investment in land productivity – what Rigg (2006) 
in the context of South and South East Asia, terms ‘old poverty’. In areas of 
economic growth, poorer people will tend to be the losers in the increasing 
competition for access to land, water and other resources, and increasingly 
subject to ‘adverse integration’ as poorly-paid agricultural wage labourers – 
what Rigg terms ‘new poverty’. Moreover, it should not be assumed that 
absolute levels of deprivation will always be worse in the ‘old poverty’ of 
remote areas than in more economically dynamic sites of ‘new poverty’. For 
example, Marzetti (2001), comparing more and less remote villages in Mor-
rumbala District, Mozambique, found lower household incomes but also lower 
levels of child malnutrition in more remote villages than in villages with better 
market (road) access. This she attributed to greater social fragmentation under 
economic boom conditions, which resulted not only from competing demands 
on parents’ time but also less willingness on the part of neighbours to provide 
snacks for young children. 
Thus far, the idea of decline and stagnation of the rural economy has been 
equated with lack of access to agricultural markets, typically due to poor trans-
port links to urban markets. However, many remote areas are actively exploited: 
as conservation areas or for significant extractive activity (forestry, hydropower, 
etc.), with associated infrastructure. Here, the key question for poverty analysis 
is the terms under which the poor gain access to natural resources, whether as 
direct users or indirectly as employees of agencies of extraction or conservation. 
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The primary consideration, then, may not be ‘remoteness’ in terms of time to 
reach urban markets (geographical friction), but the extent to which the rural 
economy can be considered to be growing or stagnating as a source of employ-
ment.  
Thus, while geographical mapping of poverty can usefully inform the analy-
sis and design of policy, it may not be possible to do this using the purely 
spatially-defined criteria of ‘remoteness’ or ‘natural resource potential’. Under-
standing the distribution of poverty will need some characterization of the local 
socio-economic dynamics of the rural economy. The following sections review 
the implications for poverty of critical aspects of these dynamics, the intensifi-
cation and diversification of resource use, the governance of access to re-
sources, and the changing nature of agricultural markets.  
Using natural resources: intensification and diversification 
Agriculture and pastoralism 
Many maintain that the impoverishment of rural areas in Africa is due to 
declining land productivity under an increasing population using low-input 
farming methods (IFAD 1994: 10, World Bank 1996: 22-25, WRI 1998: 3-4). 
However, a number of authors (Young & Wright 1980, Stocking 1996, Scoones 
& Toulmin 1999) argue that routine assertions by development agencies, such 
as ‘over 45% of Africa is affected by desertification’ (UNEP 2006), are inade-
quate to address the diversity of land management contexts encountered in 
practice. Moreover, the technical assessment of what constitutes ‘soil degrada-
tion’ in African farming contexts remains highly contentious (cf. Koning & 
Smaling 2005).  
However, it is not necessary to argue that agricultural productivity is 
declining, merely that it is not increasing, in order to identify a plausible cause 
for crisis. The long-term decline in the terms of trade between agricultural 
output and manufactured goods is sufficient to explain this. Raynaut (1997b) 
observes that in the Sahel an individual’s annual tax obligation in the 1940s 
could be paid with the sale of 20 kg of millet, but in the 1970s required the sale 
of 90 kg. Under such circumstances, migration of young men to seek wages in 
urban areas, in mining industries or in rural areas with higher-value agricultural 
output (cocoa, coffee, sugar, tea plantations) was economically rational as early 
as the 1950s (Haswell 1963) and continues to generate large human flows, such 
as that from Burkina Faso to Ivory Coast, from Southern and Central Africa to 
South Africa, and from West Africa to Europe. 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the effects of this 
emigration are double-edged. On the one hand, the loss of the most productive 
labour is a constraint on households’ capacity to maintain or improve farm 
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productivity. On the other hand, where absence is brief or seasonal, or where 
migrants generate significant remittances, migration can offset the loss of 
household labour by providing cash to invest in agriculture. The aim of such 
investments may be simply to secure household subsistence, as in the case of 
oxen, ploughs and carts purchased by migrant mineworkers returning from 
South Africa to ‘labour reserve’ areas in Lesotho and Mozambique since the 
early twentieth century (First 1983, Murray 1992), irrigation pumps purchased 
by Senegalese migrants in France in the 1970s (Adams 1981, Diemer & van der 
Laan 1987) or hybrid maize seed and fertilizer purchased by Swazi migrants in 
the 1980s (Low 1986). However, such investments usually also allow the 
prospect of increasing marketed output. 
It is important to note that, just as the majority of farm investments are made 
without recourse to credit, so adoption of new technology is largely independent 
of government technical services, which have for the most part been severely 
curtailed since structural adjustment reductions in government budgets in the 
1980s. In Sub-Saharan Africa, two key investments appear to have made 
economic sense to farmers in recent years: investments in soil and water con-
servation (SWC) and the purchase of livestock. In fact, the term SWC is a mis-
nomer – ‘water augmentation’ is probably more accurate – since investments in 
terraces, stone bunds, wetland cultivation and so on are invariably made with a 
view to increasing returns from farming through production of higher-value 
crops, such as vegetables, rather than soil conservation per se (Boyd & Slay-
maker 2000), and hence – again – the likelihood of such investments being 
worthwhile is critically dependent on access to the rapidly expanding urban 
markets. The relatively limited extent of ‘wetland’ areas (valley bottoms, stream 
banks, etc) that provide the possibility of year-round farming in the many parts 
of Africa with a long dry season has made these a particular focus of intensi-
fication of cultivation (Bell et al. 1987, Woodhouse et al. 2000b, Touré & Seck 
2005, Peters & Kambewa 2007) – and consequently of competition for land.  
In certain circumstances, small-scale water control technology for irrigation 
or rainfall storage may be an appropriate option for poorer social groups in 
areas – typically peri-urban – with good market access, since quite high returns 
on labour can be achieved on very small plots of land. Such schemes have 
proved popular for women’s groups in densely populated areas of South African 
ex-bantustans (Woodhouse 1997). However, poorer people are unlikely as 
individuals to have access to land, together with capital and labour, to invest in 
the necessary well, pump or drainage ditches, and it is likely that some form of 
organizational framework is needed (see below). 
Investment in SWC removes a major constraint to crop productivity – inade-
quate water availability – and conventional vegetable production may often be 
extended to include crops such as sweet potato, cassava and green maize that 
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can double as staple foods as well as high-value vegetables in urban markets. In 
areas with difficult market access, options for intensification are much more 
restricted, not least because these are likely to be areas of labour shortage and 
most methods of maintaining soil productivity are labour-intensive. Moreover, 
under semi-arid conditions there have been few technologies that have proved 
worthwhile as long as rainfall uncertainty was a constraint. While this remains 
open to technological advance – for example recent research (Doumbia et al. 
2005) claims significant improvements in rain-fed millet and sorghum yields in 
Mali by applying tiny doses of fertilizer mixed with seed – investments in irri-
gation or in improving water retention by the soil are unlikely to be remunerated 
by the production of cereals alone. Where such investments are made by the 
state, or otherwise appear free of cost to farmers, returns on cereal production, 
especially rice, can make it worthwhile for farmers to make other investments 
(e.g. fertilizer, hired labour) to increase productivity. The principle investment 
in such contexts is in animal draught for ploughing, and possibly weeding, with 
the effect of improving labour productivity and expanding the area under culti-
vation. Successful farmers may diversify further with the acquisition of more 
livestock (see below). The poorest members of communities in areas dependent 
on rain-fed cereal production (e.g. in Zimbabwe and Botswana) are frequently 
defined by their lack of draught animals (Clayton & Woodhouse 2000).  
A key group at risk of impoverishment by expansion and intensification of 
agriculture in Africa are pastoralists. Livestock production is possible where 
rainfall is insufficient to support reliable crop production, and in much of arid 
and semi-arid Africa transhumant livestock production or pastoralism has 
historically been the predominant form of natural resource use. In semi-arid 
West and East Africa, historically dominant pastoralist groups have lost ground 
politically, economically and socially to cultivators since the colonial admini-
stration. There are two principal reasons for this.  
Firstly, pastoralists’ territorial scope for transhumance has been reduced by 
colonial and post-independence states’ appropriation of land for other uses, such 
as game or wildlife reserves (e.g. the Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania), or for 
agricultural development schemes (e.g. Toucouleur in the Senegal River Valley, 
Fulani in the Office du Niger, the Afars in the Awash Valley). These reductions 
in the scope for transhumance were in part justified by a perception that pastor-
alist production methods were inefficient and environmentally destructive and a 
belief that this could be improved by settling pastoralists on ranches managed 
under scientific principles. This perception is now being seriously questioned 
(Sandford 1983, Behnke et al. 1993, Scoones 1994) and there is a growing 
awareness that, under conditions of extreme rainfall fluctuation that prevail in 
semi-arid Africa, pastoralist impacts on vegetation are much less destructive 
than earlier thought and that transhumant grazing management – in which 
 Natural resource management and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 37 
grazing herds migrate, tracking forage availability – is more efficient than 
‘scientific’ attempts to identify a fixed ‘carrying capacity’ for rangelands. 
A second reason pastoralists have suffered in relation to cultivators is that 
access to key resources, such as dry-season grazing, have been curtailed by 
changes in crop production systems. The most marked of these is the develop-
ment of wetlands, river valleys and other water resources in order to intensify 
agriculture (Southgate & Hulme 2000, Woodhouse et al. 2000). A related 
development is the accumulation of livestock by farmers, which undermines the 
reciprocal logic of farmers allowing pastoralists’ herds to graze crop stubble in 
order to benefit from the fertilizer effect of the manure (Ramisch 1999). The 
mobility that is essential to the pastoralists’ production system means that their 
occupation of an area is transient and, as a consequence, claims over resources 
are often seen as weaker than more sedentary communities (Hammel 2001). 
Despite international advocacy of strengthening of pastoralists’ rights over land, 
it seems clear that pastoralists’ access to land is increasingly under challenge 
from expansion and intensification of crop production, and that particular effort 
will be needed if their position is not to be made worse by land tenure reform 
processes currently underway in many parts of Africa. 
Pressure towards sedentarization is accentuated for those pastoralists who 
lose their stock to drought or disease, who may have few other options other 
than to join the stream of poor seeking livelihoods in urban areas; or to become 
landless labourers – often employed as herders of other people’s livestock. Zaal 
& Dietz (1999) suggest this latter may be a route to accumulating cash to 
purchase livestock in order to return to pastoralism, although Southgate & 
Hulme (2000: 110) regard this as ‘somewhat optimistic’. In some instances, 
government policy has further polarized livestock ownership. For example, the 
mafisa custom in Botswana ensured that owners of large herds would loan 
draught animals to poorer households to enable them to re-enter the cattle 
economy. The breakdown of this customary practice (Clayton & Woodhouse 
2000) accompanied the Botswana government’s policy of providing ploughing 
subsidies. Owners of larger herds, now ploughing with tractors, prefer to claim 
the subsidy for ploughing their poorer neighbours’ fields instead of lending 
them draught animals. This has meant that households that have lost cattle 
through disease or drought can continue farming only with assistance from the 
state or by hiring cattle from neighbours. 
 
Poverty and the use of the ‘commons’ 
Resources often identified as ‘commons’ include forests, pastures, fisheries and 
wildlife. They are characterized by resources from which it is costly to exclude 
other users, but whose use by individuals is subtractable from the resource 
available to others. Where such resources generate sufficient value to individual 
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users they may be subject to efforts to privatize their use by excluding other 
users, as in forest plantations for pulp industries, wildlife reserved for tourist 
enterprises, fisheries concessions and fencing of rangelands. As public or 
common property under, respectively, state or customary tenure, commons are 
often argued to be resources to which the poor have relatively unrestricted 
access, thus presenting a diverse range of livelihood possibilities. For example, 
forests can supply medicines, mats, baskets, furniture, timber, fuel, fruit, mush-
rooms and bushmeat, among other products. They are argued to be ‘part of a 
larger body of rural non-farm activities that act as a sponge absorbing those 
unable to obtain employment on their own farms or as labourers’ (Arnold & 
Townson 1998: 3). Shackleton et al. (2000) argue that the importance of such 
resources as a ‘safety net’ for the rural poor is often underestimated because 
their use and exchange is non-monetized and therefore unvalued.  
In this respect, it is important to distinguish the significance of use of a re-
source between, on the one hand its contribution to users’ livelihoods, and on 
the other hand the volume or value of the resource used. According to Arnold & 
Townson (1998), the contribution of forest use to livelihoods is highest for the 
poorest users but the heaviest use of forest is by wealthier users. Shackleton et 
al.’s (2000) data from South Africa illustrate the huge disparity in benefits 
obtained from communal grazing by richer and poorer households: the net 
annual value of livestock products and services was US$765 for cattle-owning 
households and US$25 for households without cattle. This is consistent with 
Arnold & Townson’s (1998) conclusion that market opportunities for forest 
products are most easily exploited by better-off users who can invest labour and 
capital to overcome entry costs. Consequently, the better-off resource users will 
exploit resources for which there are growing (i.e. urban) markets (e.g. bush-
meat, furniture-making, charcoal) and therefore high returns on labour and 
capital invested, the very poor will concentrate on activities whose entry costs 
are lower but are more likely to suffer market saturation and low returns.  
This conclusion raises important questions about diversification as a liveli-
hood strategy in rural areas. In particular, if the paths of off-farm diversification 
open to the very poor are limited to those producing low returns, this seems 
unlikely to offer a significant improvement in their well-being. If returns on the 
use of such resources by the poor are to improve, it would appear that either 
they must be provided with capital to overcome the entry costs of more remu-
nerative activities, as argued by Start (2001), or their access to the resources 
should be privileged over their wealthier neighbours. With regard to the latter, 
Inamdar et al. (1999) have suggested protecting poorer people’s access to 
income from bushmeat by allocating individualized use rights, in the form of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), coupled with the promotion of local 
institutions (user groups) to police illegal hunting. 
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Poverty, scale, risk 
In view of the often precarious livelihoods of poorer arable farmers in much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is worth asking whether such systems were less risky in 
the past. A first answer is to point to the constraints that colonial administration 
imposed upon access to more productive land, either through direct expropria-
tion for European settlers (in Southern and Eastern Africa), or through exclu-
sion from areas such as forests, stream banks, and wetlands, on the grounds of 
environmental protection. A related development that increased vulnerability 
was the switch to more drought-susceptible food-staple crops: from sorghum to 
maize in Southern Africa and the substitution of millet and sorghum by rice in 
parts of the Sahel.  
A third, and possibly more widely relevant, answer is that farming is today 
undertaken by much smaller units than in the past. The system of cultivation by 
extended family or lineage groups described by Haswell (1963), Hill (1972) and 
Toulmin (1992) involves trade-offs: subordination to the labour demands of the 
group’s senior men (though this does not preclude cultivation of fields of one’s 
own, rather the priority they can be given) in exchange for the support of the 
group in times of hardship. Opportunities for higher cash income, from cash 
crops or wage income are widely acknowledged to have led to an earlier depar-
ture of young men from the workforce of these family food cultivation systems 
to set up their own nuclear households, and consequently to a decrease in the 
size of the farming unit. In this sense, increasing market orientation of agricul-
ture during the past century may have contributed to increasing vulnerability 
among farming households.  
Brock & Coulibaly’s (1999) study in Mali shows the farming units consid-
ered the most sustainable were large complex extended households, frequently 
with over fifty – and in one case up to 95 – members, distributed between their 
original farms of cotton, cereals and fruit orchards in southern Mali and two or 
more coffee or cocoa plantations in Ivory Coast. While management of such 
units presents huge challenges and many undergo periodic divisions, at their 
most successful they provide examples of social organization that offer both 
social security and scope for individual enterprise and mobility. This hypothesis 
is supported by the observation that mobilization of labour through extended 
kinship networks in Burkina Faso is an important factor in the success of pine-
apple plantations developed by Burkinabé migrants in Ivory Coast (Colin et al. 
2007), and by Dercon et al.’s (2007) suggestion that barriers to belonging to 
networks for mutual support are an important component of the vulnerability of 
poorer households. 
These considerations suggest further limitations to the ‘small private farm’ 
as a model for reducing the vulnerability of the poor. It seems likely that a 
return to large patriarchal kinship production units is in many places neither 
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feasible nor desirable. However, larger scale economic and/or social units, 
typically involving some form of co-operation or mutual support, may afford 
better protection to the more vulnerable in high-risk environments. Examples 
exist of savings clubs linked to small-scale agricultural production, such as 
stockfels among women in South Africa (Woodhouse 1997) or Maasai women 
saving to buy land (Southgate & Hulme 2000) or mwethia terrace construction 
groups in Kenya (cf. Berry 1993: 133). However, these generally combine an 
investment in group activity to secure resources (land and water) for individu-
alized but similar activity for group members. For many of the most vulnerable, 
such as elderly or disabled people, individuals’ work capacity is likely to be 
quite varied and a collective production unit will need to offer correspondingly 
varied types of work opportunity to its members. Moreover, Dercon et al. 
(2007) argue, the capacity of a network to reduce vulnerability to general 
shocks, such as drought, is increased by the heterogeneity of livelihoods among 
its members. 
We noted earlier the importance of off-farm income as a source of invest-
ment in farming and Ellis (2000) suggests that reliance on non-farm income is 
30-50% in Sub-Saharan Africa, rising to more than 80% in Southern Africa. 
However, there is a strong divergence between diversification into high-return 
activities achieved by those with higher levels of human (especially education), 
or financial, assets, and diversification into low entry-cost but low-return 
activities which is most commonly the pattern for the poor. A further key 
observation is that, while diversification at the level of an individual’s activity is 
likely to provide advantages of flexibility in a context of risk, at the level of 
household the advantages of flexibility (for the household as a whole) are 
further increased by the possibility of specialization, and hence higher returns 
on labour, for individual household members (Ellis 1999). This potential for 
collective diversification coupled to specialization by group members is en-
hanced as the size of the group or household increases.  
Rather than a quest for ‘scale-neutral’ technology to overcome low agricul-
tural productivity, the above analysis of dynamics of small-scale farming has 
emphasized the role of agricultural and other markets in stimulating intensifica-
tion and diversification of natural resource use. Success depends on a capacity 
to invest that frequently draws upon non-farm (and non-rural) income. Migra-
tion is often a central feature of these dynamics but its effects may depend on 
migrants’ capacity to create or maintain larger-scale networks to mobilize 
labour and other resources, and to manage risk. In the remainder of the chapter I 
consider the question of changing governance of natural resources and the 
changing nature of agricultural markets. 
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Access to natural resources: governance and property 
To manage and conserve natural-resource systems effectively and sustainably, it is 
essential that local stakeholders participate. Decentralization to local communities 
has shown that local users have a comparative advantage over government agents in 
managing resources; they can design more efficient rules and more easily monitor 
and enforce them. (IFAD 2001: 26) 
 
The problem of current modes of (…) devolution, decentralization and participation 
is that rural ‘big men’ tend to run local institutions in their own interests. (IFAD 
2001: 27) 
 
These two quotes from the same source demonstrate the deeply contradictory 
character of current policy on the governance of natural resources, particularly 
in Africa. The emphasis on decentralization of natural resource management 
was founded on the perception that state agencies were both ineffective in 
managing resources such as forests, and also unaccountable to the local con-
stituency of users of those resources. This perception was reinforced by argu-
ments attributing the degradation of natural resources in Africa to the disruption 
of local regulatory institutions by colonial government, markets, or ‘centraliz-
ing’ African states (Moorhead 1989, Scoones 1994, 1996, IIED 1999: 29). 
Decentralization would therefore allow management to be more responsive to 
local users’ priorities, and make use of their local knowledge in designing and 
ensuring compliance with management regimes. Thus, ‘community-based’ 
natural resource management held out the prospect of achieving both environ-
mental conservation and greater security of access to natural resources for the 
poor (CCD 1995). 
In practice, government decentralization has tended to focus on establishing 
local assemblies with responsibility for service (education, health) delivery and 
with limited revenue-raising powers. Control of resources such as land, water, 
forests and pasture was often dealt with under separate legislation. One conse-
quence was to leave unresolved the relationship between elected local assem-
blies and customary authorities whose control over land had been integral to 
colonial administration (cf. Chanock 1991), and who continued as de facto ar-
biters of land rights in many parts of rural Africa. This remains unfinished busi-
ness in much of Africa (Mamdani 1996) where many recent land tenure reform 
proposals maintain a central role for customary chiefs in land allocation deci-
sions (Amanor 2005, Claassens 2005, Kinsey 2005, Peters & Kambewa 2007).  
Advocates of strengthening customary land rights argue, firstly, and as out-
lined above, that more local management produces more effective and account-
able resource use. This argument was reinforced by evidence of the long-term 
sustainable management of resources held as common property (e.g. fisheries, 
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pastures) by self-governing institutions (Ostrom 1990). Key features of success-
ful self-governing institutions were held to be the use of indigenous technical 
knowledge (i.e. knowledge that did not depend on external expertise) in 
managing the resource, a level of social relationships (social capital) among 
members of the community of resource users that enabled consensus on 
management rules and ensured compliance, and legal recognition (i.e. by the 
state) of the rights of the community to exclude non-members from the re-
source. The idea that self-governing institutions were appropriate to manage 
common property resources, such as forests and pastures, which were also 
identified as safety-net resources for the poor, gave further impetus to the idea 
that community-based management was a means of improving the security of 
the poor. This type of thinking imbued customary land rights with a rural wel-
fare function that was consistent with the rhetoric in many African countries 
that customary rights were inalienable – ‘not for sale’. At the end of the twenti-
eth century land policy was marked by a dichotomy between ‘non-market’, or 
‘inalienable’ customary rights on the on hand and formally registered ‘statutory’ 
land titles the other (IIED 1999, Toulmin & Quan 2000, Platteau 2000). For 
many concerned with protecting access to land for the poor, advocacy of rein-
forcing customary rights was propelled not only by their linkage, outlined 
above, with the benefits of self-governing institutions, but also by the disbene-
fits identified with converting customary rights to formal land titles, which 
include:  
? Titling programmes favour ‘the well-connected and their lawyers’ (de Soto 
2000: 167), who are best placed to deal with the bureaucratic procedures 
involved; 
? Formal titles generally involve registration of primary (i.e. cultivation) rights 
and ignore secondary or seasonal rights (e.g. to grazing) that are often 
safety-net rights under customary tenure (Platteau 2000), and thus make 
access to land likely to become more exclusive. 
? Land titling has often not allowed registration in a woman’s name; 
? One justification for title registration – that it allows land to be used as col-
lateral for loans to finance improvements in productivity – is not supported 
by empirical evidence, which shows little influence of type of land tenure on 
farm productivity (Migot-Adholla et al. 1993), and little use of credit for 
agricultural investment. 
? Conversely, the development of a land market opens up the possibility of 
distress sales by the poor in times of hardship, thus accelerating social dif-
ferentiation and landlessness among the poor. 
There is empirical evidence that in areas with low and/or declining popula-
tion, where competition between individuals for land is low, registration of 
customary jurisdiction may be adequate to secure community rights in the face 
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of competition from commercial interests such as logging or mining companies. 
Hughes (2001) details such a case in a remote area of Mozambique. However, 
where demand for land is growing, there is evidence that customary tenure may 
offer little protection for the poor. For example, the implementation of pro-
grammes to formalize village jurisdictions to improve resource management, 
such as the Gestion de Terroir in the Sahel, quickly showed that customary 
authority of the village resided in the headship of lineages of cultivators who 
regarded the rights of pastoralists or immigrant farmers as entirely subordinate 
to their own, so that community-based management excluded participation by 
such stakeholders in decision-making (Woodhouse et al. 2000a, Gray & Kevane 
2001). More generally, customary rights have multiple facets of inequality: 
between men and women; between older and younger men; between autochthon 
families with claims to first clearing of the land and later settlers and immi-
grants; and between herders and cultivators. Under increasing competition for 
land, these inequalities can result in the exclusion of those with weaker claims.  
The playing out of such competition is, moreover, influenced by the capacity 
of individuals to strengthen their particular claims to land through investment. 
At its simplest, investment in clearing land by cutting and burning vegetation 
forms the basis of all customary authority – usually held by (or transferred 
from) the descendents of the first settlers who cleared the land. Pastoralists, who 
clear no land, have more tenuous authority over grazing areas, no matter how 
ancient their management of them. However, investment in boreholes by 
Tswana cattle owners in Botswana in the 1930s provided the basis for more ex-
clusive rights not only to the water but also to the pastures around them (Peters 
1994). Similarly, planting trees or investments in SWC, such as irrigation infra-
structure, stone bunds and terracing – even manuring to maintain the period of 
continuous cultivation (Gray & Kevane 2001) – are associated with an increas-
ing degree of exclusive control – privatization of land. Indeed, in many African 
contexts privatization of land needs to be seen as a consequence (not a prerequi-
site, as proponents of land titling programmes argue) of investment to improve 
productivity. Since it is the wealthy that are able to invest, it is they who will 
strengthen their rights to land, while poorer farmers will be more vulnerable to 
losing land rights due to their inability either to establish visible investments or 
to maintain continuous production (and therefore occupation). The resulting 
differentiation between those consolidating their land holdings and those losing 
them appears similar whether land is held under customary tenure in Burkina 
Faso (Gray & Kevane 2001) or under formal registered title in Kenya (Murton 
1999).  
A further feature of increasing competition for land in many parts of Africa 
is the increasing monetization of land transactions under customary tenure in 
what resembles a land market. This is particularly visible in areas of greatest 
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competition for land: in peri-urban areas (Kasanga & Kotey 2001, Benjaminsen 
& Sjaastad 2002, Rakodi & Leduka 2004, Daley 2005a, 2005b), and in wet 
lands (valley bottoms, stream banks, swamp margins) which offer important 
advantages for agricultural intensification in predominantly dry landscapes 
(Scoones 1991, Woodhouse et al. 2000, Woodhouse 2003, Peters & Kambewa 
2007). In some instances, cash payments or sharecropping characterize land 
transactions between kin (Amanor & Diderutuah 2001). These dynamics of 
commoditization of land under customary tenure have led some to query the 
non-market nature attributed to customary tenure (Lund 2000, Woodhouse 
2003) and to recall evidence of emerging land markets in accounts of African 
agricultural development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (cf. 
Hill 1963, Bundy 1979, Berry 1993) and arguments that these land markets 
were suppressed by colonial authorities whose need to strengthen administrative 
control over the rural population converged with the interest of local chiefs in 
increasing their land allocation authority (Bates 1984, Chanock 1991, Cowen & 
Shenton 1991). Current economic dynamics of land commoditization in Africa 
are, however, profoundly influenced by the prevailing politics of land, in which 
land rights are linked to ethnic identity and citizenship (Kuba & Lentz 2006, 
Walker 2005), and sales of customary land rights are often illegal. The inter-
action between these economic and political dynamics means that land trans-
actions in Africa often constitute an informal or vernacular market outside the 
legal framework of formal property rights recognized by the state (Chimhowu 
& Woodhouse 2006). In the absence of statutory recognition, land purchasers 
attempt to protect their claim to land, both by recording transactions as written 
and witnessed documents and also by disguising them as traditional trans-
actions, such as loans (Matthieu et al. 2002). In some instances, the purchase of 
land turns out to be the first of an indefinite series of payments to the landholder 
as part of a patron-client relationship (Chauveau 2006). Land sales and rent 
agreements with outsiders may also be a means by which holders of customary 
rights seek to privatize their control of land and deflect competing claims from 
kin (Francis 1984, Woodhouse et al. 2000a). However, the legitimacy of such 
sales or rental transactions with outsiders may be contested – typically by 
younger men of the land-holding lineage claiming that senior members of their 
indigenous or autochthonous land-holding families are depriving their younger 
kin of their customary right to land. In West Africa this has resulted in hostility 
and violence towards migrants by those defining themselves as members of the 
indigenous ethnic group. Conflicts of this type have resulted in the expulsion 
from Ivory Coast of thousands of immigrants since 2000, although many were 
families settled in the country for two or more generations (Colin et al. 2007). 
Elsewhere, Berry (1993: 157) observed that community members with less pur-
chasing power can seek to invoke customary rights to expropriate or demand 
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rent from wealthier immigrants, and Gray & Kevane (2001: 583), in Burkina 
Faso, state: ‘poorer and land-short farmers (particularly the young) use political 
discourses (infused with the language of ethnicity) to halt incipient processes of 
intensification and “privatisation”’. Similar tensions between the economic 
dynamics of a land market and the politics of ethnically-identified rights to land 
are evident in Mali (Woodhouse et al. 2000a), Kenya (Southgate & Hulme 
2000) and Malawi (Peters & Kambewa 2007). 
These accounts are not encouraging for strategies of poverty reduction 
through the recognition of customary rights at the level of the community. They 
imply that where competition for land is high the incipient privatization of land 
will tend to reduce access to land for the poor, irrespective of the formal tenure 
regime in place. In these circumstances, any attempt at registering customary 
rights will only secure access for the poor if this allows the registration of indi-
viduals’ existing use of land and other resources. Opposition to the 2004 Com-
munal Land Rights Act in South Africa has focused on the prominent role the 
new legislation allows tribal authorities in land allocation and the lack of 
guarantees of protection of existing land users’ rights (Claassens 2001, 2005). 
Such issues of transparency and accountability are not necessarily addressed by 
proposals for local institutions to arbitrate and register land claims modelled on 
the Land Boards in Botswana (Quan 2000), which combine customary authority 
and locally elected officials. At the very least, such institutions would need to 
include representatives of those with only subordinate rights under customary 
tenure, such as women, immigrants and pastoralists and other users of common 
property. Secondly, the impact of land boards will, in practice, depend on the 
political context within which they will operate, and the policies which they are 
required to implement (Quan 2000: 205). Ribot (2002) has argued that decen-
tralization will not have been properly tested as an approach to natural resource 
management unless it includes devolution of discretionary powers to democratic 
local institutions – conditions he considers have yet to be met. However it is 
perhaps necessary to also recognize that the conditions for democratic govern-
ance in rural areas of Africa depend critically on the political climate promoted 
at national level. Crook & Sverrisson (2001) have argued that a concern for 
improving the plight of the poor is more likely to be found at national than local 
level, so that decentralization is not, of itself, likely to result in poverty allevia-
tion. This is exemplified empirically by a study (Francis & James 2003) on the 
reform of local revenue collection by district councils in Uganda, which under-
lined how central policy intended to increase local accountability can become 
translated locally into its opposite: in this case an increased and more arbitrary 
taxation burden on the poor. The discussion in this section suggests that the 
continued, and in some cases increasing, association of rural land rights with 
ethnic identity, coupled with a growth of vernacular land markets fuelled by 
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increasing competition for land is contributing to an increasing vulnerability of 
the poor to losing access to land, as well as an increased risk of conflict along 
ethnic lines.  
In this context, decentralization appears to offer little to the poor unless 
accompanied by political leadership from the (central) government in setting 
out policy – and social goals – for land rights, on matters such as the rights of 
women; the admissibility of ethnic discrimination in land rights; and the relative 
weight to be given to indigenous holders of customary land rights compared to 
immigrant land users, sharecroppers or tenants. An element of policy will need 
to recognize the increasing prevalence of land markets: recent research in Benin 
(Edja 2001) showed 75% of women in the villages studied were farming rented 
land, and for 40% of them rented land was their entire cultivated area. In south-
ern Ghana, Amanor & Diderutuah (2001) reported that two thirds of farmers 
obtained access to land through sharecropping and for nearly half of all farmers 
the ‘share’ to the landholder had increased (from a third to a half) under condi-
tions of increasing land scarcity. In Tanzania’s southern highlands, Daley 
(2005b) found that 54% of land transfers were either rental (31%) or sales 
(23%). Rather than denial of the existence of such markets, which often charac-
terizes existing policy, the poor may be better served by government efforts to 
regulate such transactions through, for example, the local, formal registration of 
sales and monitoring the fairness and consistency of rental agreements. 
Changing market conditions 
African farming has been profoundly shaped by engagement with (global) 
markets since the colonial period, with implications for the economics of farm-
ing in general and the significance, in particular, of economies of scale which 
disadvantage small-scale farms competing in global markets. In recent decades, 
falling international prices of agricultural commodities have had severe conse-
quences for small-scale farmers producing crops for export (Ashley & Maxwell 
2001: 404). Moreover, current international trade negotiations offer little pros-
pect of improvement of opportunities for African agriculture (Jensen & Gibbon 
2007). Increasing incomes from agricultural exports appear to depend on 
obtaining access to a higher-priced market segment, such as organic production 
methods (e.g. for groundnuts) or a ‘fair trade’ marketing channel (e.g. for cocoa 
or coffee), or both. While fair trade may stabilize agricultural prices for export 
crops, it remains to be seen whether it can significantly alter the long-term 
decline in agricultural commodity prices. Moreover, producing for a relatively 
higher-priced market niche means farmers must meet additional quality stan-
dards. This is also the case for most of the recently established commodity 
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chains for non-traditional exports from low-income countries, such as cut 
flowers and fresh vegetables.  
It is therefore unsurprising that the most dynamic element in African farming 
is in the production of high-value fresh fruit and vegetables for consumers in 
Africa’s expanding urban areas, for which international competition is likely to 
be less strong. More generally, however, most food consumed in Africa is 
produced in Africa, and even Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports of bulk cereals, for 
which international prices are most competitive with local production, have 
been estimated to amount to only 19% of consumption (Weatherspoon & 
Reardon 2003). Even where export markets are important, the local market may 
be larger, as Neven & Reardon (2004) illustrate in the case of Kenyan fresh fruit 
and vegetables, for which they estimate the shares of output consumed by the 
home market at 90% by volume and 70% by value.  
The increasing urbanization of African food markets has been accompanied 
by changes in marketing structure. The liberalization of foreign investment 
regimes and the ending of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 have been followed 
by a major expansion of South African, and to a smaller extent Kenyan, super-
market chains into neighbouring Southern and East African markets. Weather-
spoon & Reardon (2003) estimated the two largest South African chains as each 
operating about 80 supermarkets in other African countries. Supermarket share 
of the retail food market varies from 50-60% in South Africa to around 20% in 
Kenya and 5% in Nigeria. However, there are indications that the importance of 
supermarkets is set to grow not only for urban food consumers but also for rural 
food producers. Firstly, South African supermarkets have expanded the scope of 
their market from the relatively well-off and now also target low-income urban 
consumers. Secondly, supermarkets chains’ investments include sophisticated 
storage and transport infrastructure that is increasingly integrating regional agri-
cultural and food markets within Africa. As a consequence, from an initial 
position of obtaining most of their agricultural products from South Africa’s 
commercial farms, supermarkets are seeking to diversify their agricultural 
suppliers to include producers in other African countries. In the case of Tanza-
nia, government regulation requires at least 40% of supermarket food retail be 
sourced in Tanzania (Weatherspoon & Reardon 2003). The consequences for 
African farming are likely to be profound in terms of the investments in tech-
nology (including irrigation) required to meet quality standards (frequently 
approximate export standards). The questions of scale and risk identified earlier 
will be similarly intensified, and, if poorer farming households are to benefit 
from the expanding urban market, it seems likely that membership of a suppor-
tive larger organization, such as a cooperative or ‘outgrower’ scheme will be 
essential (Coulter et al. 1999). 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter I have cautioned against a ‘homogenizing’ view of rural society 
to which small-farmer models of rural poverty reduction are prone, and which 
emphasize the limitations of soils, climate or other natural resource endowments 
as the reason for rural poverty. Four key elements of the small-farmer model 
identified at the start of the paper were: 
? the problem of rural poverty is primarily a problem of low farm productivity; 
? increases in productivity of resource use by the poor are possible using 
scale-neutral technology in the form of improved seeds and water control; 
? access to natural resources for the poor will be improved by ‘decentralized 
and participatory’ methods and land reform to create small, not-too-unequal 
family farms; and 
? the engagement of small farms in (global) markets will enable income 
growth as well as subsistence security for the smallholders. 
I have sketched an alternative model of African rural society that is charac-
terized by a high degree of mobility for its most able-bodied and productive 
people, who consequently move into, or out of, agricultural production accord-
ing to the returns from agriculture relative to other employment. Opportunities 
for income from agriculture are determined primarily by the strength of markets 
for agricultural products, and investment of capital and labour in farming is 
highly responsive to market signals. An individual’s ability to make such 
investments frequently depends on their access to non-farm income and/or 
social networks. This means that the ability to take opportunities to increase 
productivity is not equally shared and, at the extreme, the least able will tend to 
lose their control of land to the better-off.  
From this perspective, the link between poverty and farm productivity needs 
to be understood through an analysis of the dynamics of agrarian change, in 
which a historical perspective and an appreciation of population mobility are 
key elements. In areas with access to strong and expanding (typically urban) 
food markets, competition for land, fuelled by immigration, and investment in 
technology (notably that related to water management) drives the emergence of 
a market for land in which the poor are increasingly liable to sell their land to 
meet emergency needs. Under these conditions, poverty is not primarily the 
result of low farm productivity but, most immediately, the result of some 
sections of the rural population becoming dependent on poorly paid work as 
agricultural labourers. While investment does bring productivity increases, as 
predicted by the small-farmer model, the lack of scale-neutrality of investment 
in technology – in the sense that the poor are least able to afford such invest-
ments – is a key factor driving the growing differentiation between landless and 
landholders. In many such areas, the opportunity for land reform to create small, 
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not-too-unequal family farms appears to have long gone. High levels of histori-
cal and current migration in many parts of Africa, coupled with an interpretation 
of customary land rights in ever-narrower ethnic terms, are restricting legitimate 
land rights to a minority of indigenous or autochthonous lineage leaders who 
are able to translate control of land into cash income via vernacular land 
markets. As a consequence, landless farmers’ access to land will come primarily 
through rental and share-cropping arrangements, though possibly with an in-
creasing share accruing to the landlord. Under such circumstances, land policy 
may need to consider how to ensure marginalized groups can negotiate protec-
tion of secondary rights; to monitor the benefits to the poor of rental and share-
cropping arrangements and to seek improved access for poorer groups to high-
return non-farm (though possibly natural resource-based) employment opportu-
nities.  
In areas with weak market access, the population is likely to be static or 
declining due to emigration, and productivity is restricted by low rates of farm 
investment and by a scarcity of farm labour. While it is possible that investment 
in technology might raise farm productivity in such areas, such technology 
should be labour-saving, not labour-intensive as the small-farmer model advo-
cates. The viability of any investment in farming will be limited in the absence 
of market demand. High levels of vulnerability of the residual population of 
such areas may signify that the small family farm is not the most appropriate 
scale on which production (and risk) should be managed. Larger units, with a 
more diverse range of activities, might be expected to manage uncertainty and 
risk better. Such approaches may be linked to agriculture or they could be 
focused on non-farm diversification. Either way, they need to seek ways of 
generating opportunities for the poorest groups to take part in higher-return 
natural resource use rather than safety-net activities that provide only low re-
turns on labour. 
Finally, I have argued that assumptions in the small-farmer model about the 
poverty-reducing effects of decentralization and the engagement of small 
farmers with global markets are very different from economic and political 
dynamics that empirical study reveals do little to help the poor. The evidence I 
have reviewed suggests that in many parts of Africa both the governance of 
natural resource access and the way market demand for food is structured are 
changing rapidly and in ways and with social consequences that appear not to 
be reflected in policy discussions. It is in this respect that the small-farmer 
model needs to be replaced by one that explicitly addresses the trajectories of 
social change in Africa. 
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Confusing counts, correlates  
and causes of poverty:  
A study of the PRSP in Lesotho  
 
Deborah Johnston & John Sender 
 
 
This chapter analyses the new Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) of Lesotho and considers whether it can be suc-
cessful in terms of poverty alleviation. The answer to this ques-
tion is likely to be negative, the main reason being that the 
PRSP approach precludes a focus on the heterogeneous nature 
of poverty and its determinants. To illustrate this, the charac-
teristics of some of the very poorest households in Lesotho are 
discussed and the extent to which the PSRP is likely to assist 
them. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Lesotho is internationally 
acclaimed for the intensity of the consultation that took place during its drafting 
(DFIDSA-Lesotho 2004: 35, Roberts 2003: 1). With up to 20,000 people con-
sulted out of a population of 2.14 million, Lesotho has one of the most con-
sulted PRSPs (Roberts 2003: 15). In addition, unlike other PRSPs, the Lesotho 
PRSP has integrated other policy initiatives, such as the national plan Vision 
2020 and the Millennium Development Goals.1  
This chapter considers the extent to which the new PRSP is likely to be 
successful in assisting the poor in Lesotho. This assessment is based, in part, on 
the results of a previously unreported survey of poor women, but the methods 
and data used in the PRSP are also critically examined. The focus of the 
                                                 
1  See Cromwell et al. (2005: 16) for concern that PRSPs are often inconsistent with or 
superseded by other national plans. 
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Lesotho PRSP is an attempt to establish headcounts of poverty and a limited 
number of poverty correlates, such as the geographic location of the poor. Paral-
lel to this, a set of poverty-reducing policies is developed. These policies, which 
are remarkably similar to those advocated in the PRS papers of many other 
African economies, emphasize investing in education and health and encourage 
foreign direct investment.  
This chapter argues that while these policies have some merit, they are 
unlikely to benefit many of those among the poor. This is because the PRSP 
approach precludes a focus on the heterogeneous nature of poverty and its 
determinants. Three things are confused in the PRSP: snapshots of the number 
in poverty; an identification of the characteristics of the poor; and an under-
standing of the causes of poverty. Instead policy makers need to understand 
poverty in the context of dynamic local economic forces, external labour mar-
kets and domestic social structures. 
How is poverty understood in the PRSP? 
World Bank and IMF guidance states that a PRSP should contain relevant, 
timely and credible poverty diagnostics, with a careful choice of appropriate 
targets and indicators. The Lesotho PRSP aims to follow these guidelines and 
claims support from the results of an extensive consultation process that cap-
tured popular views of the character and causes of poverty in Lesotho. During 
the development of the PRSP, researchers engaged in a participatory investiga-
tion of the views of people in 200 villages, mostly in the rural areas of Lesotho. 
In addition to consulting the public, the production of the PRSP also involved 
all parts of the Lesotho government as well as many NGOs and the private 
sector (DFIDSA-Lesotho 2004). However, we will argue that despite these con-
sultations, the PRSP reveals only a limited understanding of poverty in Lesotho. 
The PRSP analysis of the prevalence and characteristics of poverty, as well as 
its policy proposals, are flawed. 
 
PRSP analysis of the prevalence of poverty in Lesotho 
In its attempt to quantify the prevalence of poverty in Lesotho, the PRSP uses 
an arbitrary poverty line, coupled with poor quality data. Interestingly, drafters 
made little use of the extensive consultation exercise in developing the poverty 
assessment section of the PRSP. In fact, the results of the consultation exercise 
were written up entirely separately (DFIDSA-Lesotho (2004: 21). Roberts’s 
(2003: 29) interim review of the PRSP process came to a similar conclusion, 
saying that ‘it is disappointing that the rich analysis of the community consul-
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tations [report] (…) has not been sufficiently reflected in the poverty diagnos-
tics chapter’.2  
The poverty assessment chapter of the PRSP focuses on a money-metric 
definition of poverty. While earlier drafts had included district-level data on the 
Human Development Index, including important dimensions of poverty such as 
literacy and infant mortality rates, as well as the perceptions of poverty ex-
pressed by different social groups, parliamentarians, civil-society organizations 
and the private sector (Roberts 2003: 2), the final draft includes only national 
data on the Human Development Index, a brief mention of the 2002 Core Wel-
fare Indictor Study and an even briefer mention of the multi-dimensional nature 
of poverty in Lesotho. 
Using a calorie-based poverty line and the data from two, not strictly com-
parable official household surveys, the PRSP suggests that 58% of the popu-
lation of Lesotho is poor, while 39% are ultra poor (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 
9).3 The severity of poverty appears to have increased over time. The 1986/87 
household budget survey calculated a headcount poverty rate of 58% with ultra 
poverty at 35%, while a second survey in 1994/5 found little change in the 
overall poverty rate but an increase in ultra poverty to 39%. The results of 
smaller-scale private-sector-run surveys are quoted and they appear to confirm 
this trend (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 9). 
The poverty line used in the PRSP was originally developed for the 2001 
UNDP Lesotho National Human Development Report and is based on estimates 
of the cost of achieving a per capita daily intake of 2,200 kilo-calories (May et 
al. 2002: 4). This calorie intake was converted to necessary expenditure by 
using Consumer Price Index survey data to calculate the amount of expenditure 
associated with different calorie consumption levels. Recognizing that food 
needs were only one component of the bundle of consumption requirements of 
the poor, an amount for non-food expenditure was also added. This was 
determined by examining the actual non-food expenditure of those individuals 
in the CPI survey who appeared to be at the calorie-consumption threshold. This 
                                                 
2  However, it is important to note that the ‘rich analysis’ of the community consultation 
exercise was itself flawed in important respects. Roberts (2003: 1) argues that 
‘[d]espite impressive nature of the consultation process, the quality and scope of the 
material has been negatively affected by the rather superficial knowledge of parti-
cipatory techniques among some facilitators, insufficient attention to reporting proto-
cols and analytical strategies, and the under-representation of urban areas.’ 
3  In many developing economies, a very high proportion of all households surveyed 
(50% or more) clusters around the official poverty line. This has two consequences: 
first, it is possible to justify a wide range of policies on the grounds that they will 
have an impact on ‘poor’ households; and secondly, a very marginal shift in the 
poverty line will cause huge numbers of households to move into or out of the 
category of ‘poor’ households.  
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exercise yielded a per capita poverty line of M124 per person per month in 2001 
prices,4 which was then inflated by 2002 prices to arrive at a poverty line of 
M146 for the PRSP. The ultra-poverty line was defined, for no apparent reason, 
as being half this amount. 
A calorie-based line has been used in Lesotho before but was set at a 
different and higher minimum calorie requirement per adult equivalent of 2,500 
calories (Kingdom of Lesotho 1996: 8). Other lines have been used in Sub-
Saharan Africa and 25 of these were surveyed by Hanmer et al. (1996): in 12 
cases, the poverty line was based on a minimum calorie requirement that varied 
from a low of 1,700 calories per day in urban areas of Ethiopia to a maximum 
of 2,700 calories per adult equivalent in the Gambia. While these differences 
may be explained by a tendency to set higher poverty lines in more affluent 
countries, it is also clear that there were often no, or very shaky grounds, for 
setting the level of many of these lines.  
Uncertainties about the choice of the poverty line arise for a number of 
reasons. First, calorie ‘requirements’ are based on assumptions about the desi-
rable energy requirement for an individual, which will itself be determined by 
assumptions about standard (time-invariant) metabolic rates, weights and 
heights for particular age and sex categories. FAO (2001) data show that calorie 
requirements are very sensitive to both activity levels and weight. For example, 
FAO data (2001: 45) show that a moderately active 40-year-old woman will 
require 2,200 calories if she weighs 50 kg but 2,500 if she weighs 75 kg. If she 
weighs 50 kg and is very active (for example, as an agricultural labourer in an 
unmechanized environment), she will require 2,750 calories. Thus, age, gender 
and weight have a significant impact on the necessary calorie intake. To compli-
cate matters further, some authors have argued that calorie minimums should be 
increased to take into consideration the greater illness rates faced by poor 
people (Svedberg 1987, Gabbert & Weikard 2001). More generally, it has been 
argued that the long-term energy requirement for adequate nutrition of an in-
dividual of a given age and gender and performing specified tasks ‘is not a fixed 
number of kilocalories per day’ (Srinivasan 2001: 158). 
A second major difficulty with the poverty line in Lesotho is that adult equi-
valence scales and household economies of scale were not calculated (May et 
al. 2002: 46). As a result, no allowance is made for economies of scale and size 
in large households or for the reduced intake requirements of, for example, 
young children in relation to adults. However, such features are well known and 
the implications of their effects on poverty data have been measured elsewhere. 
For example, Székely et al. (2000: 17) show that poverty measures in Latin 
                                                 
4  The Lesotho currency, the Maloti, is pegged level to the South African Rand. At the 
time of interviewing, M7 would convert to approximately US$2.  
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America were highly sensitive to assumptions about adult equivalence scales, 
with the overall poverty rate in the Latin American region ranging from 51% to 
31% depending on the assumptions made. In addition to changing overall 
poverty headcounts dramatically, decisions over an adult equivalence scale or 
household economies of size will affect policy makers’ identification of the 
characteristics of the poorest households (Lanjouw & Ravallion 1995). Not 
surprisingly, with no adjustments, the original poverty work completed for the 
UNDP Lesotho Human Development Report found that large households 
(where monthly expenditure is divided by a larger number) were consistently 
poorer than smaller households (May et al. 2002: 14-15). An important group of 
very small and malnourished households, containing for example a single 
woman and her children, will then be ignored. 
A third problem, which also affects economies with a much more developed 
statistical service than Lesotho, arises from the use of inappropriate and/or 
insufficiently disaggregated CPI survey data. Different households, even within 
the same village, pay different amounts both for the food they consume and for 
other basic necessities; poorer people are usually in a weak position to purchase 
at the lowest prices (Sender 2002: 15). Apart from such interhousehold varia-
tion in prices, there are large spatial and intertemporal variations as well.5 There 
are enormous practical and conceptual difficulties in attempting to update 
poverty lines through the revaluation of a given poverty bundle at prices that are 
specific to each household, region, district and period of time.  
The problems mentioned above suggest that choices made when selecting an 
appropriate calorie-based line and its application will lead to considerable varia-
tion in poverty statistics. Without a disaggregated and up-to-date CPI survey, or 
adjustments for calorie-intake by gender, age and activity level, Lesotho’s 
calorie-based line is hard to justify. The fact that the PRSP has established two 
lines, an absolute poverty line and a relative measure used to distinguish the 
ultra poor (defined as those living on less than half the poverty line), does little 
to lessen this problem. While the use of multiple lines is recommended in the 
World Bank’s Operational Directive, as Hanmer et al. (1996: 6) have argued 
more generally, ‘this is not the same as providing a motivation for the position 
of either line’. 
In addition to the problems of defining an appropriate poverty line, there are 
indications that the quality of the official data is not good. The benchmark 
1986/87 household survey had very high non-response rates (64% and 66%) on 
income for certain rural areas, despite its use of a trained survey team which 
                                                 
5  These differences raise serious questions about the common assumption in the ana-
lysis of household surveys that households purchase homogenous commodities in 
competitive markets in which the ‘law of one price’ holds (Srinivasan 2001: 160). 
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collected information on a monthly basis (Government of Lesotho 1988: 8). The 
results of the 1994/95 household survey were not publicly released due to 
concerns about data quality. May et al. (2001: 37) report on a UNDP-funded 
assessment which found a muddling of monthly and annual data; poor quality of 
data on domestic consumption; and general data entry errors. While some clean-
ing of this data occurred to calculate the poverty statistics used in the PRSP, the 
extent to which these problems were rectified has not been made public. 
The problems faced in the production of official statistics are also illustrated 
by the severe capacity constraints which prevented PRSP drafters from using 
the results of the more recent (2002/03) official household budget survey. The 
analysis of this survey had still not been completed by mid 2006. The fact that 
the poverty data used by the PRSP is a decade old has also been a source of 
criticism. Roberts (2003: 26-27) argues that the data must be considered to be 
significantly out-of-date and so will not represent ‘a number of societal dyna-
mics since the early 1990s’, such as the continuing retrenchment of migrant 
mineworkers,6 political disturbances, the progression of the HIV/AIDS pande-
mic as well as several food security crises. 
Given the methodological problems cited, there are reasons to be concerned 
about the quality of both the headcount and trend data. More fundamentally, it 
should be clear that the national poverty headcount in relation to an arbitrarily 
drawn poverty line is, in itself, a meaningless statistic (Hanmer et al. 1996).  
 
Correlates and causes of poverty 
After a cursory reference to the consultation exercises, which found that a poor 
person is someone without wage employment, skills or access to basic services 
(Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 8), drafters of the PRSP use official data to discuss 
the concentration and causes of poverty. The PRSP states that ‘the greatest 
determinant of variation is geography’ (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 10), as offi-
cial data and other studies show that rural and particularly mountainous areas of 
Lesotho are the poorest.7 In addition, the PRSP (ibid.) states that ‘(s)econd only 
to geography is gender’, as the data consistently show that de jure female-
headed households (i.e. those headed by single, divorced, widowed or aban-
doned women) have the highest incidence of poverty.8 Despite gender being 
mentioned in the poverty diagnostics chapter, it is not analyzed, or even dis-
                                                 
6  In 1990 the number of migrant mineworkers from Lesotho was over 127,000; by 
2003 the number had fallen to fewer than 60,000 (Cobbe 2004). 
  
7  In the background study, May et al. (2002: 11) found that 72% of rural households 
were poor in 1994, compared to less than 30% in the capital Maseru. 
8  May et al. (2002: 16) found that 62% of de jure female-headed households were poor, 
compared to 58% of male-headed households and 55% of de facto female-headed 
households. 
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cussed, consistently in the rest of the PRSP. The most detailed policy area for 
women is that of health and there is limited discussion of other issues, such as 
education and governance. Roberts (2003: 37) says ‘Particularly worrying is the 
omission of gender in Trade, Tourism and Industry, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Mining and Employment, since these have been designated as the 
priority economic strategies for pro-poor growth’.  
Outside of the poverty assessment section, the PRSP makes descriptive 
reference to the important relationship between HIV/AIDS9 and poverty, and 
also vulnerability in childhood and poverty (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 97-98, 
106). There is no appreciation of the urgency of the need to link data on sero-
prevalence data with socio-economic status, especially to patterns of labour 
market participation (Sender et al. 2005: 7-10). We will argue that this analysis 
does not assist in the design of poverty policies and appears to confuse two 
concepts: the correlates of poverty (i.e. selected characteristics of the poorest); 
and the determinants of poverty.  
A central issue is that headcount approaches do not differentiate sufficiently 
between different types or classes of poor people, instead relying on a simple 
poor versus non-poor dichotomous categorization. This is particularly problem-
atic when, as in the case of Lesotho, almost 60% of the population are con-
sidered poor.10 As Hanmer et al. (1996: 10-11) argue, with such a large group 
of the population defined as poor, poverty reduction efforts become almost 
indistinguishable from general development measures. The apparent 
homogeneity conferred on the poor is at odds with data showing that Lesotho is 
highly unequal. Gini coefficients for per capita expenditure drawn from the 
official household budget surveys discussed above suggest that the inequality is 
very high and rising, reaching 0.6 in 1986/87 and 0.66 in 1994/95 (May et al. 
2002: 42). Studies that use qualitative or alternative methods to the household 
budget surveys confirm increasing differentiation in Lesotho (Johnston 1997: 
265-292, Wright 1993: 148-180). 
                                                
A better starting point would be some disaggregation of the poor. However, 
this requires a move away from disaggregations that rest on simple correlates of 
poverty to those that have a stronger analytical basis. For example, the finding 
that rural and particularly mountainous areas are characterized by greater 
poverty does not itself explain why this pattern of poverty exists. Living in 
 
9  The prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS amongst adults between 15-49 years has risen in 
Lesotho to 31% in 2002, which is one of highest in the world (Kingdom of Lesotho 
2004: xx). 
10  The background study found that poverty was ‘concentrated’ in a wide group of 
people: female-headed households, people living in rural areas, the elderly, children, 
and those who rely upon agricultural production and agricultural assets (May et al. 
2002: 43). 
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mountainous areas cannot explain poverty without an understanding of the 
analytical factors that cause poverty. It is not living in the region per se that 
causes poverty but the barriers to mobility faced by some of those living there, 
combined with ‘factors such as the region’s remoteness, with consequent poor 
access to markets and services or its ecological characteristics’ (Hanmer et al. 
1996: 10). As we argue below, the finding that poverty is concentrated in rural 
areas does not sufficiently delineate the different groups of rural poor, nor does 
it help us understand how changes in urban areas, or outside Lesotho’s borders, 
might assist in reducing rural poverty. Similarly, we cannot understand the 
concentration of poverty in de facto female-headed households unless we 
understand the economic, social and political reasons why the absence of a 
male-household head might confer disadvantage. A long quote from Green & 
Hulme (2005: 870) on the poverty of widow-headed households in South Asia 
exemplifies this: 
Poverty as an effect experienced by members of such households, notably the 
widow herself, is not a straightforward matter of an absence of an input in the form 
of male labour, or reduced dependency ratios, or the fact that a male household head 
might have access to a wage as a labourer or migrant worker, or even as a successful 
farmer. Rather, it is due to the ways in which adult female personhood is constituted 
as depending on a male spouse for access to various kinds of rights, including those 
over what is constituted as “property” (…) Importantly, this social casting of 
widows as second-class citizens, and the associated processes of asset stripping, is 
politically institutionalized within customary, statutory, and common law systems 
that licence and perpetuate such processes of impoverishment. 
Without linkage to an analytical framework, the description of poor house-
holds in terms of their characteristics says nothing about why these charac-
teristics cause poverty.11 For an understanding of the causes of poverty, the 
situation of the poor has to be assessed in terms of wider macroeconomic or 
socio-political factors. At a minimum, we have to understand the economic, 
social and political structures that determine the markets that the poor have 
access to, as well as the determinants of outcomes in these markets. The impor-
                                                 
11  Thus, Srinivasan (2001: 163) argues that ‘Unless one has an analytical framework 
that describes the mechanisms through which policies affect the determinants of 
poverty in all its dimensions and their quantitative significance, poverty alleviation 
policies cannot be well-formulated (…) This problem would remain even if there 
were some best way of counting the poor at any level of disaggregation.’ The 
distancing between the characteristics of the poor and the economic and social 
relations that produce poverty is the reason why many studies in poor countries 
identify the poor as having similar characteristics, such as headship by a single 
female, ‘a large number of dependants, [and] (…) inadequacies in access to such 
inputs as fertilizers and tools, education, draught animals, or credit’ (Green & Hulme 
2005: 869-70). 
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tance of understanding these factors arises from the fact that they are not static, 
and neither are they immutable to policy. 
Therefore, the broad headcount measures presented in the Lesotho PRSP are 
not only empirically flawed but are also not useful for understanding the causes 
of poverty in Lesotho. Three different purposes are confused: describing the 
prevalence of poverty; selecting certain characteristics of the poor; and under-
standing the various causes of poverty. As we shall see, this lack of delineation 
of the causes of poverty for different sub-groups of the poor facilitates vague 
and ill-targeted policy proposals. 
 
PRSP policies to combat poverty 
Looking at PRSP policies, one is confronted by a long list of policies presented 
under various themes. However before discussing these themes, it is important 
to note that the ‘shopping list’ of policies is constrained by the fact that the 
primary focus of the PRSP is macroeconomic stability, in the sense that the 
document aims to confine overall spending plans in line with the government’s 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF) commitments with the IMF. 
The fiscal framework commitments imply that the real value of government 
expenditure should grow less than GDP (IMF 2006: 5). However, the PRSP 
costings are M1.2 billion per annum over three years, which represents an 
increase in total aggregate expenditure of approximately 30% (Kingdom of 
Lesotho 2004: xxiv). This dwarfs even the ambitious growth targets used in the 
PRSP, and the costings do not include many of the policy elements listed in the 
PRSP. Therefore it is inevitable that only a sub-set of PRSP activities will be 
carried out, even if the government is able to obtain substantial additional aid to 
support its poverty reduction spending. The obvious trade-off between com-
plying with macroeconomic conditionality and poverty reduction is not set out 
clearly in the PRSP. This is common to other PRSPs as well (Cromwell et al. 
2005: 3).12  
                                                 
12  It appears that the trade-off between macroeconomic orthodoxy and poverty re-
duction was not highlighted by other organizations either. Six of the 18 NGOs that 
participated in the PRSP process where interviewed in a recent assessment of 
Lesotho’s PRSP a few months after the consultation process began. In interviews 
they suggested that ‘participating CSOs noted a similarity between the PRSP and the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) but did not feel the urge to revisit the 
macroeconomic framework sculpted by the government in pursuit of the PRSP. This 
contrasts somewhat with the posture formerly adopted by the CSOs in the context of 
the SAP. The present disinclination for unpacking the policy package may be in-
formed by (…) the experience of defeat on this matter in the context of the SAPs’ 
(Panos 2002: 40). 
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Assumptions about the future level of economic growth affect the PRSP in 
three ways. As well as having a direct impact on poverty through increased 
household income, economic growth will have an indirect impact through its 
affect on government revenues and by allowing additional public expenditure 
under PGRF rules.13 The direct impact of growth on poverty is acknowledged to 
be low in Lesotho. The PRSP makes reference to the high real growth rates 
since 1980 (averaging 4.2% per annum) but says that ‘[t]here is no evidence 
(…) of the economic benefits of these relatively high growth rates “trickling 
down” to enough households to stem the tide of growing poverty’ (Kingdom of 
Lesotho 2004: 2). This conclusion is largely based on work on poverty elas-
ticities carried out for the UNDP Lesotho Human Development Report 2001, 
detailed in May et al. (2002). In the UNDP report, a partial poverty elasticity of 
GNP growth of –0.12 is calculated, suggesting that a 1% increase in GNP 
resulted in about a 0.1 per cent decline in the incidence of poverty (May et al. 
2002: 7-9).14  
As a result, the PRSP argues that not only high growth but also redistributive 
policies will be needed (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 3). However, before 
moving on to discuss the detail of these policies, it is important to note that the 
growth estimates in the PRSP are extremely ambitious and are not consistent 
with other estimates. The PRSP targets a medium-term real GDP growth rate of 
7% by 2007, although it does not specify the source of this growth. This is 
ambitious given real GDP growth rates of 3.3% and 2.0% in 2003 and 2004, as 
well as current indicators of the decline in the garment industry following the 
phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement.15  
In summary, PRSP policies aim to create an enabling environment for 
labour-intensive investment, support agricultural growth and provide public 
services. A set of cross-cutting initiatives aimed at reducing HIV/AIDS preva-
                                                 
13  Estimates of the relative size of these effects are not given precisely as the PRSP was 
not developed using a macroeconomic forecasting model. 
14  The calculation of poverty elasticities has been criticized for the simplifying assump-
tions that they make (see Karshenas 2005). It is widely acknowledged that in many 
poor countries with a highly unequal distribution of income, growth is not very ef-
fective in reducing poverty (Ravallion 2005).  
15  Roberts (2003: 11) notes that the high annual growth rates of real GDP between 1988 
and 1994 averaging 8.5% can be largely attributed to construction activity under the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project and export growth in textiles and garments. 
Construction activity under the Lesotho Highlands Water Project is now completed. 
The IMF (2006: 5) notes that the sources of growth are not identified in the PRSP 
and that the target growth rates are unrealistic: ‘The erosion of trade preferences 
stemming from the phasing out of quotas under the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC) (…) is hurting the garment sector, and (…) is not taken into account 
in the PRS’. 
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lence and mitigating its effects is also presented.16 The fact that the PRSP is 
overly optimistic about fiscal feasibility and growth suggests that the Govern-
ment of Lesotho will be unable to implement the large set of policies outlined in 
the text. To understand what is most likely to be implemented, one has to dig 
deeper within the PRSP by making use of the prioritization matrix and budget 
costings provided. The PRSP prioritization matrix shows which policies are 
seen as priority activities, while the budget indicates which policies have been 
budgeted for. This presents something of an immediate problem, as some 
priority policies are not allocated funds within the PRSP’s already ambitious 
budget while some non-priority polices have been. In the following discussion 
we will focus only on those policies that were ranked as priority areas, although 
mention will be made of others where appropriate. 
The first thematic area is employment creation, which focuses on attracting 
foreign investment and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises. This 
reflects the high priority given to unemployment in a country where the official 
unemployment rate is 31%, with the percentage without waged employment 
considerably higher (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: xi). The two highest-ranking 
policy initiatives are the reduction in administrative procedures to attract invest-
ment, and support to small and medium-sized enterprises. Second-tier initiatives 
include: the provision of basic infrastructure crucial for investment; the facilita-
tion of international trade; and the development of market opportunities. The 
adoption of appropriate technology is also ranked as a second-tier policy action 
but it is not budgeted for. Third-tier policy activities include improvements in 
efficiency in attracting investment, and also improvements in the process of 
issuing travel documents (to assist migrant workers). However, again, this latter 
initiative is not budgeted for. Finally, a fourth tier of policy initiatives is iden-
tified, which includes the development of mining and agri-business. This tier 
also includes policy activities aimed at encouraging a better gender balance in 
industrial recruitment, but this activity is not budgeted.17 
The second thematic area is the development of agriculture to increase pro-
duction and meet food security needs. Highest priority is given to three policy 
areas: the adoption of appropriate farming practices and ensuring timely access 
to inputs; the development of appropriate irrigation schemes; and livestock im-
provement. A sole second-tier policy action is identified; that of strengthening 
                                                 
16  While the PRSP suggests that these themes were heavily influenced by the public 
consultation process (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 1-2), it is important to note that 
there is little change in policy focus from earlier documents, as recognized in the 
PRSP executive summary (ibid.: viii) which says that the ‘PRS introduces few 
entirely new activities (…) mostly it extends coverage of ongoing activities’.  
17  Employment in the garment sector has been predominantly female, leading to in-
creasing concerns about male unemployment (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: xxi). 
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and decentralizing extension services. Interestingly, revision to land tenure 
practices are mentioned in the PRSP and are budgeted, but are not prioritized, 
reflecting perhaps the political sensitivity of this area.  
Another set of thematic initiatives is related to the greater provision of 
health, infrastructure and education services. These policies are allocated over 
70% of the PRSP budget and, within this, the vast bulk is allocated to infra-
structure. Under initiatives to improve health and education services, high 
priority areas include the strengthening of disease prevention programmes; the 
expansion of free primary education to universal basic education; a reduction in 
non-fee barriers to education; a reduction in the high rate of school drop-outs; 
and an increase in access to vocational and non-formal education.  
Finally, a small set of safety-net policies are identified in the PRSP. Priori-
tized safety-net initiatives include an expansion of the bursary system for 
secondary education, as well as the provision of nutritional support and social 
welfare services to vulnerable groups. However, these are only partially bud-
geted for, although the government may be expecting to make up the shortfall 
with donor funds. More clearly excluded from budgeting and from prioritization 
is the provision of pensions to the over-seventies and social security generally. 
While these are included in the main PRSP text (Kingdom of Lesotho 2004: 27-
28), they are not given priority status and are not budgeted for. 18  Support 
measures for HIV/AIDS are prioritised in the PRSP, and include measures 
related to prevention and mitigation. However, budgets are presented for 
HIV/AIDS-related activities, with the explanation being that finances are likely 
to be available through the Global Fund and also a national fund (Kingdom of 
Lesotho 2004: Annex 2 PRSP Cost Matrix). 
In conclusion, it can be seen that despite the impression of a wide scope of 
policy initiatives, the PRSP is likely to be constrained by the fiscal targets set by 
the PGRF and also the feasibility of obtaining additional funding. With an 
overly ambitious budget, it is likely that only some of those policy initiatives 
that have been prioritized will be implemented, while many of those that have 
not will almost definitely not be put into action. However, priority policy initia-
tives are remarkably similar to those set out in the Interim PRSP and past policy 
papers (May et al. 2001: 11-14). They focus on the creation of an enabling 
environment and on the provision of services to improve education and health. 
In the next section, we present the results of a survey of poor people which will 
be used to consider the likely policy impacts on this sub-set of the poor. 
                                                 
18  This is despite earlier analysis (May et al. 2002: 44-46) that suggested that direct 
transfers and pensions in particular could be affordable and would substantially 
reduce poverty in Lesotho. 
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Alternative approach to understanding poverty 
To identify the causes of poverty among disparate groups, we need to move 
away from a focus on overall welfare levels across the population as a whole, or 
the rural and urban areas. Instead, purposive surveys (Sender 2003, Sender et al. 
2005) or functional samples (Hanmer et al. 1996) have been suggested, i.e. 
surveys that identify particular groups among the poor and attempt to under-
stand their survival strategies within particular markets and social structures. 
The results of a previously unreported purposive survey are discussed here to 
show how such a purposive survey can illustrate more clearly the causes of 
poverty and the impacts of policy for particular sub-groups of the poor. 
The research described here focused on poor women who had migrated from 
Lesotho to the farms of the South African Eastern Free State. Such work paid 
low wages, with average earnings of R5.55 a day.19 The work was often ar-
duous, with women working on average 10 hours a day and 6.5 days a week. 
The seasonality of the work meant that the working period was uncertain, and 
many women worked illegally without contracts or immigration papers, thereby 
risking deportation or jail. Despite these gruelling working conditions, farmers 
and recruiters reported turning down a high number of applicants. 
One hundred and fourteen female Basotho migrant farm labourers and their 
families were interviewed in 1993. All were migrant labourers working on the 
farms of the neighbouring Free State area of South Africa. Some were legal 
migrants, others illegal. Seventy-seven per cent were resident in the rural areas 
of Thabana Morena and Matela, while the rest were resident in the peri-urban 
Qoaling area of Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. Rather than random sampling of 
households, respondents were sampled using a purposive sampling design, 
which aimed to identify female migrant farm workers and collect detailed data 
not only on their characteristics but also on their economic activities. In 
addition, information was collected from five of the border farmers who employ 
migrants from Lesotho and with a farm-worker employment agency. 
As well as an alternative sampling approach, the survey also used an alter-
native measure of economic wellbeing in order to avoid the types of problems 
related to those mentioned above in measuring income and consumption. This 
measure is based on a composite score of household possessions and has been 
applied successfully elsewhere (Jodha 1989, Sender & Smith 1990, Pincus 
1993, Sender & Johnston 1995, Sahn & Stifel 1999, Filmer & Pritchett 1999). 
There are a number of advantages to the household possession score approach.  
 
                                                 
19  At the time of interviewing, there were approximately 3.36 South African Rand to 
the US Dollar. This suggests that the daily wage was US$1.65 per day.  
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    Map 3.1 Lesotho and research locations 
 
 
Data on assets may be less prone to measurement error since problems with 
memory or definition are minimized and problems with valuation and the esti-
mation of depreciation are not incurred. Also, the data on assets may be a better 
indicator of long-term welfare than either expenditure or income as both can be 
affected by short-term volatility. The assets discussed here were chosen to make 
a comparison of poverty with the most recent country-wide poverty study of 
Lesotho, which itself had used participatory research to compile a list of items 
without which a household was considered to be poor by those interviewed (see 
Table 3.1) (Gay et al. 1991).  
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of results from the farm-worker survey and 
the poverty ‘map’ mentioned above (Gay et al. 1991). The results show that, as 
a group, farm workers are poorer than the average household in Lesotho. On the 
full range of poverty indicators, farm-worker households were more likely to be 
deprived according to each specific indicator. This is confirmed by the results of 
a 1998 survey of 152 migrant farm workers from Lesotho (Ulicki & Crush 
2000). Authors of this study compared their results on livestock ownership to 
national data, and on this basis concluded that migrant farm workers held fewer 
livestock than other households and so were relatively poor. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of household characteristics with Poverty Map results 
 % of households Within farm-worker sample 
 Poverty Map 
national 
average 
 
All farm-worker 
households 
Rural farm- 
worker 
households 
Urban farm- 
worker 
households 
No savings account 63.9 78.1 79.5 73.1 
No radio 42.1 50.0 51.1 46.2 
No latrine 69.0 56.1 68.2 15.4 
More than 3 people 
  per room 29.4 54.4 59.1 38.5 
No piped water 48.3 51.8 55.7 38.5 
Fewer than two bags  
  of cereal per person 80.5 85.1 83.0 92.3 
Source: Gay et al. (1991: 26), Johnston (1997) 
 
 
Interestingly the relative picture is the same for urban farm workers. The 
disaggregated data in Table 3.1 show that even urban farm-worker households 
(column 4) perform badly compared to the national poverty map data (column 
1), although they are more likely to have access to a latrine and piped water 
than the national average. Thus urban status does not protect these farm workers 
from displaying characteristics that show relative disadvantage and so, in this 
case, geography plays a secondary role to other factors.  
This conclusion is supported by a detailed comparison of the results for each 
enumeration area in the Poverty Map and in the survey of farm workers. Table 
3.2 shows Poverty Map data on the average household in the relevant enume-
ration area and compares it to farm-worker household data from that area. The 
data for each area show the relative poverty of farm workers compared to the 
average household in the area. The only exceptions are two indicators for farm 
workers in Maseru South (column 2) compared to average households in the 
areas (column 1): the percentage of households having more than three people 
per room; and the percentage of households producing less than two bags of 
cereal per person. It is difficult to assess the reason for such a low prevalence in 
terms of the former indicator, although the difference is likely to stem from 
methods of counting household members (which may then cast doubt on all 
similar comparisons). For the second indicator, the difference between the two 
sets of results is relatively small. Overall, the results shown in Table 3.2 in- 
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Table 3.2 Comparison of household characteristics by census area (% of households) 
 Maseru South Thabana Morena Matela 
 Poverty 
Map 
average 
Farm- 
worker 
households 
Poverty 
Map 
average 
Farm- 
worker 
households 
Poverty 
Map 
average 
Farm- 
worker 
households 
No savings 
account 43.5 73.1 91.4 92.7 83.3 76.5 
No radio 24.0 46.2 35.8 58.5 30.7 61.8 
No latrine 14.0 15.4 83.3 87.8 64.2 70.6 
More than 3  
  people/room 30.9 11.5 44.9 63.4 31.7 41.2 
No piped water 7.6 38.5 76.9 68.3 60.8 73.5 
Fewer than 2  
  bags of cereal  
  per person  
94.6 92.3 34.9 51.2 46.3 55.9 
Source: Gay et al. (1991: 143, 145, 158), Johnston (1997) 
 
 
dicate the importance of attempting to identify poor people rather than poor 
areas. Consequently, they provide a contrast to the geographic story found in 
the PRSP. 
Migrant farm-worker households had minimal agricultural assets. For pur-
poses of clarity, only the results for rural migrant farm workers will be reported 
here (as opposed to those living in urban areas). While many rural farm-worker 
households had made small gardens on their homestead plots, only 55% had 
access to farmland and. of these, only 30% had a plough and only 44% had any 
cattle. Even among those that did have cattle, more than a third owned only one 
animal, while six cattle are usually needed for a ploughing team. Thus, very few 
households could use their own resources for ploughing and traction, and so 
would be dependent either on hiring in such resources or on reciprocal work 
schemes. Households owned few other livestock. Eighty per cent had no sheep 
and 77% had no goats. The figures for ownership of hens and pigs, usually 
considered as ‘women’s cattle’, are even more striking. Of rural households 
with land, half had no hens and almost 70% had no pigs. 
Earlier, some headline data on cereal production were used to compare 
relative poverty levels. It is worth investigating these a little more, bearing in 
mind that data were collected for the respondent’s best-ever harvest. For landed 
rural households, 14% of households grew no maize or sorghum, while 50% 
harvested four bags or fewer (a bag is assumed to be 80 kg). A common 
assumption made for Lesotho is that an adult requires 180 kg of cereal crops per 
year to meet consumption needs (Gay et al. 1991: 20). Thus, even in the year of 
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their best harvest, those households with access to farm land produced only 
85% of their physical subsistence needs. The figure for all rural households is 
60% in the best harvest year. It should be noted that this is a comparison to 
physical consumption needs and so does not include the degree to which house-
holds are able to generate cash income from crop sales to meet other subsistence 
necessities (such as clothing, education and health care). Only 21% of landed 
rural respondents reported selling any of the produce they had grown them-
selves.  
The importance of access to wage employment is evident when it is noted 
that women in these households received little financial support either from 
household residents or others. Two factors appear to explain this: first, an 
absolute lack of employment opportunities for other household members; and 
second, an absence of male financial support. Looking at adults in the 25-64 
year age range, 67% of migrant farm-worker households contained no currently 
working resident adult (either full-time or part-time resident). This compares to 
a 1991 country-wide poverty survey that found that four households out of ten 
had no regular wage earner at all (Gay et al. 1991: 26). Thus, it is clear that 
farm-worker households experienced unemployment far more severely than 
other households. At the same time, these households contained few adult men. 
Amongst the working-age residents (including those who worked elsewhere but 
returned home regularly), almost 60 per cent were women. Less than 50% of 
women lived with a man (either a husband or a boyfriend) and 41% of women 
had been either widowed or divorced. This goes someway to explaining why 
women in these households were rarely in receipt of remittances from male 
workers. Less than one fifth of all women received monthly financial support 
from a man (a husband, a boyfriend or the father of their children). This figure 
did not change even where women had a very young child. For example, when 
the sample was restricted to women with children aged 6 years or younger, only 
17% received monthly remittances from a man (and this rose to only 31% when 
a looser definition of ‘remittances received twice a year’ was used). Even where 
women were married (or cohabiting) and their partner was resident regularly, 
only one third received monthly financial support.  
Table 3.3 shows the education levels of women in the sample households. 
While few had completed primary school, the vast majority had had some 
access to education. Interestingly, a fifth had some post-school training. 
A superficial analysis of these characteristics, e.g. landlessness, lack of live-
stock, lack of access to wages, shows a similarity to the characteristics found in 
the PRSP and in other poverty studies across different geographic areas, as 
discussed above. The reasons that these characteristics have become causes of 
poverty are discussed in the next section. 
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Table 3.3  Women’s educational status (all farm-worker households) 
 % of all women 25 years and older 
Attended school 89.8% 
 of whom:  - average number of years 6 years 
Had some post-school education 22.9% 
 of whom:  - average number of months 12 months 
 - college/professional 0% 
Source: Johnston (1997) 
 
Determinants of poverty  
One of the most significant features of these households is their lack of access 
to a male wage. This occurs for a number of reasons: widowhood; a lack of 
maintenance after divorce or desertion; but also male unemployment. Thus, the 
findings of this survey do not fully support the PRSP data on the poverty of de 
facto female-headed households. A more complex pattern is found where some 
of the undoubtedly poor households surveyed here contained men, but men who 
were unable to find work. In addition, problems were faced by the women in 
households containing working men who did not remit their income. Few 
women received remittances from those men who were working. Moreover, 
from informal discussions, it appeared that women had little control over the 
size and use of the remittances they received from men.20 Thus, remittance in-
come was not pooled between household members but was clearly earmarked 
for certain items of consumption. Gay (1980) argues that a woman’s depend-
ence on remittances does not reduce the uncertainty of her income, but may 
actually increase it. Women may be unsure of the size and frequency of remit-
tances, or be unhappy with the intended use of the funds. Sharp & Spiegel 
(1990) also reached the same conclusion in their study of the former South 
African ‘homelands’ and argue that reluctance to depend on the remittances of 
men forces women to find their own income-earning opportunities. This survey 
of farm workers showed that women had important decision-making powers in 
terms of expenditure from their own income. When asked who decided how 
their wages were spent, approximately 70% of both married and single women 
said that they either decided expenditure solely or jointly with other family 
                                                 
20  Often the remittance would be received in kind, either in food, household necessities or 
furniture. Both Gay (1980) and Showers (1980) argue that female dependence on re-
mittances in Lesotho has led to conflict within the household on the use of these income 
flows. 
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members. Thus, the demographic characteristics of these poor households were 
complex. Men were often absent from these households, but not always. Where 
men were present, they were either unemployed or they refused to pool their 
income with the rest of the household. 
It can be seen from the data above that even if urban households surveyed in 
the study are excluded, many households did not have access to farmland, 
although most cultivated small household gardens. But even those that had farm 
land could not meet all their food consumption needs and only a minority had 
ever sold produce. There was some evidence that poor households with land 
were unable to farm and so engaged in sharecropping. Consequently, the results 
suggest that land did not function effectively as a productive asset for this group 
of poor households. 
The data showed that most women had had some access to primary school 
and more than one fifth had also had some post-school training. Of these, 83% 
had artisanal or craft training, with the average length of training being 12 
months. This reflects the high level of aid received by Lesotho in the past and 
the attention given by donors to non-formal education (Gill 1992: 18-21). How-
ever, it is important to note that few of those trained were utilizing their train-
ing, except perhaps for young women who had trained in dressmaking and were 
employed in textile companies in Maseru. A case study of three women, who 
had recently worked as farm labourers, is illuminating. They formed part of a 
larger group who had received training in weaving techniques. It was envisaged 
that a cooperative venture would be set up to employ these women. The scheme 
failed due to the highly competitive conditions of the local tapestry market and 
a lack of management and marketing ability. The women interviewed had been 
unable to utilize their weaving skills and were forced into farm work. It is 
apparent that unrealistic goals were set by training agencies concerning the 
skills needed and the opportunities available to the women trained. Problems in 
marketing produce from income-generating schemes have been identified else-
where (Government of Lesotho 1991: 152). A 1991 Government of Lesotho 
report found that a number of donor-sponsored income-generating projects were 
unsuccessful (ibid.: 155-156).  
Moreover, respondents did not appear to earn significant income from any 
other type of self-employment. While many traditional crafts have waned in 
Lesotho (e.g. DFIDSA-Lesotho 2004: 15), Murray (1981) and Spiegel (1980) 
both discuss the stimulus to certain types of local production from migrant 
remittances, especially beer brewing and house-building (see also Gay 1980: 
241-244). One rural study found that 34% of women earn some income from 
brewing, either individually or in cooperatives (quoted in Gill 1992: 9, Govern-
ment of Lesotho 1991). However there is some evidence to show that signi-
ficant working capital is needed for brewing and profits are small. Gay (1980: 
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155) presents a case study of the most successful brewer she found in her 
survey: 
This is the largest amount of supplementary income (M48.50) earned by any woman 
in the sample, yet it amounts to only 14.4 percent of ‘Mamoeno’s household income 
for that month. Both the sale of beer to miners who were home for the football 
weekend and the sale of agricultural produce were made possible by the large 
amount of money which she had available to invest, by the level of homestead and 
agricultural development, and by the help and encouragement of supportive affines 
who were themselves successful farmers and local entrepreneurs. It was also made 
possible by the high level of spending on convenience foods and cooking fuel, 
which allowed her to sell some of her own agricultural produce, and freed her from 
the time-consuming tasks of grinding grain and collecting firewood and wild greens.  
Thus, the poorest women are likely to be excluded from brewing, as they 
lack the finance to buy inputs and are restricted by the need to spend time on 
other household activities. This conclusion is supported by results from the 
survey. 
The study also gave a picture of wage employment. Approximately 30% of 
currently employed women and 48% of currently employed men in farm-
worker households could be considered as working in the enumerated sector,21 
with women earning an average of M7 per day. Work in the non-enumerated 
sector was more common, with this work being focused on domestic service 
and agricultural work. Domestic service accounted for a quarter of women's 
current employment. Wages for domestic work were low, averaging M4.59 per 
day (excluding payment in kind). Opportunities for waged farm work in 
Lesotho appeared more limited than in South Africa. Respondents also reported 
that they earned almost 20% less for farm work in Lesotho than in South Africa, 
with the average wage for harvesting in Lesotho being M4.6322 per day com-
pared to R5.55 in South Africa.  
The reasons for poverty and participation in waged migrant farm labour 
appear clear. The women concerned have few alternative sources of income and 
rarely receive remittances from husbands or boyfriends. There is a general 
absence of men in these households and a high level of unemployment. At the 
same time, these households are generally unable to subsist without waged 
                                                 
21  The enumerated sector can be defined as the sector covered by official regulations 
and reported in official statistics. Given the debate over the term ‘informal sector’, 
the preference here is for the distinction between enumerated and non-enumerated 
employment. Work in this sector includes government waged and salaried work, as 
well as factory and retail employment in large industrial enterprises. However, it 
should be remembered that this survey was carried out prior to the boom in Lesotho’s 
garment industry. 
22  Wages for local cattle herding were far lower, being on average R1.80 per day for adults 
and R1.51 for children. 
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work, as they have limited opportunities for farming on their own account or for 
non-agricultural self-employment. In this context, waged employment in either 
the enumerated or non-enumerated sectors is of crucial importance to the well-
being of a household. This poverty of opportunities and resources makes mi-
grant agricultural wage employment an important means to obtain an income. 
However, this picture is not complete without a brief treatment of the ra-
tionale of South African farmers for employing migrants. In the area under 
study, high-value production has been established (focusing mostly on aspara-
gus). Interviews with farmers and recruiters suggested that migrant labour was 
utilized not only because of its relative cheapness but also to increase em-
ployers’ control over labour and to hinder the ability of workers to demand fair 
treatment. Farmers were able to enter into a temporary relationship with migrant 
workers and to restrict to a minimum the dues implicit in that relationship.23 
This occurred at a time when farmers were concerned that South African em-
ployees were achieving increasing rights, including possibly the right to land 
presently owned by the farmer. 
Conclusion 
The information above gives an indication of the types of policies that would 
benefit this group of very poor households. If the poorest women depend on 
wage employment, what matters then is that policy aims to raise the wages of 
the poor relative to the price of food or other basic consumption goods. This 
may occur through an increase in wage employment opportunities in the agri-
cultural or non-agricultural sector. Furthermore, it may occur through public 
policy – either in the form of public rural employment programmes or in 
changes in the protection afforded to poor workers. However, while the PRSP 
contains general enabling measures to encourage investment, it does not have 
specific aims in these two latter areas. Although not its current aim, the nume-
rous infrastructure projects envisaged under the PRSP could fulfil the role of 
public employment generation if they are targeted correctly. Labour legislation 
to protect poor workers is also not a PRSP aim, although the PRSP does contain 
an aim to promote urban labour union development to deal with the growing 
                                                 
23  Farmers used the ethnicity of migrant workers to their advantage. Dormitories, work-
teams and conveyer belts were organized on ethnic lines, with workers divided into 
Xhosa, Tswana and Sotho groups. On some farms, the Basotho were also separated 
from South African Sotho workers. The manipulation of ethnicity by employers may 
be regarded as a means of re-channelling labour disputes and thus reducing the abili-
ty of labour in a particular sector to organize or act autonomously. Mather (1991: 23) 
reached a similar conclusion in his study of vegetable farming in Mpumalanga. See 
also Rutherford (2001). 
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number of labour disputes in the garment sector. However, this activity is given 
no priority and is not budgeted for. This may not be surprising given that 
organized labour was left out of the PRSP process (DFIDSA-Lesotho 2004: 
25).24 Furthermore, the policy aim of achieving gender balance in recruitment 
(i.e. reducing the female share of the industrial workforce) must be treated with 
caution, since some of the very poorest households depend on female labour. 
A particular issue for the poor households surveyed here is the ability to 
migrate in search of jobs. While the PRSP mentions the need for the speedy 
issue of travel documents, this is given the lowest ranking among priority poli-
cies and no budget is assigned to it. Clearly, to assist the very poor households 
discussed in this chapter, improving the ease of obtaining travel documents 
should be given higher priority. Furthermore, attention could be paid to the 
treatment by South Africa of legal and illegal migrant labour from Lesotho, and 
the rights of workers in the South African agricultural sector. This would 
require support for the Government of Lesotho to negotiate with South Africa, 
much as it currently receives support for trade negotiations.  
Such initiatives would need support from parliament to pass the necessary 
legislation, but MPs were not significantly involved in the drafting of the PRSP. 
It was drafted over the period of the 2002 general elections, with parliamentary 
briefings being held during preparations for the elections. Cromwell et al. 
(2005: 18) argue more generally that a ‘lack of attention to enabling measures, 
that often require legislation, may be both the cause and the consequence of the 
way in which parliaments and legislatures have usually played only a minor role 
in preparing the PRS’. 
While the survey results give some guidance as to policy areas that would 
have a positive impact on a group of very poor households, they also indicate 
policy areas that may be of less use. For example, employment-creation policies 
prioritize support to small and medium-sized enterprises. However, such sup-
port is unlikely to benefit these households directly. Furthermore, agricultural 
support is also unlikely to benefit these households directly. Both initiatives 
would only be of assistance if they indirectly led to greater employment growth. 
The evidence also suggested that the provision of non-formal or vocational 
education, a priority under the education theme, would only be of use if it was 
                                                 
24  A review of trade-union participation in the PRSP process in 23 countries, including 
10 Sub-Saharan African countries, concluded that: ‘no union has reported being 
engaged in the drafting, implementation or monitoring and evaluation. In a number 
of cases, unions have attended meetings on the PRSP but have not been able to make 
responses due to late delivery of background material, lack of capacity to analyze and 
present alternative proposals or simply because they were invited to only one or two 
such sessions. They have variously classified such a process as “cosmetic”, “sym-
bolic” and “unsatisfactory”’ (Egulu 2004: 10).  
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accompanied by the creation of employment opportunities, as the survey 
showed that a surprisingly high percentage of women had already obtained 
some vocational education but were unable to make use of it. 
So this purposive study helps present a detailed picture of a particular group 
of poor households, and also gives an indication of useful poverty reduction 
policies for these households, policies that are different from the priority PRSP 
measures discussed above. The PRSP measures in contrast appear rather blunt, 
indirect ways of helping this group of the poor. Although this chapter focuses 
on only one group of the poor in Lesotho, some general points may be made as 
a result. The first is that when a large percentage of a population are defined as 
poor, it should be remembered that the poor are likely to be a heterogeneous 
group. The second is that the poverty should be seen as being produced by eco-
nomic and social dynamics. The poor operate within markets, especially labour 
markets, and social structures; their prospects must be analyzed within these 
specific contexts.  
What are the implications for PRSPs?25 The discussion here shows that the 
focus in PRSP methodology on the prevalence of poverty using a headcount 
measure is unhelpful. Headcounts of poverty do not reveal the causes of pover-
ty, nor do they inform policy makers as to appropriate poverty reduction mea-
sures. Instead, purposive surveys are needed to reveal the dynamics of poverty 
for different groups of poor households. Second, it is evident that without an 
understanding of the heterogeneous nature of the poor and causes of poverty, 
PRSPs are likely to be ineffective and potentially counterproductive. 
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Why De Soto’s ideas might triumph 
everywhere but in Kenya: A review 
of land-tenure policies among  
Maasai pastoralists 
 
Marcel Rutten 
 
 
       A lack of easily understandable, formal property rights, 
Peruvian scholar Hernando De Soto argues, explains why 
people in developing countries have not been able to trans-
form their (natural) resources into productive capital. His 
claim has been welcomed by national and international 
policy-makers struggling to improve developing countries’ 
economies over the last fifty years. This chapter is based on 
longitudinal research carried out among Maasai pastoralists 
in Kajiado District, Kenya since the late 1980s. The findings 
seriously question De Soto’s claims that formalized property 
rights will result in investments, the sustainable use of re-
sources and, ultimately, wealth creation. By contrast, the op-
posite effect might be the rule in cases where key conditions 
such as reasonable interest rates, the trustworthiness of the 
land register, a friendly natural environment and security 
are not met, resulting in serious poverty for former property 
holders. 
 
 
Introduction 
The evolution of landownership in the Maasai area of Kenya is presented 
chronologically in this chapter in four major periods starting from when the 
Maasai were confronted with the arrival of British colonizers who introduced 
formal land tenure in Kenya. As a result of this, Maasai pastoralists lost their 
best grazing areas, a move that is challenged to this day. The creation of a 
specific reserve for the exclusive use of the Maasai, however, still allowed them 
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to exercise their customary land regulations. New land-use experiments, albeit 
on a limited scale, were introduced from the late 1940s onwards and grazing 
experiments were added in the 1950s.  
Individual land tenure was slowly introduced in the 1950s, a process that 
was halted in the late 1960s when formal land rights in the form of group 
ranches, i.e. land held under private title by a group of families, were intro-
duced. In the second half of this chapter, the effects of the subdivision of these 
group ranches into individual holdings are assessed. 
 
 
 
Map 4.1  Kajiado District 
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The Maasai and land: A historical review 1890-1980 
The arrival of Europeans and the formation of Maasai reserves: 1890-1920 
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, neighbouring agricultural (Kikuyu, 
Kamba) and pastoral (Pokot, Turkana) groups made inroads into a vast area of 
some 160,000 km2 which had once been firmly controlled by the pastoral 
Maasai. Approximately 60,000-70,000 km2 of this territory used to be located in 
present-day Kenya. The arrival of British colonizers resulted in an accelerated 
loss of pasture. In 1895 the Maasai population was split in two after a straight 
boundary was drawn from the Indian Ocean Coast to Lake Victoria in the 
interior. This led to the creation of Tanganyika, which was governed by the 
Germans, and the East African Protectorate and the Ugandan Protectorate, both 
in the hands of the British. Settlers were encouraged to come to the East Africa 
Protectorate with offers of large tracts of land (up to 10,000 acres) at extremely 
low prices. During the early years of the Protectorate the land issue was an 
important topic of debate. The local administration was in a hurry to attract as 
many white settlers as possible and this called for a settler-friendly land policy 
and legislation. The first legislative regulations concerning land were issued in 
1897 offering Certificates of Occupation with a renewable 21-year term, but this 
prohibited the buying and selling of land. Pressure from the settlers supported 
by the local administration at the Foreign Office demanded that freehold titles 
continued. In 1902, the First Crown Lands Ordinance allowed the local 
administration to issue settlers with 99-year leases and the possibility of selling 
land at plot sizes of up to 1,000 acres. Bigger tracts were also obtainable but 
only after consultation with the Foreign Office. The Ordinance proclaimed that 
all public land (i.e. unoccupied land) was Crown Land which, for the time 
being, was subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any treaty, con-
vention or agreement. However, the decision as to whether land was vacant or 
not was in the hands of the Commissioner and his subordinates. 
African land rights were overruled and violated in every respect. The high-
potential areas north of Nairobi became ultimately known as the White High-
lands. In 1904 the Maasai lost some 35-40% of their land after they signed a 
treaty with the British that divided Maasai territory into a northern and southern 
reserve totalling some 24,000 km2. In 1911 the Second Maasai Treaty was 
signed, making it possible to remove the Maasai from the north to an extended 
southern reserve that would then total over 36,000 km2. The Maasai were very 
bitter about being removed from their northern grazing pastures. 
 
The period of neglect: 1921-1944 
In 1923, the Colonial Office published a White Paper that denied responsible 
government to the settlers and stated that Kenya was primarily an African 
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territory and that the interests of the African population should be paramount. 
This declaration turned out to be just words and the land policy was left 
unchanged. The Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930, however, stated that 
non-natives could only obtain leases or one-year licences for lands in the 
reserves if they were not occupied or required by Africans. A Central Trust 
Board and Local Land Boards were set up to control land issues. They could 
object to a lease or licence but the Secretary of State had the power to overrule 
them. 
Estimates in 1930 of the number of Kenyan Maasai and their livestock 
totalled some 48,400 people, 720,000 cattle and 820,000 shoats in a Maasai 
reserve. This was split into two districts: Narok to the west and Kajiado to the 
east, comprising some 39,000 km2 in total (Carter 1934, minute 658). This 
meant an average availability of land of some 80 ha per person, while livestock 
numbers stood at 74 cattle, 85 sheep and goats and 18 donkeys. Other estimates 
put the number of livestock at one million head of cattle. These ownership 
figures made the Maasai fully self-sufficient pastoralists. The size of their herds 
stayed within the potential carrying capacity of the reserve but this would have 
been lower due to the huge numbers of animals sharing Maasai pastures at that 
time. Also, some localities within the reserve were heavily infested with tsetse 
flies and/or lacked sufficient water. This was (partly) the result of the Maasai 
Treaties and the consequent loss of watering points to the benefit of white 
settlers along the Maasai reserve’s northern boundary. Approximately 40% of 
the reserve’s land was, consequently, considered to be useless or, at best, of low 
value. In addition, agricultural groups like the Kikuyu, the Kamba and the 
Chagga looked with envy at Kajiado District, in particular at the slopes of the 
Ngong Hills, the Ol Doinyo Orok near Namanga and Mt. Kilimanjaro as areas 
suitable for cultivation.1 A special permit was, however, required to enter the 
Maasai reserve.  
The Maasai repeatedly protested the loss of their land to the Kenya (or 
Carter) Land Commission, which was set up in 1932 to review African land 
grievances. The final report of the Kenya Land Commission reaffirmed the 
administration’s policy towards pastoralists by opposing any extension of their 
land. In fact, the Commission, which had not given serious consideration to 
Maasai grievances, blamed them for having so much land to the detriment of 
Europeans and other African groups.2 Following the recommendations of the 
                                                 
1  In a quantitative sense, the Maasai lost more land than any other group as a result of 
the arrival of the Europeans but these other groups, the Kikuyu in particular, suffered 
more from being restricted to a reserve that was too small.  
2  The Carter Commission (1934: 7) stated ‘When we turn from the interests of the 
Masai and consider the interests of other tribes, it is clear that the permanent entail of 
a vast area of land for the benefit of a tribe which makes very little use of it and, left 
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Carter Commission, Maasai Province was renamed the Maasai Extra Provincial 
District in 1933. It totalled 39,291 km2 and Kajiado District amounted to almost 
22,000 km2. Other recommendations by the Carter Commission resulted in the 
proclamation of new land legislation by way of the Native Lands Trust Ordi-
nance in 1938 and the Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council in 1939. The 
Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance of 1938 defined the various categories 
of land: ‘Native’ instead of ‘Crown’ Land in the case of the original reserves; 
Temporary Native Reserves; and Native Leasehold Areas (see Sorrenson 1965: 
689).3 
 
Grazing scheme experiments in land management and development:  
1945-1963 
After the Second World War, African protests grew louder and ultimately re-
sulted in a struggle for freedom.4 Winds of change had also swept through 
British colonial policy, resulting in less sympathy for the dominance of Kenyan 
                                                                                                                       
to itself, would certainly not be able to keep it, must appear unjust, especially when 
one, at least, of the neighbouring tribes is living in a state which borders on con-
gestion. Nobody wishes to deprive the Masai of their land, but justification might 
arise for requiring them to lease unused portions of it to other tribes or to individual 
natives.’ 
3  While making these new land-tenure regulations, the Kenyan authorities started to 
study the problems of Native Land Tenure in more detail. Several memoranda were 
circulating within Kenya as well as to and from Downing Street. Lord Hailey’s 
Committee on African Land Tenure enunciated the problem as follows: ‘(...) how to 
ensure to guard against the harmful consequences of the growth of individual rights 
in land, while at the same time not impeding the developments of such rights, under 
proper control by the community, to the extent that they are an essential concomitant 
of economic or social progress’ (see KNA/PC/NGO/1/3/14). District commissioners 
were requested to submit information about recent developments in land-tenure 
arrangements. The District Commissioners from Kajiado and Narok reported that 
there was no land hunger by individuals in their districts and that disagreements were 
being well handled by local elders. The problems of native land tenure were mainly 
applicable to agricultural groups and the only form of individual land rights was 
through the ol-okeri, an area set aside for a family's herds to graze. These are mainly 
located in dry-season grazing areas and obtained by customary grazing patterns. They 
lack fences and even clear boundaries.  
4  As real (economic) improvements were not occurring and were repeatedly slowed 
down by the Europeans, a radicalization of African, mainly Kikuyu, politics occurred. 
This eventually escalated towards an armed struggle between the so-called Mau Mau 
movement and the colonial government. In October 1952, a state of emergency was 
declared that lasted until June 1959. The Mau Mau did not spread to the rest of the 
territory, except among the Embu and Meru and to some extent the Kamba, although 
the presence of troops and the enforcement of emergency measures certainly affected 
the overall political climate. 
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affairs by settlers. African groups began to gain influence in the national parlia-
ment and economic reform programmes were proposed for the African reserves, 
including the rangelands.5 Attention was also given to the question of land 
consolidation and the change of land tenure in zones of high potential. In 1945 
Senior District Commissioner Lambert wrote a memorandum on the topic of 
land-tenure policy in the native lands of Kenya, recommending the acceptance 
of an interim policy of individual rights subject to community control. The 
indigenous system of control needed to be preserved, recognized and used. Still 
this should not be regarded as the final stage in the evolution of the African 
system of land tenure in Kenya (see KNA/PC/NGO/1/3/14).6 In reply, officers 
from Samburu and Maasailand stated that Lambert’s memorandum had 
particular reference to agricultural and overcrowded areas. In pastoral areas, the 
DC Laikipia stated, the problems of preventing the misuse of land arose from 
the complete lack of individualism. Control of the use of land would not be 
possible unless the pastoral districts were subdivided with utmost tact and 
wisdom. Lambert felt that local land authorities should be established, building 
on traditional institutions, to act as the managing board for each subdivision. 
The size of the subdivisions should be in the order of a subdivision of major 
sections into clans, for example, and should be still sizeable areas because 
history had shown that most of the settler-owned ranches created in the former 
northern reserve in Laikipia were too small. Some 250-300 farms of 3,500-
4,000 acres each were surveyed after the Maasai had left. In the following 25 
years, it became clear that ‘successful ranching on these restricted areas is 
impossible (...) In fact, almost every farmer in the area habitually hires outside 
grazing.’ (KNA/PC/NGO/1/3/14).  
The DCs of both Kajiado and Narok opposed Lambert’s view that many 
Kikuyu immigrants had been assimilated in Maasai society. Instead, they stated 
that the colonial government had encouraged and authorized the Kikuyu to 
enter, contrary to Maasai wishes, and allowed them to ‘grab land, destroy 
forests and consider themselves outside both the laws of their own tribe and 
certainly of the Masai’ (KNA/PC/NGO/1/3/14). This might mean, they argued, 
                                                 
5  ‘Since the alternative to increased productivity could only be the expansion of the 
African Areas − the most obvious area of expansion being the Highlands − it was 
politically as well as economically important for soil conservation to succeed’ (Gor-
don 1979: 103). 
6  In Laikipia in 1945, eight ‘big’ farmers held 406,000 acres, an average of 50,000 
acres; 87 ‘small’ farmers had 577,000 acres, with an average of 6,000-7,000 acres. 
Most of the small farmers were continually in difficulties. At a conservative estimate, 
it seems that the original subdivision of the area provided about three times more 
farms than the land and climate warranted (see KNA/PC/NGO/1/3/ 14). 
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that local land authorities were not powerful enough to control the use of the 
land. 
In spite of Lambert’s ideas on using indigenous systems of land control, the 
British administration thought that traditional grazing control among the Maasai 
in their semi-arid areas had been inadequate and become even more difficult to 
implement with the abolition of section boundaries that allowed free grazing for 
Maasai pastoralists throughout the whole of Maasailand, as had been decided by 
their Joint Local Native Councils of Narok and Kajiado Districts in June 1946. 
This decision conflicted with the British aim of implementing a grazing control 
plan for each Maasai section by restricting the movement of stock from one 
section to another so as to enforce an economic limit within the boundaries of 
each section. So far the Maasai had only agreed to allow a specific number of 
animals in the vicinity of a borehole. If this number was exceeded, the borehole 
would be closed to allow the area time to rest. In the first half of the 1950s, 
cooperation between the different il-oshon was excellent. The above-average 
rainfall of the 1950s resulted in an abundance of grass and water throughout the 
district and this reduced the tensions between several sections. The Maasai 
cooperated with the colonial administration by accepting more comprehensive 
grazing control measures. 
To guide this process, it was decided to phase in a programme. Firstly, a 
selection was made of a limited number of stock owners who were allowed to 
water their cattle at each borehole. A maximum of 2,000 cattle were permitted 
around any one borehole. Secondly ‘with the number of stock using the bore-
holes limited and with the owners paying for the privilege of use by subscribing 
to a renewals fund, each area served by a borehole should, with guidance and 
control, eventually become a form of ranch unit’ (KDAR 1952: 1). A few years 
earlier the Maasai had already agreed to a ranching experiment near Konza.7 
                                                 
7  In 1949, the pilot Konza grazing scheme went ahead with 12 selected families joining 
the scheme, bringing with them approximately 1,285 head of cattle that had been 
quarantined. The fenced 36 square-mile area was divided into four paddocks of nine 
square miles each. Two boreholes and a cattle dip were installed and a manager and a 
veterinary assistant were posted to Konza. The scheme proved to be an unqualified 
success in a year in which Kajiado District experienced both drought and rinderpest. 
The only problem seemed to be maintaining fences which game broke in several 
places. The abundant rains of 1951 suddenly transformed the district into a land of 
plenty and made the Maasai less receptive to propaganda concerning the planned 
development of their land based on a reduction of stock and controlled ranching. In 
addition, it became clear that the better condition of the Konza stock in a favourable 
year had only been due to dipping. Grazing management, which included fencing and 
other costly measures or restrictions, did not therefore seem to be as necessary as had 
been propagated. By mid-1961 all the residents had left the scheme and the area was 
closed for grazing. The Konza Ranch would not open again. The scheme was sub-
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The idea of communal landownership had been dropped unofficially as early 
as 1950 by the Department of Agriculture. Neither the Land Bank nor the 
commercial banks were interested in lending money to African farmers without 
individual security provided by way of a land title. Traditional land tenure had 
to be removed as it was considered to block the intensification of African 
agriculture. In future, the creation of a landless class was predicted but con-
sidered a normal step in a country’s evolution. Together with a lifting of the ban 
on African farmers growing cash crops, the provision of security of tenure, 
technical assistance, water improvement, agricultural education, and credit and 
marketing facilities, the incomes and standards of living of the people would be 
raised, while at the same time a substantial increase in the colony’s resources 
and economy would take place. 
By late 1952, drought resulted in the death of a considerable proportion of 
the Maasai’s stock, which ultimately changed the objective of dividing the 
district into ranch units. ‘Further investigation has shown that whereas this may, 
in conjunction with heavy stock reduction, be feasible in the Kaputiei Section 
south of the Mombasa railway line, a large area of the district is, by reason of 
climatic and geological conditions, unsuitable for a static form of ranching’ 
(KDAR 1953: 1). 
However, the 1954 Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture 
in Kenya by the assistant director for agriculture R.J.M. Swynnerton claimed 
that the Maasai areas in particular were the only remaining regions to settle as 
any land naturally suited to settlement had already been occupied (Swynnerton 
1955: 7). The British government eventually provided £16 million for a five-
year programme of land consolidation and registration. The activities and finan-
ces of the African Land Development Programme (ALDEV) were integrated 
into the Swynnerton Plan. The main concern remained the limitation of stock 
numbers as it was thought that no satisfactory development could be achieved 
without this. Disease control had the lowest priority, marketing and grazing 
management the highest. Field abattoirs, grazing schemes based on groups 
using a certain borehole, the setting-up of school farms and pasture research 
were the major means introduced to reach higher productivity. 
Grazing schemes were established with funds released through ALDEV. 
‘More than £43,000 [of the £800,000 available for the whole of Kenya] has 
been spent in the Kajiado district on grazing scheme development since 1947, 
much of which has been raised by the Masai through self-tax levies’ (Fallon 
1962: 22).8 
                                                                                                                       
divided into eight individual ranches of various sizes in 1964. 
8  The Masai African District Council (Grazing Control) By-Laws, 1955 conferred 
broad powers upon the livestock officer in charge of a scheme, including the deter-
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The first scheme was established in the Kisonko area in the eastern part of 
Kajiado District in 1954 and included three traditional clan areas, making a total 
of 5,265 km2. ALDEV set aside £25,000, of which £10,000 was a loan. Grazing 
principles were based on the traditional use of the area which was then extended 
by means of strict grazing controls enforced on a clan basis by grazing com-
mittees. These committees made detailed plans for the use of several areas as 
soon as the wet season started. The prolonged drought in 1956 was a difficult 
challenge for the committees, and areas that it was agreed would be rested for a 
year or even longer had to be reopened to grazing due to the force of circum-
stance and public opinion. Also the administration fully realized that ‘owing to 
the vagaries of the rains it cannot be expected that an even pattern for grazing 
control will ever be achieved in Il Kisongo’ (KDAR 1957: 16). This was proved 
in 1959 when any controls had to be abandoned as cattle in the scheme had to 
go far afield in search of grazing, even trespassing in Taveta, Tsavo and Tan-
ganyika. 
Other schemes started in the 1950s were the Matapato Grazing Scheme 
(1957, 880,000 acres, £4,956 grant) and the Loodokilani Sectional Scheme 
(1959, 1,920,000 acres, £3,639 grant). Both got off to a bad start due to drought 
and a lack of officials. The Konza grazing experiment and other surveys had 
made it clear before the introduction of the grazing schemes that the idea of 
dividing the district into a specific number of ranches was unsound from an 
ecological point of view. 
By 1960, all the Maasai sections had applied for better water supply schemes 
such as rock catchments, dams and sub-surface dams. Government officials, 
however, combined their possible approval of such schemes with the require-
ments of grazing controls. Nonetheless, it should be realized that  
‘(...) much of the incentive for these new schemes was political in nature. Sensing 
the winds of change that would sweep independent African governments into power 
in a few years time (…) most of the schemes initiated in Maasailand during the 
1950s were hastily conceived, poorly designed, improperly implemented, and, above 
all, essentially planned for rather with them. There generally was no provision in the 
plans for innovations in human organizations to accompany the introduction of new 
technology and grazing techniques. (…) And not surprisingly, virtually all of these 
schemes failed within a few years.’ (Jacobs 1980: 294) 
                                                                                                                       
mination of those approved to graze livestock in the scheme, the number of animals 
each was to be allowed to graze, and the area to be grazed (see Fallon 1962: 25). 
These rules allowed the levying of fines up to Ksh 1,000 and/or six months’ im-
prisonment. However, when setting up the scheme, it was agreed that cooperation 
would be on a voluntary basis and without recourse to the imposition of grazing fees 
for individual cattle. As with Konza, the alternative would have been to have had no 
scheme at all. 
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Indeed by the end of 1961, the Kisonko Scheme had been suspended and was 
never reactivated. Local-level Maasai politicians in Kajiado District had been 
acquiring large individual ranches without the legal means to do so since 1954. 
Support for these individuals was, however, provided by the Local County 
Council, not infrequently because of private interests. It was this link between 
local councils that made Lambert state that land should be controlled by an 
independent Land Control Board based on indigenous structures.9 
Colonial administrators expressed their concerns but did not actively oppose 
this development. Two thousand acres was the maximum allowed for every 
individual ranch and, by 1959, interest in individual ranching had increased. 
However, in 1960 the authorities concluded that ‘There will obviously have to 
be some re-planning with regard to ranches. Few of the applicants have the 
desire or the capital to make any serious attempt to ranch’ (KDAR 1960: 20).10 
Nonetheless by 1960 grazing schemes, individual ranchers and non-incorpo-
rated Maasai were suffering alike from the severe drought.11 The drought did 
not stop other, mostly young, educated Kaputiei Maasai from obtaining indi-
                                                 
9  The Reverend Daudi Mokinyo, a progressively minded Maasai who had been work-
ing at the Ngong Veterinary Station, got permission from the Loodokilani section to 
start his own individual 4,000-acre ranch, keeping cattle along modern lines under the 
strict supervision of the Veterinary Department. A loan of £1,000 was obtained to 
install a borehole and a hand pump and for the acquisition of an improved bull from 
the Ngong Livestock Improvement Centre. However, water could not be found and 
an alternative ranch of 2,000 acres was offered in 1956. Water was then found. 
Mokinyo bought six more breeding animals and put up a thorn barricade round the 
perimeter. Other applications near Kajiado Town followed for three other ranchers. 
10  Whatever the main reason for purchasing an individual ranch, one needed to be 
wealthy to develop it. It was essential to have an area with good grazing, trees and 
water, to fence it properly and put something back into the soil. It was estimated that 
at least £10,000 (or the sale of approximately 1,000 cattle) per ranch would be re-
quired to make anything of the ranches near Kajiado. Reverend Daudi Mokinyo had 
difficulty in meeting his loan repayments at an interest rate of 6.5% per annum. 
Fallon (1962: 28) writes: ‘I am unable to see how the settlers can meet high interest 
rate – short term loan requirements. (...) There appears to be little likelihood of 
success for the ranching program unless long term loans with low interest rates (2 to 
3% per annum) can be made available for necessary ranch and farm developments 
and livestock purchases (...) Individual ownership or control should be encouraged. It 
must be remembered, however, that individual ownership alone can not guarantee 
proper land use.’ 
11  The Annual Report of 1960 reveals how Reverend Mokinyo was able to meet the 
terms of his loan. ‘The Rev Daudi Mokinyo has not made much progress but he is 
making a living though he tends to depend on charcoal burning and [the] sale of zebra 
skins to make ends meet. The former is to be discouraged if he does not replace each 
tree cut down. He also wishes to open a butchery in Kajiado and a shop on his ranch’ 
(KDAR 1960: 21). 
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vidual ranches. Initially it was the Kaputiei Development Committee that pro-
posed registering the Kaputiei area under one title deed in the possession of the 
Kaputiei section. This idea was not accepted by the authorities as it would not 
stimulate commercial changes. It seems as if the Kaputiei region in general and 
the high-potential Ngong area in particular were thought to be suitable for 
commercial ranching purposes with the prerequisite individual or cooperative 
forms of land tenure. Advice given by various researchers such as Jacobs, 
Heady and Fallon in the early 1960s, however, pointed to the risk of subdivision 
leading to unviable small units. But in the high-potential Ngong area, the 
phenomenon of individual landownership expanded rapidly. A programme of 
land consolidation to enable the division of the area into individual ranches was 
set up in the Ngong area in 1961. This development, though opposed by the 
elders, was favoured by young, educated Kaputiei and backed by Kajiado Coun-
ty Council. 
Several authors (Hedlund 1971 and 1979, Muranja 1973/74, Peron 1984) 
mentioned a number of reasons for the acceptance and growth of individual 
landownership in the Kaputiei region: the formation of a buffer of individual 
ranches on the fringes of the Maasai area to stop illegal intrusion; the strong 
position of young influential Kaputiei politicians who created a political 
clientele by handing out title deeds to supporters and tried to reduce the social 
and economic dominance exerted by the elders; the wish to settle down and start 
commercial enterprises as shown by neighbouring groups; and the group of 
Kikuyu-Maasai who had been accommodating their landless brothers from 
Kikuyu land and strongly supported the land consolidation programme. By 
1963 there were about 24 individual ranches in the district. 
The land resource base available for Maasai livestock herding started to 
dwindle as more agriculturalists started to infiltrate and occupy the high-
potential dry-season grazing pastures. When the state of emergency ended in 
1959, administrative action had to be taken to control the huge influx of Kikuyu 
into the Ngong area. In 1960 1,200 acres were surveyed and distributed to 
twenty Maasai farmers. Pressure came from the Kaputiei to start land consoli-
dation along the lines of individual ownership, a development warmly wel-
comed by the Kikuyu, who ‘had learned through experience that once land is 
consolidated and land titles issued it was possible to carry out land transactions 
through the instituted Land Boards’ (Muranja 1973/74: 58).12 The establishment 
of the Amboseli Game Reserve and Nairobi National Park, partly in response to 
                                                 
12  Supported by a £3,000 ALDEV grant, land consolidation began in Ngong in August 
1961. In the same year Ngong was gazetted under the Land Registration (Special 
Areas) Ordinance, a measure taken to prevent people from outside the area coming to 
claim land. The 1962 population census of Kajiado District showed 53,219 Maasai 
and 15,192 non-Maasai (of which 6,233 were Kikuyu) living in the Ngong region. 
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an international conservationist lobby, put a further strain on the availability of 
land for livestock.13 
With negotiations beginning at the 1961 Lancaster House Conference to 
hand over power to the African population in an independent Kenya, the Maasai 
feared an influx of outsiders after independence would end the Maasai Treaties 
of 1904 and 1911 that gave them the exclusive right to occupy Kajiado and 
Narok Districts.14 The Maasai went as far as to request the United Nations 
recognize a unified Maasailand comprised of Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai. 
This proposal was as much condemned to fail as the Maasai request to the 
British Government to hand back the former White Highlands. A £5,800,000 
claim to be paid by the British as compensation for the use of Maasailand since 
1904 was also rejected. At the Lancaster House Conference as the first Presi-
dent of the Republic of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, expressed the view that ‘There 
should be freedom of movement in the Kenya of the future and the people 
should not be insulated by tribes’ (RBC 1962: 45).  
 
The formation of group ranches: 1963-1980 
Discussions concerning the status of Maasailand reached a peak in the early 
1960s. Among the Kaputiei Maasai in particular, the land-tenure debate was 
significant. A wide variety of propositions, such as the registration of the 
section under one title deed or the creation of a fringe of individual ranches near 
the northern boundary to stop illegal infiltration, were discussed. The colonial 
authorities disagreed with the one-title deed option. Young, formally educated 
Maasai supported by the Kajiado County Council suggested the idea of indi-
vidual ranches, although elderly Maasai opposed the move to individualization. 
Support for the latter came from the Lawrance Mission of 1965 that criticized 
the government’s haphazard approach to the Maasai land question and the 
illegal approval of the creation of individual ranches. In the end, all the Maasai 
                                                 
13  In December 1946, Nairobi National Park (117 km2) was officially opened and the 
Maasai lost total access to it. In 1947 the 3,260 km2 Amboseli National Reserve was 
created, the boundaries of which were arbitrary and did not prohibit Maasai move-
ment. In 1958 a first agreement was reached whereby the Maasai could restrict 
human beings and cattle numbers from 20,000 to 7,000 head of cattle only. In 1961 
the Amboseli administration was handed over to the Kajiado County Council and 
soon afterwards, it set aside a 78-km2 stock-free area (see Western 1982: 304). 
Amboseli National Reserve was renamed Masai Amboseli Game Reserve. 
14  African representatives from Nyanza and Nyeri, both densely populated areas, had 
protested as early as 1959 against the closed status of Maasai districts and had called 
for the integration of the land and all ethnic groups in Kenya. ‘It was wrong to talk in 
terms of Masailand. “it is African land, Kenya land”’ (EAS 05/09/59). Their appeal 
was not successful and it was the late 1960s before the status of closed district was 
withdrawn. 
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sections accepted the group ranch concept in 1969, which was introduced by the 
Kenya Livestock Development Project and sponsored by the World Bank.15 
In short, the idea of a group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain piece 
of land to be communally owned by a group of people who were recorded and 
registered as the legal owners through membership of the particular ranch. 
Unlike in the past, livestock movements would be restricted within the group 
ranch’s specific boundaries and non-members would not be allowed to bring 
their animals to graze there. Through the provision of loans for infrastructural 
development and steer fattening, an attempt was made to radically transform the 
nomadic subsistence-oriented production of the Maasai pastoralists into a 
sedentary, more commercial system. This market-oriented production was to 
bring about a de-stocking of Maasai pastures while at the same time providing 
meat for the national and international markets. 
Besides welcoming the idea of water provision, veterinary care, improved 
livestock breeds and the like, a major rationale for accepting the group ranch 
proposal was an increase in the number of Maasai acquiring individual ranches 
and fears of the encroachment of non-Maasai into the district. The concern that 
even more land could be lost to game reserves or national parks also played a 
role.16 
The performance of the Kajiado group ranches has been followed closely by 
scholars and review missions. The introduction of these group ranches had orga-
nizational, juridical and economic consequences and the ranches were effective 
in stopping an educated elite of Maasai allocating themselves huge chunks of 
former communal land that had been set aside as individual ranches. Likewise, 
the feared massive influx of non-Maasai was avoided.17 Only land from indi-
vidual ranchers could be acquired, as in the Ngong and Loitokitok areas. 
                                                 
15  In some regions of northern Kaputiei and the better-watered parts of the Ngong area, 
individualization was preferred and opposition to the formation of group ranches 
persisted. These ranches, although officially registered, never functioned as group 
ranches. 
16  The pilot Poka group ranch started in the south Kaputiei location in 1964 and in 1969 
Phase One of the Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP I) began officially. 
By 1970, 14 group ranches, covering more than 10% of the district were recorded in 
the Kaputiei area. KLDP II, which started in late 1974, added 16 ranches comprising 
another 25% of Kajiado District. And, by 1980, a further 20 ranches had been 
incorporated. These are often referred to as ‘Phase Three group ranches’ but no 
World Bank funding was provided for them. This brought to 51 the total number of 
group ranches covering 15,200 km2, or some 75% of Kajiado District. 
17  By the late 1960s the status of closed district was removed. From then onwards, non-
Maasai, who were well represented at national level, were able to enter the Maasai dis-
tricts much more easily. The installing of group ranches, however, prevented outsiders 
from buying land legally. 
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Secondly, the group ranches initiated livestock management techniques and the 
construction of facilities such as boreholes, dams, troughs, tanks, pipelines and 
cattle dips. Thirdly, group ranches stimulated the building of schools, shops and 
health centres. A final achievement of such group ranch development is said to 
have been to allow wildlife to continue roaming freely over large parts of the 
district. 
In addition to these accomplishments, several scholars mentioned problems 
and failures including delays in project implementation; disappointing rates of 
investment and difficulties in loan repayments; a continued trespassing of group 
ranch boundaries; refusals to de-stock ranches; no real transformation to a 
market-oriented livestock production; and corruption among ranch committees. 
Overall it can be concluded that in many respects, the group ranch concept, 
as proposed by outsiders, was an artificial creation that lacked a firm traditional, 
sociological as well as ecological basis. The implementation of this change in 
land tenure was over-ambitious in aiming at de-stocking pastures and commer-
cializing production while barely taking into account pastoralist strategies and 
household needs. The final outcome of these problems and the resulting frus-
trations was a growing desire among many Maasai for the subdivision of the 
group ranch into individually owned shares. 
The dissolution of group ranches and the individualization of 
landownership 
In the early 1980s no clear position was taken by the government in response to 
the call for the subdivision of group ranches – apparently because the admini-
stration itself had some doubts about it and the individual departments were in 
dispute with each other. 
Supporters of group ranch subdivision said it would help self-advancement 
and raise standards of living, boost the ability to procure a loan using the 
freehold title deed as collateral, minimize the exploitation of the poor by rich 
households, promote Maasai engagement in agricultural and industrial enter-
prises, and facilitate better maintenance of the existing infrastructure. In gene-
ral, those opposing subdivision claimed that the ultimate result would be the 
alienation of land to the non-Maasai, severe erosion in areas where cultivation 
was to start, the loss of Maasai culture, and the restriction of the movement of 
wildlife and livestock to the detriment of the district’s meat-producing and 
tourist functions. 
All these arguments have been studied by the author among a group of 500 
Maasai households but we will restrict ourselves here to a review of the mone-
tary and juridical effects of the individualization of landownership: the buying, 
selling and mortgaging of land. The threat and actual sale of land has been the 
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most highly debated topic in Kajiado District (see, for example, Pasha 1986, 
Tobiko 1989, Dietz & Rutten 1990, Rutten 1992, Kimani & Pickard 1998, 
Ntiati 2002). 
By 1990, a total of 40 group ranches had decided to dissolve their ranches. 
Seven had already gone through the procedure and the members had obtained 
private titles (Olkinos, Embolioi, Kitengela, Empuyiankat, Poka, Saikeri, 
Olchoro-Onyori). Only four ranches opposed the idea of subdivision, while 
another seven had not yet made a decision. In other words, 78% of the ranches 
had at that time ceased to exist or were about to. Alongside this process, a 
whole range of other difficulties arose, including disputes over ranch boun-
daries, corruption in plot allocation and conflicts between registered and non-
registered group members. In 1998 more ranches indicated their willingness to 
subdivide and took steps to formalize the process of obtaining freehold titles. 
However, the number of ranches that had run into dispute and whose cases 
subsequently went to court had increased significantly (see Maps 4.2a & 4.2b). 
The following section looks in particular at the post-subdivision develop-
ments that occurred on Olkinos and Meto group ranches from late 1986 until the 
beginning of 2000. Table 4.1 shows a major difference in household size be-
tween the Kaputiei Maasai of Olkinos and the Matapato Maasai of Meto. This is 
partly the result of the Kaputiei Maasai having seen an influx of Kikuyu and 
Kamba wives and adapting to smaller households with a nuclear household 
orientation than their more traditional counterparts in the south. Also, over the 
years, the trend in the Maasai area has been a reduction in the size of house-
holds. Further analysis is needed to establish the reason for the increase in 
household size in Meto. Possibly, the loss of cattle in the Meto region in 2000 
forced family members to stay together and combine activities to recover from 
the drought.  
 
 
Table 4.1  Population characteristics of Olkinos and Meto study area sample,  
 1990 and 2000 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS N = 108 N = 45 
Total household members 
Ratio male:female 
Average household size 
649 
1: 0.96 
6.0 
213 
1: 0.81 
4.8 
METO N = 104 N = 41 
Total household members 
Ratio male:female 
Average household size 
1106 
1: 0.96 
10.6 
537 
1: 0.96 
13.1 
 Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
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Map 4.2a  The land-tenure status of group ranches in Kajiado District in 1990 
 
 
Young Maasai are better educated than their fathers and mothers but the 
Kenyan job market has a limited capacity to absorb them. Most Maasai remain 
engaged in the livestock industry either full-time or part-time, and many young-
sters also try their luck in the livestock trade. Table 4.2 shows that the main 
occupation of the head of the household remains livestock keeping. For some, 
mainly Meto inhabitants who lost their livestock, cultivation became their main 
occupation by 2000. 
The cultivation of maize (during the long and short rains) and beans (during 
the short rains only) is important for Maasai engaged in agriculture but the 
availability of seeds that fit the climatic conditions is a major problem.  
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 Map 4.2b  The land-tenure status of group ranches in Kajiado District in 1998 
 
 
From Table 4.3 it can be seen that almost half of Olkinos farmers have a 
second occupation, mainly livestock keeping. In Meto almost all the heads of 
households engage in two or more activities, in particular cultivation. Some 
Maasai have made a substantial shift away from livestock keeping to agriculture 
while others use cultivation to reduce the pressure of forced livestock sales. 
Rich families employ (non-Maasai) labourers but poorer ones do the work 
themselves. Even (old) men are nowadays turning the soil, something which 
was once a taboo. The input of machinery is on the rise exemplified by the use 
of tractors and ox ploughs. 
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Table 4.2  Main occupation of the head of household 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS N = 108 N = 45 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
70.4 
1.9 
4.6 
22.2 
69.8 
18.6 
4.7 
6.9 
 
METO N = 104 N = 41 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
93.3 
1.0 
2.9 
2.9 
70.7 
19.5 
9.8 
2.2 
 Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
 
 
 
Table 4.3  Other occupations of the head of household 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS N = 108 N = 45 
2nd occupation 45.5 44.0 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
20.4 
13.9 
6.5 
4.6 
24.4 
8.5 
11.1 
0.0 
3rd occupation 11.1 13.3 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
0.0 
2.2 
2.2 
6.6 
2.2 
 
METO 
 
N = 104 
 
N = 41 
2nd occupation 91.3 84.4 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
6.7 
60.6 
21.2 
2.9 
22.2 
55.5 
2.2 
2.2 
3rd occupation 28.8 8.8 
Livestock keeping 
Cultivation 
Business 
Wage labour 
0.0 
22.1 
5.8 
1.0 
0.0 
4.4 
2.2 
2.2 
Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
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Table 4.4 provides details of wealth classes and their involvement in 
cultivation practices. It can be concluded that cultivation was initially some-
thing for the poor (especially in Olkinos) but by 2000 had been adopted by all 
wealth strata. 
 
 
  Table 4.4  Cultivating by wealth stratum 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS   
Poor 
Medium 
Rich 
 
45.9 
27.6 
35.7 
90.0 
91.9 
100.0 
METO   
Poor 
Medium 
Rich 
88.4 
82.1 
86.4 
90.9 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
Note: The wealth strata are based on Livestock Equivalents (LE) per Active Adult Male Equivalents 
(AAME). This is a more precise indication, based on metabolic weights, of the feed requirements of herds 
versus human beings. Cut-off points were established at 5 and 13 LE/AAME to produce three wealth strata. 
The equivalents used for livestock and human beings were as follows: LE: 0.71 for cattle and 0.17 for small-
stock. AAME:1.0 for adult men; 0.52 0-5 yrs; 0.85 6-10 yrs; 0.96 11-15 yrs; 0.86 female. 
 
The outcome of the group ranch subdivision process 
After subdivision started in 1986, the former Olkinos members each owned a 
farm with a mean size of 46.7 ha within a range from 11.0 to 132.0 ha per 
parcel. The process of subdivision had been most favourable for the most 
powerful within the Maasai group ranches. Former committee members ob-
tained above-average plot sizes. The average size of the farms held by these 
officials stood at 81.8 ha, almost double the overall mean size. 
Landownership per person decreased during the 1986-90 period due to 
natural population growth and the sale of land. The average availability of land 
for Olkinos ranchers was reduced from 8.4 ha/person in 1986 to 7.1 ha/person 
in 1990, a fall of 16%. The Meto group ranch had not been subdivided by 1990. 
 
Opinions on subdivision 
A generally positive attitude towards the process of subdivision and the allo-
cation of plots was recorded among the Olkinos and Meto ranchers. In 1990, 
91% of the Olkinos members were positive, 7% had mixed feelings and only 
2% were negative. Approximately 1 in 5 households, however, had mixed to 
negative feelings concerning the size of the plots allocated. 
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In recent years opinions have become more negative, especially among those 
who sold land. Overall though, opinions are still positive (81%) and the most 
negative point is the size of the parcels of land (18% negative). The opinions of 
women were also sought as they are very often not consulted when their 
husbands sell land. This gave a similar picture (see Table 4.5).  
 
 
Table 4.5  Overall opinion of women about subdivision 
 OLKINOS 2000 METO 2000 
Positive 
Neutral 
Negative 
86 
2 
12 
76 
22 
2 
Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
 
 
Mwangi (2003) reports a similar outcome for Meto and other group ranches 
in southern Kajiado among a cross-section of Meto inhabitants (widows and six 
different male age groups) interviewed in 2001. The figure for Meto widows 
stood at 75% positive and 79.5% overall.  
The fundamental reason for subdividing the group ranches of Enkaroni, 
Meto, Nentanai and Torosei were members’ concerns with increasing numbers 
of people in the context of a fixed land resource base. As young men matured, 
they used to be recruited into group ranch membership and thus legally become 
landowners. This recruitment commonly involved the collective registration of 
an entire age set and members’ shares in group ranch land were gradually 
diminishing with the expansion of its membership. The anticipated outcome 
was that parcels would be small and unviable upon the eventual subdivision of 
the group ranch at some unknown time in the future. This concern reflects a 
general sense that land subdivision was unavoidable due to events in Kajiado 
District and elsewhere in Kenya. Pushing for subdivision before a new age 
group was registered is reminiscent of the defensive move of the late 1960s to 
push for group ranches to stop the elite Maasai from acquiring individual title 
deeds and to stop non-Maasai from settling in the district. A positive attitude 
towards subdivision would seem to indicate that the concept of individual 
ownership of land in general is still favoured by the majority of landowners 
despite their negative experiences. However, a decade of individual title owner-
ship has doubled the percentage of those holding mixed or negative feelings to 
the process of subdividing land into individual parcels. Those omitted from the 
process of subdivision are not included in the sample.  
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The sale of land  
More detailed information concerning sales of land by the individual plot 
holders at Olkinos in the 1990-2000 period shows that in 1990 no specific set of 
characteristics could be perceived for the group of sellers, and sales of land 
occurred among a wide range of people irrespective of their age, wealth or 
education. It was noted, however, that the group of former committee members 
at Olkinos dominated the group of non-sellers. Those committee members who 
sold land had bought it previously and apparently for speculative reasons. 
Furthermore, a correlation was seen in the plot size per person and the sale of 
land. The more land available, the more would be sold, except by the wealthiest 
land-holding households who were not engaged in selling at all. This reflects 
the fact that the group of former committee members were aware of the value of 
the land they possessed as well as the shortcomings this amount of land posed 
for fenced ranching livestock production.  
The marginalized Maasai who roam and have no involvement in group ranch 
matters seem to be the most willing to sell part of their ranches and earn the 
salary of a lifetime all at once! Some excesses have apparently followed (see 
Box 4.1). 
 
 
Box 4.1  Some comments by (former) landowners in Olkinos 
• Came back from Nairobi (watchman). Regrets he immediately sold 5 acres of his land 
at a throwaway price to educate his children. Selling 0.5 acres would be sufficient 
nowadays. If he had had no land, he would have looked for other ways to educate his 
children. 
• A former Kenyan soldier returned to keep livestock. When the drought hit in 2000, he 
had serious problems moving his animals because of fencing and agricultural plots. 
Also he has only girls and they are at school. His animals suffered and they all died. 
• The household sold about ¾ of its land and bought a lot of animals. Now they do 
not know where to graze them, although he got a big plot of land as a former group 
ranch committee member. 
• After getting his individual plot, he left his job as a driver in Nairobi. He sold almost all 
of his land and did not invest. Now he has no job, no land and regrets having ever 
had land. 
• He misused all his land money. He is old, his wife passed away and he feels guilty 
about having sold all his land mostly to Kikuyu. 
• As a former group ranch treasurer, subdivision seemed good and fair to him. It has 
helped many in the group ranch to develop their own plots.  
• She is very comfortable because as a half Maasai-Kikuyu widow she might not have 
inherited land if subdivision would not have occurred. 
Source: interviews 2000 
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The comments by Maasai landowners show a mixed picture of the effects of 
individual landownership on a group of landowners who were apparently not 
well prepared to handle a new situation regarding property rights. It has brought 
chances and opportunities for the educated few and some immigrants but has 
been less favourable for the original Maasai landowners. This questions De 
Soto’s claim that formal ownership is not just a system regulating property 
rights but is also an instrument that will force owners to think and plan ahead in 
order to get more value out of their newly acquired property. 
From Map 4.3 it is clear that the process of land sales continued during the 
1990s. In 1990 some 30% of owners had sold (part of) their land and by 2000 
this had doubled. In addition to legal transactions, informal land sales were also 
taking place.  
 
 
 
 Map 4.3  Olkinos sales 1990-2000 
 
 
By early 2003, Neighbours Initiative Alliance (NIA), a Kenyan NGO based 
in Kajiado, aimed through its ‘Land Justice Programme’ to educate the local 
people about the value of land. To this end it organised local discussions and 
also produced 36 billboards that carried the title “Selling Wealth to Buy 
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Poverty” taken from an earlier publication of the author (Photo 4.1). These 
English lines were translated in both Maa (Osina orok emirata enkop = selling 
of land will result in extreme poverty) and Kiswahili (Kuuza uridhi kununua 
umasikiri = selling your natural inheritance (= land) will make you poor). In 
addition, a reference was made to a verse from the bible (Leviticus 25:23): ‘The 
land shall not be sold forever: for the land is mine, for ye are strangers and 
sojourners with me.’ The billboards were placed in strategic places such as near 
markets, Lands Office, Administrative Headquarters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4.1 Billboard in Maasailand 
     [Photo: Marcel Rutten] 
 
 
Acquiring loans 
Of similar interest is the trend in acquiring loans. Obtaining loans from financial 
institutions by offering land as collateral does not appear to have developed 
significantly among the new Maasai landowners. Only 17 applicants (2.2%) out 
of all the former group members intended to or had actually mortgaged 1,195 ha 
(1.6%) of the former group territory. It was claimed that selling land was a 
much faster, less obstructive and more comprehensible way of obtaining money 
than mortgaging one’s plot. Financial institutions (especially the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation) also seem to have been somewhat reluctant to provide 
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loans, except when the prospective borrower had received some formal edu-
cation and had other more important sources of income besides only livestock 
keeping. The individualization of land as such seems therefore not to have 
resulted in an increase in loans for ranchers. Other factors such as level of 
education, main occupation and experience or lack of it with financial insti-
tutions seem to have been of more importance. In 2000 the number of mort-
gages had increased but was still far smaller than the group of Maasai land 
sellers (see Map 4.4). 
Information was also gathered concerning the utilization of the proceeds of 
land sales and loans. After subdivision, the percentage of Olkinos people who 
made infrastructural improvements rose from 21% to 56% of all Olkinos 
ranchers by 1990. Lack of funds or the fact that they were not settled were 
among the most frequently mentioned reasons for not conducting an improve-
ment. Comparing Olkinos sellers with non-sellers and mortgagees versus non- 
mortgagees showed that both groups, sellers and non-sellers, were increasingly 
engaging in infrastructural improvements. However, the rise in the sellers’ 
group is significantly higher. No clear picture emerged for mortgagees versus 
non-mortgagees. 
 
 
 
 Map 4.4  Olkinos mortgagees 1990 and 2000 
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Attention was also paid to the kind of improvements made. In 1990, the 
ranches had not been fenced by the original Olkinos ranch owners. As with 
drilling boreholes, this is a costly innovation and fencing was mainly restricted 
to small areas set aside for cultivation and young or sick animals. Those 
Olkinos ranchers that did fence their shamba or ol-okeri were mainly found 
among the group of educated Maasai and land sellers. The number of fences is 
on the rise and newcomers often fence their plots. Initially, Maasai occupants 
did not do so because fencing is costly, a hindrance and was thought to be 
unnecessary. Recently, well-off Maasai households have been fencing their 
land. In 2000 Meto had overtaken Olkinos in this respect, although the fencing 
they used was mainly natural. Fencing has however meant that the mobility of 
both livestock and wildlife is being restricted, which is problematic (Table 4.6).  
Most of the infrastructural improvements made were in non-productive faci-
lities, such as the building of a modern house. Other accusations made about 
consumer behaviour by the Maasai ranchers who sold part of their land fre-
quently referred to the buying of cars and beer drinking. 
 
 
Table 4.6  Fencing characteristics (as % of ranches) 
 1990 2000 Material used 
OLKINOS 0.0 11.1 barbed wire and poles 
METO n.a. 21.6 trees and shrubs 
Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
 
 
The research also looked at the less capital-intensive improvements made in 
range management. Hardly any innovations were undertaken following sub-
division, but Potter (1989) has stressed the common-sense nature of this, as 
such adjustments would not be economically viable anyway (see Table 4.7). 
 
 
      Table 4.7  Use of extra feed/rotational grazing (as % of ranches) 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS   
Extra feed 
Rotational grazing 
 
1.1 
6.5 
2.5 
10.0 
METO   
Extra feed 
Rotational grazing 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
7.3 
       Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
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Hay is kept as an alternative kind of food relief during a period of drought, 
and some Maasai have turned to haymaking themselves. However, most feel 
this to be an unnecessary move and claim that grass is still plentiful. Hay is 
especially in demand by those pastoralists who have invested in improved 
breeds, pure Frisians in particular who are admired for their milk production but 
considered not to be well-suited to the area’s harsh conditions. Sahiwal and 
Boran crosses are the most popular if one wants to increase (meat) output.  
There is an opposite trend in the importance of improved breeds in the 
Olkinos herd as compared to the Meto herd. This is probably due to ecological 
conditions which are harsh for improved breeds in the Meto region (see Table 
4.8). 
 
 
      Table 4.8  Improved breeds held (as % of ranches) 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS   
Improved cattle  
Improved small-stock 
 
16 
24 
73 
71 
METO   
Improved cattle 
Improved small-stock 
47 
76 
30 
46 
       Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
 
 
The trend in cattle and small-stock ownership, expressed in Livestock Equi-
valents (LE) per AAME (Active Adult Male Equivalent) in both Olkinos and 
Meto, is clearly downward (Table 4.9). The average number of LE/AAME was 
lower in 2000 than in 1990 and fewer households were able to meet the 8.6 
LE/AAME threshold for pure pastoralism. 
 
 
     Table 4.9  Changes in herd size  
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS   
Mean LE/AAME 
% < 8.6 
13.4 
48.1 
4.1 
86.7 
 
METO 
  
Mean LE/AAME 
% < 8.6 
9.0 
65.4 
6.3 
73.1 
      Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
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Table 4.10 clearly indicates that the increase in small-stock numbers at the 
expense of cattle has stopped. However, the idea of a beef-market-oriented 
attitude among Maasai pastoralists was still far from the World Bank objectives 
of the 1960s. Maasai pastoralist strategy is still to invest in female cattle for 
milk production. Stated otherwise, income levels for Maasai pastoralists have 
not improved since land tenure was formalized; on the contrary, per capita 
income levels are in a downward trend in the longer term. The fast-growing 
Maasai population is putting pressure on the subsistence milk-oriented pro-
duction capacity of the herd. A market orientation that was operationalized 
because of a rise in the proportion of small-stock in the herd has more or less 
reached its limits and higher outputs from improved breeds have shown pro-
mising developments, but failures as well.18 Livestock numbers have fluctuated 
and the 2000 stock levels have fallen due to the drought and stress-causing 
diseases. Non-livestock options are on the rise, in particular cultivation. This is 
partly due to the changes in land tenure but it has also been observed in areas 
that have not been subdivided. Wage labour or business is still providing a 
limited source of income. 
 
 
     Table 4.10  Ratio cattle:shoats and percentage of female cattle in herd 
 1990 2000 
OLKINOS   
Ratio cattle:shoats 
% females in cattle herd 
 
1 : 2.10 
67 
1 : 1.92 
72 
METO   
Ratio cattle:shoats 
% females in cattle herd 
1 : 1.59 
75 
1 : 1.60 
83 
      Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
 
 
Improvements in shallow wells 
The subdivision of the group ranches triggered one key investment, i.e. in water 
development. Among the most revolutionary and productive developments has 
been the introduction of shallow wells and water pans within the farm com-
pound. A well costs Ksh 150-200,000, which is about 10% of the cost of a bore-
hole. The exact costs will depend on the time needed for digging. A filter is 
placed and a hand pump or diesel engine brings water to the surface for live-
stock (improved breeds) and human consumption. In some cases the water is 
                                                 
18  The feeding of Napier grass is an option that might cause a revolution among Maasai 
herd productivity. Improved outputs to a factor five have been reported. 
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also used for cultivation. The wells have proved to be durable and reliable, and 
women, in particular, have benefited from this development since fetching 
water has become less time-consuming. 
 
Competition and conflicts over natural resources (land and water)  
In addition to individual newcomers, a few new industries have emerged in the 
Olkinos area, notably chicken, ostrich, flower and lately also tree-growing 
farms. Farm workers are mostly non-Maasai immigrants. A large number of 
private educational institutions have also arrived and the demand for water is 
consequently on the rise. This has resulted in increased conflict among the 
groups active in the area, especially over water (see the article in the Daily 
Nation and box on the next page).  
Competition for land is on the rise too. Tour operators and nature con-
servation organizations are collaborating to try to safeguard wildlife corridors. 
Local communities are being urged to set aside part of their land in return for a 
share of the profits from wildlife-based tourism. 
In the Meto area conflicts have also arisen. In the mid-1990s informal sales 
were rampant as Meto’s Tanzanian Maasai members sold their title deeds un-
officially for cattle or cash. In subsequent times of stress however, they were no 
longer allowed to return to the subdivided Meto area as in the past. In reta-
liation, the Tanzanian Maasai closed their wells on the Tanzanian side – the 
only ones available in the area – to the Meto Maasai.  
Political interference by barons in the urban setting triggered a sensitization 
of the land question in the Matapato area (see DN 29/10/1994). Accusations 
were made that in Namanga Township and the Bissel Holding Ground, land was 
allocated to outsiders for monetary considerations alone at the expense of the 
indigenous owners. Even church compounds have not been spared. In return, 
the Matapato resolved that any land or plot allocation, sale or transfer within 
Matapato must be vetted and approved by the Matapato Development Com-
mittee. They made an appeal for a stop to the allocation of land at the expense 
of the indigenous people. Possibly because of this increased awareness of the 
value of land, Meto landowners did not rate land as their major problem in 2000 
as Olkinos inhabitants did (see Table 4.11). 
The importance of land policies for the poor 
Property rights are increasingly becoming a key issue of debate in Africa. 
Besides water, land is an asset that has gained attention in the last decade, not 
least because of the problems in southern Africa, in particular in Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa. Advocacy groups, often supported by western  
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Reports of a lack of water due to the 
drilling of boreholes by new settlers 
have been heard since the mid-1990s. 
Flower farms have in particular been 
accused of lowering water tables on 
and near their farms and of tapping 
water from the Noolturesh pipeline in 
such amounts that the water no longer 
reaches others. In March 2005 an 
accident was reported that involved 
local politicians inciting local Kaputiei 
Maasai to invade a flower farm in the 
Olkinos area. When following up, I 
learned, however, that the claim of 
discharging toxic wastes was false. A 
local Maasai herd owner had made a 
mistake in the mixture of the acaracide 
he applied to his cattle and 15 cows 
died as a result. Further enquiries, 
however, established that this story 
was rumoured by the cattle owner in 
return for footing the hospital bill for his 
family that had fallen ill after eating the 
meat as well as compensation paid by 
the flower farm owner for the loss of 
livestock. 
Another, even more serious complaint 
aired, was that the use of water on the 
flower farm was so high that, for the 
first time ever, the water in Maasai 
wells in the vicinity of the farm had run 
dry. It was argued that the recent 
expansion of boreholes on the flower 
farms coincided with the reduction in 
water levels which was then felt during 
the 2004/05 drought. 
 
Source: Daily Nation (March 2005) 
 
Table 4.11  Major problems for households 
     1990     2000 
OLKINOS 1. Water 
2. Poverty 
3. Animal diseases 
1. Land 
2. Water 
3. Poverty 
   
METO 1. Water 
2. Animal diseases 
3. Poverty 
1. Water 
2. School 
3. Poverty 
Source: Datasets 1990, 2000 
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donors, have sprouted rapidly in the last decade. In Eastern Africa the land 
question is ‘hot’ again too. New land policies have been drafted for Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya and, in the drafting of the new Kenyan constitution, a whole 
chapter was devoted to the land question.  
Official World Bank policy, which has been employed over the years in 
Kenya and other developing countries to create a positive environment for 
economic development, is similar to the claim made by De Soto.19 One of its 
officials, Klaus Deininger (2003) stresses that land is a key asset for the rural 
and urban poor as it provides a foundation for economic activity and the 
functioning of market (for example, credit) and non-market (for instance, local 
government and social networks) institutions in many developing countries.  
Others have argued that the issue of security is not necessarily best 
guaranteed through formal land-tenure arrangements. Owen Lynch (2002), for 
example, has proposed a new typology which he calls the Community-Based 
Property Rights (CPBR) concept that would replace the old typology of land-
tenure arrangements (private, common, state, open access) that denies the 
reality of a bundle of rights and promotes the disaggregation of individual rights 
from community-based systems. Instead, he states that CPBRs emanate from 
and are enforced by communities; that they are a bundle of rights (communal 
and individual) and that they refer to rights to water, land, forest products and 
wildlife. He differentiates between private and public, and between individual 
and group. Out of the four combinations he considers private – group to be the 
best option. The World Bank and the nation state, Lynch claims, believe that 
individual property rights are superior, a belief that has been strong for a while 
in some key sections within the Bank. However, World Bank thinking towards 
property has also undergone review in the last couple of years. The Bank has 
recently released a report entitled ‘Land Policies for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction’ that is based on wide-ranging discussions with key stakeholders. 
The report concludes that property rights affect economic growth. Security of 
property rights is needed for investment, credit, insurance for shocks and facili-
tating the transfer of land at low cost, and unequal land distribution reduces 
productivity. Insecure land rights prohibit the renting out of land; and poorly 
designed land markets and corruption hamper non-farm economic development. 
Access to land and improving the ability of the poor to make effective use of 
land is central to reducing poverty. Experiences in the Kajiado area of southern 
Kenya, in particular the former Olkinos and Meto group ranches, however, chal-
lenge some of the Bank’s statements. More conditions are needed to ensure that 
                                                 
19  It should be emphasized, though, that the World Bank stresses the security aspect of 
new land-tenure regimes. Security of tenure is not necessarily similar to formal 
statutory law and customary tenure might be a more secure arrangement.  
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security of tenure is assured and access to (affordable) credit is a realistic 
option. So far it seems that the commoditization of land has made the liveli-
hoods of many Maasai more risky.20 Nowadays, access and control over grazing 
land (i.e. flexible mobility) is less assured. Water resources are being depleted 
or diverted away from pastoral production by newly introduced activities 
operated by outsiders and/or elite Maasai. Stress-coping and survival strategies 
are under threat especially for the poor and levels of wealth are no longer 
merely expressed in ownership of cattle but primarily in the size of land 
holdings. The land-reform process is creating a more permanent arrangement of 
rich and poor members within Maasai society. There is a need to strengthen 
agricultural intensification and diversification, starting from local initiatives 
(e.g. water development) and to come up with labour-intensive alternatives. In 
summary, the Maasai are experiencing both positive and negative effects, either 
directly or indirectly due to changes in land-tenure arrangements. These can be 
summarized in a way as shown in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. 
 
 
Table 4.12  Positive effects of individual landownership 
Direct 
? Restricting misuse of grazing land by neighbouring individual ranchers.  
? Wealthy herders are renting land from poor pastoralists. 
? The misuse of loans by corrupt committees is no longer possible. 
? Flexibility in pasture management is reintroduced. 
 
Indirect 
? Job opportunities in the mining and flower industries are increasing. 
? Maasai are copying immigrants’ activities, improvements in cultivation, modern 
houses, water facilities, etc.  
? Extra fodder (Napier) is being grown. 
? There is bartering of livestock (products) for maize and beans. 
? Informal self-help groups are investing money and labour in steer fattening, breed 
improvements and wells. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20  A specific case to stress the risk of formalizing property rights for local landowners 
is the Loodariak group ranch (146,000 ha) located in Kajiado District some 75 km 
south of Nairobi. During the land adjudication process, fraudulent land allocations to 
the tune of 20,000 ha to 362 non-members occurred. Among the beneficiaries were 
the political elite including ministers, while some 1,200 poor Maasai were left out. 
The local Maasai have since then tried to get the adjudication cancelled, even draft-
ing a ‘Land Adjudication (Amendment) Bill’, but in vain.  
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Table 4.13  Negative effects of individual landownership 
Direct 
? The livestock system is undermined by removing (high-potential) land out of the 
pastoral migration cycle. 
? There is reduced access to land (sales, fencing, and grazing fees).  
? Several Maasai households are in disarray after land sales due to extreme poverty, 
hunger and court cases. 
? Only a few Maasai widows have been given a title deed. Usually only non-Maasai 
women (groups and rich individuals) are able to buy land. 
 
Indirect 
? Households have been split and there is less labour for herding. 
? Land sellers are buying more livestock which leads to higher stocking densities on 
already overstocked farms. 
? Some of the new activities are threatening the area’s carrying capacity (e.g. flower 
production). 
? Poverty has a detrimental effect on the environment (e.g. charcoal burning). 
? Loss of land is pushing many Maasai into wage employment but they cannot compete 
due to a lack of education. 
? An influx of outsiders is causing tension between ethnic groups. Political patrons can 
manipulate these tensions by instigating clashes. 
? Land sales can result in poverty of a more structural nature (loss of respect in society). 
Herds – unlike land – can be rebuilt. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the evolution of land-tenure arrangements from 
group to individual ownership in Kenya’s Maasailand in the period from 1985 
to 2000. It has addressed in particular the pros and cons of this process within 
the context of De Soto’s claims that formal property rights will increase the 
incentive of households and individuals to invest and will provide them with 
better credit access. Experiences in Kenya during the subdivision of the Maasai 
group ranches in Kajiado District, however, challenge this bold claim. The 
formalization of individual land rights has not triggered a widespread run by the 
local farm owners on financial institutions, nor has it benefited the majority of 
them economically. In contrast, the formalization process has brought severe 
problems for many of the original landowners after the sale of (part of) their 
land. The beneficiaries have mainly been speculators and new immigrants. The 
latter have either acquired a small piece of land for crop cultivation or found a 
job on one of the new flower or tree farms or at educational institutions. This 
influx of new economic activity is to a certain extent responsible for the overall 
heightened strain on natural resources, notably water, putting pressure on the 
sustainability and resilience of the area’s main economic activity, namely 
livestock keeping. As a result, severe forms of poverty, which are of a more 
structural nature than in the past, are creeping into Maasai society. Loss of land 
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is harder to overcome than loss of livestock. In short, the role property rights 
can play in benefiting less well-off members of society will in reality be less 
easy to achieve and might be more of a threat to these groups, leaving the 
opportunities to a small minority of foreigners, immigrants, the educated elite 
and well-informed politicians.  
Reviewing the changes in Kajiado District in the last decade leaves one with 
the impression of a people and way of life under increasing pressure. Shrinking 
land resources due to increasing numbers of Maasai people and an even faster-
growing number of migrant settlers in the district, malfunctioning group ranches 
and the call for their subdivision, a lack of a clear governmental land policy and 
corrupt land practices threatening large groups of Maasai have all contributed to 
this. 
The role of the Kenyan government should also be stressed here. The central 
government's initial opposition to the subdivision of group ranches seems to 
have changed to a standpoint of modest support. Once the dissolution of group 
ranches was no longer opposed by (part of) the administration, the process of 
subdivision went very quickly.21 The same arguments De Soto put forward in 
favour of formal land rights were used in the 1960s by the World Bank and the 
UNDP and again in the 1980s by those in favour of the subdivision of group 
ranches. In my opinion, none of those who allowed this process to happen fully 
realized or wanted to acknowledge the possible negative side effects it would 
have for a large number of Maasai people, their children, the district's ecology, 
the livestock economy, wildlife and the tourism sector. As a result, the process 
started without clear guidelines and amongst a group of people who were not 
yet ready to withstand the clamour for land within modern-day Kenya.  
Foreign donors are sometimes involved in the formalization of land-tenure 
arrangements. International policy-makers need to understand, however, that 
providing funds to establish a land titles register is only one side of the coin. 
They should ensure that the intermediate phase of fundamental changes in the 
legal/tenure system is the final chance for speculators and the well-informed to 
misuse these new opportunities at the cost of the illiterate in society. The land 
register funds should come with the understanding that some of the money be 
allocated to district wide discussions concerning the consequences of the pro-
                                                 
21  Those sections within the government opposing subdivision, like the Range Manage-
ment Division within the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and Mar-
keting, have been abandoned in the process of subdividing group ranches. Now-
adays, a feasibility study of the group ranch to be subdivided, showing the individual 
parcels as well as areas to be set aside as public utility plots, is no longer needed. 
Once the group ranch members decide to dissolve their demarcation sketch, a sur-
veyor is asked to produce the final map before applying to the Divisional Land Con-
trol Board for the transfer of the single group title into individual title deeds. 
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posed new land-tenure setting. This is not so necessary among policy-makers 
and politicians but more so among the local inhabitants. I cannot illustrate this 
limited scope and horizon among policy-makers more clearly than by referring 
to a remark made by a young Dutch policy-maker who, following a presentation 
of the Kajiado case, said ‘You spoke about land rights but mainly about live-
stock numbers and other socio-economic indicators’. Her interest had been to 
get more detailed information about the legal and geographical technicalities of 
the formalization of the land-tenure system and was not so concerned in the 
implications. And after a presentation of this same case at the World Bank, 
some of its policy-makers clearly embraced the positive outcome of the process 
of individualization and belittled the negative ones. This biased attitude is 
equally dangerous. 
The Maasai experience shows that De Soto’s claim that the hidden wealth of 
the poor can be brought to the surface by simply formalizing their property is 
rather short-sighted. Alongside formal property rights are a whole range of other 
legal and non-legal arrangements that need to be put in place before the West’s 
experience can be copied. For example, financial institutions need to be willing 
to lend money to illiterate landowners and need to do this at reasonable interest 
rates. Corrupt practices in formal land registration do not build confidence in 
the formal land-tenure system and living in a natural environment characterized 
by a non-equilibrium situation makes economic activities such as livestock 
keeping risky and may quickly result in loan arrears. The failure of World 
Bank/UNDP managers to run a profitable business on the Maasai ranches in the 
1960s and 1970s is proof that, in addition to formal property rights, these 
international policy-makers from the West should have brought along their 
mild, mostly livestock-disease-free, climatic zone to this semi-arid area. This 
wisdom was aired in colonial days by Lord Hailey, Lambert and Fallon, the 
latter stating that ‘Individual ownership or control should be encouraged. It 
must be remembered, however, that individual ownership alone cannot guaran-
tee proper land use’ (Fallon 1962: 28). But as long as these huge risks create an 
insecure business climate that easily undermines investments, the introduction 
of formal property rights will not be able to act as the panacea for wealth 
creation in these regions. On the contrary, evidence presented here shows that 
the opposite, i.e. a loss of wealth, is more likely. For now, besides educating 
Maasai landowners on the value of land, the best the Maasai youngsters can 
hope for is that their parents will value the wealth they still own. And as for De 
Soto’s claim that formalized property rights will do the trick, let us hope that 
Kenya’s experience is an exception to this rule. 
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Political instability, chronic poverty 
and food production systems in 
central Chad 
 
Han van Dijk1 
 
 
In many parts of the world long-term political instability com-
bined with frequent droughts results in chronic poverty and 
high levels of malnutrition and child mortality. Despite the 
magnitude and importance of the problem in these areas, the 
relation between political instability and changes in food pro-
duction systems that form the basis of the economy in many 
remote rural areas of the world, has rarely been investigated. 
In this chapter three case studies of villages in the Guéra region 
in central Chad will be presented. This areas was particularly 
hard hit during 25 years of civil war and recurrent drought 
between 1965 and 1990. The case studies show that the func-
tioning of food production systems in these villages differs 
widely depending on the particular context and the extent to 
which the villages were exposed to violence and other pressures 
such as drought and religious change. 
 
 
Introduction 
Chronic poverty is a persisting phenomenon in Africa, especially in remote rural 
areas (Bird et al. 2002, Bird & Shepherd 2003) where it occurs in contexts of 
ecological, economic and political instability. Such contexts have been labelled 
                                                 
1  The author wishes to thank Wijnand Klaver and Marja Spierenburg for their construc-
tive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. An earlier version was presented at 
the conference on ‘Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa’ that was 
held at the Free University, Amsterdam, 24-26 September 2003. 
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‘complex emergencies’ in the literature (Macrae et al. 1994), i.e. prolonged 
situations of drought and political instability in areas where the economic and 
social infrastructure is weak or in a state of disrepair because of an existing 
emergency. Complex humanitarian emergencies are defined as long-term multi-
causal crises that require system-wide responses (Duffield 1994: 38) According 
to the UN, Chad and its neighbours Sudan and the Central African Republic 
have been declared complex emergencies.2 
In these situations, access to the resources necessary for the continuity of 
livelihoods is frequently restricted and because of the enduring character of 
these conditions, chronic poverty results and often persists long after the com-
plex emergency has ended (Goodhand 2003). The effects manifest themselves 
in the form of malfunctioning political institutions, fundamental changes in food 
production systems and the irreversible disruption of the relations that bind 
social groups and families together. These conditions result in high rates of 
child mortality, malnutrition, morbidity and day-to-day conflict (Hulme & 
Shepherd 2003). Situations are becoming chronic and the life chances of the 
present generation are being affected to such an extent that the effects are being 
passed on to the next generation in the form of stunted growth and reduced 
intellectual capacity (Moore 2001). On the food production side, these emer-
gencies have a long-term impact on production systems, patterns of access to 
resources and food insecurity. 
The relationship between chronic poverty, changes in food production sys-
tems, resource tenure systems and political instability is explored in this chapter 
by considering the changes in food production systems in central Chad in three 
different villages. They were all differently affected by the civil war that 
ravaged the country and this area in particular between 1965 and 1990. It is 
argued that this may partially explain how food productions systems have 
developed over the past decades and the way in which land tenure regulations 
have come into being. 
Political instability and food production systems 
Remote rural areas in Africa, also euphemistically called ‘less-favoured areas’ 
(Ruben & Pender 2004), are known for their bad living conditions, a lack of 
social services and chronic poverty. The percentage of people living on less 
than US$1 a day is often higher than 80% and most of these areas are subject to 
periodic droughts that lead to oscillations in food production and famine con-
ditions. An economic and social infrastructure is usually absent and, if present, 
frequently malfunctions (Kuyvenhoven et al. 2004). Governments do not have 
                                                 
2  www.reliebweb.int (accessed 11 June 2007). 
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the capacity to provide good services or administer these areas properly and low 
population densities tend to make the cost of providing services prohibitive. A 
shortage of human capacity, corruption and bad governance further contributes 
to a low level of service provision.  
From an economic point of view, remote rural areas are in a bad position. 
Given their isolated location often in countries with no seaport and their general 
lack of infrastructure, access to markets is difficult because of the high trans-
portation costs involved. Local producers face two main disadvantages: their 
inputs are more expensive, and their products fetch lower prices because of the 
distance to markets, which in turn makes it less attractive to invest in agricul-
tural production (Bryceson 2000). 
Given the weakness of the states governing these areas, remote rural areas 
are susceptible to political instability. Their distance from the capital makes it 
difficult for the state to control these vast territories. Local administrators and 
the military who are charged with territorial administration and the maintenance 
of security often have too many powers. In the absence of democratic control, 
oppression, corruption and the uncontrolled use of violence by the state is often 
the rule rather than the exception. Given the low level of central control, the 
potential for ethnic and political conflict is high, and can lead to localized 
rebellions and sometimes to general insecurity. All these different factors 
coalesce and the compounded effects of the hazards may result in what have 
been labelled ‘complex emergencies’ in the literature. These emergencies have 
primarily been studied as historical phenomena or within a framework of the 
provision of emergency aid, the restoration of peace, and conflict resolution (see 
Duffield 1994, Albala-Bertrand 2000, Lautze et al. 2004). Little thought has yet 
been given to an analysis of complex emergencies and the long-term effects of 
these phenomena (see Barakat et al. 2005). 
Complex emergencies are also complex in a legal sense. Access to certain 
resources can help overcome the consequences of an emergency and is crucial 
in disaster situations and hazardous conditions (Wisner et al. 2004). In most 
studies of legal complexity, it is assumed that various legal systems co-exist and 
that people who are trying to settle legal problems refer themselves to these 
legal systems and negotiate their way to the most acceptable solution. Terms 
such as ‘legal pluralism’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1983) and ‘forum shopping’ 
(K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981) are used for these kinds of situation. However, 
the regulation of access to resources during complex emergencies is not only 
about the law and interaction between plural legal systems but also about the 
workings of power, violence and conflict. An analytical focus on the complex 
workings of governance processes at different levels of society and the state is, 
therefore, warranted. 
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Situations of war and violent conflict are normally regarded as exceptional 
and not representative of normal processes of governance. However, in situa-
tions of protracted war and long-term political instability that sometimes span 
decades, one could also argue that war and violence have become the most 
important ways of governing and controlling access to resources. An assessment 
of the consequences of war and violence on patterns of access to resources and 
the functioning of food productions systems, on which more than 90% of the 
population in remote rural areas depend, is therefore crucial in assessing the 
long-term impact of complex emergencies. Specifically, one should focus on 
how patterns of resource distribution through the population have evolved and 
the ways in which they have come to be used over time (technologies, labour 
and knowledge). 
Little thought has been given in legal science to the relationship between 
political instability and law and legal complexity (von Trotha 1993). In situa-
tions of political instability, the state loses its monopoly on violence, which has 
important consequences for the workings of the law and its role in mediating 
access to resources. It may lead to situations in which legal systems or juris-
dictions not only co-exist at times but also rapidly compete with each other and 
follow in rapid succession. The settling of land claims during a complex emer-
gency characterized by political instability may later on be considered illegiti-
mate or unfair as the people were coerced into accepting these solutions in the 
face of violence. Solutions born out of the war-torn local environment may, 
therefore, give rise to new conflicts. 
War and violence also promote rapid political, social and cultural change, 
and disrupt settlement patterns and land-use practices. Examples are the accessi-
bility of land due to the presence of mines or the effects following the killing of 
so many men on the organization of rural labour and the strength of the claims 
of their female family members and widows to the land. The effects of war may 
be even more profound on the functioning of structures of governance such as 
the official administration and traditional authorities. Often the administrative 
system is completely disrupted and, in some instances, governance structures 
may lose their legitimacy because of their role in the war. During the war, 
people may have changed from one normative system to another or been forced 
to do so by new power holders or because they felt that their previous way of 
organizing and sanctioning norms and rules were no longer valid in the difficult 
situation they are now encountering. 
There appear to be very few studies that address these problems in a syste-
matic way (e.g. Yalçin-Heckmann et al. 2003). Yet it is an extremely relevant 
topic given the number of countries that are in turmoil and have experienced 
severe conflict in the past decades. Population displacements, the devastation 
these conflicts caused and numerous institutional deficiencies have remained 
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important factors in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. The rest of this 
chapter discusses the impact of political instability in Chad on food production 
systems in the Guéra in central Chad. 
Data were collected during an eight-month stay in Chad in the framework of 
a research programme focusing on the consequences of drought and civil war in 
the Guéra region of central Chad between September 2002 and May 2003. 
Interviews were done both in the Guéra and in the capital with migrants from 
the area. Village studies in the Guéra concentrated on livelihood activities, 
village histories, food production systems, and nutritional and anthropometric 
data. Supplementary data were collected in subsequent field trips in 2004, 2005 
and 2006. The author was responsible for the research on food production 
systems and the two other researchers focused more on the project’s anthro-
pological and nutritional components.3 
Chad 
Chad, the fourth largest country in Africa, is land-locked and sits at the cross-
roads between East and West Africa and North and Central Africa. Half of its 
surface area of 1.24 million km2 is in the Sahara, while the southern part of the 
country borders the humid forest zone. The diversity in climate, vegetation and 
socio-political organization is enormous, with black African desert nomads 
inhabiting the north, combinations of pastoralism, agro-pastoral and sedentary 
agricultural groups in the central Sahelian part of the country, and in the south 
the cultivation of cereals and tubers, which are an important source of food. 
At independence, Chad was ill-prepared for self-governance. Even though 
self-rule had been introduced following World War II (see Lanne 1998), it was 
hard to expect Chad to be ready to develop into a mature Western-style demo-
cracy. Parts of the country had only been under colonial rule since 1930 and the 
colony had been under military rule for much longer than other parts of colonial 
French Africa. 
The administrative system at a local level consisted of sultans and chefs de 
cantons, who had been put in place by the colonial government. The stature and 
legitimacy of these local and regional representatives differed widely. On the 
one hand there were sultans who were the direct descendants of the rulers of the 
pre-colonial empires of Ouadday/Biltine Kanem and Baguirmi. On the other, 
there were areas in the south as well as in the extreme north where no cen-
                                                 
3  Field research was sponsored by the African Studies Centre. This interdisciplinary 
project involved collaboration with Mirjam de Bruijn (anthropologist, African Studies 
Centre) and Nakar Djindil Syntiche (nutritionist, Laboratoire de Recherches Vétéri-
naires et Zootechniques de Farcha). For some of the findings, see de Bruijn et al. 
(2003), de Bruijn & van Dijk (2007), and de Bruijn & Djindil (2007). 
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tralized government had existed until colonialism. Here, the French appointed 
‘traditional’ rulers but, not knowing local power relations, they appointed 
anyone as chef de canton, including their cooks, drivers or housekeepers, 
probably because of their knowledge of French (Lohse 2002). Any kind of 
government – local, traditional, neo-traditional or modern – would have had a 
hard time gaining the confidence of the population and being seen as legiti-
mately expressing the population’s political will. 
Compared to other former French colonies, Chad was handicapped at inde-
pendence. There was hardly any infrastructure, communication networks were 
not in place and there were very few educated people (and most of those came 
from the south of the country). It was difficult to ensure even the most rudi-
mentary form of administration in large parts of the country. The north re-
mained under French administration until 1965, with southern civil servants 
lacking credibility in the eyes of those from the north and central parts of the 
country. Moreover, these civil servants thought the time had come to oppress 
the northern population after centuries of slave raiding in the south. 
Despite their lack of legitimacy, the French-appointed neo-traditional autho-
rities (chef de canton, chef de village) became more important. They formed the 
basis of state power in most of the country, and the financial benefits accruing 
from these positions increased. In the absence of any countervailing power and 
a functioning legal system and in the presence of an administration based on 
exploitation, they became administrators, judges and prosecutors at the same 
time. 
There was little scope for political and democratic reform or the expression 
of civil liberties and political education. Religious and ethnic divisions had 
deepened during the military struggle. While Muslims and Christians4 were 
more or less proportionately represented in the legislative and governing bodies 
of the colony and the state during the first years of self-governance and inde-
pendence, this fragile equilibrium was fractured after a decade or so of rebellion 
by FROLINAT (Front National Pour la Libération National du Tchad) against 
the government. After 1966, the movement fought the post-colonial government 
of the southerner Ngarta Tombalbaye, who was finally toppled by a military 
coup in 1975. After a tumultuous period, governments dominated by norther-
ners came to power (Buijtenhuijs 2001) and have remained in power to date. 
Some even claim that the Zaghawa, members of the president’s clan, dominate 
the state apparatus nowadays. 
Soon after independence, the central government lost control of parts of the 
country and, following revolts in the east and the centre of the country, armed 
opposition groups, under the banner of FROLINAT, took control. These oppo-
                                                 
4  Animists were mostly uneducated and therefore did not qualify for political positions. 
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sition groups were supported by foreign assistance from Libya and Sudan, and 
dominated the political history of Chad from 1965 until 1990 when Idriss Déby 
took power. 
The country was in a state of anarchy during this time and even afterwards 
there was no monopoly on violence by the state, with ongoing fighting and re-
bellions (eighteen since 1990) in large parts of the country. The security forces 
were not under central government control and they pillaged the countryside, 
violating people’s human rights. 
Though the situation was relatively calm from 1990 to 2003, democrati-
zation and political reform had to be implemented under complicated condi-
tions. The population was traumatized after 25 years of insecurity, dictatorship 
and famine due to a combination of drought and military insurgency, and 
exhausted by the double exploitation of the government and the opposition 
forces. In addition, the present government does not serve as an example of 
transparent, democratic governance nor did it do much to reconcile the various 
population groups that were opposed to each other during the years of civil 
unrest. 
The economic and political situation is bad. On every indicator of social and 
economic development, Chad figures among the worst in the world. In 1990, 
there was no trace of democratic tradition at the level of the administration, nor 
was there much scope for local people to participate in politics at a local level 
since there was always a threat of violence from either the administration or its 
opponents. Banditry was rampant and there was hardly any control of the secu-
rity forces that were supposed to protect the population but instead terrorized 
the people. After the Habré regime, under which approximately 40,000 people 
were killed and 250,000 imprisoned, civil society was weak and shattered. 
However, pressured by protests following the general wave of democratization 
in the early 1990s and pushed by donors, President Déby gave way to admini-
strative reforms in 1993. As in many other West African countries, a national 
conference was held to develop a blueprint for the future of Chad and its road 
towards democratization (Buijtenhuijs 1993). 
Around 2000, administrative reform became more concrete when a process 
of administrative decentralization was set in motion. The official purpose of the 
whole decentralization process was the establishment of municipalities, depart-
ments and regions as self-elected territorial units. Decision-making authority 
was then relegated in the domains of health care, education, hydraulic infra-
structure, physical infrastructure and markets. The official purpose of decentral-
ization was to repair defects of the administrative system but this operation has 
turned out to be much too costly for the Chadian government (Lohse 2002). 
The level of urbanization is low, with 80% of the population subsisting on 
agriculture. The country’s main cities are N’Djaména, the capital, Moundou and 
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Sarh in the south, and Abeché in the east. The country is extremely poor as a 
result of both the difficult natural conditions and decades of civil war and 
political unrest that lasted from 1965-1990. Chad ranks 171st out of 177 
countries on the UNDP’s Index of Human Development (UNDP 2006). With 
the discovery of oil, which came on line in 2003, there were hopes that revenues 
from this source might be channelled into socio-economic development. In the 
south, the oil fields are being exploited by two American and a Malaysian oil 
company. According to an agreement with the World Bank, that funded part of 
the exploitation, the revenues from oil should be mainly invested in socio-
economic development, with 10% being reserved in a fund for future gene-
rations. This offered the prospect of economic growth and socio-economic 
development but by 2006 the Chadian government was already trying to get this 
clause removed from the agreement because of budgetary problems caused by 
political unrest and the mismanagement of state resources. 
Since 2004, the political situation has deteriorated rapidly because of the 
conflict in Darfur in neighbouring Sudan, in which ethnic groups that straddle 
the border – one of them being the clan of President Déby – are deeply in-
volved. During 2005 and 2006, there was an increase in cross-border raiding by 
Janjaweed Arab militias from Sudan and there were accusations by Chad and 
Sudan that each was supporting armed groups opposed to the other’s regime. 
There were several attempted coups against President Idriss Déby’s regime, 
with the Chadian army suffering defections among those dissatisfied with 
President Déby’s soft stance against Sudan. Most joined armed rebellion groups 
based in Sudan because they were unhappy with the government and the slow 
progress of democratization (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2006).5 In this context, any 
attempt at political and economic reform is bound to fail, as the oil revenues are 
increasingly being spent on war, and the government’s attention is exclusively 
focused on survival. 
Poverty, resource tenure and land use in central Chad 
The Guéra is a mountainous area in central Chad, in the geographical centre of 
the country, halfway between east and west in the Sahelian zone. The landscape 
is dominated by mountains rising to 1600 m in the middle of the vast plains of 
central Chad. The climate is Sahelian with rainfall varying from 400 to 750 mm  
 
                                                 
5  However, the good intentions of these armed rebel groups must not be taken too 
seriously. They have not been capable of formulating a coherent political programme. 
Most of the leaders have held important positions under former President Hissein 
Habré and the current President Idriss Déby, and are not known for their support of 
democratization. 
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    Map 5.1 The Guéra in Chad and research locations 
 
 
per annum. Agricultural conditions are difficult. Soil fertility is generally low 
on the sandy soils on the mountains and on the plains near the mountains. The 
clayey soils on the plains are somewhat more fertile. 
The main crops are pearl millet (Pinnesetum thypoïdes), though increasingly 
less so because of problems with weeds (Striga hermonthica) and birds, and 
various varieties of sorghum (Sorghum bicolor). Flood retreat sorghum 
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(berberé) is cultivated on the clayey plains when the water retreats after the 
rainy season. The women cultivate peanuts (Arachis hypogea) and sesame 
(Sesamum indicum) on separate fields either on infields around the house or on 
outfields as follow-up crops after millet or sorghum. In addition, women 
cultivate a number of vegetables such as okra (Hibiscus esculentus), pumpkin 
(Curcurbita spp) and garden sorrel/sour dock (Fr: oseille sauvage; Rumex 
acetosa). 
The sedentary population is divided into different ethnic groups, collectively 
known as the Hadjerai (from the Arab hadjer, mountain), with their own 
language and socio-cultural characteristics. Roughly each mountain range is 
inhabited by a different ethnic group overseen by its own mountain spirit or 
Margay.6 Until recently, most Hadjerai adhered to the animist cult that worships 
these mountain spirits and is led by Margay priests who used to protect the 
population against outside intruders and took care of rainfall (Fuchs 1970, 
Vincent 1975). However, with colonialism, Islam and Christianity arrived in the 
area. Islam, which had been present for centuries, was intensively propagated by 
northern rebel forces during the civil war and Christianity was brought to the 
area by Catholic and Protestant missionaries after the Second World War. Islam 
is the dominant religion in the area today, with a small minority of Christians, 
and only elderly people and isolated villages still worship the Margay.  
 
The Guéra in the Chadian civil war 
Violence and war have been important in shaping the organization of food pro-
duction systems in the Guéra in central Chad as far back as human memory 
goes. In pre-colonial times the area was located between two regional empires, 
the Ouaddai and the Baguirmi, who used the area as a slave-hunting ground. For 
safety reasons, the population settled in villages situated on inaccessible slopes 
and used fields that were located on plateaux and near the foot of the mountains. 
In the pre-colonial past, the inhabitants fiercely resisted conquest and slave 
raiding from the surrounding empires of Ouaddai, Kanem and Baguirmi. Before 
the advent of the French, political organization was limited and most groups did 
not have any political centralization. Only the Kenga towards Bitkine and the 
Daadjo who were the last to settle north and northeast of Mongo, the capital of 
the Guéra, knew some kind of centralized political organization and had the 
potential to grow into a state-like structure. 
When the French colonial government conquered the area and established 
colonial rule, the region experienced a period of relative calm and slave hunting 
                                                 
6  Margay is the name of the mountain spirit in the local cult of the Hadjerai. The name 
is given by outsiders, as a different name is given to the mountain spirit in local 
dialects. 
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and raiding stopped. Villagers either descended voluntarily from the mountains 
or were forced by the colonial authorities to settle at the foot of the mountains.7 
The colonial administration was always weak in the area and initially the French 
did not have any administration at all as they sensed that the area was difficult 
to control without any previous structures in place. First, they appointed chefs 
de villages but in practice this proved difficult because there were too many 
villages to be overseen by a single French administrator. By 1924, the French 
had appointed chefs de cantons, like in other parts of the colony of Chad. 
(Rense 2006). Their main tasks were to collect taxes and act as intermediaries 
between the French administration and the population.  
The French had many problems with the chefs de cantons. In the first place it 
was difficult to find the right persons for the post. As most Hadjerai groups did 
not know central authority, there were no logical candidates and there were 
constant power struggles. Secondly, the quality of the selected chefs was bad. 
They often misused their newly acquired authority to exploit the population that 
was opposed to the colonial administration in any case (Rense 2006). They also 
had to compete with customary leadership based on the Margay cult. The real 
authority within the villages lay with the Margay priests, who were responsible 
for rituals centring on the fertility of the land and relations with the spirits of the 
mountains. In many cases, they were also responsible for land distribution 
(Fuchs 1970). 
The French were ambiguous about the degree of authority they should give 
the chefs de canton. On the one hand they wanted to make use of local 
authorities because they lacked personnel themselves. On the other hand, these 
local authorities could not have too much power otherwise they might endanger 
the colonial administration (Rense 2006). 
After independence, the Guéra played a special role in the civil war. One of 
the trigger events of the civil war took place in Mangalmé in the northeastern 
part of the Guéra. The people there were fed up with the high taxes they had to 
pay under the regime of Tombalbaye, Chad’s first president after independence. 
The tax on land was in particular deeply resented in the Guéra and was per-
ceived as a way of dispossessing the Hadjerai of their ancestors’ land. In addi-
tion, these taxes were often levied several times by exploitative administrators, 
chefs de canton and chefs de village. Following the tax riots in 1965, 
FROLINAT became the main opposition force to the official government and 
infiltrated the Guéra (Abbo Netcho 1997, Buijtenhuijs 1978). 
                                                 
7  Similar settlement patterns can be observed in other mountain areas in the Sahelian 
zone, such as the Bandiagara Escarpment, the Mandara Mountains, the Nuba Moun-
tains and the Jos Mountains. 
130 van Dijk 
Discontent mounted and led to civil unrest and ultimately revolts and armed 
rebellions in the eastern, central and, later on, northern parts of the country. In 
historical publications, these rebellions and civil wars are often depicted as 
national movements but this is only partially true. The struggles at national level 
had their counterparts at regional and even local level. In several of the cantons 
in the Guéra, conflicts arose as a result of the control of the neo-traditional 
power position of the chef de canton. In the Niergui canton, the chef de canton 
was killed in fighting with rebels that was led by his relatives. The current chef 
de canton remained with the rebel forces and acquired the rank of captain in 
Hissein Habré’s army. After fiercely resisting the rebel forces with his goum-
miers,8 the chef de canton in Baro sided with the rebels and disappeared for 
three years, returning with troops to re-occupy his post as chef de canton under 
the new government led by Hissein Habré (see de Bruijn & van Dijk 2007). In 
certain villages, civil unrest led to their splitting up, to the rupture of families, 
and a general atmosphere of fear and resistance towards any authority (Fuchs, 
pers. comm.; for a study of these processes in a Chadian region south of the 
Guéra, see also Pairault 1994; Abbo Netcho 1997). 
The rebellion led to religious change over a period of two decades. The 
Margay priests lost most of their influence and politically were no longer 
relevant as chefs de village and chefs de cantons became mediators for the 
administration’s government, which was dominated by Muslim northerners. 
Their religious power waned as Islam spread in the villages under the influence 
of various rebel armies. The northern Muslim rebels despised the Margay cult 
and forced people to abandon it. The role of Islamic scholars in this movement 
is, however, not clear (Buijtenhuijs 1990).9 During this period of unrest, many 
people were killed by the rebels or government troops. Villagers were forced to 
pay taxes to the rebels as well as the government, and this state of terror forced 
many to leave the area. Some settled in the south, while others went to 
N’Djamena. This mobility was a consequence not only of social dislocation but 
also of poverty, of fear and anxiety, and of conflicts that arose between various 
groups and within groups (cf. Bennafla 2000). 
The first phase of the rebellion is reported as having had a profound impact 
on the Guéra and its people. What happened in the 1980s is less clear as there 
was no longer one unified rebel movement but several that controlled the area in 
succession (see de Bruijn & van Dijk 2007). On top of this, severe droughts 
plagued the area and led to large-scale population displacements. Apart from 
                                                 
8  Goummiers were the armed guards of the chefs de canton. In fact these were local 
militia who were in place to back up the position of the chef de canton. 
9  Buijtenhuijs (1990: 135-37) quotes extensively the thesis of a Chadian student (Nabi 
1985-86) which I could not access but similar stories were collected in the course of 
fieldwork and also by others in the east of Chad (Doornbos 1982). 
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sporadic references to the Guéra and its capital Mongo in publications related to 
skirmishes in the civil war (see Buijtenhuijs 1978, 1987; Lanne 1984), no 
documented information relates the events or conditions in the area. The 
information collected by interviewing in the villages more than 20 years after 
these events took place is confusing. There was a high basic level of violence 
that caused an outflow of young men and people to the cities. This must have 
had a considerable impact on food production in the area. 
Insecurity and drought stimulated a migratory wave of nomads from the 
north to the south, and also to the Guéra. They settled in the Guéra as drought 
refugees, herdsmen for townspeople and as agro-pastoralists clearing land and 
establishing villages with the intention of staying in the area. As a result, 
relations with other ethnic groups had to be (re)negotiated. This period was also 
marked by more tensions between and within different Hadjerai villages (Fuchs 
1997, Père Franco, pers. comm.). 
 
Local politics in the Guéra 
The changes at local level due to the civil war and conversion to Islam have 
been tremendous. In most villages, the political organization has changed from 
a system of dual control by the Margay priest and the chef de village to a single 
source of power embodied by the chef de village. The droughts and war had a 
huge impact on food production systems. Many villages and people who were 
resettled during the war for safety reasons or to bring them under the control of 
the army were killed or fled their villages. Traditional land-use patterns have 
been extremely disrupted and in combination with the demise of the Margay 
priest, this has led to uncertainty about land tenure. In one case, a village that 
had remained more or less in place started to occupy the land of a neighbouring 
village, which had been almost deserted since the war. In another case, a new 
land-use system emerged over the course of 25 years under the control of a 
number of rich male villagers. In a third case, entire villages were resettled in an 
area between former villages that was under the control of the chef de canton 
and the chef de village, whereas land near the former village sites remained 
under the control of the Margay priest who has since become irrelevant from a 
political point of view. 
At present, the power of the chef de canton is extensive in the Guéra. He 
was, and still is, the first administrative layer to deal with political, admini-
strative and legal problems. Even in civilian cases, such as divorce or adultery, 
he is often regarded as the administrator, judge and prosecutor. He does so in 
situations in which rules and norms are derived form several normative and 
legal frameworks. Given the demise of the Margay cult, the sudden prominence 
of Islam, the disruption of economic life and the displacement of people after 
thirty years of disasters, groups and individuals are often confused about rules 
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and norms. This is compounded by the physical insecurity most people have 
experienced. Though the situation has much improved since 1990 when the 
Habré regime was overthrown by Idriss Déby, the threat of physical violence, 
torture, and intimidation still looms large amid attempts by the population to 
deal with conflict and administrative and legal problems. On recent visits in 
2006, it appeared that insecurity was again on the rise. Cattle thefts and 
conflicts with passing nomadic pastoralists were increasing in frequency and 
severity. This could be the result of the appalling security situation in the east of 
Chad where the Darfur conflict was spilling across the border. 
An administrative decentralization process in the Guéra was in sight during 
our fieldwork period in 2002-2003. Guéra District (Fr: prefecture) was original-
ly subdivided into four subunits: Mangalmé, Mongo, Bitkine and Melfi. These 
in turn were subdivided into cantons headed by a traditional chef de canton. 
Basically, this administrative structure was inherited from the colonial era and 
the course decentralization took in the Guéra consisted of turning the Guéra as a 
whole into a region divided into two subunits: Melfi District, and Mongo Dis-
trict. The districts are now being subdivided into smaller sub-districts (Fr: sous-
prefectures), which coincide, not by chance according to local intellectuals, 
with the former cantons. At present, a number of cantons have been trans-
formed into sub-districts. Other cantons are still waiting to be turned into sub-
districts. No municipalities have yet been formed in the Guéra. 
The suggestion embodied by the word decentralization that this process is 
geared towards democratization is not true. All new officials are appointed by 
the central government, no elections are held and there are no bodies to re-
present the population within the new administrative structure. It is extremely 
difficult to get any reliable information on what is decentralized, why and in 
which form, which decision-making power has been transferred, how relations 
are organized with neo-traditional political positions such as the chef de canton 
and chef de village, how decision-making power is distributed over the various 
layers of the administration, and so on. 
If the division of decision-making powers and procedures are not clear for 
the administration, they will be even less so for the population, which is already 
in a state of uncertainty as to what to expect from the administration. In addition 
to the chef de canton, they are faced with a sous-préfet. In their perception, the 
authorities, regardless of whether they are state-appointed, neo-traditional or 
elected, are people who want money. In the case of administrative affairs, such 
as conflicts between villagers or between villages, between nomads and seden-
tary farmers, or when the intervention of the administration is needed or im-
posed because people have been fighting and killing each other, large sums of 
money are tapped from the village economy. 
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Another element to be taken into account is that cantons are mostly based on 
ethnic divisions. It is not clear in the Guéra whether people living in the same 
canton considered themselves as belonging to one ethnic group when it was 
established at the beginning of the colonial period. Nevertheless, one of the con-
sequences of the cantonal organization has certainly been that ethnic sentiments 
have been formed on affiliations to a specific canton. The conflicts and re-
shuffling of canton boundaries during the colonial period created a certain 
momentum for the formation of ethnic identities. The process has evolved to the 
extent that the chiefly families in the cantons are in the process of inventing oral 
traditions concerning the origins of their ethnic group and justifying the present 
political position held by the chiefly family. The chef de canton of Niergui told 
me, for example, a story about how a piece of wood, brought from Mecca, had 
pointed at the house of his father to indicate that he should be the leader of the 
Bidiyo. He also argued that the name Bidiyo indicated that they were related to 
the Bideyat, the Zaghawa clan to which President Déby belongs. The chef de 
canton of Baro produced a written document in which the various ethnic sub-
divisions in his canton were explained, and why they were different from their 
neighbours.10 These ethnic sentiments are again reinforced by transforming the 
canton into a sous-prefecture, which the population regards as official recog-
nition of their ethnic identity.11 
Food production systems at village level 
Korlongo 
The village of Korlongo has around 4,000 inhabitants spread over a vast area 
and organized in large compounds of 5-15 related families. These compounds 
are surrounded by fields of several hectares where the women cultivate sesame, 
peanuts and some sorghum and millet. Cattle routes have been made between 
the fields to allow the livestock to move from the pastures to the compounds 
where they are corralled each night. Dung is collected from the compounds and 
used to fertilize the field surrounding the compounds. 
                                                 
10  We were shown documents from the colonial era by cantonal chiefs concerning the 
history of the canton and the administrative decisions creating the boundaries of the 
cantons in order to ‘prove’ that they are a separate group from the others. 
11  In the south of Chad these subdivisions have gone even further. Commentaries in 
Chadian newspapers argue that this is done to create political divisions in the south so 
that it will not form a strong opposition to a government dominated by northerners. 
The commentators also argue that most of the appointed administrators are of north-
ern origin and accuse the government of using administrative decentralization to gain 
control over the south. 
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The men’s fields are located some distance away from the village, some-
times as far as a three-hour walk. On these outfields they cultivate millet and 
sorghum and sometimes on the low-lying plains post-rainy season sorghum 
(berberé)12 too. Given the size of the village, there is a lack of good land for 
growing crops in the immediate surroundings.  
The land-use system among the villages we studied in the Guéra is more 
complex than that in other villages. There is not only an elaborate system of 
land allocation between various crop types but also a complicated pattern of 
cattle routes which requires immense effort to maintain and a high degree of 
organization at the compound and village level. This level of organization is 
maintained through a strict organization of village life, with Islam as the basis. 
The village chief is now the one in charge of land allocation and in cases of 
conflict works in consultation with the chef de canton and the sous-préfet. Each 
of the five quarters has its own chef de quartier who is replaced if he does not 
function well. According to village officials, they have done away with the 
Margay cult, and the whole village has converted to Islam. In contrast with 
other villages, no beer is produced in this village although the women produce 
their own non-alcoholic variant of millet beer. The Dangeleat who inhabit this 
village are known as hard workers and this is promoted at the local level by 
contests to determine who is the best and the worst farmer. 
The contrast with the situation in 1965, as described by Fuchs (1997: 186ff) 
and local informants, is enormous. The entire village was located at the foot of 
the mountains and most of the villagers then still adhered to the Margay cult. 
There was a dual system of ritual and political control over land allocation but 
after a large fire reduced most of the village to ashes, it was decided to rebuild 
over a larger area and compounds were set up on other parts of the village 
territory. 
When the civil war started, the village soon came under the control of a rebel 
leader who guaranteed it a state of relative security. Unlike other locations, 
there was hardly any pillaging and the village was not set to fire as other 
villages in the region were. The decision to convert to Islam was taken as the 
outside occupants already adhered to Islam and coerced the population to follow 
suit. The altars of the Margay priest were destroyed and practising the Margay 
cult was banned (Fuchs 1997: 245). As a result, the impact of the war on the 
villagers’ wealth was limited compared to other villages. Despite the fact that 
drought ravaged the country and led to many casualties, which was interpreted 
as the revenge of the Margay, the authority of Islam was no longer challenged 
(Fuchs 1997: 245-46). The Catholic mission was burnt down and the priests 
were chased away. A new order was established. After the war and despite all 
                                                 
12  Called muskwari sorghum in Cameroon (Sorghum durra). 
 Political instability, chronic poverty and food production in central Chad 135 
the havoc, the population still disposed of assets like livestock, and they were 
able to develop an entirely new land-use system based on a combination of 
cereal cultivation and livestock keeping. 
One of the most spectacular aspects of these changes is in the spatial 
allocation of habitation sites, fields and cattle routes. Not only have livestock 
keeping and cultivation been separated, the village is now also divided into 
female and male spaces with a division between infields around the compound 
and outfields for the men in the bush. With a growing population, the internal 
dynamics of this system are expansive. This population growth is partly reduced 
by migration to urban areas such as Mongo, the regional capital, where many 
impoverished former inhabitants of Korlongo were found during our fieldwork, 
and N’Djamena, the national capital, where a number of migrants live in the 
peripheral quarters. Contacts between migrants and the village are limited. It 
would appear that the poorest move away, since they can no longer sustain an 
existence in the village. 
Settlement patterns in the village itself indicate that every now and then parts 
of compounds split off and move away from the original. The wealthiest parts 
of the compound seem to remain, whereas the poorest parts move away. Mutual 
assistance among the families making up a compound is virtually absent and 
extreme poverty exists amid the relative wealth of people who own cattle and 
are able to buffer bad harvests by selling livestock. 
Though there are few indications of conflicting claims on land, there are 
important political struggles over village leadership positions. As political 
leadership is nowadays synonymous with control over the regulation of access 
to land, these can also be regarded as struggles over land. Changes in land 
tenure occur quite frequently. People often move their compound from one 
location to another, away from the densely inhabited centre towards the less 
densely populated periphery. Fragments of compounds break away from old 
compounds and set up units of their own and as there are no clear rules for 
regulating these movements, most cases are regulated through negotiations be-
tween individuals, groups and village officials. The position of village officials 
and their legitimacy has thus become an important subject, as is testified by the 
frequent changes in these positions. 
 
Baro 
Baro is the capital of the Migaame or Djonkor Abou Telfan canton. It is located 
east of the Abou Telfan Mountains at the entrance to a valley cutting into the 
mountain range. The village of Baro did not exist until the 1950s. It was only 
when the Catholic mission asked the chief of the village of Douram for a place 
to settle that he gave them a site on his own fields some kilometres from the 
village because the village as a whole was squarely opposed to it. The chief was 
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killed soon afterwards by a bolt of lightning which, it was said, indicated that he 
had been punished by the local Margay for his deeds. The mission built its site 
on this compound, and started a school and boarding school there. Even today a 
large number of highly educated Hadjerai come from this area, having attended 
the mission school. 
When the civil war started, this site was naturally an attractive point for 
forces opposing the government and soon they were occupying strongholds in 
the surrounding villages. Several villages refused to recognize the authority of 
the chef de canton any longer and the chef de village and the chef de canton 
decided to relocate the villages around the Catholic mission of Baro and con-
centrate the population in order to create a stronghold for safety purposes. The 
population was settled on land east and north of the compound of the Catholic 
mission that bordered a wadi (a temporary stream). The former villages were 
emptied; some of them remaining deserted forever. Due to the population 
pressure on the new site, people had to change their farming systems from a 
fallow-based system to a system of permanent cultivation. And for safety rea-
sons, they could no longer stay in cultivation hamlets in the bush. 
This alone disrupted former patterns of land allocation. Some villagers’ 
agricultural land was occupied to resettle other villagers and land in the former 
villages was abandoned and could no longer be used for agriculture due to a 
lack of safety. After stiff resistance, the village and the chef de canton finally 
had to give in to the pressure of the opposition forces. The chief joined the 
opposition forces and disappeared. When the rebel forces occupied the village 
in 1978, adherence to Catholicism was forbidden and services at the Catholic 
Church were suspended. The remaining animists were pressed to convert to 
Islam. 
After the war, tensions continued between Muslims and Christians but 
fundamentalist Islam started to become influential. There were political power 
struggles but by 2001 the canton was turned into a sous-prefecture and land was 
set aside for administrative purposes. 
So in a time span of two decades, the population was resettled and changed 
religion, and the village was turned into an administrative centre with an 
enormously increased population. This has led to complicated interactions 
between traditional authority over land, state interference in land tenure, and 
Western and Muslim notions of land ownership. 
At present, there are four loci of power within the village: the village chief, 
the chef de canton, the sous-préfet and the Margay priest. People resort to 
different centres of power for various sorts of claims. Despite the fact that 
animism was suppressed and the village where the Margay altar was located no 
longer exists, the Margay priest still plays a role in the background. He is 
consulted for advice in secret, and sometimes makes sacrifices on behalf of 
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other authorities in order to legitimize land claims and promote a good rainy 
season. In 2004, the current Margay priest returned to his original village to be 
nearer to the shrine of the Margay, which he stills maintains with the help of 
some older people. He lives there with his wife and a few grandchildren who 
help him tend his goats. His son, and successor, still lives in Baro. 
In dealings with immigrating Arabs from the north, the dominant role is 
played by the chef de canton and the sous-préfet. Numerous Arabs claim access 
to pasture and fodder resources in Baro. As pastoralists from the north dominate 
the national government, their demands are difficult to turn down, even when 
local authorities want to reserve these resources for the local population after a 
season of bad rainfall. After the poor rainy season of 2002, the sous-préfet of 
Baro decided to close part of the valley west of the capital of the sous-
préfecture to Arab camel herdsmen. This valley belonged to a game reserve, 
and exploitation was consequently subject to limitations. He wanted to preserve 
the tree resources in the valley for the local sedentary population. Since the 
harvest had been bad, tree fruits and leaves would be important for the survival 
of the population. In addition, there had been a plague of locusts that had 
destroyed most of the local vegetation. 
The Arab camel herdsmen protested but the sous-préfet stuck to his decision. 
The Arabs took their case to the préfet and even to the president of the republic 
when he was on his way from the battlefields with the MDJT of Togoimi in the 
east of the country to N’Djamena and visited Oum-Hadjer in Batha Province. 
Some weeks later, the sous-préfet received a letter from the Office of the 
President ordering him to annul his decision and admit the Arab herdsmen into 
the valley. 
Most of the fields in the vicinity of the village have very poor soils because 
they are permanently cultivated without the application of any manure. Al-
though some families have disposed of livestock, the total number is far from 
sufficient to compensate for lost soil fertility. The population of the village – 
now around 5,000 – needs a much larger area for cultivation but to find virgin 
soils people have to go further and further from the village. Some families have 
started to make bush camps during the rainy season and cultivate there. How-
ever, a lot of land has been occupied in the meantime by the Arab pastoralists13 
who have migrated into the area over the past decades and have settled in the 
bush. They have settled on an almost permanent basis and obtained permission 
from the chef de canton to dig wells, which is more or less the equivalent to 
                                                 
13  One of the armed groups that dominated the region for a while during the civil war, 
the CDR, Conseil Démocratique Révolutionaire, consisted mainly of Arabs. This 
may have promoted the immigration of Arab nomads into the area. However, the 
precise link between the CDR and the Arab nomads needs to be clarified (see de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 2007). 
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having permission to settle permanently. The example discussed above suggests 
that their presence is increasingly causing problems. 
 
Bourzan 
This small village of about 100 families belongs to the canton of Niergui, the 
homeland of the Bidiyo, another group of Hadjerai. The area was located in the 
heartland of another opposition group hiding in the mountains. Between two 
mountain ranges this and a number of other villages were deeply affected by the 
war. The people were forced to settle in the valley along the road that connects 
Mongo with Abou Deïa to the south. Nowadays, there are hardly any people left 
on the plateaux and the mountains. When crossing the mountains to the old 
Margay shrine, one passes numerous abandoned fields, some of which have 
been re-opened by their former owners now living on the valley floor. The area 
has been an important corridor for the transport of military personnel and 
equipment and a number of battles were staged in the valley. As a result, the 
population was under constant pressure: entire villages disappeared, inhabitants 
were forced to move because of the war, and droughts compounded the effects 
of the war. Some of these people now live in Bourzan, while others have moved 
to Niergui where the chef de canton lives. 
The village is extremely poor. Only two of the 100 families have any cattle; 
the rest only have goats and poultry. The number of female-headed households 
is also very high because a lot of the men died during the war, or fled to safer 
areas. Nowadays many men, mainly youth, try to escape poverty and earn 
money in town. In N’Djamena the men from Bourzan gather in the quarter of 
Moursal, but this, unfortunately, does not help the women who are left behind 
in the village. Often their husbands do not come back or they spend their money 
on another woman and the amenities of urban life and send very little money 
back.  
Unlike the other two villages, systems of land use did not intensify but 
became more extensive. And because so many people had fled the area, there 
was sufficient land available to continue operating a slash-and-burn land-use 
system. Every two to three years a new field is cleared by the head of the family 
where field millet or red sorghum is cultivated until soil fertility becomes too 
low or Striga begins to cause too much damage to the crop. Then the woman in 
the household cultivates peanuts or sesame in the field until it is finally 
abandoned. Abandoned fields are easy to recognize because of the very little 
vegetation left. When the big trees have re-grown, the field can be put into 
production once again. 
This inefficient land-use system can only be sustained because the inhabit-
ants of Bourzan who remained in the area started to clear land on the territory of 
neighbouring villages. They pay compensation to a representative of the ori-
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ginal population – in the case of a neighbouring village of Bourzan this was an 
18-year-old boy. However, it is clear that these people were not able to prevent 
encroachment on their territory, and that the compensation had a token value 
only and did not imply the recognition of their authority since they were too 
weak to resist competing claims from outside. 
On the village’s own territory, land is cleared in a quite anarchistic way. As 
long as there is no competing claim, anyone seems to be able to clear land 
where s/he wants to. In this village, women too may claim land. However, they 
encounter practical difficulties in making land productive since they cannot or 
are not allowed to clear land of vegetation. In the past, they could organize a 
beer-drinking party and invite all the men to cut down the trees in the field. 
Nowadays, the production of beer and beer-drinking parties are no longer 
allowed, leaving female-headed households without any means of mobilizing 
cheap male labour. 
A central authority that had the power to regulate access to land has been 
pushed aside as the people were forced to convert to Islam. Local marabouts 
prevent overt expressions of adherence to the Margay cult and intervene, for 
example, when beer-drinking parties are organized by older men who are not 
yet willing to give in totally to Muslim proselytizing. The person who is now 
formally the Margay priest is no longer interested in the shrine and it is now 
maintained in secret by someone else. 
Curiously, in a recent dispute over frontiers between villages, the Margay 
ritual has been called to help once again, though Islam is now the official 
religion. Inhabitants of a village near Bourzan started cultivating the territory of 
another village without asking the permission of this village. The occupants 
rejected the authority of the host village by refusing to take part in the Margay 
fertility ritual at the beginning of the agricultural season. As no decisive rules 
were specified in Islam or in the laws issued by the government, the chef de 
canton and the sous-préfet had no other choice than to resort to the ancient 
pagan cults with dancing and beer drinking. 
Discussion 
The changes in the institutions and regulations controlling access to land and 
territory have been enormous. Important alterations in land-tenure regulations 
and the spatial organization of land use occurred during the years of civil unrest. 
Numerous people were forced to abandon their crop-growing land, which in 
some cases has now been reoccupied by others. In two of the villages, there is 
still an acting Margay priest who has some authority, although this is not 
officially recognized. Muslim marabouts and representatives of more funda-
mental forms of Islam are trying to become involved in village politics but at 
140 van Dijk 
the same time, there are government efforts to decentralize the administration, 
which will lead to more interference in local-level administration. At first sight, 
it appears that one land-management regime has been replaced by another. 
However, it is difficult to assess whether old land claims are still regarded as 
relevant or reasons for contesting present land claims. People have been brought 
under totally different political systems of control in an extremely short period 
of time. In the struggle for power during the war, there was a lot of violence and 
coercion, and the shadow of this time still looms large over local politics and 
the settling of land claims. 
This has led to an enormous diversity in systems of governance over land. In 
the case of Korlongo, a new system has emerged with a new design in a dif-
ferent ideological and religious framework. In the case of Bourzan, a situation 
has emerged where authority over land has become very diffuse and is no 
longer under the control of any central authority or frame of reference. Animist 
religion no longer functions and Islam does not yet have legitimacy as an 
ideological framework in the debate on the distribution of land. In the case of 
Baro, a multiple system of authority has emerged where the administration that 
has been implanted in the area and is responsible for the resettlement of the 
village is in charge. However, one also has to deal with the traditional and neo-
traditional authorities that derive their power either from the animist religion or 
from customary authority. 
At present there are few overt conflicts. This may be due to the high costs 
involved in litigations over land. When land claims need settling, they have to 
be brought to higher level authorities such as the chef de canton, the sous-préfet 
or even the court or higher order authorities. Such procedures are expensive and 
as there is no rule of law in post-war Chad, officials all want their share in the 
spoils of such conflicts. With the proliferation of administrative layers under the 
current decentralization efforts of the Chadian government, a lot more resources 
are needed to satisfy these officials’ greed. 
It is clear that the civil war and the accompanying violence have influenced 
the evolution of land rights, the economic situation and the well-being of village 
populations. This has enormous implications for any policy to combat poverty 
in remote post-conflict rural areas. Most land-use systems have low levels of 
productivity. In only one village are investments being made in land, levels of 
technology are low, and an increase in production can only result from increas-
ing the amount of land under cultivation. It is hard to assess whether people feel 
they have secure access to land or fear ancient or competing claims will be 
made once they invest in manure or new technology. At present, the scope for 
investment in land is limited with the majority being too poor to invest in 
anything and with a lot of female-headed households struggling to mobilize 
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sufficient labour just to survive. The sheer poverty of the large majority of the 
population is the first obstacle to be overcome. 
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the Great Limpopo, Southern Africa: 
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transfrontier conservation 
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The Great Limpopo is one of the largest Transfrontier Con-
servation Areas (TFCA) in the world, covering vast areas of 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The TFCA concept 
is embraced by practically all (international) conservation 
agencies, with the rationale for support being that the boun-
daries of ecosystems generally do not correspond to those of 
nation-states. By arguing that local communities living in or 
close to TFCAs will participate and benefit economically, pri-
marily through tourism ventures in cooperation with commer-
cial operators, TFCA proponents claim social legitimacy for the 
project. However, analysis shows that communities first have to 
maintain rigid standards set by the international conservation 
authorities, before they are considered fit to participate and 
benefit from the commercialization of nature. Commercial ope-
rators, NGOs and the public sector seem to have a similar 
agenda with regard to prioritizing conservation ideals before 
                                                 
1  Research conducted for this chapter was supported by the Transboundary Protected 
Areas Research Initiative, a programme under the auspices of the IUCN South Africa, 
and funded through the Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of 
Global Change, by way of a cooperative agreement between the National Science 
Foundation. The authors would like to thank Monique Nuijten, Oscar Salemink, Phil 
Woodhouse and Dick Foeken for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
chapter. They also appreciate remarks made by participants of the Conference on 
Transnational Aspects of Localized Conflict and Protest, held in Soesterberg, Decem-
ber 2004. 
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local communities can enjoy the benefits of economic develop-
ment. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Great Limpopo is one of the largest Transfrontier Conservation Areas 
(TFCAs) in the world, encompassing the Kruger National Park in South Africa, 
the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique, as well as the Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe.2 Practically all international conservation organizations 
have embraced the concept of TFCAs (Aberly 1999, Wolmer 2003), with the 
rationale for this support being that ecosystems generally do not coincide with 
national political boundaries. In addition, significant global threats to inter-
connected ecosystems and migrating species require large-scale conservation 
efforts.  
Chapin (2004) and Ramutsindela (2004b: 62) have pointed out that growing 
commercial interest in biodiversity is also driving TFCAs. Especially in the 
South, they are hailed as opportunities for economic growth through tourism 
(Wolmer 2003). Public-private partnerships are seen as the main vehicle for this 
type of economic development (Ramutsindela 2004a, 2004b). In Southern 
Africa a trend towards private wildlife conservation has been evident since the 
1980s (Wels 2003). An OECD report concluded that: 
(…) the private sector plays an indispensable role in the provision of biodiversity in 
the region [of southern Africa] (…) private reserves, conservancies and game 
ranches protect critical habitat in various regions and play an important role in the 
protection of highly endangered species including black and white rhino. (…) The 
comparison of public and private conservation reveals that the total area of privately 
protected land is growing, while there is little scope for enlarging the network of 
public protected areas. (Krug 2002: 34) 
The African Parks Foundation, established by the late Dutch billionaire Paul 
Fentener van Vlissingen, is an example that has lately received significant press 
coverage. It establishes public-private partnerships with governments to manage 
and finance their national parks. So far ‘African Parks is (…) working in six 
countries, managing eight national parks and is responsible for the stewardship 
of approximately two million hectares of African wilderness’.3 McIntosh Xaba 
& Associates confirm the increasing importance of the private sector but warn, 
                                                 
2  Even back in 1926 when the Kruger National Park was established, the South 
African government tried to persuade the Portuguese colonial authorities to establish 
a contiguous conservation area on the other side of the border (Mavhunga & Spieren-
burg 2004). 
3  See www.africanparks-conservation.com/index.html, consulted 10 December 2006. 
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in a commissioned report for the National Land Commission (NLC) and the 
Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) in South Africa, that this trend, 
whilst being promoted as ‘one of the key mechanisms to catalyze rural local 
economic development’, also carries the inherent risk for communities of ‘nega-
tive livelihoods consequences, including false and uneven economic growth, 
loss of resources, cultural pollution, and increased vulnerability’ (McIntosh 
Xaba 2003: 1).  
TFCA proponents, however, never tire of stressing that local people living in 
or close to TFCAs and other wildlife areas will benefit from the economic 
opportunities that TFCAs generate. This provides these large-scale transfrontier 
conservation efforts with social legitimacy and follows, in principle, the global 
conservation priority of ‘people and parks’, set out in the wake of the 1982 Bali 
Declaration and the 1987 report by the Brundtland Commission. Some authors, 
including Hutton et al. (2005: 345), argue that the call to allow local commu-
nities to benefit from conservation, as much as the promotion of public-private 
partnerships in conservation, fits nicely with the neo-liberal ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ that stressed the need for a reduction in the role of the central state, 
and assigned an important role to service delivery. The idea was to foster an 
entrepreneurial spirit among communities, individuals and households to exploit 
the economic values of conservation resources to ensure both sustainable 
livelihoods and conservation. Faikir (2001) initially suggested that a community 
approach to conservation could very well be combined with public-private 
partnerships. He believed the private sector to be more efficient in exploring 
and developing local possibilities for economic development and service de-
livery to local communities. However, three years later, Faikir (2004) warned 
that powerful (transnational) companies were using the partnerships to appro-
priate natural resources on a large scale, especially in developing countries (see 
also Dzingirai 2003, McDermott Hughes 2001). 
Looking at the specific case of the Great Limpopo TFCA, Ramutsindela 
(2004a, 2004b) argues that a number of factors facilitated the establishment of 
the TFCA: the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, which opened up possi-
bilities for regional co-operation; the end of the civil war in Mozambique in 
1992; and the fact that both countries have adopted a free-market approach (see 
also Carmody 2002, Castel-Branco 2002). He also argues that conservationists 
promoting the establishment of the Great Limpopo and other TFCAs in the 
region took advantage of the financial demands being placed at that time on the 
new democracies of South Africa and Mozambique. Given the pressure put on 
these governments to redress the historically skewed distribution of resources 
and services and to address economic growth and poverty alleviation as top 
priorities, nature could only be conserved if it would pay for itself. This condi-
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tion encouraged the privatization of conservation and allowed the private sector 
to step in (Ramutsindela 2004b: 69). 
President Chissano of Mozambique publicly stated that both national 
governments and the private sector in Southern Africa should establish partner-
ships and form strategic alliances to promote regional development (Tevera & 
Chimhowu 2003: 35). Critical scholars, however, argue that these strategic 
alliances can also be viewed as ‘post-colonial discursive constructions that are 
based on the use of private capital in order to establish zones of influence, 
without incurring direct costs’ (ibid., see also Mudenda 2000). According to 
Mudenda (2000) and Ramutsindela (2004a, 2004b), there is mounting anxiety 
within Southern Africa that South African investors are somehow colonizing 
the transfrontier area.  
This accusation is not only levelled against the South African private sector 
but also against conservation agencies such as SANParks (South African 
National Parks), DEAT (South African Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism) and the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), a South African NGO that 
is a major promoter and funder of TFCAs in the region. Ramutsindela (2004a) 
has suggestions about how South Africa came to dominate the Great Limpopo 
TFCA initiative. In the wake of post-apartheid transformations, SANParks 
metamorphosed into different formations (ibid.: 69). As a member of the World 
Protected Areas Leadership Forum, it deployed its former and current personnel 
to serve as international coordinators of the TFCAs, and some SANParks em-
ployees joined the PPF after its establishment in 1997. Ramutsindela thinks that 
this gives SANParks, and South Africa as a whole, a comparative advantage 
over the other countries in the region involved in TFCAs. Indeed, South Africa 
presented itself as a leader in biodiversity protection at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (ibid.: 69).  
In this chapter we discuss the opportunities for the communities living in and 
around the Great Limpopo TFCA, particularly in South Africa and Mozam-
bique, to benefit from transfrontier conservation. We will specifically focus on 
the impact of public-private partnerships concluded to manage and add econo-
mic value to the TFCA. The implementation of TFCAs involves the cooperation 
of local and international environmental and development NGOs with state 
agencies and private-sector companies. This kind of cooperation is a growing 
trend in the field of sustainable development and Edwards et al. (1999) argue 
that it provides NGOs with an opportunity to exert more objectives and interpret 
sustainable development in the same way (Draper et al. 2004, Roué 2003). 
Furthermore Edwards et al. (1999) appear to suggest that NGO influence on 
development policies is unequivocally positive, which is equally debatable. 
Whereas Escobar (1995) considers the rise of NGOs in itself as a counterpoint 
to the dominant neo-liberal discourse, others argue that NGOs contribute to 
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neo-liberalism (Levine 2002). The NGO sector is not homogeneous and its 
involvement in TFCA development is likely to have contradictory effects on the 
position of communities – which are not homogeneous either – and therefore 
further complicate the issue. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, some 
communities have received assistance from NGOs in reasserting rights over 
land within the TFCA. However, this has not meant that the communities had 
sole control over the use of this land (see also Ribot 2004). Other NGOs have 
prioritized conservation above communities’ rights to land and similar pro-
cesses can be discerned concerning the role of the private sector in TFCAs. On 
the one hand, their involvement can generate economic benefits for communi-
ties but, on the other hand, the sector’s greater experience with negotiating pro-
cesses and legal contracts can reduce these benefits and diminish communities’ 
control over land.  
The promise of development through transfrontier conservation 
The Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) has enthusiastically worked through the 
media to disseminate the message that transfrontier conservation can offer 
exciting prospects for economic growth. It was highly successful in lobbying 
for the establishment of TFCAs and in fundraising (Speets 2001). Perhaps as an 
illustration of the point made by Edwards et al. (1999), the PPF managed to 
mobilise funding for the Great Limpopo TFCA from a variety of parties in-
cluding the World Bank, USAID, the German Development Bank Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau, WWF Netherlands, Novamedia, the Rufford Maurice Laing 
Foundation, the Dutch National Postcode Lottery, the Deutsche Bank, SAFRI/-
DaimlerChrysler and the African Wildlife Foundation. The PPF itself also con-
tributes generously.4 The PPF and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
however, are most directly involved in the implementation of the Great 
Limpopo, especially in Mozambique where they have offered technical advice 
and personnel. 
                                                
Since its inception in February 1997, the PPF has stressed the importance of 
community development. John Hanks, its former executive director, repeatedly 
stated that ‘we feel very strongly about making the communities our partners in 
the growth of tourism’ (italics added).5 Its current CEO, Prof. Willem van Riet 
and the PPF founder, the late Dr Anton Rupert, never tired to stress the impor-
tance of community development and participation in TFCAs.  
 
4  See www.sanparks.org/conservation/transfrontier/great_limpopo.php. 
5  Clipping from unknown newspaper, ‘Mandela approves first Trans-Frontier Conser-
vation Area’. 
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The high hopes for community benefits are sustained by a number of high-
profile cases of communities that have been successful in economically valori-
zing natural resources that are included – or to be included – in TFCAs. A 
much-cited example in this respect is the Makuleke case in the Kruger National 
Park, in the northeastern part of South Africa (see Map 6.1 below), which is 
discussed in more detail later. Another example is the Richtersveld community 
in the northwest corner of South Africa. This community has successfully 
reclaimed land – which happened to be very rich in diamonds – from which it 
was removed in the 1920s. Not only did the community win its land back, quite 
exceptionally it successfully claimed back the mineral rights too.6 Since then 
the community has established the Richtersveld Community Conservancy, 
hoping to become part of the envisioned Greater !Gariep TFCA.7 Again, this 
(transfrontier) initiative is being presented as promoting conservation, while at 
the same time ‘boosting local livelihoods’ and striving towards ‘sustainable 
development’ (Thornton 2006).  
The success stories have fuelled the belief that transfrontier initiatives do not 
only foster nature conservation but also contribute to the economic development 
of the local population. For this to happen, partnering with the private sector is 
considered crucial in order to operationalize the assumed tourism potential of 
TFCAs. This partnership idea can be traced back to the early days of the 
CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe when local communities were stimulated 
to form partnerships with hunting operators to get hunting started in some of the 
country’s more marginal Communal Areas. The WWF supported CAMPFIRE 
wholeheartedly and produced two papers explaining how Rural District 
Councils with the appropriate authority to manage the wildlife on their commu-
nal land could form partnerships with the private sector through joint ventures 
(Jansen n.d., 1989). Safari hunting is the first activity mentioned in the docu-
ment for which a joint venture could be considered (Jansen n.d.: 1). Dzingirai 
(2003) has heavily criticized this partnering trend in conservation as it could 
marginalize communities even more. He argues that: 
 
the new environmental management partnerships emerging in southern Africa’s 
countryside (…) not only fail to deliver benefits to villagers, more importantly, they 
curtail the long-established rights to land and other natural resources of indigenous 
communities. While villagers may engage in a battle to recover these rights, it is a 
struggle in which the odds are stacked against them, and which the private sector 
and its partners are set to win (ibid. 2003: abstract). 
 
                                                 
6  Business Report, 14 October 2003, www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=260221, 
consulted 10 December 2006. 
7  See www.richtersveld.net/BROADER.htm, consulted 10 December 2006. 
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McDermott Hughes (2001: 593) concurs: ‘Ultimately, CAMPFIRE has come to 
denote an expensive public-private partnership for latter-day colonization’. 
Aided by state and donor funding, conservationists and private-sector partners 
have managed to obtain access to land that hitherto had been exclusively 
reserved for small-scale farmers, the latter running severe risks of having to 
give up farming for a relatively small share of the benefits from eco-tourism 
that often does not compensate for the loss of income from farming. 
While McDermott Hughes and Dzingirai discuss the fate of communities 
losing land to conservation, South African communities are trying to do the 
opposite and reclaim land in conservation areas. After the transition in 1994 to a 
democratic government, communities that had been displaced under discrimi-
nating legislation, such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, could file a land claim. 
Such claims are believed to greatly strengthen the bargaining power of local 
people relative to that of the conservation authorities, increasing their chances 
of extracting benefits from the parks – including those that are or will become 
part of TFCAs. Some of these were established by way of forced removals. In 
1996, the South African Minister for Land Affairs announced that land claims 
were one of the strongest mechanisms for correcting the balance of power 
between communities and conservation authorities (Reid 2001: 138). Such 
claims were facilitated by the Communal Property Association Act of 1996 that 
allows communities to set up a Communal Property Association through which 
they can acquire, hold and manage property communally (ibid.).  
 
South African Communities and the Great Limpopo TFCA:  
The Makuleke Land Claim 
One of the most widely publicized claims – and one that is often cited by both 
SANParks and the PPF as proof that communities are benefiting from the Great 
Limpopo8 – is that lodged by the Makuleke community. In May 1998 the 
Makuleke and SANParks announced that they had reached a negotiated 
settlement of the Makuleke’s claim for the restitution of what was then known 
as the Pafuri Triangle, the northernmost section of the Kruger National Park. 
This area is quite central to the Great Limpopo, bordering on all three of the 
countries involved in the TFCA. The community was able to prove that it had 
occupied the area until August 1969 when it was removed by the then 
Department of Native Affairs to an area 60 km to the south and only 6,000 
hectares in size (Harries 1987). After eighteen months of tough bargaining, the 
Makuleke were successful. At the official signing ceremony in Makuleke 
village, the new (black) CEO of SANParks announced the settlement was a 
                                                 
8  See for example, http://www.peaceparks.org/new/news.php?pid=161&mid=429, The 
Star, 6 August 2003, or Koro (2005). 
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‘breakthrough for South African conservation’ and promised that something 
like the Makuleke removal would ‘never again take place’. A new paradigm, he 
said, had been established within SANParks that aimed at transforming its 
relationship with its neighbours. 
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Map 6.1 Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
Source: GLTP website 
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This celebrated statement, however, obscured the conflictual process that 
preceded the settlement. It started with the introduction of the Transform 
(Training and Support for Resource Management) Project, a joint venture 
between the Department of Land Affairs and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Zuzammenarbeit (GtZ), a German development agency. The project was intro-
duced in 1995 to challenge the control that the National Party still held over the 
Environment Affairs and Tourism portfolio and hence SANParks (Steenkamp 
2000). As such, it provided the Makuleke with possible allies in their struggle 
with SANParks to regain control over the land they claimed in the Kruger. 
Transform supported the Makuleke Ecotourism Project, a proposal whereby the 
community would establish a game lodge on the disputed land in partnership 
with the private sector. At the time, the Makuleke land claim had not been 
settled and the land was still under the stewardship of SANParks.  
In 1996 the nature of Transform’s support for the Makuleke project changed 
dramatically. In what was described as a ‘positive move’ by the GtZ project 
manager, SANParks became part of the Transform steering committee. Within 
the multi-stakeholder format used by Transform, which did not make a dis-
tinction between primary and secondary interest groups, it was possible for 
SANParks to participate directly in the planning of the projects affecting them. 
The result was a reorientation of the GtZ funding away from the Ecotourism 
Project towards a range of alternative community development projects. 
Notable emphasis was placed on the development of a buffer zone along the 
western periphery of the Kruger, using Makuleke land. This would restrict the 
community’s possibilities of using part of the limited land that had been 
allocated to them after their eviction from the Kruger. If SANParks’s influence 
within Transform on the basis of these outcomes were analyzed, it would seem 
evident that the NGO and the public sector joined together in arguing against 
the local community along the lines of SANParks’s views on the role of com-
munities and conservation. 
The issue of the buffer zone clearly reflected SANParks’s interests and was 
repeatedly rejected by the Makuleke. Despite growing tensions, the Makuleke 
continued to participate in the GtZ-Transform steering committee, motivated by 
the impression that they could still benefit from the process. This expectation 
gradually disappeared as a result of logistical difficulties experienced by GtZ in 
making the promised funding available. At the same time, GtZ-Transform was 
secretly having discussions with SANParks about ways to resolve the land 
claim. Having become suspicious, the Makuleke eventually requested that GtZ 
keep out of their land claim. 
Unlike GtZ-Transform, which sought to reduce tensions between Makuleke 
and SANParks through the multi-stakeholder platform, the Land Claims Com-
mission recognized and exposed the conflict of interest between the Makuleke 
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and SANParks and structured the decision-making process accordingly. A 
rigorous distinction was made between Makuleke and SANParks interests, a 
step that clearly undermined existing power relations between the two and 
strengthened the community’s overall bargaining position. A particularly ener-
getic land claims commissioner further ensured that the Makuleke claim was 
taken to its logical conclusion. The Commission intervened directly at a com-
munity level by putting the Makuleke CPA (Communal Property Association) 
in place as the vehicle for community ownership of the land claimed. The CPAs 
were originally designed to replace the politically discredited ‘tribal authority’ 
system from the apartheid era and to democratize land ownership and commu-
nity development. The objective was to set in place accountable, transparent and 
representative institutions and thereby ‘transform’ community-level power rela-
tions. In Makuleke there was a good deal of overlap and cooperation between 
the CPA and the traditional authorities, though there was conflict as well. 
The breaking of GtZ-Transform’s hegemony made possible the emergence 
and establishment of an NGO-like structure in 1997 called the Friends of 
Makuleke. It consisted of four freelance consultants (including one of the 
authors of this chapter) who had developed a long-term relationship with the 
Makuleke preceding the initiation of the Transform process. From 1997 on-
wards, the Friends of Makuleke provided the community with technical ex-
pertise in the land claims process, supporting the community’s Legal Resources 
Center attorney.  
Although the Makuleke land claim was successful (see Steenkamp 2000, 
2001), a number of conditions were attached to the restoration of land owner-
ship. The land had to be used for conservation purposes for the next 99 years, 
no mining, prospecting, housing or agriculture would be permitted and no 
development was allowed without an environmental impact assessment. 
SANParks retained the right of first refusal9 should the land ever come on the 
market. Importantly, the Makuleke entered into a twenty-five-year contractual 
national park agreement with SANParks. To manage the contractual park, a 
Joint Management Board was established consisting of three SANParks and 
three community representatives. SANParks is responsible for all of the 
management costs of the Makuleke part of the park for an initial period of five 
years and after that the Makuleke community’s CPA will be liable for 50% of 
these costs (Steenkamp 2000: 143, Steenkamp 2001). These conditions amount 
to a compromise between the Makuleke and the state, encouraged by a state-
ment made by the then Minister of Land Affairs that he was willing to support 
                                                 
9  The right of first refusal in this case means that if the land were to come up for sale, 
it would be offered to SANParks first, and only be sold to another party if SANParks 
was not interested in it. 
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the Makuleke claim as long as they were willing to compromise and not be 
‘greedy’. In other words, a neo-liberal discourse and rhetoric is being used to try 
and stimulate local entrepreneurialism and commercial activities on the one 
hand. On the other hand it is a neo-liberalist approach to which conditions apply 
for the local communities. To date, we have not come across any empirical 
evidence in this case that similar or other conditions apply to private-sector 
partners. 
The Makuleke’s quid pro quo for accepting the restrictions was that the CPA 
was given the right to make sustainable use of the land’s natural resources, 
including hunting. They also gained exclusive commercial rights to the land, a 
right that they are able to exercise independently of SANParks. This is ex-
pressed by a clause in the agreement that specifies that a commercial decision 
by the Makuleke CPA is considered a decision by the Joint Management Board. 
SANParks is able to object only to the environmental dimensions of any 
proposed activities and may engage in the process through an environmental 
impact assessment. This places the Makuleke in effect on the same footing as 
the private game reserves adjacent to the park (Steenkamp 2000, 2001).  
One of the first steps taken by the Makuleke was to establish a highly 
profitable hunting camp on the land, which they used for a limited number of 
high-profile hunts per year. This was a logical step in the commercialization of 
their land claim: hunting concessions are the biggest money-maker in the 
wildlife tourism industry (Roth & Merz 1997). It was an unusual step in the 
sense that in terms of the IUCN category of a national park, of which the 
Makuleke claim is a part, hunting is strictly prohibited.10 This has remained an 
issue that SANParks is not happy with (personal communication, Steenkamp). 
As a second step, an agreement was made with a private-sector partner to 
develop a game lodge, The Outpost, on the western section of their land. 
Recently, however, the Makuleke signed a surprisingly unfavourable agreement 
with another safari operator, Wilderness Safaris. The duration of this concession 
is forty-five years, a very long timeframe considering that the contract does 
little to hold the private-sector partner to a certain level of performance and 
does not contain a clear exit clause that would allow the Makuleke to withdraw 
from the relationship if it became too unprofitable. The contract also contained 
a clause that effectively prevents the Makuleke from hunting on the land, as is 
expressed by one of the Makuleke representatives on the Joint Management 
Board: 
We have 24,000 hectares, we had all the rights, including the right to hunt. I am not 
afraid to say that the contract stopped the Makuleke from hunting. It is not 
                                                 
10  See www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/categories/index.html,  
visited 10 December 2006. 
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SANParks that stopped us, but it is the way they develop the contract with the 
private sector. We were making a lot of money with hunting (…) There are many 
mistakes in the contract (…) [These companies have] been in business for a long 
time, they are negotiating with communities who have very little experience. You 
need very good advisors to compete with these big guys. Somewhere, somehow the 
community overlooked a few things in the contract.11 
The community did, however, have access to competent legal advisors. 
Responses from former Friends of Makuleke members were mixed. One felt 
that this was the best deal that the Makuleke were likely to get; another advised 
them not to sign the agreement as it stood, but this was one day before the 
signing ceremony and the advice was not followed. 
The game lodge currently generates less than what was brought in by the 
hunting operation and it remains to be seen whether the higher projected income 
figures will eventually be achieved by Wilderness Safaris. Until such time, it is 
hard to judge whether the decision made by the Makuleke was the right one. In 
the interim, however, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the private 
sector had more experience with the negotiation of contracts in this sector than 
the Makuleke legal advisor did, and that the private tour operator and SANParks 
had similar (conservation) priorities in preventing hunting operations within the 
boundaries of a national park. The advantageous conditions applied to Wilder-
ness Safaris with regard to the length of lease and conditions on their level of 
performance could be interpreted from this angle as leverage granted for coope-
rating with SANParks. 
Dealing with national conservation agencies and policies is not easy for 
communities, as this case shows. The state is inconsistent in its approach to the 
communities, and some forces within the state were strongly opposed to the 
Makuleke claim. Furthermore, the alliances the communities concluded with 
development agencies and the private sector have generated mixed results. They 
variously helped the Makuleke secure their land and resource-use rights such as 
hunting, but also oversaw the signing of an agreement with the private sector 
that reduced these rights. In the course of negotiations, the planned transfrontier 
park was repeatedly used by SANParks as a reason for the state to retain control 
over the land. Despite land ownership by the Makuleke, the community is not 
participating in the management structure of the overall TFCA. At a workshop 
on tourism in the Great Limpopo TFCA in April 2005 at Wits Rural Facility in 
South Africa, a representative from Makuleke addressed the audience, which 
included the TFCA’s international coordinator and a SANParks representative:  
                                                 
11  See www.peaceparks.org/profiles/kruger.html 
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The way you present the plans, it appears that the communities are only subjects. 
But Makuleke have land, we have a contractual park, so we are part of the [Great 
Limpopo TFCA]. But we are not part of the management board. 
The creation of a joint management structure for the TFCA would, he claimed, 
further dilute community representation. 
If there is a representative of the joint management board of our land in the [TFCA] 
board, that does not mean that the community is represented, it is the management 
structure of our conservation area that is represented. There are lessons to be 
learned. We must ensure that communities are represented, and that this area is not 
dominated by the elite. Who benefits who[m] between the communities and the 
Great Limpopo? 
Mozambique: Freeing up space for investors 
The situation of the people living in the Mozambican part of the TFCA looks 
much grimmer. According to the initial Mozambican conception, the Great 
Limpopo TFCA was meant as a multiple-use area, supposedly to help impover-
ished communities, especially those in the communal areas in Mozambique.12 
Looking at the map accompanying the objectives (see Map 6.2) it is clear that 
the communal areas enclosed in the TFCA plan were initially much larger than 
the protected areas included, namely Coutada Sixteen, now the Limpopo 
National Park (adjacent to the Kruger National Park), the Zinhave National Park 
and the Banhine National Park combined. However, the main focus is now on 
Coutada Sixteen, which was a Wildlife Utilization Area and has about 27,000 
people living within its borders. Soon after the signing of the agreement on the 
TFCA, Coutada Sixteen was declared a national park but this was done without 
much thought as to what it would mean for the communities living on the land 
concerned. 
A World Bank consultant, who was initially involved in the TFCA re-
marked:  
This was supposed to be a transfrontier conservation area, now it is becoming a 
transfrontier park, that is not the same thing, that is not what we had agreed upon. 
This was supposed to bring benefits to the local communities, but the way it is going 
now it will not.13 
The PPF brochure celebrating the establishment of the Great Limpopo reflects 
the change in policy:  
                                                 
12  Presentation by and interview with a representative of the Makuleke community at a 
workshop on tourism, 14-16 April 2005, Wits Rural Facility, South Africa. 
13  Interview at the World Bank, Maputo, 6 August 2003. 
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Map 6.2 Original map of the Tranfrontier Conservation Area 
Source: Peace Parks Foundation 
 
 
(...) all a Transfrontier Park means is that the authorities responsible for the areas in 
which the primary focus is wildlife conservation, and which border each other 
across international boundaries, formally agree to manage those areas as one inte-
grated unit according to a streamlined management plan. These authorities also 
undertake to remove all human barriers within the Transfrontier Park so that 
animals can roam freely. [italics added] 
A member of the Mozambican National Steering Committee and the Tech-
nical Committee for the Great Limpopo concurred that what they agreed upon 
was something ‘completely different’ from what they had worked so hard to 
establish for five years.14 The World Bank consultant explained the shift in 
focus as follows: ‘The South Africans were becoming impatient. They were 
anxious to show that NEPAD15 was working, and the transfrontier park would 
be a concrete example of interregional cooperation, so they needed it.’16 At 
least some South African participants and observers agree that ‘massive 
                                                 
14  Interview at Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT), Maputo, 2 February 2001. 
15  New Economic Partnership for African Development. The South African govern-
ment was an important driving force in forging this pan-African partnership. 
16  Interview at the World Bank, Maputo, 6 August 2003. 
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ill admit that the Technical Committee was not 
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nt would not only benefit the park 
                                                
litical pressure’ was being placed on the TFCA implementers to speed up the 
cess:  
I think if asked in a sensitive way that the Mozambican and Zimbabwean senior 
people involved in the process w
allowed the time to implement the ‘Action Plan’ or timetable that they had initially 
developed and which the Ministerial Committee had slashed in half. (Senior 
conservation official, July 2005)  
Representatives of various organizations directly and indirectly involved in 
the implementation of the TFCA17 felt that the Great Limpopo had also become 
a matter of prestige for the PPF: it would be the largest TFCA on the continent 
and become a world famous park. A great deal of pressure was therefore put on 
the various partners to make it happen and, in the process, the communities lost 
out. ‘Community issues kept falling by the wayside due to the massive political 
pressure for tangible progress to be seen,’ said a senior conservation official in 
July 2005. With the release of the first group of elephants into Mozambique, for 
instance, ‘no single official effort was made by any of the governments to 
inform the local communities about the plan to translocate elephants right up to 
the day that the first group of twenty-five elephants were taken to Mozambique’ 
(ibid.). 
The majority of the people in the park live along its eastern and southern 
boundaries. Seven villages with a total of about 7,000 inhabitants are located 
along the Shingwedzi River, which transects the southern part of the park. A 
study commissioned by the PPF concluded that the banks of the Shingwedzi 
River also hold the greatest tourism potential.18 On the map accompanying the 
plan (see Map 6.3), the villages along the river have been replaced by luxury 
lodges, and only one community lodge has been foreseen along the park’s 
eastern border. A tender was put out on the Limpopo National Park’s website  
inviting tourism investors to bid for concessions on parts of the area along the 
river. The closing date for bids was August 2006. 
Both of the government officials in the Ministry of Tourism who are 
responsible for the TFCA and representatives of the Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau insisted that no forced relocations would take place.20 But at a press 
conference on 23 May 2005, the head of the TFCA’s Project Implementation 
Unit in Mozambique repeated that resettleme
 
17  Interviews in Maputo, April/May 2005. Perhaps as an indication of the power PPF is 
felt to have, none of the sources wanted to be quoted on this. 
18  Interview with PPF staff, April 2005, and interviews with members of the Project 
Implementation Unit of the Limpopo National Park, May 2005. 
19  See www.limpopopn.gov.mz. 
20  Interviews at the Ministerio de Turismo and German Embassy, Maputo, June 2002 
and May 2005. 
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e park will 
not damage their interests but will actua improve their lives. Families in this area 
can never rely on farming to escape from poverty: the soils are poor and the semi-
arid climate guarantees that yields from agriculture will always be low.21 
 
 
 
t also the communities. He announced that the first hundred families would 
resettled in October 2005 and remarked:  
It is hoped that this will lead the remaining families to understand that th
lly 
 
Map 6.3 Limpopo National Park tourism plan 
Source: Limpopo National Park website 
                                                 
21  Press statement published by the Smart News Network International, 
www.bernama.com/cgi-bin/ssn2/list_item.cgi?peserta/mozambique/mo2505_2.txt, 
consulted on 27 May 2005. 
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Ph o 6.1 Sign indicating where villagers from Macavene will be resettled 
 [Photo: Marja Spierenburg] 
e good soils here.’ Similar sentiments were expressed by many 
of 
are
ss to vast areas of 
ot
 
 
A recent visit to some of the villages along the Shingwedzi River revealed 
that this was not how most community members judged their situation. When 
asked whether she would leave the area voluntarily to move to somewhere 
along the Elephants River south of the park as proposed by park management, a 
woman responded: ‘We do not want to die from hunger over there, we do not 
want to leave th
the people interviewed. A report by a consultant on possible resettlement 
as concurs:  
They utilise alluvial soils in the Shingwedzi valley which have higher agricultural 
potential than generally occurs in the region. They have acce
grazing for livestock and to other forest resources (…) The villages have access to 
reasonable supplies of water in nearby rivers. (Impacto 2005: 1) 
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spite their objections, many people fear that they will be indirectly forced to 
move because of restrictions imposed by the park. They can ‘stay and starve’, as 
a consultant put it.  
According to national parks legislation in Mozambique, cultivation inside 
national parks is forbidden. The communities along the Shingwedzi are allowed 
to continue farming the fields they had cleared before the declaration of the park 
but they are not allowed to clear new ones. Most farmers rotate their fields 
every few years and are worried what will happen when their current fields lose 
their fertility. Furthermore, accessing the emergency pastures used in times of 
drought has become illegal. Fishing is no longer allowed, nor is subsistence 
hunting. The park is also impinging on another livelihood strategy, namely 
illegal migration to South Africa to look for (temporary) work on commercial 
farms and as servants in communities living near the Kruger National Park. 
According to police officers in the Guarda
ldlife and the fact that people will now have to cross two wildlife areas 
(including the Kruger) with predator populations will deter possible migrants, as 
will the increased anti-poaching patrols.  
The first elephants translocated into the Limpopo National Park found their 
way back into the Kruger not long after their release. To keep the elephants in 
Mozambique, a fenced sanctuary was created in the south of the park where the 
translocated animals could acclimatize. As long as the animals remain inside the 
fenced area, community members are unlikely to object to their presence. How-
ever, the southern part of the sanctuary bordering on the Massingir Dam is not 
fenced and when water levels are low, elephants and lions can cross into the 
park and go to the Shingwedzi River.23 The increased anti-poaching patrols 
have also resulted in an increase in the numbers of smaller ungulates. As a 
result, the communities are increasingly suffering from damage to their crops by 
wildlife and many have lost cattle to reintroduced predators. The situation dete-
riorated for the villagers with the opening of the newly constructed Giriyondo 
Gate border post in the park in December 2005.24 As the first tourists used the 
border post – mainly as a shortcut to the Mozambican coast – the PIU decided 
to dismantle the fences round the sanctuary, arguing that tourists would not 
want to see animals fenced in. Defending this action, which proceeded again 
without community consultation, a PIU member remarked that ‘the fence was to 
protect the animals, never to protect the people’.25 A village headman com-
 
22  Interview, Massingir, 12 May 2005. 
23  Interview with a member of the Project Implementation Unit of the Limpopo 
National Park, Massingir, 12 May 2005. 
24  The official celebration of the opening in the presence of the three heads of state, 
Presidents Mugabe, Mbeki and Guebuza, took place on 16 August 2006. 
25  Interview in Maputo, January 2006. 
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plained that ‘whenever we report damage to our crops and the loss of our cattle 
to the people from the park, nothing is done but whenever we try to defend 
ourselves against the wild animals they are there within a minute to arrest us.’ 
The communities receive no compensation for wildlife damage, as one of the 
park’s employees remarked: ‘This is now a national park, agriculture and cattle-
keeping are officially forbidden in a park, so how can we compensate for 
dam
inc
res
orced but that is not true. We are forced because 
ittee for Resettlement 
tha
munities. 
bee
rig
                                                
age to things that are not allowed?’ As a result of the restrictions and 
reased damage, many people living along the Shingwedzi now believe that 
ettlement is inevitable. The village headmen formulated it this way:  
They say that resettlement is not f
we are no longer allowed to live our lives as before, we can no longer cultivate 
where we want, we can no longer take our cattle out to graze. Yes, we agreed to 
move but we did not do so freely. 
By contrast, the Limpopo National Park’s official website states that: 
‘Fundamental to the concept of the Limpopo National Park is the requirement 
that it contributes to the welfare of the people of Mozambique through sustain-
able eco- [a]nd cultural tourism development.’ As in the Makuleke case, at-
tempts have been made to establish links with NGOs to assist the communities 
in their struggle to maintain control over their land. A number of national and 
international NGOs active in the area have organized themselves in a forum, 
which now has a representative in the Consultative Comm
t was established by the TFCA Project Implementation Unit. Through its 
contact with a German NGO, the forum has recently secured EU funding to 
facilitate coordination and better serve the com
However, the NGO representatives feel that because the area has already 
n declared a national park, it is impossible to help local people retain land 
hts in the park. As one of them remarked:  
It is now a park, what can we do? We cannot touch the park, we will not touch the 
park, it is too sensitive. All we can do is to make sure that the resettlement is done in 
a proper way, to ensure that people are sufficiently compensated.26 
Under the land laws gazetted in 1997, all land in Mozambique ultimately 
belongs to the state. Both communities and individuals can register land and 
obtain titles for the use and enjoyment of the land (see Norfolk 2004). To 
register land, communities have to convince the authorities that they have been 
occupying an area for a considerable period of time. In the case of the commu-
nities along the Shingwedzi, government officials from the Ministry of Tourism 
have repeatedly disputed the claim by these communities that they ‘belong’ to 
the area. As a result of the civil war, many people fled to South Africa, only to 
 
26  Interview with a member of the NGO Forum, May 2005. 
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return to Mozambique after the ceasefire in 1992, while others moved around 
within the area, changing residency to escape the violence. Yet, regardless of 
the conflicts about whether or not the communities belong, the state can decide 
un
int
in 
us that we were going to benefit from the park. 
rea that these families have opted to return to South Africa ‘permanently’, that 
, until they are discovered by the South African authorities. It can be 
 
 
ilaterally on the conversion of land use if this is deemed to be in the public’s 
erest (ibid.). In this case, linking up with NGOs can only assist communities 
moderating the impact of resettlement. As one community member put it: 
The first time they came they told 
But now what is happening is that when we report to them about animals nothing is 
done to help us. So now we doubt whether they are really going to help us when we 
are there [in the resettlement area]. 
Many villagers are not prepared to stay until life in the park becomes 
impossible. Cross-border migration has increased as a form of resistance to 
resettlement; and one could even speak of ‘conservation refugees’. More than 
twenty families out of a total of about a hundred families from Massingir Velho 
have ‘returned’ to South Africa. Most of these families were living in South 
Africa during the civil war and some of their members returned regularly to 
look for temporary jobs. Such is the fear of lack of possibilities in their new 
a
is
concluded that, despite the rhetoric of the Great Limpopo bringing development 
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Photo 6.2 Family in Massingir Velha 
 [Photo: Marja Spierenburg] 
to local communities, the TFCA has so far not yielded a rich harvest in (oppor-
tunities for) local development, especially now that it has become a park instead 
tour 
op
Since most development and land rights organizations find it difficult to chal-
of a conservation area. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyzed the sometimes contradictory consequences of the 
development opportunities for local communities of transnational cooperative 
processes involving three countries, and a wider network of national and inter-
national NGOs, private companies and development agencies in the context of 
the establishment of the Great Limpopo TFCA. While the TFCA is opening up 
the borders to wildlife, tourists and investors, communities are becoming in-
creasingly geographically bounded, even though their livelihood strategies often 
include border crossings. Yet in South Africa, the ideological binding of com-
munities to certain territories has also facilitated the land claim process of the 
Makuleke. Nevertheless, the Makuleke negotiated the claim with state agencies 
that were not unanimous in their response, trying to reconcile - or perhaps to 
compromise - promises to redress past injustices (by the Land Claims Com-
mission) with current conservation goals (by SANParks). The alliances the 
Makuleke have chosen, with NGOs and development agencies, to further their 
case, will have varying effects on their empowerment. In the end, the Makuleke 
managed to secure rights of access to land within the TFCA through their 
alliances but did not obtain (complete) control over the way they can use the 
land commercially. Apart from being a paradox in terms of the spirit of neo-
liberalism that seems to drive (part of the efforts towards) transfrontier con-
servation, it is also a form of disempowerment. Though their links with NGOs 
strengthened their negotiating capacities, they struggled to define a favourable 
relationship with the private sector and ended up signing a contract that signifi-
cantly reduced their control over their part of the TFCA. Here it seemed that 
agendas of the public sector, i.e. SANParks, and the private sector, i.e. a 
erator, strengthened each other in enforcing the strict and categorical condi-
tions towards conservation in a national park on the Makuleke community. 
The communities on the Mozambican side of the TFCA are clearly in a 
much worse position. They have little to no bargaining power and though the 
official policy is not to relocate them forcibly, the restrictions on land-use op-
tions and the increased presence of wild animals in the area are threatening their 
livelihoods. The change of status of the area they live in, from a Wildlife 
Utilization Area to a National Park, has undermined their right to the land. 
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lenge the state or the PPF on this issue, the communities’ alliances with NGOs 
could serve only to improve their compensation once they have been resettled. 
So
ho
er-respected, under-skilled, and under-resourced actors in this power 
gam
 economic development to the benefit of those living in or 
close to the parks.  
 
me, however, have opted to cross the border into South Africa. 
Both cases draw our attention to the dangers of treating the NGO world as a 
single body with similar goals and priorities. The same seems to hold for the 
communities and national and (inter)national private-sector companies involved 
in the establishment of the Great Limpopo: assuming they constitute single 
bodies or fit in simple categorizations does not offer much in terms of analytical 
depth or an understanding of the intricate dynamics of the interconnected confi-
gurations in local contexts. In the multi-sector alliances that communities form, 
attention should be paid to the power relations between the different stake-
lders, resulting inter alia from differences in access to funding and publicity.  
Partnerships between the state, communities, NGOs and the private sector in 
development in general but also in community-based natural resource manage-
ment (CBNRM) are advocated as important strategies towards development. 
However, in CBNRM, as we have shown in this chapter, large tracts of land that 
are – or are expected to become – under conservation, like the Great Limpopo 
TFCA, are effectively being brought under the control of such partnerships, 
which in some cases are dominated by non-state organizations and institutions. 
Despite the claims of conservation bodies and the private-sector parties in-
volved that this leads to economic development, communities are being margi-
nalized and are, in effect, denied full development potential. Local communities 
are und
e. 
What in both cases appears to be a persistent and also powerful tool in 
enforcing decisions and choices from almost all the parties involved is the 
categorization of land under conservation as ‘national park’. In the case of the 
Makuleke, it has meant that the commercially lucrative business of sport 
hunting was contractually eliminated. In Mozambique, the concept of a national 
park has meant that although people will not be forcefully removed from the 
park, they are left with no other option – in terms of livelihood opportunities – 
than to leave. The park concept has proven its resilience over time (Jones & 
Wills 2005), with its aim of preserving wildlife and their natural habitat, and of 
excluding humans. This idea still resonates today and it often does not match – 
in spirit or in practical execution – the rhetoric within transfrontier conservation 
circles of catalyzing
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The social-security function of land 
in Mbarara District, Uganda 
 
André Leliveld1 
 
 
By means of a case study in Mbarara District in southwest 
Uganda, this chapter analyzes the social-security functions of 
land for poor rural households. The results show that under the 
combined influence of population growth, market integration, 
national land-reform policies and land degradation, the social-
security functions of land in Mbarara District are eroding. This 
process is disadvantageous for poorer households and those 
totally dependent on agriculture for survival. Households 
headed by widows, divorced or single women are more likely to 
suffer as a result of the eroding social-security function of land 
than male-headed households. This has implications for the 
land-reform policies in Uganda that insufficiently reflect the 
realities found at grassroots level.  
 
 
Introduction 
The significance attached to land in agrarian economies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
generally goes far beyond the simple notion of a factor of production and its 
                                                     
1  Research for this chapter was started at the Law and Governance Group at Wage-
ningen University and continued at the African Studies Centre and was funded by the 
Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). The 
author wishes to thank Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR) for facilitating 
the field research in Uganda. This fieldwork would not have succeeded without the 
valuable assistance of Andrew Ainomugisha and Milton Rwangire, and the LC1 
Chairmen of Kyera 1 and 2, Rwariire 2, Katojoo, Ngaara, Nykakoni and Karugy-
embe. The respondents in these villages are thanked for their hospitality and for 
sharing their knowledge.  
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associated scarcity and price. Land takes on important functions of identity, 
security and prestige related to kinship, culture and religion (Sjaastad 2003). 
This chapter concentrates on the (social) security function of land in African 
agrarian economies, which used to be vested in customary land-tenure arrange-
ments whereby membership of a rural community ensured access to land, be it 
in the form of rights of use over privately apportioned land plots or the village 
commons (Platteau 2002). The cultivation of land can form a base for survival 
and a major safeguard in case of adverse events such as (temporary) unem-
ployment or falling prices on output markets. In addition, poorer members of 
rural communities could derive a substantial part of their income from the 
village commons, which then also have a clear social-security function by pro-
viding protection against the risk of chronic poverty (Agarwal 1991, Dasgupta 
1987, Platteau 2002).2 
There are, however, several developments in African societies, some dating 
back to colonial times, that have influenced the social-security function of land. 
Firstly, under the combined influence of population growth and market integra-
tion, land pressure has increased causing a shift from extensive to intensive 
resource-use patterns (Baland et al. 1999, Platteau 2002). This development has 
accelerated, particularly in areas with access to strong and expanding (typically 
urban) food markets where competition for land, fuelled by immigration and 
investment in technology, is driving the market for land (Benjaminsen & 
Sjaastad 2002, Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). Secondly, many national land 
policies and legislation are promoting individual tenure through the creation and 
registration of individual property rights. The rationale behind this is to allow 
land to be sold through land markets, which is supposed to promote investment 
and productivity growth. This is in contrast to property rights under customary 
or communal forms of tenure that are typically associated with low rates of 
productivity-enhancing investments (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). And 
thirdly, land degradation as a result of soil erosion, nutrient loss and changes in 
crops causes declining land fertility of individual and communal plots, thus re-
ducing the role of land in meeting social-security needs.  
These developments have raised questions about the social-security function 
of land in contemporary rural Africa. One position suggests that the transfor-
mation of Sub-Saharan African societies towards land markets and more indivi-
dualized forms of land tenure leads to property rights in land that are increas-
ingly defined with no regard for social-security concerns (see André & Platteau 
1998, Fafchamps 1992, de Janvry et al. 2001, Platteau 2002, Sjaastad 2003). 
                                                     
2  For the analytical use of the concept of social security in non-industrialized societies , 
see Ahmad et al. (1991), F. & K. von Benda-Beckmann (1994), Dekker (2004), de 
Bruijn & van Dijk (1995), de Jong et al. (2005), Jütting (1999), Leliveld (1994), 
Nooteboom (2003) and Platteau (1997). 
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Those persons with indirect and secondary rights to land (such as women, 
ethnic minorities, nomadic pastoralists) may lose them if land is formally 
privatized under titling and registration programmes. Land titling generally 
involves the registration of only primary (i.e. cultivation) rights and excludes 
secondary or seasonal rights (e.g. grazing, firewood and wild food gathering) 
that are likely to be important ‘safety-net’ rights for the poor under customary 
tenure (Toulmin & Quan 2000). Land title registration is also thought to favour 
the wealthy, who are best placed to deal with the bureaucratic procedures 
involved. And the development of a land market would open up the possibility 
of distress sales by the poor in times of hardship, thus accelerating social 
differentiation and landlessness among the poor. In summary, for the advocates 
of this position, the flexibility (or ‘negotiability’) of access to land though kin-
ship under customary law offers the possibility of re-allocating land to poorer 
community members on the basis of need, and the subsequent ambiguity or 
non-final character of customary rights is a positive factor that ensures conti-
nuing access for the poor (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006: 348). 
A different position is taken by Baland et al. (1999), who found that the land 
market in Uganda permitted those households that had inherited little or no land 
to acquire land, often from those who had inherited sizeable tracts of land. 
Although these landless and land-poor households continued to have less land, 
the opportunity to buy (and rent) land did increase their landholdings, and also 
improved their equity with regard to land access. Troutt (1994) had a similar 
argument based on her findings that land markets increase access to land for 
women and commercial producers, persons who generally have difficulty 
acquiring land through customary mechanisms. Several authors have pointed 
out that for poor women , customary land-tenure systems may well be a source 
of social insecurity (see van den Berg 1997, Daley 2005a, 2005b, de Jong et al. 
2005, Whitehead & Tsikata 2003).  
Both positions can be related to two interpretations of the effects of agrarian 
change in African rural societies (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). Sender & 
Johnston (2004), for example, argue that processes of agrarian change increase 
farm scale and labour demand, thus providing employment for rural people who 
would prefer to earn wages rather than eke out an uncertain living on less-
productive farms. This view assumes that the eroding social-security function of 
land is compensated for by increased output and employment to the benefit of 
the rural poor. Others, however, argue that agrarian change leads to an increase 
of average farm size but without absorbing labour displaced from small-scale 
farms, hence the importance of maintaining access to land for the poor to 
provide a safety net for a subsistence livelihood (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 
2006: 362). This view seems to dominate the discussion on poverty reduction in 
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Africa, and creates tensions between pro-poor and productivity-enhancing goals 
within national agricultural modernization strategies and land policies.  
By presenting an empirical study undertaken in Mbarara District in south-
west Uganda, this chapter aims to contribute to further insight into how devel-
opments regarding land affect the social-security function of land for poor and 
vulnerable households. After an explanation of the data set and a brief descrip-
tion of the context of the study, the first part presents and analyzes data on 
(changes in patterns in) access to land and land quality, and how this affects the 
social-security functions of land for poor and vulnerable households. The 
second section discusses the extent to which land policies in Uganda reflect the 
situation on the ground as far as the position of poor and vulnerable households 
is concerned.  
Data set 
Fieldwork was conducted in a cluster of seven rural villages in the southern part 
of Mbarara District, 2 to t10 km south of Mbarara, the district capital (see Map 
7.1). The fieldwork consisted of two parts: a study with semi-structured and 
open interviews, and a random sample survey with a closed questionnaire. The 
former was done in two villages, Kyera and Rwariire 1 in 1999. By means of 
observation, semi-structured interviews, open interviews and discussions with 
village members, community leaders and NGO workers, qualitative information 
was collected on the operation and changes in social-security arrangements, 
including the role of land in these arrangements. On the basis of a socio-
economic survey involving all the households in both villages, households and 
respondents were selected on the criteria of gender, age and wealth, thus repre-
senting the socio-economic differentiation found in both villages (see Leliveld 
1999). A total of 109 interviews were conducted.  
In 2000, a household survey was conducted in five other villages: Rwariire 
2, Katojoo, Ngaara, Nykakoni and Karugyembe. This sample survey with a 
closed questionnaire was done to check whether the observations and insights 
derived from the qualitative study were representative of a wider area. In each 
village, 40 to 50 households were interviewed (almost 50% of all the village 
households). The selection was semi-random, interviewing every second house-
hold. In total 260 interviews were held, with men and women present at most of 
the interviews. The household survey had a number of sections: household type 
and composition, livelihood activities and wealth indicators, land ownership and 
land use, land degradation, labour availability and use, risks and contingencies 
facing the household, exchange and support relations between generations and 
within social networks, and membership of and participation in community- 
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   Photo 7.1 Kyera village 
 [Photo: André Leliveld] 
 
 
based organizations and NGO programmes. Observations from both the quali-
tative study and the household survey are used here. 
Context of the study 
Mbarara District is in southwest Uganda in an area that used to be part of the 
Ankole Kingdom, also referred to as Nkore. Its people were and still are called 
the Banyankore, and are divided between Bairu and Bahima. The latter, a 
numerical minority, were pastoralists, while the Bairu majority were primarily 
engaged in agriculture. The kingdom was incorporated into the British Protec-
torate of Uganda in 1901 with the signing of the Ankole Agreement and it was 
later formally abolished in 1967 by the government of President Milton Obote 
and has not been restored. During President Idi Amin’s time, Ankole also 
ceased to exist as an administrative unit and was divided in three districts: 
Mbarara, Bushenyi and Ntungamo.  
The population of Mbarara District is about 1.1 million according to the 
2002 census, with a population density of 107 per sq km and an annual growth 
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 Map 7.1 Uganda and research area 
 
 
rate of 2.9%. The average household size is 4.9 persons and 8% of the popula-
tion lives in urban areas. The district has a tropical climate with a bi-modal rain-
fall pattern averaging 1200mm per annum. The rainy seasons are between mid-
August and December, and mid-February and May. The district has a total 
surface area of 7,606 sq km of which approximately 42%, predominantly in the 
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southern part, is given over to agriculture. This southern area has abundant 
vegetation and is hillier than the northern part, making it more suitable for the 
cultivation of food crops (see Photo 7.2). It is the leading producer of green 
bananas or matooke in Uganda and its main cash crops include maize, beans, 
vegetables and Irish potatoes. Coffee was introduced in colonial times as an 
export commodity but, due to the civil war and a sustained decline in world 
market prices, coffee production fell dramatically in the late 1990s. Mbarara 
Town is the district’s administrative centre and is enjoying economic growth as 
a service centre along the Kampala-Kigali road that forms part of East Africa’s 
Mombasa-Kigali transport corridor. Its success has tripled the town’s popula-
tion from around 23,000 in 1981 to approximately 70,000 in 2002. This urbani-
zation has created multiple links with nearby villages in terms of employment, 
trade, supplies, infrastructure (notably roads) and settlements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Photo 7.2 Land degradation in Mbarara District 
 [Photo: André Leliveld] 
 
 
Poverty and wealth distribution 
The civil war in Uganda ended in 1985, leaving the new government with a 
battered and traumatized society and social, economic and political disorder. 
Although there have been major improvements in the country since then, living 
conditions, especially among the rural poor, remain critical. In 1999/2000 about 
27% of the rural population in the western districts, to which Mbarara District 
belongs, were estimated to be living in households that spent less than what was 
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necessary to provide for their calorie requirements and a mark-up for non-food 
needs (UBOS 2003: 48, Table 6.3.2.b). In 1992 this figure was about 54%, 
which means a decrease of 50% in nearly ten years in the number people living 
below the poverty line in Uganda’s rural western districts (UBOS 2003: 49, 
Table 6.3.2.d). In Mbarara District, 39.5% of the rural population has access to 
safe drinking water, and 78.1% of the population live within 5 km of a health 
clinic (UBOS 2006: 83, Table A1.1). People in the villages surveyed depend on 
Mbarara for healthcare services, where a wide range of facilities are provided 
by NGOs, private clinics and government organizations, including a hospital. 
The villages do not have access to electricity, and safe drinking water is ac-
cessed through bore holes, by harvesting rain water and a dam. 
For more than a century, Mbarara District has had a history of commoditiza-
tion and market integration that has led to changes in relations of production 
and social and economic differentiation among households (Doornbos 1976, 
1978, Good 1970, Kafureeka 1992, Kasfir 1988, Mamdani 1987). This is re-
flected in the villages under study. Table 7.1 shows the main sources of house-
hold income (see also Table 7.7). A third of the households do not depend on 
agriculture for their daily income but this is not representative of Uganda and is 
related to land shortages near Mbarara Town which has forced households out 
of agricultural production and into casual wage labour and other non-agri-
cultural income-generating activities. 
 
 
Table 7.1 Sources of income in sample households (n=260)  
Source of income Percentage  
Agriculture only 14.7 
Agriculture and/or self-employment and/or wage labour 51.8 
Self-employment only 11.5 
Self-employment and wage labour  8.5 
Wage labour only 9.3 
Fully dependent on transfers from others 4.2 
Total 100.0 
Note: Wage labour includes both salaried employment and casual wage labour 
Source: Survey data 2000 
 
 
The diverse pattern of income generation is also reflected in differences in 
wealth among households in the villages, as can be seen in Table 7.2. Wealth 
differences were measured by using information based on visible wealth, and 
then calculating a possessions score (P-score) for each household, drawing on 
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Sender & Smith’s (1990) methodology.3 The higher the P-score, the wealthier a 
household is. The mean P-score is 3.2 for all households. At first sight, the 
wealth differences in Table 7.2 do not seem very pronounced: the distribution is 
normal with the majority of households falling in the middle ranges (2-5), while 
fewer households are found at the lower and upper ends of the scale. However, 
wealth differences by gender were more marked. The mean P-score among 
female-headed households was 2.3 and among male-headed households it was 
3.6. In female-headed households, 38.5% had P-scores of 0 and 1, compared 
with 9.7% for male-headed households.4 These patterns were also found by 
Sender & Smith (1990) and more recently by Daley (2005b) in studies in rural 
villages in Tanzania. Marked differences were also found between households 
that hired labour – a feature of ‘capitalist’ farmers – and those who did not 
(mean scores of 4.3 and 2.7 respectively), households having members involved 
 
 
Table 7.2  Possessions score of households (n=253)  
P-
score 
Number of 
households 
Percentage  Female-headed* 
households (%) 
Male-headed 
households (%) 
0 3 1.2 2.6 0.6 
1 44 17.4 35.9 9.1 
2 56 22.1 23.1 21.7 
3 46 18.2 20.5 17.1 
4 42 16.6 9.0 20.0 
5 
6 
7 
32 
24 
6 
12.6 
9.5 
2.4 
3.8 
5.1 
0.0 
16.6 
11.4 
3.4 
Total 253 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* These are de jure female-headed households. 
Source: Survey data 2000 
                                                     
3  The P-score is a simple index of the level of material well-being of households, 
providing a rapid indicator of the overall economic status of respondents and house-
holds. Households or persons score 0 for the absence or 1 for the presence of several 
pre-selected visible wealth items. The P-score for each household is calculated by 
adding up the scores for the selected items. Sender & Smith used 14 items to calculate 
the score, including the personal belongings of household members (for instance, a 
watch, coat, sweater, two or more pairs of shoes). During the Mbarara survey, suffi-
cient questions were asked on wealth items at household level to calculate a P-score, 
although it was not possible to explore intra-household wealth distribution. House-
holds could score on seven visible wealth items: their roof (metal), floor (cement), 
walls (bricks), furniture (sofa, chairs), bicycle, cattle and goats. 
4  Variance analysis (one-way ANOVA) gives an F-score of 35.70, which is significant 
at the 0.05 level.  
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in casual wage labour – usually done by poorer households – or not (mean 
scores of 2.3 and 3.6 respectively), and households with or without permanent 
salaried members (mean scores of 4.5 and 3.0 respectively).5 In summary, 
wealth differences among households are substantial, an issue that is addressed 
in further detail later.  
 
Developments in land availability and land reform 
For a full understanding of the current social-security functions of land for 
households and groups of people in Mbarara District, some insight in develop-
ments in land availability, land-tenure systems and land policies in the district is 
needed. Kasfir (1988) used the notion of the land frontier6 in a historical ac-
count of these processes in Mbarara District. In the pre-colonial Nkore King-
dom there was no land frontier and land was relatively abundant but this began 
to change when the Nkore Kingdom became part of the British Protectorate of 
Uganda in 1901. The British did not establish a plantation and settler economy 
in Uganda and smallholder agriculture – with cattle and crops – continued to be 
the basis of production in Ankole, although it became increasingly integrated in 
a capitalist economy (Kasfir 1988: 160). The main factors behind this market 
integration in the colonial period included population growth and migration, the 
emergence of a wage labour force, government and individual initiatives 
towards an expanded trade in livestock, tax collection and the gradual extension 
of coffee and tea production (Good 1970, Kasfir 1988). These factors started the 
commercialization of land as a factor of production that became manifest 
through an increasing frequency of sales and rents, either for cultivation or for 
purposes of investment, speculation and prestige (Doornbos 1978: 133). The 
colonial authorities also introduced three new tenure systems in Ankole: mailo7, 
leasehold and individual freehold, which soon became an alternative route to 
land acquisition, thus adding to the trend towards commercialization (Doornbos 
1978: 134). However, the main means of land acquisition was still inheritance 
or the opening up of vacant land because public land in colonial times – or what 
                                                     
5  Variance analysis (one-way ANOVA) gives F-scores of 50.60, 37.72, and 25.98 
respectively, which are significant at the 0.05 level. 
6  The notion of the land frontier ‘refers to the situation where there is availability of 
underdeveloped land so extensive that it has little or no market value. This frontier 
disappears when land becomes a valued commodity, whether or not it is actually 
being developed’ (Kasfir 1988: 160).  
7  Mailo land was a term adopted from Buganda where it had become the local ex-
pression for the square miles of land allocated by the British to royalty and the chiefs 
of Buganda. A similar policy was introduced in Ankole – though in smaller numbers 
– as part of the colonial benefits provided to the Bahima, who occupied most of the 
senior chieftainships in the colonial administrative system.   
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used to be called Crown Land or Karandaranda – was still widely available for 
cultivators and herders in Ankole.  
After independence in 1962, the commoditization of land and the steady 
growth in converting land from customary ownership to private freehold and 
leasehold continued, and the land frontier gradually disappeared. An important 
reason for the disappearance of the land frontier was population growth. 
Between the 1959 and 2002 censuses, the population of Mbarara District almost 
quintupled from 236,000 to 1.1 million people. Mbarara District has seen large 
inflows of migrants from other areas since the 1950s, including people from the 
densely populated neighbouring district of Bushenyi and pastoral migrants from 
Rwanda fleeing the civil war there. And since the early 1970s, Mbarara has 
experienced continuing in-migration of cultivators from the districts of 
Rukungiri and Kabale near the Rwandan border as a consequence of the earlier 
closure of the land frontier in those areas (Kasfir 1988: 162).  
A second important contribution to the demise of the land frontier has been 
subsequent national land policies which brought changes to the system of land 
tenure in the district. At independence, the majority of public land was still 
available for customary tenants and, without title, they could not legally buy or 
sell their land or use it as collateral for bank loans. To promote economic 
development, the 1969 Lands Act permitted these customary tenants to apply 
for leaseholds. The vast majority, however, could not afford the survey fees or 
just did not bother to do so and, therefore, could not sell their land. Instead, they 
started selling their coffee trees and banana plants. For most purposes they 
could be considered freehold owners but with no title to their land.  
The 1969 Lands Act was followed by the Land Reform Decree of 1975, 
which did away with all forms of freehold by declaring all land in Uganda to be 
public and to be administered by the Uganda Land Commission. The 1975 
Decree gave the state title to all land, and individuals could only acquire land 
through long-term leases (99 years). For those who had the capital to apply for 
leases, the Decree provided regulations by which customary tenants on either 
public or mailo land could be forced off the land at short notice at the discretion 
of the leaseholder. Insecurity over land led to a sharp rise in leases: the more 
leases there were, the more land rose in value in Mbarara and the more people 
wanted to acquire them.8 However, for all poor and most middle-class farmers, 
the fees made it impossible to think of applying for leases, even though many of 
them became aware of what a lease held by someone else meant for them. 
                                                     
8  In the 1970s about 16% of the total land area was covered by enclosed farms. This led 
to clashes between Bahima and Banyarwandan herders and Bairu cultivators who 
could not expand their holdings as their numbers increased, while in other places 
fencing by Bairu cultivators forced herders to move or give up their way of life 
(Kasfir 1988). 
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Actually, the status of most of the customary tenants on public land was 
reduced to that of tenant on sufferance (Kasfir 1988: 165, Rugadya 1999: 4). 
They were left with an uncertain claim to resettlement, and if they could be 
resettled it was unlikely to be on the most fertile and well-watered land in the 
area. And there was no guarantee that someone else would not lease that public 
land and evict them again (Kasfir 1988, Kafureeka 1992, Okuku 2006). Though 
suggestions were made to improve their situation, none were put into effect 
(Okuku 2006). 
Under President Museveni’s government, which came to power in 1986, a 
new land policy was gradually developed. This process was informed on the 
one hand by a modernization paradigm inspired by the IMF/World Bank 
whereby land had to be transformed into a tradable commodity to promote 
agricultural development and transformation, and, on the other hand, by the 
political power play of the Museveni government, in particular towards those 
groups seeking to restore injustices that had resulted from the implementation of 
the 1975 Decree (Bazaara 2002, Okuku 2006, Rugadya 1999). The result was 
the 1998 Land Act, whose central aim has been to reform land-tenure relations 
in Uganda and encourage and support investment in agriculture by making rural 
and urban land more readily available. The Land Act introduced two significant 
changes following the 1995 Constitution and the abolition of earlier legislation. 
First, whereas in the 1975 Land Reform Decree all land was declared public and 
vested in the Uganda Land Commission, the radical title to land was now vested 
in the citizens of Uganda. Second, the systems of land tenure that were in 
existence before independence were re-instated: customary tenure, mailo tenure, 
freehold tenure and leasehold tenure. The 1995 Constitution and the 1998 Land 
Act were the first to recognize customary tenure as a land-tenure system in 
Uganda, a remarkable fact given that following independence over 75% of land 
in Uganda was and still is held customarily (Busingye 2002). The 1998 Land 
Act has generated much discussion in Uganda. One of the major criticisms is 
that the Act is unclear and contradictory about how the poor and vulnerable are 
to be protected, while simultaneously encouraging a land market (Bazaara 2002, 
Okuku 2006, Rugadya 1999). 
Besides population growth and national land policies, land degradation has 
also contributed to the demise of the land frontier by affecting the quality of 
arable land and rendering it unsuitable for agriculture. Pender et al. (2004: 768) 
noted that the rate of soil nutrition depletion in Uganda is amongst the highest 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that soil erosion is a serious problem in highland 
areas. Several indicators of food security, farmland availability and access to 
energy sources have also deteriorated (see Pender et al. 2004: 773-775, Table 
1). Olson & Berry (2003: 10, Table 1) estimate that 50% of the total land area in 
Mbarara District is currently affected by soil erosion (see Photo 7.2). Akello 
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(2002), who links Ugandan farming systems with land degradation challenges, 
sees the erosion problems in Mbarara District resulting from the highly 
fragmented land holdings due to population pressure, alarming deforestation, 
poor farming practices, steep slopes and the customary land-tenure system. 
Land and social security: Findings from the case study 
The social-security functions of any arrangement or institution can generally be 
defined in terms of insurance and assistance. The insurance function refers to 
the support that is given to (vulnerable or poor) members of a community to 
tide them over periods of unusual economic stress caused by a wide spectrum of 
risks and uncertainties. The assistance function refers to the help provided to 
poor members of a community to escape chronic poverty. In many rural African 
societies, these social-security functions are embedded in state-contingent 
reciprocal transfers and access rules for vital resources including land (see 
Platteau 1991, 2002). Historically, the main social-security function of land has 
been assistance – helping (vulnerable) members of the community to escape 
chronic poverty. This function was mostly vested in the rules governing access 
to land (and other natural resources) insofar as these rules could ensure families 
or persons access to land that would enable them to earn a decent livelihood in 
different phases of their lifecycle, be it in the form of use rights over privately 
apportioned land plots or village commons (Platteau 2002: 6-7). If the risk lies 
in a short-term shortage of land, the customary land-tenure system could also 
have an insurance function provided that it allows for a flexible system of land 
loans or pledges to provide the necessary safeguard against short-term imbal-
ances in land distribution (Platteau 2002: 6).  
Among the Banyankole, both functions were historically vested in their 
customary land-tenure arrangements9 under which the Omugabe (the King) was 
theoretically the owner of all land although this title had little or no bearing on 
the way land was allocated (Doornbos 1978: 56). There were mainly two ways 
in which a man10 could gain access to a piece of land, namely through inheri-
tance or by opening up a new plot. The latter required the consent of the local 
                                                     
9  The term ‘customary tenure’ is used in this chapter to refer to the form of land tenure 
that recognizes land ownership not because the owner has any documents or papers 
to prove it but because the community accepts that the person owns it, either because 
it belonged to his father and grandfather or because he bought it or because he was 
the first to settle an unoccupied place (Adoko & Levine 2005). As long as everyone 
accepted the claim, it was fact. 
10  The use of the term ‘man’ should be taken very literally here because among the 
Banyankole, as elsewhere in Uganda and the developing world, only men used to 
have access to land. 
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people and the chief, something that does not seem to have been particularly 
difficult to obtain (Doornbos 1978: 132). This customary tenure arrangement 
was of particular importance to Bairu cultivators. A man who cultivated a piece 
of land had certain rights to it: to utilize his land as he thought best, lend his 
land, pledge crops but not the land itself, dispose of the land according to the 
laws of inheritance, dispose of trees growing on his land, prohibit grazing near 
his homestead, and fence his homestead. The general community had the right 
to graze communally and had access to water and other common resources 
(Rugadya 1999).  
Land ownership as a concept therefore does not have the same meaning for 
the Banyankole as might be expected regarding individual property. For the 
Banyankole, as for many other Africans, land rights are embedded in concrete 
local practices, social relations, obligations and responsibilities and do not have 
much meaning in the abstract. Rights to land were established in the past by 
cultivating the land, and as long as land was being cultivated it was said that a 
man ‘owned’ the land as if it were his individual property. A woman could only 
have access to land through her husband or a male relative, and her rights were 
restricted to usufruct rights. So women who were childless, single, widowed, 
disabled, separated or divorced, or had only female children often had little or 
no access to land and did not have access to land through a male relative either.  
 
Access to ‘permanent’ land 
Survey respondents were first asked whether their households had access to 
cultivated land that in their view could be considered as their own. They were 
also asked by which transfer arrangement their households had acquired the 
land and which land-tenure arrangement the plantations and gardens operated 
under.11 Several observations are shown in Table 7.3. Firstly, 70% of the 
poorest households (those with P-scores of 0 and 1) owned land in the form of 
banana plantations, and 21% owned gardens where vegetables, potatoes and 
other seasonal crops were grown. These figures contrast with the other wealth 
categories where at least 90% of households owned plantations and on average 
43% of households owned gardens.12 In the lower wealth strata, a relatively 
high number of (de jure) female-headed households can be found, and cross-
tabulation shows that there is a significant negative relationship between house-
                                                     
11  The term ‘plantation’ refers to the plots that are used for planting banana trees and/or 
coffee trees, usually surrounding the house (Photos 7.1 and 7.2). The term ‘gardens’ 
refers to the plots that are used for planting seasonal crops such as Irish potatoes, 
green beans, tomatoes, green peppers and so on. 
12  Cross-tabulation shows a significant relationship between access to land and wealth 
categories. Kendall’s tau-c score is 0.190, with a T-value of 4.15, which is significant 
at 0.05. 
 
 The social-security function of land in Uganda 183 
holds that are female-headed and have access to permanent land holdings.13 
Half of the households with no access to permanent land were female-headed 
households (in contrast to 28% of land-owning households), of which 76% had 
a P-score of 0 or 1, and their heads were single (6.3%), widowed (21.9%) or 
divorced (21.9%). Similar data was found by Appleton (1996: 1816), who 
reported that female-headed households were significantly less likely to report 
cultivable land among their assets. 
 
 
Table 7.3  Land ownership of households ranked by P-score (n=253)  
P-
score 
Number of 
households 
Plantation 
ownership (%) Acquired through Tenure arrangement 
   Inheritance Purchase Customary Freehold 
0-1 47 70.2 66.7 24.2 97.0 3.0 
2-3 102 89.2 68.1 30.8 97.8 2.2 
4-5 74 93.2 53.6 46.4 94.2 5.8 
6-7 30 100.0 56.6 53.3 80.0 20.0 
 
P-
score 
Number of 
households 
Garden 
ownership (%) Acquired through Tenure arrangement 
   Inheritance Purchase Customary Freehold 
0-1 47 21.2 40.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 
2-3 102 28.7 63.3 33.3 100.0 0.0 
4-5 74 45.9 50.0 41.1 97.1 2.9 
6-7 30 53.3 62.5 43.8 93.7 6.3 
Source: Survey 2000 
 
 
Findings from the qualitative study show that many of the households 
headed by widows have a long history of disease (in particular HIV/AIDS) and 
this has depleted their household’s assets, including land, or their land has been 
taken by their in-laws after their husbands died. 50% of the widows reported 
land grabbing by in-laws after their husband’s death. Some of the divorced 
women suffered social problems while they were married such as alcoholism or 
physical abuse that made them decide to leave but they were not able to enforce 
any claim to (part of) their husband’s land. Two-thirds of divorced women 
reported that they could not stay on their land after their divorce. Some of the 
male-headed households without land have faced similar problems in the past, 
in particular disease and alcoholism, which have depleted their land posses-
sions. In other cases, a lack of land was not stated as a problem because the 
                                                     
13  Kendall’s tau-c value is -0,101 with a T-value of -2.39, which is significant at 0.05. 
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head of the household had bought a plot in the village for residence purposes 
only and had an income from a salaried job in Mbarara Town. This indicates 
that landlessness is not by definition associated with lower household con-
sumption per adult because some households with remunerative non-agricul-
tural activities may choose not to farm (Appleton 1996). 
Table 7.3 also shows that most of the land owned by households is still 
under customary tenure, but on average 38% of the households purchased their 
plantations and 42% of the households acquired their gardens in the same way. 
This confirms the observations by Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2006: 356) on the 
existence of ‘vernacular land markets’ under customary tenure systems and 
indicates that most of the land traded or rented falls outside state-registered 
property, and, by implication, the ‘legal’ land market. In an earlier study on land 
ownership in the Mbarara region, Heck (1996: 7) observed that there was an 
apparent ease and frequency with which farmers and others buy and sell land in 
Ankole nowadays. A major reason is that lineages and lineage holdings have 
never had much time depth. Farmers used to change their residence quite 
frequently in their search for more or better land or in response to shifting 
political conditions. Another reason is that cash crop production (mainly coffee) 
started back in the early 1930s, providing many farmers with cash to expand 
their holdings and leading to an active land market. Similar processes have been 
observed in other parts of Uganda (see Baland et al. 1999, Deiniger & Mpuga 
2003). The figures in Table 7.3 may even underestimate the existence of a 
vernacular land market because some of the respondents who said they had 
inherited their land, indicated that their (grand)fathers had bought it way back in 
the past. 
Respondents were also asked whether their land produced enough to feed 
their households in normal years and whether they had experienced land short-
ages.14 Table 7.4 shows that while the number of landless households is still 
relatively low (except in the lowest wealth stratum), even what many land-
owning households produce from their land is not sufficient to feed their family 
throughout the year. As can be seen from Table 7.4, the answer to whether land 
possession allows for food sufficiency or not corresponds well with a control 
question about whether households with land experienced, in their perception, a 
land shortage in the last five years. At least 70% of the land-owning households 
in each wealth stratum felt they had not had enough land. And 95% of the 
respondents said that the shortage of land was a major problem in their villages. 
They were not only referring to land that could be claimed by individual house-
                                                     
14  In 1999, a severe drought hit Mbarara District. The question about food sufficiency 
was asked in 2000, which was considered by respondents to be a normal year in 
terms of rainfall and harvests. 
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holds (ekibanja, lineage land) but also to open access areas of grazing land, 
swamps and forests (karangaranga, public land). Of the 253 respondents, 229 
said there were no longer any commons in their villages that they could use for 
grazing or for collecting firewood. Drinking water could still be collected from 
pumps in the villages and wells in the valleys.  
 
 
Table 7.4  Land shortage and food insufficiency among households with land 
possessions, ranked by P-score (n=252)  
P-
score 
Number of 
households 
(n=252) 
Landless 
households 
(%) 
Land insufficient to feed 
the family (% of land-
owning h’holds, n=215) 
Land shortage in eyes of 
land-owning households 
(%, n=215) 
0-1 47 29.8 81.8 84.8 
2-3 101 10.9 74.4 82.0 
4-5 74 5.4 71.4 70.6 
6-7 30 0.0 60.0 72.4 
Source: Survey 2000 
 
 
When respondents were asked about the causes of land shortage in their 
village, four main answers emerged. Firstly, the population growth in the 
villages over the last few decades has increased the number of claims on unused 
land. Secondly, the inheritance system, whereby a man receives a part of his 
father’s land when he gets married, has led to plot fragmentation and a decline 
in plot sizes. Thirdly, economic activity in Mbarara Town has grown in the last 
20 years and this has resulted in pressure on land for residence plots and rising 
land prices in town. Increasingly, people from Mbarara Town have started to 
buy plots in surrounding villages, either for residence or speculative purposes, 
or both. And fourthly, there are the sales of land through necessity to cover 
healthcare and funeral expenses because of HIV/AIDS, and to pay school fees. 
Survey respondents were also asked about the soil quality of their land 
holdings. Table 7.5 shows that the majority of respondents classified the quality 
of their plantations and gardens as either ‘moderate’ or ‘poor’. In general, the 
soil quality in gardens was seen as being higher than that on the plantations, 
possibly because gardens are usually situated in the more fertile valleys and 
near water sources. The second column in Table 7.5 shows that households in 
the lower wealth strata generally occupy less fertile grounds, a situation widely 
seen in rural societies around the world.15 Respondents’ observations on the 
long-term quality of their soil are even more important. When asked about soil 
                                                     
15 Cross-tabulation between P-scores and quality perception gives a significant relation-
ship at 0.05 (Kendall’s tau-b -0.183, t-value -2.881). 
 
186  Leliveld 
quality over the last five years, 47.3% of the respondents said that the soil 
quality of their plantations was decreasing, while the figure for gardens was on 
average 32.7%. Only 11% of respondents said the quality of the soil on their 
plantations was improving, and 8% felt this was true for their gardens. Most of 
these respondents had participated in an NGO programme on land improvement 
and organic farming.  
 
 
Table 7.5  Respondents’ opinions about the soil quality of their plantations and gardens, 
ranked by household P-scores 
P-
score 
Respondents’ opinions of soil quality on 
plantations (n=222) 
Respondents’ opinions about soil quality 
in gardens (n=89) 
 Poor Moderate Good Decr.* Poor Moderate Good Decr.* 
0-1 54.5 39.4 6.1 60.6 10.0 70.0 20.0 20.0 
2-3 32.2 44.4 23.4 42.2 33.3 44.8 21.9 41.4 
4-5 23.2 49.3 27.5 33.3 17.6 55.9 26.5 38.2 
6-7 20.0 50.0 30.0 53.3 12.5 77.7 9.8 31.2 
* Decr. = decreasing 
Source: Survey 2000 
 
 
The land-shortage problem, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, 
creates vulnerability for another group of households in addition to the landless, 
namely those fully dependent on agriculture for survival and income generation 
(14.7% of the sample, see Table 7.1). Three-quarters of this group reported 
experiencing a shortage of land and 70.8% did not raise sufficient food to feed 
their family throughout the year. The majority of these households are in the 
middle-wealth strata: on average 17.7% of the households in the P-score range 2 
to 5 were fully dependent on agriculture. This figure is 8.5% for the 0-1 range 
and 13.3% for the highest range. And in the agriculture-dependent group, a 
relatively high percentage of female-headed households can be found (56.7%) 
compared to the whole sample (30.4%). This is no surprise because many of the 
female heads are the only adult in the household, which – in the absence of 
(informal) childcare arrangements – confines them to income-generating activi-
ties that can be done at home, i.e. agriculture or rural industry. 
 
Extending access through land loans or pledges 
Land shortages at household level do not have to be a major problem as long as 
the risk lies in a short-term shortage of land, and provided the customary land-
tenure system allows for a flexible system of land loans or pledges to provide 
the necessary safeguard against short-term imbalances in land distribution. This 
refers to the insurance part of the social-security function of land-tenure 
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arrangements. This flexible system of loans and pledges can be found in many 
customary tenure arrangements and the one in Ankole society is no exception. 
Respondents were first asked whether their households had acquired temporary 
use rights to land in the last five years and how these rights were obtained (see 
Table 7.6).  
 
 
Table 7.6 Temporary land use, purchase and sales among surveyed households, by 
access to land and P-score 
Access to 
land and  
P-scores 
Temporary 
use rights Compensation paid Rented out land 
Bought 
land (last 
5 years) 
Sold 
land (last 
5 years) 
 No Yes None Harvest Money    
Landless 
(n=29) 
        
0-1 (n=14) 4 10 4 3 3 0 0 1 
2-3 (n=11) 1 10 1 9 0 0 0 1 
4-5 (n=4) 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Land-short 
(n=170) 
        
0-1 (n=28) 7 21 1 18 2 1 0 5 
2-3 (n=73) 23 50 4 39 7 1 6 14 
4-5 (n=48) 20 28 0 15 13 4 8 5 
6-7 (n=21) 10 11 1 7 3 3 8 3 
Land-
sufficient 
(n=49) 
        
0-1 (n=5) 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 
2-3 (n=16) 13 3 0 3 0 5 1 3 
4-5 (n=20) 19 1 0 1 0 7 1 2 
6-7 (n=8) 8 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 
Source; Survey 2000 
 
 
For many of the landless and land-short households, acquiring use rights to 
land on a lease basis was a way of expanding their land holdings. Compensation 
for the lease was usually paid either in the form of a part of the harvest (in 71% 
of the landless and land-short cases) or money (for 11% of those who leased 
land). There were only a few cases where no compensation was requested 
which would seem to suggest that the system of temporary leases has an insur-
ance function against (temporary) land shortage for which a quasi-premium 
(any form of compensation) has to be paid. These figures more or less corre-
spond with the answers of those who lease land out. 80% asked for part of the 
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harvest, 7% requested money and in the rest of the cases no compensation was 
asked at all or this was left up to the tenant. Tenants were asked how they were 
related socially to the landlord. 65% of respondents said that the people they 
leased from were ‘just’ neighbours or other villagers, with neither group being 
related through kinship. 11% said the landlord was a relative of the male head 
of the household, 10% mentioned friends and 8% said the Catholic Church.16 
These figures correspond with the answers of those who leased land out: 56% 
leased land to non-kin neighbours and 16% had leased it to relatives. Among 
those who borrowed land, there were also female-headed households, with 
55.6% of the female-headed households (n=79) having access to land for 
temporary use. In 95% of the cases, the women involved borrowed from non-
relatives, people who were mentioned as friends, neighbours or other commu-
nity members. This seems to confirm the observation by Whitehead & Tsikata 
(2003: 78) that women – under customary tenure – do not only have access to 
land through marriage but also through other social relations. 
Table 7.6 shows that relatively few households (9.7%) leased land out com-
pared with the high percentage (38.7%) of households leasing land. The low 
figure for households that leased out land could be an indication that large land 
holdings are concentrated in only a few hands in the villages. Land sizes were 
not measured or asked for in the sample survey, but the number of days that it 
takes to complete the first digging of plantations and gardens was used as an 
indication. Means and variance analysis of the number of days needed for the 
first digging shows a significant difference between households that rented out 
land and those borrowing land. The mean for the group that leased land was 
11.9 days, and for those who did not it was 22.4. The same analysis, but consid-
ering whether or not households rented out land as the independent variable, 
shows similar results: 25.4 for those who did, 15.7 for those who did not.17 In 
addition, a significant relationship could be seen between the wealth status of 
households and the incidence of borrowing and leasing out land, though the 
relationship is less clear for the cross-tabulation between wealth and renting out 
land.18  
                                                     
16  The Catholic Church was only mentioned in one village where the Catholic diocese 
of Mbarara still owned land which had been allocated in the past by the colonial 
government to Catholic missionaries.  
17  The variance analysis (one-way ANOVA) with ‘the number of days for first digging’ 
as the dependent variable and ‘whether or not households leased land’ as the inde-
pendent variable gives an F-score of 21.04, which is significant at the 0.05 level. For 
the variance analysis where ‘whether or not households rent out land’ is the inde-
pendent variable, the F-score is 6.56, which is significant at the 0.05 level. 
18  Cross-tabulation between wealth categories (P-scores) and whether or not households 
leased land gives a Kendall’s tau-c of -2.38 with a T-value of -3.57, which is signi-
ficant at 0.01. Cross-tabulation between wealth categories and households leasing out 
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Extending access through purchase 
Another option for households to expand land holdings is to buy land, which 
was not possible in the past but has become an interesting feature of customary 
tenure systems in the last few decades (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006, 
Benjaminsen & Sjaastad 2002). Table 7.6 shows that in most cases households 
in the higher wealth strata were able to do so.19 In contrast to borrowing prac-
tices, no female-headed households had bought land in the last five years, 
though there are no legal constraints for women to buy land. Many of the people 
from households in the higher wealth rankings did not originate from the village 
but had come to live there in the last 20 years and had different reasons for 
acquiring land. Having salaried jobs in Mbarara Town or its surroundings, 
people have started to buy small residence plots in nearby villages because land 
is still cheaper there than in town. Others have bought bigger tracts of land to 
ensure they have access to land if they become unemployed, their business fails 
or some other adversity hits them. There is a strong social-security (insurance) 
element underlying these motives, which has been observed by other scholars 
too. Kasfir (1988: 173), for instance, observed that ‘to judge from Mbarara the 
acquisition of land presently seems more a way for entrepreneurs to protect 
assets from continuing political and economic uncertainties than to introduce 
large-scale commercial agriculture as the basis of production’. Bazaara (2000) 
noted that people buy land to ensure intergenerational security: ‘the bulk of the 
land that is passing through the market is geared towards intergenerational 
household security rather than production for economic purposes’. And Kafu-
reka (1992: 38) found that poorer people in Mbarara used land for productive 
purposes but the rich just kept it as an asset.20 
While wealthier households purchased land, others (generally poorer house-
holds) sold land (see Table 7.6) to raise cash to cover medical expenses, in 
particular the high costs that come with HIV/AIDS (36%), to pay school fees 
(16%), to buy groceries (15%), to cover building expenses (17%), or a combi-
nation of all these. Significant relations could be found between the incidence of 
land sales and vulnerable households, including female-headed households, 
single-parent households and those headed by one or two grandparents taking 
care of (orphaned) grandchildren.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
land gives a Kendall’s tau-c of 0.115 with a T-value of 1.94, which is significant at 
0.05. 
19  Cross-tabulation between P-scores and the buying of land gives a Kendall’s tau-c of 
2.63 with a T-value of 4.59, which is significant at 0.01.  
20  The observation that people invest in land more for social-security purposes than for 
productive purposes may also explain why no particular tenure system in Uganda is 
more popular than others in terms of land use efficiency (see Place & Otsuku (2002). 
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Engagement in other income-generating activities 
Another way for households to avoid land shortage is by generating income that 
does not depend on access to land. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 present such data. Table 
7.7 shows the percentage of households (in each row) that are involved in a 
particular income-generating activity.21 It can be seen that poorer (and generally 
more vulnerable households) are less engaged in agriculture than wealthier 
ones. Many poorer households compensate for a lack of income from agricul-
ture by engaging in on-farm non-agricultural activities or doing casual work for 
others. The former include activities such as beer brewing, making grass mats 
and baskets, rope making and producing products for which local inputs are 
available. Generally, these activities generate low incomes and are frequently 
found among poor female-headed households as the activities can easily be 
done at home and low-cost inputs are required.22 This is in contrast to many 
forms of off-farm self-employment such as trading, shop keeping, building, 
painting, plumbing, taxi driving (scooters or cars) and practising healing. These 
forms of self-employment were found predominantly among the higher wealth 
strata (see Table 7.7) because they generally need ex ante investments in tools, 
machines or knowledge before any income can be realized. 
A similar observation on low- and high-earning activities can be made for 
wage-labour activities. Table 7.7 shows that many poorer households were 
involved in casual wage labour, while wealthier households were engaged in 
salaried employment. Among the poorest landless and land-short households, 
60% and 70% respectively were engaged in casual labour, mainly agricultural 
activities like ploughing (with the hoe), planting and weeding. Generally, the 
wealthier households in the villages employed casual labour (see Table 7.8).23 
Casual work is not very remunerative: the daily rate paid for casual work in 
2002 varied between USh 500 and USh 1,000 (US$ 0.41 to US$0.83 at the 
time) and the number of working days ranged between 20 and 45 days a year, 
with a median of 35. However, for poorer households with a lack of opportuni- 
 
                                                     
21  No income or consumption data were collected in the survey so Table 7.7 only 
shows whether households engaged in a particular income-generating activity or not. 
The fact that many households have multiple income sources is shown in Table 7.1. 
22  Cross-tabulation shows a significant relationship between this cluster of activities 
and households that are female-headed or not (Kendall’s tau-c 1.48, with a t-value of 
1.92, which is significant at 0.05). 
23  A significant relationship can be found between wealth and whether or not house-
holds are involved in casual labour, either as labourers or as employers. Cross-tabula-
tion between P-scores and doing casual work for others gives a Kendall’s tau-c of -
0.365, with a t-value of -6.14, which is significant at the 0.05 level. Cross-tabulation 
between P-scores and employing casual labour gives a Kendall’s tau-c of 0.382, with 
a t-value of 6.50 which is significant at 0.05. 
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Table 7.7 Percentage of households involved in a particular income-generating activity, 
by land availability and P-score  
Land availability 
and P-scores 
Agricul-
ture 
Self-empl. 
on-farm 
Self-empl. 
off-farm 
Casual 
work 
Salaried 
employed 
All households (n=253)      
0-1 (n=47) 40.4 34.0 17.0 59.6 0.0 
2-3 (n=102) 70.6 17.6 39.2 41.2 10.8 
4-5 (n=74) 71.6 12.2 58.1 16.2 17.6 
6-7 (n=30) 83.3 10.0 36.7 13.3 40.0 
Landless (n=29)      
0-1 (n=14) 7.1 35.7 14.3 50.0 0.0 
2-3 (n=11) 36.4 27.3 63.6 63.6 18.2 
4-5 (n=4) 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 75.0 
Land-short (n=170)      
0-1 (n=28) 57.1 39.3 14.3 67.9 0.0 
2-3 (n=73) 72.6 19.2 39.7 41.1 8.2 
4-5 (n=48) 66.7 10.4 64.6 14.6 16.7 
6-7 (n=21) 81.0 4.8 38.1 14.3 38.1 
Land-sufficient (n=51)      
0-1 (n=5) 40.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 
2-3 (n=18) 77.8 5.6 27.8 22.2 16.7 
4-5 (n=20) 95.0 15.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 
6-7 (n=8) 87.5 12.5 37.5 12.5 50.0 
Source: Survey 2000 
 
 
Table 7.8  Percentage of households that employed casual labour (1999/2000), by land 
availability and P-score 
P-score All households 
(n=248) 
Landless 
(n=28) 
Land-short 
(n=170) 
Land-sufficient 
(n=50) 
0-1  8.5 7.7 12.0 0.0 
2-3  20.6 22.2 17.7 70.0 
4-5  39.2 33.3 65.5 53.8 
6-7 70.0 -- 66.6 87.5 
Source: Survey 2000 
 
 
ties to generate an income from agriculture because of little or no access to land, 
casual work is in many cases the only possible option apart from self-employ-
ment.  
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The social-security functions of land revisited 
This section assesses the social-security function of land and considers how it 
might develop in the near future. First of all, the case study reflects conditions 
in Mbarara District as a whole. The land frontier has disappeared in the survey 
villages and, as Kasfir (1988: 161) notes: ‘no longer can the sons of a farmer 
who want to cultivate more than the share they inherited from their father 
simply request a chief to allocate unused land’. The result has been pressure on 
the availability of arable land, the disappearance of commons and severe land 
degradation. With these developments, the assistance function of land – or to be 
more precise, of the customary land-tenure system – is eroding. This will 
probably continue as the population is growing by an alarming 2,9% annually in 
Mbarara District. Pressure is being placed on land for residence and agricultural 
purposes, not only in terms of land availability but also in terms of land quality. 
In fact, land shortage and degradation have become risks in themselves, and 
particularly female-headed households and households that depend solely on 
agriculture for survival and income generation are being confronted with this 
situation. Krishna et al. (2006) found that land-related factors like crop disease, 
land exhaustion and land division are all associated with a descent into poverty 
in western Uganda.24  
When land shortage and degradation erode the assistance function of the 
customary land-tenure system and land shortage becomes a risk in itself, one 
could still argue that this is not a problem provided that the customary tenure 
arrangements allow a flexible system of land loans or pledges to provide the 
necessary safeguard against temporary imbalances in land distribution. This 
refers to the insurance function of land. The above data show that this flexible 
system is present and because of the commoditization of land increasingly takes 
the form of ‘vernacular land markets’, through which land under customary 
tenure is rented, bought or sold. The system offers many landless and land-short 
households the opportunity of gaining access to land though temporary use 
rights and the conditional payment of compensation, either in kind or money. It 
was also shown that the system of loans or pledges gives female-headed house-
holds access to land through social relations that go beyond marriage and 
kinship. At first sight, therefore, a relatively well-developed insurance function 
of the customary tenure system seems to compensate for the eroding assistance 
function because of the disappearance of commons and unused arable land. 
                                                     
24 Other factors that are associated with a descent into poverty are health (ill health, 
healthcare expenses, and the death of income earners) and social and behavioural 
characteristics (e.g. family size, the age of the household head, funeral and marriage 
expenses, alcoholism). 
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However there is more at stake. Given that landless and land-short farmers’ 
access to land comes primarily through rental and sharecropping arrangements, 
there are indications from the case study that increased pressure on available 
land in combination with a continued commoditization of land and labour will 
work against those with lower purchasing power, thus threatening reduced 
access to land and potentially further impoverishment for poorer land users (see 
also Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). Firstly, when looking at the flexible 
system of land loans and pledges, it is tempting to describe the lease system as a 
form of sharecropping but a sharecropping arrangement usually implies a 
longer-term multi-stranded relationship between land owner and tenant, in 
which the tenant can also rely on other forms of support in times of need. But 
increasingly, as Whitehead & Tsikata (2002: 76) observed for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, land relations and transactions that were formerly embedded in social 
relations are changing into property relations. From this survey and the qualita-
tive study, it becomes increasingly clear that the relationship between land-
owner and tenant is changing into a one-stranded relationship. In many cases a 
lease is only given for one or two years, and an extension has to be negotiated 
after each growing season, which forces tenants to use the land only for culti-
vating seasonal food crops and not for planting cash crops (banana or coffee 
trees). In the tenants’ eyes, this is different from in the past when landowner-
tenant relations were longstanding and often multi-stranded. Many landowners 
remarked that they wanted to have more freedom and flexibility in how they use 
their land as new opportunities for investment or sale are presenting themselves, 
and calamities may demand the short-term availability of their land. 
Secondly, the possibility to buy and sell land in the end seems to work 
against the poorer people in villages. As discussed in the previous section, it is 
mostly the wealthier and younger households that buy land, while poorer, older 
households sell land, and often these are distress sales. Respondents from 
poorer households viewed these developments with concern because they felt 
this showed increased economic inequality in their village. Those who buy land 
are being accused of exploiting the poor by buying land cheaply instead of 
helping the poor with loans or by leasing them small areas of land. Baland et al. 
(1999), in a study in Central Uganda, found that a rise in land markets had led 
to a concentration of land assets in the hands of a minority but that land markets 
also correct initial inequalities through land sales and land rentals and the bor-
rowing of land. But Baland et al. (1999) claimed that whether this correction 
takes place depends on whether there is still a land frontier, which was not the 
case in Mbarara District. The findings in the case study, therefore, are more 
similar to those found by André & Platteau (1998) in densely populated 
Rwanda where such correction for inequalities does not take place.  
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While the commoditization of land has opened up a one-time option to sell 
land in times of hardship or cash need as a form of self-insurance for poor 
households, the sale of land by poor households to cope with distress leads to a 
vicious downward cycle. Those who sell remain in agriculture but with less land 
than before. As Kasfir (1988) and Kafureeka (1992) observed for Mbarara 
District, the disappearance of open land began to force poor farmers off their 
customary holdings, while increasing the economic differentiation with those 
who have managed to hold onto their land (Kasfir 1988, Kafureeka 1992). The 
likelihood of future emergencies increases as farm incomes decline, making 
future land sales even more likely. Land sales would seem to be accelerating the 
process through which a large class of people will become rural landless agri-
cultural labourers instead of farmers (Adoko & Levine 2005: 54), a process that 
can be observed in the villages surveyed (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Sender & 
Johnston (2004) argue that this agrarian change increases farm scale and labour 
demand, thus providing employment for rural people who would prefer to earn 
wages rather than eke out an uncertain income on less productive farms. From a 
social-security perspective, this may be advantageous because access to casual 
wage labour might be an exit option in cases of landlessness or land shortage. 
But it is also generally known that casual wage labour is an option of last resort 
because of low payments, poor labour conditions and the irregularity of de-
mands. And there are others who argue that agrarian change leads to an increase 
in average farm size but without absorbing the labour displaced from small-
scale farms, hence the importance of maintaining access to land for the poor to 
provide a safety net of subsistence livelihood (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006: 
362).  
In summary, there are strong indications from the case study that the social-
security function of land in Mbarara District is eroding. This is disadvantageous 
to poorer households and households fully dependent on agriculture for their 
survival. Households headed by widows, divorced or single women are more 
likely to suffer from the eroding social-security functions of land than male-
headed households. The following section relates these conclusions to the cur-
rent debate on land reform in Uganda.  
Land policy and social security 
Since independence in Uganda, as elsewhere in Africa, land questions and how 
to solve them have been at the centre of the political debate and policy making. 
Subsequent governments have tried to settle the land question in Uganda once 
and for all. To what extent do current land policies in Uganda deal with the 
(eroding) social-security functions of land? And are these policies informed by 
the realities at grassroots level? With sections on land in the 1995 Constitution 
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and the 1998 Land Act, the Ugandan government has three objectives; (1) to 
promote agricultural development through the creation of a land market that 
permits those with rights to land to voluntarily sell their land and for progres-
sive farmers to gain access to land; (2) to ensure that people are not forced off 
the land, particularly those who have no other way of earning a reasonable 
living or surviving; and (3) to create uniformity across the country. It is clear 
that the Land Act’s second objective has a strong social-security undertone 
because it recognizes that access to land is still vital for the survival of many 
people. 
A step forward in current land legislation is the recognition that people who 
live on customary land are landowners. Under the 1975 Decree, customary land 
holding was not recognized as a legal tenure, that is, customary tenants may 
have moved onto the land and occupied it lawfully according to customary rules 
but their continued stay there became illegal. Under the 1975 Decree, custom-
arily tenants were regarded as tenants who could be evicted at any time at the 
whim of the state (Busingye 2002, Kafureka 1992, Okuku 2006). The 1998 
Land Act grants tenure rights to customary holders of land who can now 
process certificates of customary ownership and thus gain immediate title to the 
land they occupy. The 1998 Land Act also permits holders of land by customary 
tenure to convert it to freehold tenure. This can be done with or without a 
certificate of customary tenure. And the Land Act provides for communal 
ownership of customary land, prescribing a communal Land Association, which 
can be formed by a group of persons with the aim of communal ownership and 
improved land management. This provision is intended to protect the rights of 
pastoralist communities that are still found in northeastern Uganda and in the 
cattle corridors in the western parts of the country. 
Whether the 1998 Land Act is sufficient to protect the right to land of poor 
people is subject to much debate in Uganda. One issue of concern is that the 
Land Act is based on a perception of customary tenure systems as an unchanged 
tradition, not taking into account the changes that customary systems have 
undergone since colonialism (see Cutola 2007). These include developments 
like the rise of ‘vernacular land markets’, the threat of fragmentation under 
customary tenure, rising inequality and land concentration in some parts of the 
country, the influence of land degradation, the disappearance of the land 
frontier, and the social and economic differentiation that has come with these 
developments (see also Okuku 2006, Bahiigwa et al. 2005, Baland et al. 1999, 
Deiniger & Mpuga 2003, Bazaara 2002). Though these developments are 
acknowledged in the contemporary research literature, they are not reflected in 
Uganda’s official land-tenure reform agenda. Okuku (2006) claims that this has 
much to do with the donor-driven conceptualization of land-tenure relations in 
Uganda (see also Tripp 2004) and the institutional and political context of the 
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Land Act debate in Uganda: ‘the concerns for equity, justice and social change 
in land relations in Uganda were sacrificed at the altar of power politics and 
narrow class interests’ (Okuku 2006: 22). To protect the rights of the poor, more 
radical land reform is required whereby farmers would be given title deeds and 
not certificates of occupancy (Okuku 2006: 23). Similar conclusions were found 
by Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2006: 18-22) who argue that  
(…) in circumstances of competition for land and the incipient privatisation of land 
will tend to reduce access to land for the poor, any attempt at registration of cus-
tomary rights will only secure access for the poor if this allows the registration of 
individuals’ existing use of land and other resources. (…) And in a situation where 
[also shown in this chapter, AL] landless farmers’ and land-short farmers’ access to 
land will come primarily through rental and sharecropping arrangements, land 
policy may need to consider how to ensure marginalised groups can negotiate 
protection of secondary rights, how to monitor the benefits to the poor of rental and 
sharecropping arrangements, and to seek improved access for poorer groups to 
high-return non-farm (though possibly natural resources-based) employment oppor-
tunities.  
A second point of concern is how the Land Act deals with men’s and 
women’s unequal access to land. During the drawing up of the Land Act, 
women’s movements in Uganda made sure that key clauses were included to 
protect women (see Rugadya 1999 and Tripp 2004). For example, one provision 
in the Act requires the prior written consent of both spouses in transactions 
involving family holdings. The Act also prohibits decisions pertaining to cus-
tomary land that deny women access to, ownership of or occupation of land. Of 
particular importance to women activists was the inclusion of a clause on the 
co-ownership of land between spouses and/or family members that stems from 
the fact that customary practices provide limited possibilities for women to own 
land. Though the co-ownership amendments were passed by Parliament, politi-
cal manoeuvring on the grounds of technicalities left women without this clause 
(Tripp 2004: 7).25 In the absence of co-ownership, women’s rights to land re-
main inferior to men’s, and given that customary practices are fluid because 
they are socially embedded and are based on evolving local social and political 
relations, they can still potentially help or hurt women. At a time when clan 
leaders feel under siege and land is scarce, women have no guarantee that their 
claims will be given full consideration, and practices like grabbing land from 
widows and divorced women are likely to continue. Also the exclusion of the 
                                                     
25  MP and Ethics Minister Miria Matembe was about to read the amendments into the 
microphone for Hansard (the legislative record) when she was interrupted in mid 
sentence by someone who said they were finished and that she did not need to read 
them. Later she was told that because she had not read the clauses into the micro-
phone, they could not be included in Hansard and, therefore, in the amendments to 
the Land Act (Tripp 2004: 7).  
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co-ownership clause prevents women from having access to credit as they 
cannot use land as collateral. This results in them being less willing to make 
investments that enhance agricultural productivity, one of other main objectives 
of the Land Act. 
And thirdly, other policies, not related to land reform per se, may contribute 
to dealing effectively with the eroding social-security functions of land. Several 
researchers have emphasized the importance of the promotion of land manage-
ment practices that prevent or reduce land degradation (Krishna et al. 2006, 
Pender et al. 2004). In the southwest region of Uganda, Pender et al. (2004: 
780) observed that land management measures such as soil and water conserva-
tion practices including mulching, composting, manuring and incorporating 
crop residues are increasing because these measures are apparently well suited 
to the coffee-banana system found in the country’s central and southwestern 
regions. In two of the surveyed villages, a local NGO, Kyera Farm, had been 
active in successfully promoting these measures; and farmers who had applied 
them said that the quality of their land had improved, or at least further degra-
dation had stopped. 
Landlessness is likely to become the future face of poverty in Uganda 
(Adoko & Levine 2005) and more attention needs to be paid to people who 
have no connection with land, namely the landless. The case study described in 
this chapter has shown that casual wage work is one of the exit options for 
landless or land-short households. Given Uganda’s poor working conditions, 
policies that regulate the labour conditions of rural casual wage workers could 
contribute to improving the living conditions of those who are engaged in 
casual wage labour. The existence of land markets may lead to distress sales, 
which points to the need for a gradual and balanced growth in credit and 
insurance markets that could replace more traditional pooling mechanisms 
(Sjaastad 2003: 23). In the end, the development of social-security schemes that 
could protect informal-sector workers would be very effective at preventing 
them from falling into poverty but for this to be achieved major administrative, 
technical, economic and political constraints need to be overcome in Uganda.  
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Intra-household differences in coping  
with illness in rural Ethiopia 
 
Marleen Dekker 
 
 
Recent empirical evidence from Africa suggests that households 
may not offer all members full protection against shocks. Yet 
what mechanism drives such an outcome still remains unclear. 
This chapter explores the role of support networks in coping 
with health shocks in rural Ethiopia and makes a distinction 
between the financial and labour needs. Data on 357 house-
holds and 670 individuals show financial needs can be met 
through a range of strategies undertaken by individuals and/or 
household members, while labour needs are often not cushioned 
within the household and can only be met through support 
networks of female relatives. In the absence of such networks, 
women are frequently not able to cope. These findings suggest 
that the assumption of full insurance within the household may 
cover the financial consequences of health shocks but not the 
labour needs during periods of illness.  
 
 
Introduction  
Illness is an important risk factor affecting people in developing countries. 
Some illnesses are, of course, potentially life-threatening and warrant serious 
attention but even non-life-threatening illnesses can have grave effects on 
individuals and their households, for example by affecting the availability of 
labour for domestic and productive activities or by creating increased financial 
burdens due to hospital fees and other medical costs. An increasing number of 
studies document the importance and economic consequences of health shocks. 
Dercon et al. (2005) show that the illness of a household member is the most 
frequently reported shock experienced by Ethiopian households. Similar find-
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ings are described by Dekker (2004a) for Zimbabwe, where the need to cover 
medical expenses affected rural households more frequently than other shocks. 
In China, Lindelow & Wagstaff (2005) found evidence of substantial reductions 
in income and labour supply as a result of illness. And along similar lines, 
Bogale et al. (2005) argue that the costs of illness, both financially and in time, 
contribute significantly to the impoverishment of households in rural Ethiopia. 
Except for epidemics, illness is an idiosyncratic shock, and affects only one 
or a few persons at any one given time (Dercon et al. 2005). For this reason, 
persons or households experiencing health shocks can, at least in theory, rely on 
neighbours, friends or family to provide assistance if they are not in a position 
to cope themselves. This assistance, in cash, kind or labour, will usually enable 
the sick to recover from a non-life-threatening illness. In anthropological and 
economic literature, such assistance is referred to as social security arrange-
ments (von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann 1994, Dekker 2004b, de 
Jong et al. 2005, Jutting 1999, Leliveld, this volume) or mutual insurance (risk 
sharing or informal insurance) arrangements respectively (Alderman & Paxon 
1992, Platteau 1997). 
The economic literature on risk sharing emphasizes the importance of per-
sonalized contacts in overcoming monitoring and enforcement problems asso-
ciated with informal contracts. For this reason, studies on risk sharing are in-
creasingly focusing on informal arrangements and social ties between house-
holds (de Weerdt 2004, Fafchamps & Lund 2003, Fafchamps & Gubert 2007, 
Dekker 2004b, Murgai et al. 2002). These studies take households, or the ties 
between households, as the unit of analysis and the approach assumes risk is 
fully shared within the household. Household resources will be allocated in 
such a way as to best cope with a shock affecting one of its members, ir-
respective of their age, sex or position within the household. Recent empirical 
evidence suggests this assumption may not hold. For example, Dercon & 
Krishnan (2000) showed that women in poor households in southern Ethiopia 
find it more difficult than men or women in rich households to recover from 
illness. Indications of the absence of full insurance within the household are 
also found in studies in Ghana (Goldstein 2004) and Cote d’Ivoire (Udry & 
Duflo 2004). These economic studies, however, only consider outcomes and 
barely explore the mechanisms leading to such unequal outcomes. 
When discussing the results of Dercon & Krishnan’s study with Ethiopian 
women, I asked for their perception of women’s recovery from illness and 
whether they could explain the observed differences in recovery between men 
and women. Indeed, they confirmed the differences and argued that it could be 
related to a difference in support networks. As women usually change their 
place of residence when they get married, they have fewer female relatives who 
can help them out if they become ill. This is not necessarily in terms of finding 
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money for healthcare but of providing labour for domestic activities that are 
invariably the responsibility of women, such as collecting water, cooking, 
taking care of the children and the sick, and cleaning. A woman who moves 
away from her village of birth to live in her husband’s village does not have a 
network of female relatives on whom to rely for help with her domestic 
responsibilities and is therefore more likely to resume work before being fully 
recovered or to continue to work while she is ill. This, according to the women, 
results in the reduced possibility of her recovering quickly from illness. 
This chapter explores differences in coping with illness between men and 
women and investigates the hypothesis advanced by Ethiopian women that 
gender differences in recovering from illness result from differences in social 
support networks. Such networks can be either (i) a source of transfers to meet 
cash needs for medical expenditures; (ii) a source of in-kind transfers such as 
prepared food or other household necessities; and/or (iii) a source of labour to 
fulfil domestic and/or productive responsibilities. The chapter focuses particu-
larly on differences between women who moved away from their place of resid-
ence when they got married and those who continued to live in their own 
village. The analysis presented is based on data collected in Turufe Kechema 
village in Oromiya Region, Ethiopia between May and August 2005. The sur-
vey data is supplemented with qualitative material collected in the same village 
by the author and researchers from WeD-Ethiopia.1 
Women are ill more often than men and experience longer periods of illness. 
Compared to women who did not move when they got married, women who did 
more often reported having experienced a shortage of labour when they were ill. 
In addition, fewer had access to free medical care and they more often failed to 
totally recover from their illness. Interestingly, they were able to generate 
higher amounts of money when they did recover from illness. These findings 
suggest that relocated women are more able to cope with the financial needs 
arising from health shocks through individual, household or network resources 
than with labour needs as they do not have access to a network of female 
relatives.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the data used 
in the analysis and is followed by a section setting out the context of the study 
and the relevant socio-economic characteristics of the village. The next section 
presents empirical information on the effects of health shocks and the role of 
networks in coping strategies, both for the total population and disaggregated 
                                                 
1  WeD-Ethiopia is part of the Wellbeing in Developing Countries research programme 
at the University of Bath, UK. WeD-Ethiopia is a collaborative project between the 
University of Bath and the Department of Social Anthropology at Addis Ababa Uni-
versity, Ethiopia. 
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between men and women. The differences in the effect of health shocks and 
coping strategies between women who changed their place of residence when 
they got married and those who did not are then discussed. The following 
section explores the role of networks as an explanation for these results by 
reviewing the effects of wealth, the presence of other (female) adults in the 
household and the women’s length of residence in the village. Some con-
clusions are then drawn. 
Data2 
The data used in this chapter are unique and differ from conventional survey 
data in two important ways. First, unlike most surveys that take a random 
sample from a village population, we interviewed all households in Turufe 
Kechema using a household questionnaire about household composition, house-
hold assets, any land used/owned for cultivation, livestock ownership and 
household food stores.3 Secondly, within each household we aimed to interview 
at least two adults, while in most conventional surveys questionnaires are 
addressed only to the household head. In many cases we interviewed both the 
husband and wife. If one of them had died, was involved in labour migration or 
the spouses were too old to support themselves, we also interviewed adult sons 
or daughters living with their parents (where applicable). If the children of a 
widowed respondent were too young, only one respondent per household was 
interviewed. Table 8.1 presents an overview of the number of respondents 
interviewed in households.  
We asked each respondent about his/her marital status and contract, pre-
marital and current assets, participation in economic activities, participation in 
local organizations, credit transactions, social position and perceptions, food 
 
                                                 
2  The Turufe Kechema data set (TK data set) was collected between May and August 
2005. Questionnaire data were collected by Fitsum Wakoya, Luwam Yohannes, Sul-
tan Abduraman and Tilahun Desta of the Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, Debub University, Awassa, under the supervision of the author. Indispen-
sable research support was provided by Rediet Bayu, Adane Hirpo (Debub Univer-
sity), and WeD-Ethiopia researchers Alula Pankhurst, Bizuayehu Ayele, Yohannes 
Gezahegn (Department of Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa University) and Pip 
Bevan (Bath University). The funding for data collection from the Amsterdam 
Institute of International Development and the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific 
Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we would like to thank all 
respondents from Turufe Kechema village who participated in the research and the 
support we received from key persons in the community.  
3  As we observed the entire population of the village and not only a selection, signi-
ficance tests were not performed when comparing differences in outcome.  
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Table 8.1 Composition of data set: households and individuals 
Number of respondents 
per household 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative number 
of individuals 
1 68 19.1 68 
2 266 74.5 600 
3 22 6.2 666 
4 1 0.3 670 
Total 357 100 670 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
security, illnesses and coping strategies. In total, 357 households and 670 indi-
viduals were interviewed.  
Turufe Kechema is part of two long-term research projects involving the 
collection of qualitative and quantitative information: the Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey (ERHS) and the Well-being in Development project (WeD-
Ethiopia).4 These projects have already yielded a wealth of information relevant 
to the study that is referred to in the remainder of the chapter. 
Context of the study 
Turufe Kechema is one of three villages in a kebele in Shashemene wereda in 
the Eastern Shewa Zone of Oromiya Region. It is in the Rift Valley Lake area, 
just over 10 km northeast of Shashemene town and some 250 km south of the 
Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. It is at an altitude of approximately 2,000 m in a 
plain area with fertile soil. There are two rainy seasons: the main rains, meher, 
between June and September, and the belg rains in March and April. People 
cultivate cereals (tef,5 maize, millet and wheat) and vegetables (potatoes and 
onions) for their own consumption and to sell. Many are actively engaged in 
trading and other non-agricultural activities to generate or supplement their 
incomes. The village has six small shops with basic necessities and ten drinking 
houses that sell a locally brewed spirit. Turufe Kechema has good access to 
local markets and an all-weather road connects the village to the main road from 
Addis Ababa to the south and Kenya. Crops and products can be sold at Kuyera 
market or at the markets in Shashemene and Negele, which are slightly further 
away. Potatoes are also sold to merchants who take them directly to Addis 
Ababa (Gezahegn et al. 2006). 
                                                 
4  The ERHS is being conducted by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa Uni-
versity in collaboration with the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford 
University, UK and the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, 
DC.  
5  Tef or teff is a local grain. 
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Photo 8.1 Going to the market in Kuera [Photo: Marleen Dekker] 
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Social composition 
Turufe Kechema was established during the villagization programme in 1985, 
when people who lived scattered around the kebele territory were organized into 
compact villages to facilitate service provision. Although located in an area 
originally inhabited by Oromo people, the rural areas surrounding Shashemene 
town are known for their migration history (Gezahegn et al. 2006). This is 
clearly reflected in the ethnic composition of Turufe Kechema. Just over half of 
the respondents in this study are Oromo. Amhara, Tigrayan and Wolayita 
people form relatively large minorities, while the Kambata and Hadiya are 
considerably smaller in number. Gamo, Gurage, Sidama and Silte account for 
only a tiny fraction of the village’s population. 
This variety of backgrounds is also visible when considering the different 
religious denominations found in the village. Islam, the Orthodox Christian 
religion and Kalehiwot (Protestant) are the religions most adhered to, while a 
minority attend the Catholic Church. Religion is in general strongly determined 
by ethnic background: Amharas and Tigrayans predominantly attend the 
Orthodox Christian Church, the Wolayita and Kambata are mainly followers of 
Kalehiwot, while the Oromo are Muslim. However, religious membership is not 
fully determined by ethnicity. Gezahegn et al. (2006) report that it is not un-
usual for members of one household to adhere to different religions, suggesting 
that there is some freedom of religion in the village. Although not common, 
marriage to someone outside one’s ethnic group or of a different religion is 
possible. 
 
Distribution of land and wealth 
Over the years and due to the growing population, land has become a scarce 
commodity in Turufe Kechema (Pankhurst & Bevan n.d.). Households own on 
average 0.55 hectares of land. At 0.675 hectares, the average acreage under 
cultivation is slightly higher, indicating farmers are accessing land outside the 
village through sharecropping or renting arrangements. The distribution of land-
ownership reflects differences between migrants and the original Oromo inhabi-
tants. Landlessness is significantly higher in households with non-Oromo heads 
(ranging from 19% to 50%) compared to households with Oromo heads (10%). 
Landlessness does not necessarily mean the household does not have access to 
land for crop cultivation; many households who do not own land themselves, 
rent or sharecrop land from landowners in the village. Given the skewed 
distribution of land across ethnicity of the household head, these renting and 
sharecropping arrangements are often interethnic. 
Interestingly, the distribution of land ownership in favour of the households 
with Oromo heads is not reflected in the distribution of wealth across house-
holds (see Table 8.2). This table reports the proportion of households in each 
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wealth quintile according to the ethnicity of the household head.6 Households 
with Amharan or Tigrayan heads are well represented among the richer house-
holds. Respectively 32% and 42% belong to the highest quintile, while only 
19% of Oromo belong to this wealth category.7 
 
 
Table 8.2  Ethnicity of the household head and distribution of wealth (row %) 
 Quintiles:     
Ethnicity 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Oromo (N=182) 23.1 22.0 18.7 17.6 18.7 
Amhara (N=37) 13.5 16.2 16.2 21.6 32.4 
Tigrayan (N=40) 5.0 7.5 22.5 22.5 42.5 
Kambata (N=16) 31.3 12.5 6.3 50.0 0 
Wolayita (N=37) 19.0 27.0 29.7 8.1 16.2 
Hadiya (N=17) 23.5 17.7 17.7 35.3 5.9 
Total 20.0 19.3 19.7 20.0 21.1 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
Marriage and location of residence 
In many parts of Ethiopia, including the area around Turufe Kechema, it is 
common for women to relocate to their husband’s village when they get 
married.8 Interestingly however, a considerable number of married women in 
Turufe Kechema originate from the village itself: more than half of the women 
interviewed (55%) indicated they had not changed their location of residence 
                                                 
6  These quintiles are based on the ranking of households from poor to rich on an asset-
based wealth index. The first quintile contains the bottom 20% of the distribution, i.e. 
the poorest, the second quintile represents the next 20% of households, the third 
quintile 41-60%, etc., while the fifth quintile represents the richest 20% of house-
holds. The index is based on housing characteristics (toilet facilities and iron roofing 
sheets) and ownership of assets (plough, sickle, spade, lamp, spray, cart, radio, 
bicycle, sewing machine, watch, clock, modern bed, blanket, mattress, sofa, table, 
wardrobe, leather mat and another house outside the village). For more details on the 
construction and use of asset-based wealth indices, see Sahn & Stifel (2000) and 
Dekker (2006) who constructed and reviewed the use of asset-based wealth indices in 
the Ethiopian context. 
7  Given the existing distribution of land in the village, these wealth differences be-
tween ethnic groups are counterintuitive. This discrepancy may (at least in part) be 
related to social networks in the sense that the obligations and norms related to a 
strong support network may in fact hamper individual economic development. The 
analysis required to further explore such a relationship is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
8  In Oromo culture this is related to the principle that marriage within one clan is not 
allowed. 
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when they got married. In contrast, only 5% of the men interviewed indicated 
having changed residence upon marriage. Various reasons explain this diver-
ging pattern. First and foremost, daughters from families who are descended 
from the original settlers in the area may inherit land from their fathers, 
especially if they do not have brothers who land can be passed on to. In such 
cases, the daughter(s) will establish their home in their natal village and their 
husband will come to live with her (and her family), either from within the 
village or from another village. Secondly, daughters of families who are 
descended from the original settlers may marry (sons of) migrants who came to 
live in the village. Or thirdly, daughters of migrants may marry into families 
descending from original settlers in the area. This is, for example, reflected in 
the ethnic background of women who did not change residence when they got 
married (see Table 8.3).  
 
 
Table 8.3 Women’s ethnicity and change of residence (row %) 
Ethnicity Change of residence  No change of residence 
Amhara (N=42) 46 54 
Hadiya (N=25) 26 74 
Kambata (N=28) 15 85 
Oromo (N=170) 57 43 
Tigrayan (N=36) 27 73 
Wolayita (N=39) 38 62 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
Hadiya, Kambata, Tigrayan and Wolayita women more often do not change 
residence when they marry, while the largest group of women relocating on 
marriage is Oromo women. Still, just over 40% of Oromo women did not 
relocate when they got married, indicating the first two reasons mentioned 
above are certainly important. 
Although a change of residence with marriage may affect the informal social 
ties between women and their fellow villagers, as advanced by the respondents 
referred to in the introduction, this does not hold for more formal ties in the 
village. Table 8.4 presents information on participation in local organizations.9  
 
                                                 
9  Note that the measure used here is based on dummy variables. For example, the 
variable iddir is equal to one when the respondent indicated s/he was a member of 
one or more iddirs. This is admittedly a very crude measure and does not distinguish 
between the number of associations the respondent is member of. Especially in the 
case of iddir, membership in multiple iddirs (up to four) has been recorded. The 
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Table 8.4 Percentage of women participating in local organizations 
Institution Change of residence 
(N=145) 
No change of residence 
(N=176) 
Iddir 87 82 
Cattle tera 32 42 
Equb 6 8 
Mahber 16 22 
Sembati 2 1 
Government clubs 21 11 
Source: TK data set   
 
 
In the village there are iddirs (associa-
tions that organize funerals and offer a 
form of funeral insurance), cattle tera 
(associations of cattle owners who ro-
tate responsibilities for herding), equb 
(a rotating savings and credit associa-
tion), the religious mahber and sembati 
(associations in which members prepare 
feasts, religious get-togethers and gene-
rally help each other in all aspects of 
life) and associations initiated by the 
local government. The latter were es-
tablished only a few years ago and aim 
to organize women, men and youth 
respectively.10 In the table, each cell 
represents the proportion of women 
who participate in a listed organization  
Photo 8.2 Iddir payments and each row compares the differences  
[Photo: Marleen Dekker] between women who relocated or not. 
  Although there are differences between 
women who relocated and those who did not, these are generally small. Notable 
exceptions are memberships of cattle associations and participation in organi-
zations initiated by local government, such as the mothers’/women’s associa-
tion. Local women participate more often in the first, while membership of the 
mothers’ association is more often reported by those who relocated. It could be 
                                                                                                                       
difference in the number of memberships between men and women and between 
women who relocated and those who did not should be studied in more detail. 
10  The activities of these associations have been limited to courses on how to organize 
the groups and women have been educated on their rights, participation in the com-
munity and the use of contraceptives. Future activities could include savings and 
credit schemes but these had not been arranged at the time of the study.  
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that the need to have good connections to local government structures is 
perceived to be more important by women who have moved away from their 
village of birth in order to compensate for informal social ties. The average 
number of memberships in associations is two, both for women who relocated 
when they got married and those who did not. 
 
Responsibilities within the household 
Several studies on the position of women in Ethiopia have documented a heavy 
workload for women and girls, especially regarding domestic activities such as 
collecting firewood and water, preparing food, cleaning and child care (von 
Massow 2000, Mukhopadhyay 2001). Von Massow reports that traditional and 
religious beliefs preserve this strict division of labour. Although the prevailing 
ethics in Turufe Kechema are not much different from those in Ethiopia in 
general (Gezahegn et al. 2006), in practice women do participate in economic 
activities, albeit less frequently than men. Slightly under half of the women in 
the survey cultivate crops on agricultural land (either alone, with their husband 
or with other non-household members), while 61% are involved in the culti-
vation of crops at the homestead. Just over 40% are involved in marketing the 
crop, most doing so independently of their husbands. Although participation by 
women in non-farm economic activities is lower (ranging from 2% to 14% of 
the women interviewed), some activities such as shop keeping, trading, brewing 
and the sale of dairy products, firewood or prepared food are reported more 
frequently by women than men. At the same time, men are engaged in more 
activities than women, reporting an average of 3.0 activities compared to 2.3 
activities for women. 
Although a small majority of women have an independent source of income 
that provides them with some autonomy and status, women in general have a 
lower social status than men. Traditionally, this is part of the so-called ‘patriar-
chal bargain’ whereby women, when they marry, exchange autonomy and deci-
sion-making power for protection and support from their husbands (Kandiyoti 
1988). This implicitly implies it is the responsibility of the husband to provide 
his wife with adequate protection against shocks.  
Illness and coping 
In the individual questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate whether they 
themselves had been ill over the past year.11 If so, they were asked a range of 
questions about their symptoms and the duration of the illness, how it affected 
                                                 
11  Other questions in this part of the questionnaire asked about the illnesses of other 
household or family members, and deaths in the household or family. In this chapter 
we restrict the analysis to cases of illness reported by the respondent him/herself.  
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them and if and how they were able to meet any related medical expenses. We 
first explore the general pattern of illness and coping reported by the respond-
ents and touch upon differences between men and women. In the next section, 
this is followed by a more in-depth exploration of heterogeneity among women, 
notably related to their migration status. 
 
Illnesses: differential impact men and women 
Table 8.5 presents selected indicators related to self-reported illness and pro-
vides insights into the effects of illness on respondents. The results clearly 
indicate that women experience illness more often than men; 64% of women 
reported at least one period of illness in the past year compared to 50% of men. 
The total number of days this illness lasted was also considerably higher for 
women: on average they were ill for 54 days compared to 34 days for men. This 
difference however decreases to 22 and 27 days respectively when corrected for 
chronic illnesses with long-lasting effects (in this case measured as lasting 
longer than 300 days).  
 
 
Table 8.5 Indicators on the effect of illness: frequency percentages for all  
 respondents and men and women respectively 
Indicator All respondents Men Women 
 (N= 668) (N=308) (N=360) 
Illness in the past year 58 50 64 
    
For those who reported illness (N=385) (N=153) (N=232) 
Effect: - labour 21 17 24 
 - cash 13 6 17 
 - cash and labour 66 75 59 
    
Income:  - no effect 25 22 28 
 - moderate effect 50 51 49 
 - severe effect 25 26 23 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
If we look more closely at the effect of the illness on the respondents, dis-
tinguishing self-reported effects on labour, cash and income, men experienced a 
labour shortage slightly more frequently than women, either in combination 
with a need for cash or not; 92% and 83% respectively. At the same time, men 
more often report an effect on their income compared to women. Taken to-
gether, these results suggest that although women are more often confronted 
with health problems, the impact is no worse for them than for men. This is in 
contrast to the findings reported by Dercon & Krishnan (2000).  
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It is also important to consider the way individuals or their fellow household 
members met the medical expenses they incurred due to their illness. A wide 
range of responses are mentioned by respondents and illustrated in Table 8.6.12 
The most frequently recorded response is the sale of assets, ranging from selling 
cattle or land to the sale of part of their harvest to cover medical expenses. The 
second most frequent was to do nothing, using self-treatment or waiting until 
the illness was over, a response given by a quarter of respondents who had been 
ill in the past year. Some 15% used savings to cover medical expenses. A net-
work strategy, i.e. borrowing money or getting assistance from friends, neigh-
bours or relatives was reported by just over 10% of respondents. Free medical 
care through a letter from the kebele was obtained by 5% of the respondents 
reporting illness. Borrowing money from a moneylender or iddir, working 
longer hours and other strategies were of minor importance. 
 
 
Table 8.6  Responses to illness reported by respondents who were ill (in %)  
 and total amount of money generated in response to illness 
Response All respondents Men Women 
 (N=376) (N=153) (N=224) 
Sale of assets 32 31 32 
Use of savings 17 19 15 
Network strategy 14 12 14 
Free medical care 5 7 4 
Borrowing money from 
   moneylender 
3 5 2 
Borrowing money from iddir 2 1 2 
Increased work by h’hld members 3 3 3 
Other 1 1 1 
Nothing 24 21 27 
Amount (in Birr) 106 85 120 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
Comparing the third and fourth columns of Table 8.6, there are only slight 
differences in responses to the illnesses of men and women, while the bottom 
row does show women’s illnesses on average triggered the generation of more 
money compared to men’s illnesses. Therefore, the findings presented in this 
section do not offer a consistent perspective on the differences in coping with 
illness between men and women, as reported by Dercon & Krishnan (2000). 
Although women report illnesses more often and slightly longer episodes of 
                                                 
12  In this list of coping strategies, no distinction is made between the person who 
actually took the action, e.g. whose assets were sold, whose network was used, etc. 
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illness, they do not report a shortage of labour and effects on income any more 
frequently. At the same time, men and women display very similar strategies in 
coping with illness and larger amounts of money are generated to deal with the 
illness of a woman. To gain more insight into the possible mechanism behind 
the differences in recovery from illness between men and women, the next 
section looks in more detail at the existence of heterogeneity between women 
with respect to the effects of coping with illness. 
Illness: Heterogeneity between women 
To further explore the hypothesis advanced in the introduction that differences 
in support networks may affect the impact of illness and coping strategies, we 
disaggregate our findings to women who moved when they got married and 
women who did not. This change in residence is a proxy for informal support 
networks of female relatives that can provide labour for women during episodes 
of illness and/or financial assistance to meet medical expenditures. 
Table 8.7 shows that there is no difference in incidences of illness between 
women who relocated when they got married and those who did not. Although 
they report slightly shorter episodes of illness (on average 65 compared to 46 
days), this difference disappears when correcting for chronic illnesses. There is, 
however, a difference in the impact of illness in line with the hypothesis 
advanced by Ethiopian women. Although the majority in both groups of women 
reported a labour shortage as a result of illness, women who changed residence 
on marriage more often reported such shortages, either in combination with 
cash needs or not (90% and 79% respectively), while they did not report a 
differential effect on income.13 
When considering the coping strategies reported in Table 8.8, differences 
between women are somewhat more pronounced compared to the differences 
between men and women reported in the previous section. Three differences are 
of particular interest here. First, women who did not change residence use a 
network strategy more often than those who moved, which is indicative of 
differences in support networks. At the same time, women who changed their 
place of residence when they got married report more often that nothing was 
done when they were ill. And they were less often able to use free medical 
                                                 
13 28% of both groups reported no effect on income. Of the women who reported an in-
come effect from the health shock, those who changed residence slightly more often 
experienced severe income effects compared to those who did not move. 
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Table 8.7  Indicators of the effect of illness: frequency percentages for those  
 who changed residence and women who did not change residence 
Indicator  
All women 
Women who 
changed residence 
Women who did not 
change residence 
 (N=330) (N=148) (N=182) 
Reported illness 65 64 65 
    
Effect:  - labour 24 27 22 
 - cash 17 9 22 
 - cash and labour 59 62 56 
    
Income:  - no effect 28 28 28 
 - moderate effect 50 47 55 
 - severe effect 21 26 17 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
Table 8.8 Responses to illness reported by women who were ill (in %) 
 
 
Response 
 
 
All women 
Women who 
changed 
residence 
Women who did 
not change 
residence 
 (N=208) (N=92) (N=116) 
Sale of assets 32 28 34 
Use of savings 16 18 14 
Network strategy 14 10 17 
Free medical care 4 1 6 
Borrowing money from  
moneylender 
2 3 2 
Borrowing money from iddir 2 2 1 
Increase work by h’hld members 2 3 2 
Other 1 0 2 
Nothing 27 34 22 
Quantity in Birr 120 140 88 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
services organized through the mediation of the kebele. These results support 
the argument made by respondents that women who relocate may find it more 
difficult to find support via their network of informal relations. This does not 
only apply to the informal ties that there may be between a woman and her 
(female) relatives or neighbours, but also, through a more formal channel such 
as the kebele office. A letter from the kebele office can only be obtained if 
‘proof of need’ is supported by other members of the village, thus reinforcing 
the importance of informal ties. Given the low number of respondents reporting 
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free medical services in the first place (eight women in total), the differences 
reported here should not be given too much weight. 
A possible explanation for the lack of response to an illness could be that the 
illness is not serious in nature and does not need attention, rather than a lack of 
support from their household or network. Detailed information on the effect of 
the illnesses provide initial evidence that this is not the case. For women who 
experienced a period of illness, there is no significant difference in the duration 
of the illnesses between those who reported a response and those who did not. 
Moreover, illnesses not responded to have predominantly resulted in a lack of 
labour for domestic or productive activities rather than a lack of cash or a 
combination of both lack of cash and labour.  
So far we have discussed the type of strategies undertaken in response to 
illnesses without discussing the outcome in terms of the amount of money 
generated that is presented in the last row of Table 8.8. At Birr 140, the illness 
of women who changed residence generated a 60% higher amount of money 
compared to the Birr 88 reported by women who did not move.14 This suggests 
that women who changed residence were quite successful in obtaining money to 
get treatment. This is in stark contrast to the reported difficulty in dealing with 
shortages of labour, indicating that it is important to make a distinction between 
financial and labour effects associated with health shocks. This important 
observation has two implications. First, a network response to financial needs as 
a result of health shocks is only one of various alternative responses, while there 
is no alternative to the network response to labour needs caused by health 
shocks. Although the identity of the person within the household who actually 
implemented the response was not considered, this argument can be linked to 
the assumption of full insurance within the household. The findings then 
suggest that a household does indeed provide insurance for financial needs but 
not for labour needs associated with illness. 
Explaining heterogeneity among women 
The results presented above indicate differences in the labour effects of health 
shocks between women who relocated when they got married and those who 
did not. So far, we have assumed that these differences can be attributed to 
differences in informal support networks associated with the relocation of 
women when they get married. After all, women who marry someone from 
another village move away from their female relatives (sisters, mother, grand-
                                                 
14  The average amounts of Birr in Table 8.8 refers to all women, i.e. including those 
who did not generate any money in response to the health shock, i.e. the category 
‘nothing’.  
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mother, aunts, sisters-in-law and nieces) who can take over domestic responsi-
bilities during episodes of illness if they live in the same village.  
As no information on the number of female relatives a woman has in the 
village was recorded, we have worked with the variable ‘change of residence’ 
as a proxy indicator of such informal support networks. Although it is likely 
that change of residence is a good proxy for the availability of an informal sup-
port network of female relatives (given the exogamous and patriarchal marriage 
arrangements in Turufe Kechema), it is important to consider in more detail the 
effect that other characteristics of the respondents and their households might 
have on the relationship between labour needs during illness and informal 
support networks. Here we consider the influence of household wealth, the 
presence of other (female) adults in the households and the length of residence 
in the village, as these characteristics may potentially influence the observed 
relationship between change of residence and coping with illness. 
 
Wealth 
As the likelihood of obtaining assistance through networks is often associated 
with wealth (see for example De Weerdt 2004 and Leliveld, this volume), we 
first consider the effect of wealth. It might very well be that the poorer section 
of the population will find it more difficult to gain access to support from their 
networks to meet labour needs. Table 8.9 reports the proportion of respondents 
who experienced a labour shortage during periods of illness for each of five 
wealth quintiles. Although the majority of respondents in each wealth quintile 
reported a shortage of labour, among all the respondents, those from households 
in the highest quintile (i.e. the richest) are least likely to experience a labour 
shortage during a time of illness (as seen in the second row). This difference is 
even more pronounced for women (see Table 8.9, third row). This difference 
 
 
Table 8.9 Percentage of respondents reporting labour shortages during illness across  
 wealth quintiles 
 1st 
quintile 
2nd 
quintile 
3rd 
quintile 
4th 
quintile 
5th 
quintile 
Labour shortage: all respondents 
(N=380) 
 
92 
 
93 
 
88 
 
89 
 
74 
Labour shortage: women  
(N=226) 
 
86 
 
93 
 
84 
 
87 
 
59 
Labour shortage: women who 
relocated (N=94) 
 
95 
 
95 
 
86 
 
87 
 
86 
Labour shortage: women who did 
not relocate (N=116) 
 
84 
 
91 
 
81 
 
86 
 
37 
Source: TK data set  
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may be associated with the presence of domestic servants who perform most of 
the domestic activities in better-off households. In fact, our data indicates 
wealthier households more often have domestic servants than poorer households 
and women in households with a domestic servant reported lower incidences of 
labour shortages when confronted with illness compared to women in house-
holds with no domestic servants.15  
Interestingly, the likelihood of women who relocated experiencing labour 
shortages during illness is high across all quintiles, and only slightly lower for 
the richest quintiles. At the same time, women from rich households who did 
not move when they got married reported very low incidences of labour 
shortages compared to their counterparts from poorer households. The impact of 
relocation on marriage cannot be explained by differences in the presence of 
domestic servants, as women who relocated are equally likely to live in a 
household with domestic servants compared to women who did not move.  
To sum up, women in richer households experience labour shortages after 
health shocks less frequently except if they have changed their place of resid-
ence when they got married. If it is assumed that the lack of labour shortages for 
women in richer households is related to having easy access to labour through 
support networks, this tentatively suggests that preferential access to labour 
support associated with wealth is conditional on the presence of an informal 
support network. These results suggest that wealth plays a role in providing 
access to labour support but its effect is only felt in the presence of female 
support networks. 
 
Presence of other adults in the household 
Another possibility to be considered in more detail is that labour support is not 
provided by informal support networks outside the household but by a daughter 
or son or other (female) relative in the household. They may take over domestic 
activities when respondents are ill and unable to work. In such cases, the labour 
effects of illness could be cushioned within the household. The presence of 
other (female) adults within the household is thus expected to lead to a lower 
incidence of labour shortages during illness. To explore this possibility, the 
correlation between the presence of (female) adults within the household and 
the incidence of labour shortages during illness was considered (Table 8.10).16 
The second and third columns in this table show no correlation between the 
                                                 
15  85% of women in households without a domestic servant reported labour shortages 
when confronted with illness, compared to 57% of women in households with a 
domestic servant. Only households in the fourth and fifth wealth quintiles reported 
having a domestic servant.  
16  Here, adults is measured as the number of persons over 15 years of age within the 
household. 
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presence of (female) adults in the household and incidences of labour shortages 
during illness among women, except for women who had changed their place of 
residence when they got married. The direction of the relationship is, however, 
not what would have been expected as there is a positive relationship: women 
who changed residence and live in households with more female adults are 
more likely to face labour shortages, which suggests that labour shortages are 
no more easily cushioned within the household when a woman has moved.17 
This counterintuitive result may be explained by the fact that in the absence of 
female relatives nearby, female adults in households of women who changed 
residence already undertake a multitude of tasks and tasks cannot, therefore, 
easily be transferred from one person to another in cases of illness. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have the data to investigate this issue further. 
 
 
Table 8.10 Pearson’s correlation coefficients of labour shortage with selected  
 variables* 
 Female 
adults 
Adults Years of 
residence in 
the village 
Age 
For all women reporting illness 
(N=227) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
-0.05 
(0.41) 
-0.25 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
For women who changed location 
of residence (N=95) 
0.28 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.34) 
0.09 
(0.36) 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
For women who did not change 
location** (N=116) 
-0.07 
(0.41) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
*  Significance levels of correlation coefficient in brackets. 
** For this group of women, length of residence in the village is equal to their age, since they  
 were born in the village. 
Source: TK data set 
 
 
Length of residence in the village 
A third possibility to explore in more detail is the possible temporal nature of 
the lack of an informal support network of female relatives associated with a 
change of residence at the time of marriage. As time goes by and women live in 
their new home for longer, they will establish contacts and participate in local 
networks that could potentially provide alternative sources of (wo)manpower 
when facing labour shortages during episodes of illness. We do however find a 
negative relationship between the length of residence in a village and labour 
shortages for women, but not for migrant women. This is illustrated by the 
                                                 
17  There is no significant difference in the number of female adults between households 
for women who changed residence and those who did not. 
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positive, albeit insignificant, correlation coefficient in the fourth column of 
Table 8.10.18 
There are at least two possible interpretations for the lack of association 
between length of residence in a village and experiencing a labour shortage 
during periods of illness for women who had changed their location of resid-
ence at the time of their marriage. Either the length of residence does not in-
fluence the development of alternative support networks or the length of 
residence in the village captures another characteristic of women that is also 
associated with the likelihood of shortages of labour during periods of illness.  
The wealth of our data allows us to assess both options. First, the relation-
ship between the length of residence in the village and the development of 
alternative support networks are considered. We proxy the development of 
alternative support networks by looking at three outcomes such networks might 
generate: the number of friendships in the village and the participation of 
respondents in local labour-sharing arrangements19 and informal credit trans-
actions. For women who changed their location of residence, there appears to be 
no positive relationship between length of residence and participation in 
informal social networks, but only between length of residence and participation 
in local institutions such as iddir and equb.20 Also, there are no differences in 
participation in informal networks between women who relocated when they 
got married and those who did not. This suggests that women who move are 
indeed able to build up alternative support networks when they go to live in a 
new village. The observed differences in labour needs suggest, however, that 
such networks are not capable of replacing the possibility of obtaining labour 
assistance by female relatives when illness strikes. These findings imply a 
                                                 
18  Migrant women’s average length of residence in a village (N=92) is 23 years. Women 
experiencing a labour shortage had on average lived 5 years longer in the village 
compared to those who did not experience a labour shortage. Those experiencing a 
shortage of labour had lived in the village for 25 years on average, while those with 
no shortage of labour had lived in the village on average 20 years.  
19  The two most common labour-sharing arrangements in the village are debo and 
wenfel. For debo, a person invites friends and neighbours to work for him/her and in 
return provides food and drinks to those participating, while wenfel is a contractual 
reciprocal arrangement in which each participant contributes labour to the other parti-
cipants, sometimes in return for food. Debo and wenfel can be organized for agri-
cultural activities, building houses or organizing (religious) feasts (Gezahegn et al. 
2006).  
20  In fact, there is a negative relationship between the length of residence measured in 
years and the number of friends (-0.14, sig. 0.10), the number of labour-sharing ar-
rangements participated in (-0.16, sig. 0.05) and the number of informal credit trans-
actions (-0.23, sig. 0.00). The correlation between length of residence and number of 
memberships in local organizations is positive (0.36) and significant (0.00). 
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difference in the quality of networks, differentiating between female relatives in 
a women’s natal village and the alternative networks she may make after relo-
cating on marriage.21  
It is important to realize that length of residence in the second situation is 
strongly associated with the respondent’s age.22 Moreover, Table 8.10 (column 
5) shows a negative correlation between age and labour needs: older women are 
less likely to report a shortage of labour when confronted with illness. It might 
be that older women face fewer labour shortages because they have already 
delegated tasks to daughters (in-law) who live in their household. Yet, this does 
not explain why the negative correlation is not significant for women who 
relocated upon marriage, especially since these women do not have any fewer 
female adults within the household to whom they could have delegated do-
mestic chores. This brings us back to the availability of support networks and 
suggests that only in the presence of female support networks are older women 
more eligible for labour support and thus less likely to experience labour 
shortages in response to illness. This eligibility may be related to the social 
status associated with seniority, either because increasing age is associated with 
an increased likelihood of labour needs and/or because older women have been 
able to build up stronger networks over time. 
In summary, these results indicate that the length of residence does not affect 
the likelihood of experiencing labour shortages. Although women who have 
relocated are able to develop alternative networks, these may not provide the 
same quality of support as those in their natal village. In addition, age decreases 
the likelihood of reporting labour shortages, suggesting social status and net-
works related to seniority facilitate access to labour in cases of labour needs 
related to health shocks.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored intra-household differences in coping with illness 
using data on 357 households and 670 individuals from one Ethiopian village. 
Various dimensions have been discussed related to illness, such as the incidence 
and length of illness, its effects and coping strategies. The central hypothesis 
explored was that gender differences in recovering from illness result from 
differences in participation in social networks. Such networks can be either a 
source of transfers to meet cash needs for medical expenditures, in-kind trans-
                                                 
21  Dekker (2004b) reports similar differences for support networks of resettled farming 
households in Zimbabwe who had moved away from their kin-based support net-
works. Although the resettled farmers developed new networks, these networks did 
not provide assistance as frequently as kin or ethnicity-based networks.  
22  Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.86, sig. 0.00. 
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fers or access to labour to help fulfil domestic and/or productive responsibi-
lities. Female respondents in Turufe Kechema advanced the argument that 
women who moved away from their female relatives when they got married 
might find it more difficult to find someone who could take over their domestic 
and productive activities if they were ill. The focus was therefore on differences 
between women who moved away from their place of residence when they got 
married compared to those who remained in their village of residence. Differ-
ential access to support networks would appear to be one of the mechanisms 
that might explain the absence of full insurance within the household, and 
which is found elsewhere in the literature. 
We found some differences between men and women in the frequency and 
length of illness. Women are ill more often than men and also experience longer 
periods of illness. At the same time and in response to women’s illnesses, 
higher amounts of money are generated but women did not experience a 
shortage of labour any more often as a result of their illness. These findings do 
not provide conclusive evidence of differences in coping with illness between 
men and women. Interestingly however, a distinction between women who 
changed their place of residence when they got married and those who did not 
does show some noteworthy differences. Compared to women who remained in 
their natal village, women who moved to their husband’s village when they got 
married reported a shortage of labour in response to illness more often but use a 
network strategy less frequently to cope during the illness and more often 
reported not having undertaken any action in response to their illness. This 
indeed provides support for the hypothesis advanced by respondents in the 
village. 
At the same time, it was also noted that if there was any response to the 
illness of a woman who relocated when she got married, the amount of money 
received was higher than that received by women who had stayed in their natal 
village. This suggests that alternative strategies can replace some network 
functions, while others are exclusive to networks and cannot be substituted by 
others. In the case of illness, we found that networks are only one of a range of 
potential sources of cash to help meet medical expenses. If network support is 
not available, it can potentially be obtained by employing other strategies, such 
as the sale of assets. In the case of labour shortages, assistance through net-
works cannot easily be replaced and, in fact, failure to receive assistance 
through one’s network is not easily substituted by other methods. An explo-
ration of alternative explanations for the observed results shows that a lack of 
support from female relatives cannot be counterbalanced by wealth, the 
presence of other (female) adults within the household or the development of 
alternative informal support networks in the new area of residence.  
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Consequently, it is essential to disentangle the different effects of health 
shocks: the financial needs to cover medical expenses, and labour needs result-
ing from labour shortages to perform domestic and/or productive activities. Our 
results suggest that the assumption of full insurance in the household may hold 
for the financial needs associated with temporary health shocks, but not for the 
labour needs resulting from such events. These findings are not only relevant 
for our understanding of intra-household dynamics but have direct implications 
for policy too. Current policy initiatives in the field of micro health insurance 
are focusing on the financial needs of those affected by illness and aim to 
improve health and mitigate the effect of risk on long-term economic growth. 
Previous research has indeed shown that meeting these financial needs is as 
important as existing individual or household coping strategies, such as the sale 
of assets and the ‘obligation’ to participate in informal insurance arrangements, 
as they may constrain the potential for long-term economic growth. We cer-
tainly do not want to deny the relevance of micro-finance initiatives in this field 
but the information presented in this chapter provides some initial evidence that 
financial needs associated with health shocks may not necessarily be the most 
important or that these needs are the most difficult to meet. Presenting micro-
health insurance as the solution to the impact of illness ignores the labour needs 
associated with these shocks and the constraints they may pose for recovery. 
The effects of micro-insurance on women’s health may not be as great as 
expected. The evidence presented here suggests that recovery from illness is not 
only affected by economic factors but also by cultural practices, such as the 
position of women in patriarchal marriage arrangements that requires them to 
leave their natal village, a normative dimension that may well be beyond the 
scope of development interventions.  
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Urban agriculture and the  
urban poor in East Africa:  
Does policy matter? 
 
Dick Foeken 
 
 
This chapter addresses urban agriculture from a legal and 
policy perspective, focusing in particular on the poor. Based on 
studies carried out in Nakuru (Kenya) and Morogoro and 
Mbeya (Tanzania), it is shown that those who would benefit 
most from urban farming, namely the poor, are actually under-
represented among urban farmers, and those who do farm 
perform worse than their richer counterparts. The legal and 
policy setting in these towns is not only confusing but also such 
that the poor do not generally benefit from policy measures, if 
indeed policies exist at all. 
 
 
Introduction 
Millennium Development Goal 1 calls for a 50% reduction between 1990 and 
2015 in the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and whose income is 
less than US$1 a day. During the 1990s, the percentage of people in Sub-
Saharan Africa living below the ‘poverty line’ of $1 a day rose, as did the 
number of those who were undernourished.1 Instead of a reduction, poverty is 
on the increase in this part of the world. In addition, by the year 2015, about 
half of the continent’s population will be living in urban centres and poverty 
will have increasingly moved from rural to urban areas. According to Satter-
thwaite (1997: 5), urban poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa was ‘steadily and fright-
eningly on the increase during the 1980s and 1990s’. Even though the rural poor 
today still outnumber the urban poor in absolute terms, the latter have been 
                                                 
1  See http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/gdmis.do. 
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increasing in number at an alarming rate, a phenomenon commonly described 
as the ‘urbanization of poverty’ (e.g. Lee-Smith & Memon 1994). Urban areas 
have been particularly hard hit by declining economies and the resulting 
structural adjustment policies, the costs of which have been disproportionately 
felt by the urban poor (Rakodi 2002). Life in urban areas has become more 
expensive, while employment in the formal sector has dropped and real wages 
have not kept up with price increases or have even declined in absolute terms 
(Jamal & Weeks 1988, UNCHS 1996, Simon 1997). In other words, many 
urban households have been faced with a serious decline in their purchasing 
power. People have responded to this in a number of ways, with diversification 
of income sources undoubtedly being the most notable (Bigsten & Kayizzi-
Mugerwa 1992, Ellis 2000, de Haan & Zoomers 2003, Kaag et al. 2004). A 
wide range of activities are being employed, all of which are in the informal 
sector (e.g. Lee Smith & Memon 1994, Rogerson 1997, Hansen & Vaa 2004, 
Owuor & Foeken 2006). 
Urban agriculture is an important aspect of this informalization process and 
has expanded considerably over the past decades. It can be interpreted as an 
adaptive response by urban households to improving their food situation and to 
diversifying their livelihood options under conditions of persistent economic 
uncertainty and threats such as unemployment and declining purchasing power 
(e.g. Mougeot 1994, Mougeot 2005, Foeken & Mwangi 2000, Foeken & Owuor 
2000). Studies have revealed that urban agriculture contributes to household 
food and nutritional security, informal employment creation, income diversi-
fication through sales of surplus produce or savings on food expenditures, and 
promotes general urban food supply systems and, in theory, environmental 
sustainability too (Armar-Klemesu 2000, Mougeot 2000, Nugent 2000, Foeken 
et al. 2004, Brock & Foeken 2006). It is widely recognized that the urban poor 
could benefit from farming in town because of the relatively low start-up costs 
involved. There are indications that, in terms of income, food security and 
nutrition, the poor who practise urban farming are better off than those who do 
not (Mwangi 1995, Mwangi & Foeken 1996, Foeken 2006). 
Despite its importance as a livelihood source, farming in town is illegal in 
many African countries. By-laws frequently date from colonial times and forbid 
all agricultural activity within the boundaries of urban centres, as it does not fit 
in the western perception of what constitutes ‘urban’ (e.g. the city-is-beautiful 
idea) and because it supposedly causes all kinds of environmental hazards. 
However, as the practice has become increasingly widespread, changes in 
policy have occurred (Bakker et al. 2000). During the 1960s and 1970s, policies 
were restrictive in the sense that harassment and the destroying of crops were 
measures commonly taken by the local authorities. In the 1980s, a gradual shift 
in attitude took place and, nowadays urban farming is usually tolerated as long 
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as it is not a nuisance. In some urban centres, Dar es Salaam being an example, 
the authorities are encouraging the practice to raise food-supply levels (Jacobi et 
al. 2000). 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the extent to which urban policy and the 
practice of urban agriculture by the poor are related. More specific questions 
include: (1) To what extent are the urban poor practising urban agriculture? (2) 
If they do, how do they perform compared to the non-poor who engage in this 
practice? (3) What influence does the legal and policy context have on the 
possibilities for the poor to perform urban agriculture? (4) To what extent can 
the urban poor benefit from policy measures? 
The results presented in this chapter are based on two studies, one in Nakuru 
Municipality in Kenya and the other in Morogoro and Mbeya Municipalities in 
Tanzania (Map 9.1). Fieldwork for the Nakuru study was carried out in 1999 
and 2000 and for the Morogoro-Mbeya study in 2000 and 2001.2 The three 
towns resemble each other in size, as they all had a population of around 
250,000 in 2000. In terms of climate and physical characteristics, they also 
show many similarities. Nakuru lies at an altitude of about 1700 m and is fairly 
flat except for the Menengai Crater on its northern boundary. Being situated on 
the floor of the Great Rift Valley, it has fertile, volcanic soils. And with an 
average annual rainfall of about 940 mm, Nakuru has a dry sub-humid climate, 
although rainfall shows strong fluctuations between and within years, making 
rain-fed agriculture a risky business. Morogoro has, except for its altitude 
(about 500 m above sea level), more or less the same characteristics. Mbeya is 
at the same altitude as Nakuru but is hillier and receives more rainfall, on 
average about 1200 mm a year. 
For practical reasons, urban agriculture was defined in both studies as any 
agricultural activity undertaken within the municipal boundary. The studies 
dealt only with urban farmers3 living in the built-up area; so farmers living in  
 
                                                 
2  The funding of the Tanzania study by the Netherlands-Israel Development Research 
Programme (NIRP) is gratefully acknowledged. This study focused on the sustain-
ability of urban farming; see Foeken, Sofer & Mlozi (2004) for the results of the 
study. The Kenyan study focused on socio-economic aspects, farming practices and 
environmental issues and has yielded various publications to date. See, for example, 
Foeken (2006). Most of the Nakuru figures presented here come from the latter 
publication (Chapter 10), but the Tanzanian figures are largely based on new ana-
lyses. It should be noted that because it concerns two separate studies with different 
foci, data are not always available for both Kenya (Nakuru) and Tanzania (Morogoro, 
Mbeya). 
3  People cultivating crops on a plot of at least one square metre and/or keeping one or 
more types of livestock. One square metre as a bottom-line may seem small but 
studies have shown that there are examples of surprising production levels from such 
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    Map 9.1 Research locations in Kenya and Tanzania 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
a plot (see, for example, Smit et al. 1996). An overwhelming majority of the urban 
crop cultivators in the two studies however had plots that were much larger. The 
benchmark for livestock used in this study was one head of cattle or five goats/sheep 
or ten small animals. 
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the peri-urban areas – defined as the zone between the built-up area and the 
municipal boundary – were not included. However, some of the farmers living 
in the built-up area had farming plots in the peri-urban zone too. 
In Nakuru, poor households were defined as households with a gross 
monthly cash income of less than Ksh 5,000, which is the equivalent of about 
US$ 0.67 per person per day (see Foeken 2006: 138). The non-poor are those 
with a monthly cash income of at least Ksh 10,000. In Morogoro and Mbeya, 
households with a gross monthly cash income of less than Tsh 50,000 were 
defined as ‘poor’ (about US$ 0.50 per person per day) and those with an income 
of Tsh 90,000 a month as ‘non-poor’ (see Foeken et al. 2004: 42).4 The differ-
ent benchmarks in the two studies are due to the use of income classes when the 
respondents were asked about their household’s income situation instead of 
absolute incomes but for the purpose of this chapter this is not a problem. The 
distribution of poor and non-poor households in the three towns is presented in 
Table 9.1. 
 
 
Table 9.1 Distribution of poor and non-poor households by town (N) 
 Nakuru Morogoro Mbeya 
Total number of households in survey 594 300 308 
- no. of poor households 310 122 157 
- no. of non-poor households 106 71 42 
Source: Surveys 1999 (Nakuru) and 2000 (Morogoro, Mbeya) 
 
The poor versus the non-poor 
Urban households engaged in farming activities 
In Nakuru, poor households appeared to be underrepresented among urban 
farmers in both crop cultivation and livestock keeping (Figure 9.1). In the two 
Tanzanian towns, where urban farming was much more common than in 
Nakuru, the situation was slightly different: poor households in Morogoro were 
only underrepresented among urban livestock keepers, and in Mbeya only 
among urban crop cultivators. In another Tanzanian town, Mwanza, Flynn 
(2001) found a comparable situation to that in Nakuru. In her small sample, 
only 20% of the low-income households were engaged in urban farming, 
compared to half of the middle-income and all of the high-income households. 
The underrepresentation of the poor among Nakuru’s urban farmers 
indicates that they faced more serious obstacles to starting farming than the 
                                                 
4  At the time of the studies, US$1 was about Ksh 70 or Tsh 700. 
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non-poor. Lack of access to land as such cannot explain the difference between 
the two income groups because this obstacle was mentioned by both the non-
farming poor and non-poor. Instead, it was to some extent the combination of 
lack of access to land and lack of capital that seemed to explain the poor’s 
underrepresentation among urban farmers in Nakuru town.5 
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Percentage of urban farmers, 
by town, type of farming and  
income class. 
Source: Surveys 1999 (Nakuru)  
and 2000 (Morogoro, Mbeya) 
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Urban crop cultivation 
To get a good assessment of the performance of urban crop cultivation by the 
poor and the non-poor, output figures are needed. However, these are available 
only for Nakuru and the figures can at best be considered estimates. What we do 
have for all three towns, however, are a number of variables that can be 
                                                 
5  In both income groups, more than 80% of non-farmers mentioned ‘no access to urban 
land’ as a reason for not farming, while ‘no capital’ was mentioned by 33% of the 
poor and 10% of the non-poor (Foeken 2006: 199). 
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considered as performance indicators: plot size, plot location,6 the use of 
chemical inputs, the practice of irrigation and the hiring of paid labour. 
The two plot characteristics are presented in Table 9.2. In Nakuru, the plot 
size distribution hardly differed between the two groups, so the average plot 
size was also practically the same. This is related to the fact that over half of the 
poor crop-cultivating households had a plot outside their own compound, where 
there is more space than inside the compound (if they had a compound at all). 
Many of them grew their crops along a road or railway or under a power line. 
Among the non-poor, the majority had their shamba7 within the compound. In 
Morogoro and Mbeya, the situation regarding the urban plots was different from 
that in Nakuru (apart from the fact that plots in these Tanzanian towns were 
much bigger than in Nakuru). The poor’s urban plots were on average some-
what smaller than those of the non-poor and another disadvantage for the poor 
was that most had a plot outside their own compound and thus faced an in-
creased risk of crop theft. 
 
 
Table 9.2 Characteristics of urban plots by town and income class 
 NAKURU MOROGORO MBEYA 
  non-  non-  non- 
 poor poor poor poor poor poor 
 (N=46) (N=61) (N=120) (N=77) (N=110) (N=51) 
Average plot size* (acres) 0.24 0.24 2.2 3.3 1.4 1.7 
Location: in own compound (%) 46 69 27 43 28 71 
* The Nakuru figures are estimates based on class averages. 
Source: Surveys 1999 (Nakuru) and 2000 (Morogoro, Mbeya) 
 
 
In all three towns, maize was the most frequently cultivated crop, followed 
by beans in Nakuru and Mbeya, kale (sukuma wiki) in Nakuru and rice in Moro-
goro. In Nakuru, maize and beans were more commonly grown among the poor 
than among the non-poor, the latter specializing more in, for instance, vege-
tables. The same applies to Morogoro (where, besides maize, rice is a staple 
crop) and Mbeya (beans). In general, this suggests that the poor were more in-
clined to grow basic staple foods than the non-poor. 
Data regarding the three input indicators are presented in Figure 9.2. The use 
of chemicals for crop cultivation was fairly widespread among both the  
 
                                                 
6  Within or outside the household’s own compound. Crops grown on plots outside the 
compound are more liable to theft, so people are less inclined to invest in such plots. 
7  Shamba is the Swahili word for plot or field. 
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poor and the non-poor in Nakuru and Mbeya. Only in Morogoro was the use of 
chemicals much less common among the poor than among the non-poor. As for 
irrigation, the Nakuru study showed a significant relationship between the use 
of this input and crop yields (Foeken 2006: 60). However, irrigation of crops 
was not widespread in the three towns, particularly among the poor. Tap water 
is the most common source of irrigation water and most poor households lack 
such provision. The third factor potentially contributing to higher yields con-
cerns hired labour. In Nakuru, the average harvest from the plots where hired 
labour had been used was twice as high as that from plots where no additional 
labour had been hired (Foeken 2006: 60-61). As Figure 9.2 shows, hiring 
additional labour in all three towns was much more common among the non-
poor than among the poor for the simple reason that many of the latter simply 
could not afford it.  
Many poor farmers tried to economize on the use of inputs, as can be seen in 
the example of Baba David in Nakuru:  
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Photo 9.1 Woman cultivating sukuma wiki in front of her one-room house in Nakuru 
 [Photo: Samuel O. Owuor] 
 
 
 
Photo 9.2 Dairy cattle in zero-grazing (left) and vegetable cultivation in a 
compound in a high-density, low-income area of Mbeya. The same 
household kept about 70 chickens in a room in the house. 
 [Photo: Dick Foeken] 
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In the case of sukuma wiki he does not need to buy seeds or anything because he just 
removes the smaller plants from in-between the larger plants and plants them on 
open space. Also suckers can be used. As for maize, he buys seeds in case there are 
not enough useful seeds from last year’s harvest. For beans, it is the same, although 
those are usually all from last year’s harvest.  
He does not always use fertilizers; he only buys fertilizers when he has some extra 
money. Crop leftovers are left on the plot to serve as fertilizers. He does not use any 
water (…) because there is no water source around. (Versleijen 2002: 44-45) 
 
Urban livestock keeping 
In this section, five indicators are presented (Figure 9.3) to show that even 
though the poor keep livestock in town, they do not perform as well as their 
better-off counterparts. The first indicator concerns the percentage of the 
livestock-keeping households that keep cattle. Cattle – and improved cattle in 
particular – are the most (financially) rewarding but at the same time the most 
expensive type of animal. Many poor households lacked the means (and/or 
space) to invest in cattle and as a result, particularly in Nakuru, kept chickens. 
But keeping free-range chickens can be risky, as one respondent explained: 
You know, if you want to keep chickens, that is very risky. First of all, chickens are 
very likely to die because of the polluted drainage canals from which they will 
drink. Those canals are polluted by dirt. Second, the risk of theft is very high, since 
you cannot keep an eye on your chickens each and every moment. (Versleijen 2002: 
54) 
The use of inputs for livestock keeping shows the same picture: in all three 
towns, almost all inputs were used less frequently by the poor than by the non-
poor. Particularly in Nakuru, the poor apparently could not afford to buy such 
modern inputs as improved breeds and drugs (Figure 9.3). The same applies to 
feed supplements. For example, during the dry season when grass is scarce in 
town, cattle keepers have to buy it from so-called ‘grass boys’. One respondent 
described it as follows: 
During the dry season, the cows are just inside here and I buy grass from the people 
who sell it. You know, you can often see them passing on their bikes with those 
piles of grass on the backs of the bikes. They know who has cattle so they go to 
these people to sell the grass. (Versleijen 2002: 70) 
The two other performance indicators of urban livestock keeping concern 
professional support and the hiring of additional labour. The Nakuru study 
showed that those livestock keepers who received professional support (from 
extension officers, programme officers, etc.) used more sophisticated ways of 
managing their animals (zero-grazing, modern inputs, recycling their animals’ 
waste) than those who did not receive any assistance or only limited assistance  
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from neighbours, relatives or friends (Foeken 2006: 97). Figure 9.3 shows that, 
in general, the poor received less professional support than the non-poor and 
that this was particularly the case in Nakuru. Hiring additional labour shows a 
comparable picture. 
An important environmental matter related to livestock keeping in town is 
the disposal of animal waste. There appeared to be quite a difference in this 
respect between Morogoro and Mbeya, on the one hand, and Nakuru on the 
other. In the two Tanzanian towns, among the poor as well as the non-poor, 
most waste was recycled into crop cultivation either by the livestock keepers 
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themselves or by their neighbours. Any surpluses were (temporarily) dumped in 
the livestock keepers’ compounds. Dumping in the street did not occur, except 
for two cases in Mbeya. The situation in Nakuru was quite different. Here, the 
non-poor also used most of the waste for their own or their neighbour’s crop 
cultivation but only a minority did so among the poor. Half of the latter dumped 
some or all of their animals’ waste in the street (and even some of the non-poor 
did so). It should be added that this mainly concerned waste from small live-
stock, but it was still an offence.  
Urban farming as a source of livelihood 
The overwhelming majority of both the poor and the non-poor urban farmers in 
all three towns said they farmed in town for the food. For them, urban crop 
cultivation was an additional food source for the household. The percentage of 
households for whom urban cropping constituted a major food source was 
higher among the poor than among the non-poor. The importance of urban 
livestock keeping as a food source was equal in both income groups but as a 
direct food source it was less important than urban crop cultivation. In general, 
a household’s own urban agricultural production was among the most important 
food source for many households in both income groups, albeit more so in 
Morogoro and Mbeya than in Nakuru. In combination with the other two most 
important food sources (purchased food and the household’s own rural pro-
duction),8 most households ‘always [had] enough to eat during last year’. How-
ever, there was one notable exception, namely Morogoro, where the majority of 
the poor households had faced food problems. 
The importance of urban farming for a household’s food supply was shown 
in another way in Nakuru. The general food security issues discussed in the 
previous paragraph reflected the situation in 1998. This was a fairly normal year 
in terms of rainfall, and the resulting harvests were also more or less normal. 
The following year, however, was a dry year in Kenya.9 This had a serious 
impact on households’ own urban production resulting in a deterioration in the 
food security situation of poor households in particular (Figure 9.410). Whereas 
in 1998, 12% of poor households in Nakuru had not ‘always enough to eat’, this  
 
                                                 
8  On the importance of rural farming as a livelihood source for the Nakuru population, 
see Owuor (2006). 
9  See Foeken (2006: 23) for monthly rainfall distributions in 1998 and 1999. 
10  Even though the figures in Figure 9.4 can only be seen as rough approximations (in 
qualitative terms) of households’ food security and the 1999 numbers of poor urban 
farmers are relatively small (13), the 1999 figures indicate notable differences with 
those of 1998. 
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Figure 9.4 
Urban farmers in Nakuru: General food security issues by income class, selected 
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percentage jumped to 77% in 1999. The figures show that this was to a large 
extent caused by the failure of the urban (as well as the rural) harvest, as the 
percentage of poor households for whom this was an important food source 
declined concomitantly. As a result, the percentage of poor households for 
whom urban farming constituted at least half of their food supply dropped from 
60% in 1998 to 20% in 1999 and the dependence on purchased food increased 
accordingly. However, even though 100% of poor households relied on pur-
chased food, Figure 9.4 also indicates that they could not afford to purchase all 
the food they needed, witness the fact that only a quarter of them always had 
enough to eat in 1999. As for the non-poor, although they were affected by the 
drought as well, the impact on their households’ food supply was far less dra-
matic. 
In the following year (2000), the drought in Nakuru was even worse. Those 
who practised crop cultivation without irrigation had no – or hardly any – 
harvest. As one respondent remarked: 
Mostly when there are droughts, the crops are affected and the harvest is small, like 
at the end of last year [1999] and the beginning of this year [2000]. All the kales 
dried up this year and now we have to buy the food from the market. This has made 
it difficult for us. 
The drought had an impact on livestock keeping as well. Some respondents 
blamed the lack of water – and hence the lack of feed – for the loss of some of 
their animals: 
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The drought had very bad effects. Last year’s [1999] drought cost me two heifers 
because of the lack of soft green grass. Moreover, the livestock became so emaci-
ated that they took a longer period to recover and by the time they were recovering, 
this year’s [2000] drought started. 
Urban farming is a source of both direct and indirect income. Regarding the 
latter, by growing one’s own food, money is saved to spend on other neces-
sities. How important this indirect income – and hence the urban plot – can be 
for a poor household is illustrated by the case of Baba and Mama Christopher in 
Nakuru: 
You know, if you manage to grow your own food for several months per year, then 
you can educate your children from your salary. (Versleijen 2002: 36-37) 
As a direct source of income, livestock keeping was more important than 
crop cultivation, albeit with differences between the three towns. In general, the 
commercial aspect of urban agriculture was more important in the two Tanza-
nian towns than in Nakuru. What is important for the present analysis is that the 
poor and the non-poor show hardly any differences in this respect.  
No attempt was made in the two studies to assess the amount of money 
earned by those who sold crops and/or livestock products. An important aspect 
in this context concerns the price fluctuations of food stuffs. Many of the poor 
have plots at some distance from their houses and are forced to harvest their 
maize when it is still green to prevent theft, and this fetches a lower price than 
dried maize. Moreover, because the poor generally have no storage facilities, 
they have to sell when there is an abundant supply and they consequently 
receive a relatively low price for their crop. The crops of those with storage 
facilities (usually the non-poor) will get a better price when demand is higher. 
As a respondent in Morogoro explained:  
When crops are scarce, prices for crops go up and when the farmers sell their crops 
they get a lot of money. 
Some urban farmers are very successful in turning their agricultural activi-
ties into a profitable business. An example is the case of Baba Josephine in 
Nakuru who had two good dairy cows from which he made an annual profit of 
some Ksh 80,000 gross.11 Compared to a total initial investment of Ksh 75,000 
(two cows, a shed and milking equipment), Baba Josephine had good reason to 
be content with his business: 
Cows are expensive animals to keep, because of the veterinary drugs and check-ups 
they require. However, they also bring in a lot of money! (Versleijen 2002: 74) 
                                                 
11  See Foeken (2006: 91, 193). Ksh 1,000 was the equivalent of about US$ 14 at the 
time. 
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Other success stories were a commercial dairy cattle and pig farm on the 
outskirts of a high-density neighbourhood in Morogoro and a small mushroom 
farm in Mbeya.12 One of the things these examples have in common is that the 
owners had the financial means to invest in their businesses, something that 
most poor households lack. 
The legal and policy context 
Despite its importance, urban agriculture is still an illegal activity in many 
African towns and cities. In this section, the legal and policy context, both local 
and national, of urban farming in the three towns is discussed in an attempt to 
link it to policy measures and the position of the poor.13 
 
National legislation and policies 
Rules and regulations regarding urban agriculture are laid down in local by-laws 
and are based on the manoeuvring space allowed by national legislation. There 
is a variety of national legislation in Kenya related to urban agriculture.14 The 
most relevant is undoubtedly the Local Government Act15 because it provides 
local authorities with decision-making powers regarding crop cultivation and 
livestock keeping within their municipal boundaries. For instance, Section 144 
states that: 
[a]ny land belonging to a local authority (…) may (…) be appropriated for any other 
purpose for which the local authority is authorized to acquire land. 
In other words, by means of urban-agriculture-friendly by-laws, a local 
authority may invoke this Act to temporarily provide its urban dwellers with 
land for urban agriculture. However, growing crops on land not owned by the 
cultivator – which is quite common in Nakuru – is illegal. According to Section 
154, every municipal or town council has the power 
(…) to prohibit the cultivation by unauthorized persons of any unenclosed and unoc-
cupied land in private ownership and of any government land and land reserve for 
any public road. 
In short, according to the Kenyan national legislation, urban agriculture can 
be forbidden, restricted, allowed, controlled, facilitated or even promoted. 
                                                 
12  See Foeken et al. (2004: 78, 134). 
13  Both sections are based on Foeken (2005). 
14  Such as the Agricultural Act, the Land Control Act, the Physical Planning Act, the 
Public Health Act, the Water Act, the Local Government Act and the Chiefs Act. For 
a more detailed discussion of these Acts, see Foeken (2005: 10-12). 
15  Laws of Kenya: The Local Government Act – Chapter 265, Revised Edition 1998. 
Nairobi: Government Printer. 
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Which line is actually followed at the local level depends entirely on the by-
laws and ordinances issued by the local authorities. The latter’s power to draw 
up such a local legal framework is provided by the Local Government Act, 
while the various other acts form the legal handle for the provisions made in 
these by-laws. 
The situation in Tanzania is quite different and much more straightforward 
in the sense that, at the national level, urban agriculture has been recognized 
since the beginning of the 1970s. Whereas in Kenya there is no national legis-
lation directly dealing with urban agriculture and the national government has 
never devised any policy on the subject, the Tanzanian government did both. As 
a result, urban agriculture in Tanzania is practised in a generally favourable 
political and legal context. Government and political leaders have time and again 
told urban dwellers to raise livestock and grow food crops in their backyards and 
on other open spaces (Mlozi 2001).16  
The Agricultural and Livestock Policy of 1997 observes, on the one hand, 
that ‘agriculture is not a principle function of towns’ but also that ‘when pro-
perly organized [it] has the potential to provide employment and income and is 
a complementary source of food supply’ (Kitilla 2001: 79). The positive attitude 
of the national government towards urban agriculture was once again expressed in 
the National Human Settlement Development Policy of 2000 put forward by the 
Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development (URT 2000): 
Urban agriculture exists in most urban areas both in the developed and developing 
countries. As an economic activity, it provides income and employment opportuni-
ties to the urban populations, and a reliable supplementary source of food supply to 
urban dwellers at affordable prices. As a land use, well-planned urban agriculture 
creates a pleasant greenly scene. 
This implies that outright recognition of urban agriculture as an important 
economic sector in terms of food supply and employment and, therefore, as an 
important livelihood source for many. At the same time, however, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, attempts have been made to control the sector. For 
instance, in the 1992 Urban Farming Regulations, guidelines were laid down on 
maximum plot size, number of cattle, and rearing systems for livestock (Kitilla 
2001) and it prohibits any farming activity that might cause a nuisance. 
                                                 
16  Policies behind this included Siasa in Kilimo (Politics is Agriculture) in 1972, Kilimo 
cha Umwagiliaji (Irrigated Agriculture) in 1974, Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona (Agri-
culture for Life and Death) in 1974/75 and, in the same year, Mvua za Kwanza ni Zaku-
pandia (First Rains are for Planting). Others were the 1981/82 National Economic 
Survival Programme (NESP), the 1982 National Food Strategy, the 1983 National 
Livestock Policy (NLP) and the National Agricultural Policy (NAP), and the 1986-90 
National Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). 
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At the ministerial level in the 1970s in a bid to encourage urban dwellers to 
produce their own food, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) set 
up an urban agriculture extension service. Currently, MAFS is using its urban-
based Agriculture and Livestock Extension Agents (ALEAs) to promote livestock 
raising and crop growing. ALEAs visit urban dwellers and impart modern skills 
and knowledge (non-formal education) about agriculture so that farmers’ pro-
duction levels increase. 
 
Local by-laws and policies 
By the end of the 1990s, urban agriculture in Nakuru’s policy circles was still 
what it had been for decades: officially illegal but tolerated in practice. The 
main legal control mechanisms were the Public Health By-Laws of the Muni-
cipal Council of Nakuru, for instance those in 199417 that stated that farming 
was prohibited if it caused a nuisance. Thus, any farming activity that was con-
sidered detrimental to public health and/or safety or that other people com-
plained about was dealt with by the municipal authorities, usually the Public 
Health Officer.18  
The slightly ill-defined status of the sector is illustrated by the fact that urban 
agriculture was conspicuously absent from the Localising Agenda 21 (LA21) 
programme. The LA21’s objective was to provide training for the development 
of a new approach towards urban planning and management, focusing on an 
environmentally-conscious development of Nakuru into a ‘People’s Green City, 
with particular attention to low-income groups. The major results of the pro-
gramme were the creation of a town planning unit and the preparation of the so-
called Strategic Nakuru Structure Plan (MCN 1999). Although the Strategic 
Plan has been described as ‘the blueprint for urban sustainable development for 
the town’ (Mwangi 2001: 17), the only time urban agriculture is mentioned (on 
p. 44), it is seen as being a temporary feature. ‘Economically, urban agriculture 
is a transitory activity which eventually gives way to more traditional urban 
functions.’ 
Due to the influence of developments elsewhere over the past few years and 
to research19 carried out in Nakuru itself, there has been a growing awareness 
among the local authorities that farming in town is very important for the 
livelihood of many Nakuru townspeople. It is now felt that it is better to try to 
regulate the sector than to maintain a laissez-faire attitude (which is so common 
in many African towns and cities) towards something that is officially illegal. 
                                                 
17  The Municipal Council of Nakuru (Public Health) By-Laws (1994). 
18  Mr S.C. Kiarie, Public Health Officer, Municipal Council of Nakuru, personal com-
munication, September 1998. 
19  The Nakuru Urban Agriculture Research Project (NUAP) by the African Studies 
Centre. 
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This change in attitude and policy regarding urban agriculture is clearly shown 
by recent by-laws that were developed between 2004 and 2007, notably the 
Control of Stock By-laws of 2004, the Environmental Management By-laws of 
2006 and the Urban Agriculture By-laws (still in the making). 
The 2004 Control of Stock By-laws20 deal with livestock keeping in Nakuru 
Municipality. These by-laws do permit the keeping livestock but the conditions 
in which they must be kept are quite strict. For instance, By-law 4 states that 
‘No person shall keep or graze any stock or horse within the boundaries of the 
Municipal Council of Nakuru unless he is in possession of a permit’. This per-
mit, however, is only issued for stock waiting to be slaughtered at the Council’s 
slaughterhouse, stock to be presented at the Nakuru Agricultural Show, or stock 
that has been ‘lawfully impounded’ (By-law 5). In other words, it is not possible 
to obtain a permit for livestock kept in the way many Nakurians currently do so. 
And By-law 6 prohibits the construction of any stable or shed or building for 
the keeping of livestock, while By-law 7 provides that ‘no stock shall be kept 
(…) in or under any portion of any building (…) used for the purposes of 
human habitation’, so keeping chickens in a room in the house, as some people 
do, is illegal. 
The development of the recently implemented Environmental Management 
By-Laws 200621 is perhaps the best example of the changes in policy over the 
past few years. In the draft version of 2004, any form of urban agriculture was 
simply forbidden. For instance regarding the growing of food crops, it stated 
that ‘[a]ny person found growing food crops within the Council’s jurisdiction 
shall be guilty of an offence’. The same applied to livestock keeping: ‘Any per-
son who rears or keeps any animal within the jurisdiction of the Council shall 
be guilty of an offence. Such animals shall include but are not limited to cows, 
pigs, goats, sheep, chicken, turkey, duck and donkeys.’ However in the final 
version approved by the Minister of Local Government in 2006, none of the by-
laws forbid any form of urban agriculture. All that is required under By-law 
172(i) is a municipal permit as a regulatory measure.22  
In 2006, a first draft of the Urban Agriculture By-laws was drawn up.23 This 
in itself is a positive step towards legalization and control of the sector, and is 
quite unique in Kenya. Based on the recognition that ‘every person within the 
jurisdiction of the Council is entitled to a well-balanced diet and food security’ 
and that this entitlement ‘includes facilitation by the Council to acceptable and 
approved urban farming practices’, farming is now legally recognized as an 
                                                 
20  The Municipal Council of Nakuru (Control of Stock) By-Laws (2004). 
21  The Municipal Council of Nakuru (Environmental Management) By-Laws (2006). 
22  Mr S.C. Kiarie, Director of Environment, Municipality of Nakuru, personal commu-
nication, December 2006. 
23  The Municipal Council of Nakuru (Urban Agriculture) By-Laws (2006) (Draft). 
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urban activity. These by-laws are based on the Kampala example24 in the sense 
that farming in town is recognized as an important activity for many urban 
dwellers and that it is in principle permitted, while at the same time the muni-
cipality attempts to regulate the sector, for instance by introducing permits that 
are required by anyone who wants ‘to practise urban agriculture within the 
jurisdiction of the Council’ (Section 9). Another attempt to control the sector is 
included in Section 33 which states that the ‘growing of any crop of more than 
one metre high’ in residential areas is an offence, which would imply that the 
large majority of the present cultivators (maize growers) in the built-up areas of 
Nakuru violate the (by-)law. At the time of writing, the completion of the 
formulation of the Urban Agriculture By-laws was still going on, including a 
discussion round in all 15 of the municipality’s wards, with the aim of making 
the by-laws enabling and as far as possible feasible for local communities. In 
other words, it is still too early to determine the extent to which the new Urban 
Agriculture By-laws will either restrict or promote urban farming in Nakuru, 
especially where it concerns the poor. 
Some developments on the ground also confirm changes in attitude and 
policy in Nakuru. For instance, officially recognized NGOs have for some time 
been actively involved in farming activities in the municipality. Two of these 
are the Agriculture and Rural Development Programme and the Ecumenical 
Church Loan Fund. Another (Danish-sponsored) NGO called SENVINET (Stra-
tegic Environmental Network) has been working in Nakuru since the mid-1990s 
on an environmental awareness programme focusing on school children and 
actively promoting organic farming in schools, assisted by Ministry of Agricul-
ture extension officers. 
In addition, high-ranking representatives of the Municipal Council were 
recently quite positive about farming in Nakuru town. A workshop was held in 
November 2002 where the results of the Nakuru research project25 were pre-
sented to and discussed by various stakeholders, including Municipal Council 
officers. The then Director of the Department of Housing spoke about how the 
workshop had been an ‘eye-opener’, stressing that Nakuru’s housing policy 
needed to be revised, i.e. new municipal houses should have a compound so that 
the inhabitants could at least produce a part of their own food. In December 
2004, a meeting was held in Nakuru in the context of an initiative entitled 
‘Local Participatory Research and Development on Urban Agriculture and 
Livestock Keeping in Nakuru’. Its purpose was to develop a common under-
                                                 
24  The Kampala City Urban Agriculture Ordinance: A Guideline. Kampala/Nairobi: 
KUFSALCC/Urban Harvest. 
25  The Nakuru Urban Agriculture Research Project (NUAP) consisted of two surveys, 
one PhD study and four Masters theses. See Foeken (2006, Annex 1) for a brief 
overview; see also http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/infosheet1.pdf . 
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standing of the initiative among all stakeholders, including representatives of 
the Municipal Council. As can be seen in the report of the meeting,26 all groups 
– municipal officials included – ‘strongly felt that there was a need for the 
proposed initiative in Nakuru (…) and expressed their commitment to the pro-
ject if it came to fruition’. Finally, during another consultative meeting with 
local stakeholders in May 2005,27 the representative of the Department of 
Environment said that they were actively promoting urban farming in Nakuru, 
at least as long as the activity was carried out in an environmentally friendly 
way.28 
The situation in Tanzania (Morogoro and Mbeya) regarding local legislation 
regarding urban agriculture is completely different from in Kenya (Nakuru). 
By-laws concerning crop cultivation and livestock keeping are in place in all 
Tanzanian towns and municipalities. The first urban by-laws regulating crop 
cultivation and livestock keeping in urban centres were enacted by the British 
colonial authorities back in 1928 and were particularly directed at preventing 
agricultural activity by Africans.29 After independence in 1961, most of these by-
laws fell into disuse but during the 1980s new ones were developed, essentially 
stating that growing crops or raising animals was permitted under certain con-
ditions.30 Specific by-laws forbid planting crops in designated areas or restrict 
the cultivation of certain crops. For instance, crops taller than one metre are 
forbidden, which includes maize – one of the most common crops in Tanzanian 
towns. By-laws concerning livestock keeping include the required purchase of a 
special permit from the Town or City Director; a maximum of four head of 
cattle may be kept and only in zero-grazing and in specific settings; and the 
compulsory removal of manure, liquid waste material and other animal waste 
(Kitilla 2001; Mlozi 2001). 
The Mbeya by-laws on crop cultivation apply to 15 of the town’s 36 
wards.31 These 15 wards roughly coincide with the built-up area of the town 
while the other 21 wards make up the peri-urban area where farming is an 
                                                 
26  See http://www.cipotato.org/urbanharvest/news_events2005/nakuru.htm. 
27  To discuss a research proposal on school farming and feeding programme in Nakuru 
in the context of NUAP, Phase 2. 
28  Mr W. Wanyonyi, Assistant Director of Environment, Municipal Council of Nakuru, 
personal communication, 31 May 2005. He also explained that the municipality’s 
policy change in favour of urban agriculture in Nakuru was a direct result of the 
NUAP studies and workshop. 
29  By-laws for Regulating the Cultivation of Crops and Keeping of Animals in Urban 
Areas. 
30  See for instance the Mbeya Municipal Council (Regulations of Cultivation) By-Laws 
(1987) and the Morogoro Municipal Council (Animals in Urban Area) By-Laws, 
(1999), as presented in Annex 8 and Annex 9 respectively in Foeken et al. (2004). 
31  A ward is the administrative entity directly under the municipality. 
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important economic activity. As far as the built-up area is concerned, the by-
laws make a distinction between areas where growing crops is completely 
prohibited (By-law 3) and where it is permitted (By-law 4). The area where crop 
cultivation is prohibited applies to 11 of the 15 wards and most of another one. 
In practice, these by-laws imply that urban agriculture is an illegal activity in 
most of the built-up area of Mbeya (and other Tanzanian municipalities as 
well). But this is rarely enforced. 
                                                
In the Morogoro by-laws on livestock keeping, ‘animals’ include cattle, 
donkeys, goats, horses, mules, pigs and sheep. In other words, small livestock 
like chickens, ducks, rabbits and turkeys, most of which are now raised in urban 
areas, are excluded. In By-law 3, the Council stipulates that it  
(…) shall earmark certain areas to be known as ‘specified areas’ within the Urban 
area for the purpose of keeping animals [and] along which to move an animal or 
animals and permits shall be issued by the Council in respect of animals authorized 
in the Urban area. 
The by-laws however do not specify the numbers and types of animals that 
urban dwellers are allowed to raise in different density areas. By-law 5 forbids 
keeping animals outside ‘a building, structure or enclosure’, so keeping animals 
in free range is prohibited. According to By-law 8, animals are not allowed to 
be kept ‘in a building or part of such building that is used for human habitation’, 
but the researchers observed that people still keep improved chickens in their 
houses. Since chickens are not defined as animals in these by-laws, does this 
imply that keeping chickens in a house is allowed? Animals can only be moved 
with special permission from the Council, yet most, if not all, urban livestock 
keepers rear their animals without a permit. By-laws 5 and 6, requiring urban 
dwellers to remove manure, liquid filth and other animal waste, are never 
enforced. The fact that there are many senior government and party officials 
among the livestock keepers who ignore the by-laws with impunity is probably 
the best assurance for most other livestock keepers that they will not be 
prosecuted if they break the law. This is not unique to Morogoro because in 
every Tanzanian municipality virtually all the by-laws are ignored by most 
urban farmers.32 Besides the fact that the municipal authorities do not have the 
means to effectively enforce them, there are other reasons as well. One is that 
the very people who are supposed to ensure the enforcement of the laws are 
those breaking them or, as Sawio (1993: 348) put it, ‘it appears impracticable 
for a junior officer to punish his or her boss who is found violating the law’. 
As far as local policy is concerned, Mbeya’s policy can best be characterized 
as laissez-faire. Unrestricted crop cultivation is only allowed in the peri-urban 
 
32  Mvena et al. (1991). There is little reason to expect that the present situation has 
changed since the beginning of the 1990s. 
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areas and in the built-up area only crops less than two feet. Animals are allowed 
if kept in zero-grazing,33 and there is no assistance for the agricultural sector in 
the town. In the words of the Municipal Town Planner: ‘We just let it go. There 
is no active support of any kind.’34 The situation in Morogoro is different. 
Although the Acting Municipal Director there claims that35 ‘officially, farming 
in town is illegal’, the policy is that the Municipality allows farming ‘on the 
condition that environmental degradation is (…) prevented and city develop-
ment is not being hindered’. Morogoro participates in the UNDP Sustainable 
Cities Programme, which suggests that urban agriculture has become an integral 
part of its town planning ‘because of its importance for the people and for the 
food provision of the town’.36 The policy implication of participation in this 
programme is mainly that both the Council and the Ministry of Agriculture are 
actively developing plots for urban farmers. 
Keeping cattle in town – and especially in the built-up area – is generally 
regarded as an undesirable activity by the Morogoro authorities. According to 
the Acting Municipal Director (who himself was keeping two dairy cows at the 
time), ‘livestock keeping has an impact on the environment and on safety on the 
roads’ and ‘there are many complaints from neighbours’; so ‘the official policy 
is that cattle keeping is restricted to four animals, zero-grazing’.37 The Ministry 
of Agriculture tries to discourage the keeping of too many cattle, for instance by 
raising fees for livestock38 but ‘the collection of the fees is problematic’.39 
Moreover, penalties are imposed on animals found roaming around.40 Accord-
ing to the Municipal Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer, ‘these 
measures worked because you nowadays see many fewer animals roaming 
around’.41 
                                                 
33  Mr M.O. Mhando, Municipal Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer, per-
sonal communication, 20 September 1999. 
34  Mr J. Mwangoge, Municipal Town Planner, Mbeya Municipality, personal communi-
cation, 21 September 1999. 
35  Mr E. Kalunelo, Acting Municipal Director, Morogoro Municipality, personal com-
munication, 17 September 1999. 
36  Mr Mkupete, Head, Department of Town Planning, Morogoro Municipality, personal 
communication, 16 September 1999. 
37  Kalunelo, op. cit. 
38  For instance Tsh 1,000 per year per head of cattle or per pig, Tsh 800/yr per calf or 
donkey and Tsh 500/yr per goat or sheep.  
39  Mr Maeda, Municipal Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer, Morogoro 
Municipality, personal communication, 24 September 1999. 
40  For instance, Tsh 10,000 per head of cattle and Tsh 5,000 per goat or sheep. 
41  Maeda, op. cit. 
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At the time of the fieldwork (2000-2001), the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Morogoro was pursuing other policies as well.42 One concerned the propagation 
of organic farming by bringing livestock keepers and crop cultivators together. 
Apparently this policy was successful to a certain extent because ‘crop culti-
vators now sell their crop residues to livestock keepers’. The next step was to be 
a reverse flow: manure going from livestock keepers to crop cultivators. More 
generally, the Ministry has started to educate farmers about environmental 
conservation and cultivators are, for instance, encouraged to grow trees along 
the edge of their plots. Zero-grazing is compulsory and animal waste should be 
disposed of properly, i.e. ‘solid waste should be used on the plots and urine 
should be collected and not allowed to flow onto the neighbour’s plot’. Finally, 
because it is impossible for most urban farmers to obtain credit, the Ministry 
has started to organize farmers into groups of 5 to 20 persons to form so-called 
‘saving and credit schemes’. Several groups were set up in 1999 and they are 
now being encouraged in all wards. 
Legislation, policy and the poor 
To what extent do existing legislation and policies influence the possibilities for 
the urban poor to engage in urban agriculture? National legislation and policies 
in Kenya in relation to farming in urban areas are vague and in fact the Local 
Government Act puts all decision-making power in the hands of the local 
authorities. In this Act, there is only one reference to urban agriculture and the 
urban poor, namely in Section 155, which states that every municipal or town 
council ‘shall have power (…) to engage in livestock and agricultural under-
takings’ and  
(…) to require the planting of any specified crops by persons for the support of 
themselves and their families in areas which in the opinion of the (…) council are 
suffering from or likely to suffer from shortages of foodstuffs. [emphasis added by 
author] 
This means that, if it so wishes, Nakuru Municipal Council has the legal right to 
engage in or allow crop cultivation by the (very) poor and in areas where these 
people are living. The Localising Agenda 21 programme was a chance to put 
this into practice, all the more so as the programme focused on environ-
mentally-conscious planning and development, with particular attention to low-
income groups. That did not happen but legalizing the sector in the 2006 
Environmental Management By-laws and the (draft) Urban Agriculture By-laws 
is an important step forward because it opens up the way for local government 
                                                 
42  Maeda, op. cit. 
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to stimulate the activity among the urban poor, for instance by creating easily 
accessible farming zones. 
Meanwhile, various developments, instigated by NGOs but with the consent 
of the municipal authorities, have been going on to support (poor) urban 
farmers. The Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (ARDP) – under 
the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru – focused on small-scale farmers, providing 
them with indirect support (training) or direct support (e.g. loans for buying 
animals, materials for building a water tank for irrigation or a zero-grazing unit 
for dairy cattle). Although the programme mainly took place in the rural areas, 
several urban and peri-urban farmers in Nakuru Municipality were among the 
participants. In general, the programme was quite successful. As for the urban 
farmers in Nakuru, a comparison of this group with a group of ‘neighbours’ (i.e. 
urban farmers not participating in ARDP) showed that incomes from selling 
animals (mainly cattle) and animal products (mainly milk) were much higher 
among ARDP farmers (Foeken 2006: 102).  
The Ecumenical Church Loan Fund (ECLOF) is a global initiative with its 
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The Kenyan branch – ECLOF-Kenya – 
was launched in 1994. Besides the country’s head office in Nairobi, ECLOF-
Kenya has offices in six other towns, Nakuru being one of them. ECLOF-Kenya 
supports the building of sustainable communities by providing fair credit 
services for human development in both rural and urban areas. One of its main 
objectives is ‘to increase accessibility to credit by the economically active and 
marginalized micro/small business and farming people of Kenya’. The Nakuru 
branch was set up in 2001 and three years later the Nakuru office was serving 
about 600 members/clients, most of whom were small-scale traders. A small 
proportion of them were farmers who were benefiting from ECLOF’s financial 
assistance for expanding or improving their farming activities. Nearly all of 
them were rural farmers engaged in dairy farming (zero-grazing) and poultry 
keeping. Five of the farmers could be classified as urban farmers, i.e. living and 
farming within the municipal boundary or, more precisely, in the peri-urban 
areas of Nakuru town. All five were involved in livestock keeping: three in 
dairy farming (zero-grazing), one in pig raising and one in poultry keeping. To 
be eligible, the potential member must be engaged in an income-generating 
activity (business or farming) and at the same time belong to a registered group. 
This is usually a group of friends or neighbours with a common interest. 
Members of a group who know each other well are able to act as co-guarantees 
for each other when applying for a loan.43 While ECLOF-Kenya encourages 
                                                 
43  An example from yet another loan scheme, Pride Kenya, was the Baraka Women’s 
Group that consists of 36 members. Each member contributed Ksh 500 per month, 
with which members facing some crisis situation – such as death, sickness or the 
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already established groups, the majority of their members got together after 
learning about ECLOF’s activities. This also applied to the four cases that are 
described in Foeken (2006). All four were low-income households (including 
one female-headed household) and they all managed to substantially raise their 
income by using the loan to expand their commercial (urban) livestock acti-
vities. One involved the improvement and expansion of a pig-farming business, 
an activity usually considered as one of the least desirable in an urban setting 
from an environmental point of view. 
More recently, the previously mentioned initiative ‘Local Participatory 
Research and Development on Urban Agriculture and Livestock Keeping in 
Nakuru’ was launched in December 2004. This programme is an initiative by 
two NGOs (Urban Harvest, an international research body sponsored by 
CGIAR,44 and Kenya Green Town Partnership Association), the University of 
Nairobi (Department of Soil Science) and the Municipal Council of Nakuru. 
The major aims of the programme are to further develop the Urban Agriculture 
and Livestock Keeping Research and Development Centre already established 
next to the Nakuru dump, and to help Nakuru urban farmers and livestock 
keepers to improve their livelihoods and contribute to urban security. 
In Tanzania, despite the favourable national legislation and policies towards 
urban agriculture, local by-laws are such that urban agriculture is an illegal 
activity for most inhabitants because it is largely confined to the peri-urban 
zones. Yet, as in Nakuru, urban farming in both Mbeya and Morogoro is very 
common among the people living in the built-up area, and the local authorities 
ignore the situation. The two municipalities differ (at least they did at the time 
of the study in 2000-2001) insofar as policies regarding the sector were con-
cerned. In Mbeya, a laissez-faire attitude prevails and the only ‘policy’ concerns 
restrictive measures when and where it is deemed necessary to intervene. The 
Municipal Council of Morogoro, on the other hand, has launched a policy 
focusing on the development of two types of plots:45 
1) Garden plots of 1.5 to 3 acres in the so-called green-belt areas. ‘The concept of 
garden plots is now part and parcel of town planning.’ Green belts have been created 
along the rivers and ‘other hazardous areas’, such as mountain slopes. Somebody 
who is interested in a garden plot has to pay Tsh 65,000 for the necessary survey 
work. After that, he signs a lease contract with the municipality (based on the 1998 
Land Act) for a period of 1 year, 33 years or 99 years. The 33-year contracts are the 
most common; the 99-year contracts involve larger plots. The municipality dis-
courages one family from obtaining more than one plot ‘but it cannot be avoided 
                                                                                                                       
inability to repay the Pride Kenya loan – could be assisted (Samuel O. Owuor, field 
notes, 2003). 
44  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. 
45  Mkupete, op. cit. 
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entirely’. The leaser pays an annual ‘land rent’ or ‘lease fee’ of Tsh 20,000 to Tsh 
25,000 depending on the size of the plot and is allowed to build a house on the plot 
‘but the predominant activity must be farming’. The garden plots ‘have a long-term 
objective’. 
2) Plots in the so-called nguvukazi areas. These are located on former sisal estates that 
have long since been abandoned and have become part of the town with the ex-
pansion of the town’s boundaries. The municipality sub-divided these areas into 5-
acre plots and each of the 19 wards in Morogoro has a right to some of the plots. 
The allocating of plots, which started in 1974, is taken care of by the ward leaders. 
The users pay a modest fee because use is of a temporary nature, as ‘the present 
nguvukazi land will surely be used for further urban development’.  
In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture in Morogoro acquired 3,000 hectares 
of land about 50 km outside the town for use by townspeople who would not 
otherwise have access to land.46 The plots, an acre in size, cost Tsh 1,000 per 
acre for demarcation and are partly intended for former villagers who became 
urbanites after the town expanded and who subsequently lost their plots to 
urban development. This scheme can be seen in the context of a policy launched 
by the Tanzanian Prime Minister at the end of the 1990s that allowed each 
urban household to have four acres at its disposal: three to feed itself and one 
for commercial purposes.47 According to this policy, the Municipal Council has 
to make a plan, allocate a budget and present it to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Another initiative by the Ministry concerns the earlier-mentioned saving and 
credit schemes whereby urban farmers are organized in small groups in order to 
obtain a loan. 
Do the urban poor benefit from policies such as those taking place in Nakuru 
and Morogoro? This depends first of all on how one defines ‘poor’. Although 
policies are often, at least on paper, directed towards ‘the poor’, the ‘very poor’ 
can easily miss out. In Nakuru, participants in the ARDP and ECLOF pro-
grammes were already engaged in urban farming before joining the programme 
and were therefore unlikely to belong to the very poor. At the same time, the 
Nakuru study revealed that it is the very poor who were most underrepresented 
among urban farmers. Providing access for them to a piece of land would be 
more worthwhile than loan schemes. However, there is no such policy at 
present in Nakuru. In Morogoro, such a policy does exist but it is doubtful 
whether the very poor will benefit from it. The garden plots are simply too 
expensive (one-time costs for surveying and annual costs for renting). The 
nguvukazi plots might be affordable but allocation tends to be by means of 
personal networking, so the ones with the closest relationship to the ward 
leaders are usually the beneficiaries; and they are not likely to be the very poor. 
                                                 
46  Maeda, op. cit., 17 September 1999. 
47  Kalunelo, op cit. 
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Finally, the plots provided by the Ministry of Agriculture might be affordable 
but the distance (50 km away) and the transport costs involved are a major con-
straint for the very poor.  
Conclusions 
It is widely recognized – even by many municipal authorities – that urban 
agriculture is not only common practice but also that it is an important source of 
livelihood for many (poor) urban dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa. But because 
the urban poor often lack the necessary resources (land, capital), they are 
underrepresented among urban farmers. Moreover, those urban poor who do 
practise urban farming usually perform worse than their better-off colleagues. 
This can largely be contributed to smaller plots and a lack of inputs, particularly 
modern and expensive inputs like irrigation and chemicals in urban crop 
cultivation and improved breeds, drugs and feed supplements in urban livestock 
keeping. In addition, few of the poor urban farmers can afford to hire additional 
labour and they also receive less attention from professional advisors. 
In the three East African towns investigated in this chapter, urban agriculture 
is a very common economic activity. However, legislation, policy and practice 
show contradictions within and between the various levels of decision making 
(although recent developments in Nakuru show that these contradictions seem 
to be disappearing). Martin et al. (2000) describe a similar situation in Harare 
(Zimbabwe) and, to a lesser extent, in Pretoria and Cape Town (South Africa). 
Such contradictions can put the local authorities in a difficult situation. On the 
one hand, the activity is illegal or is only allowed under strict conditions, as 
used to be the case in Nakuru and still is in Morogoro and Mbeya. On the other 
hand, attempts (usually by NGOs) to promote the activity with the aim of 
improving the situation of the poor are being supported or even carried out by 
the municipality itself, for example in Nakuru and Morogoro. The strange thing 
is that the by-laws, even though implicitly recognizing urban farming as an 
important livelihood component for many of the urban poor and now as a legal 
urban activity, can in practice remain as restrictive as ever. 
If the authorities are serious about reducing urban poverty by means of urban 
farming, the first thing to do is to integrate urban agriculture into urban 
planning, for instance, by creating zones for farming purposes. Access to land is 
a major obstacle for many of the urban poor, so providing land should have the 
highest priority. Institutional support in combination with the creation of 
farmers’ associations is another prerequisite for successful poverty eradication 
by means of urban agriculture. Examples like the credit schemes in Nakuru and 
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the farmers’ cooperatives in Cotonou48 are promising developments in this 
respect. What such initiatives have in common is that the private sector takes 
the lead and local government allows, or maybe even supports, proposals. Only 
in Morogoro do some initiatives originate from the municipal government itself. 
It is time for local authorities to give up their wait-and-see attitude and to go a 
step further than only recognizing the urban farming sector in legal, policy and 
planning terms. 
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Livelihoods and income 
diversification among artisanal 
fishers on the Kenyan coast 
 
Jan Hoorweg, Barasa Wangila & Allan Degen 
 
 
Artisanal fishers are generally regarded as a poor, if not desti-
tute, group. This chapter focuses on income diversification 
among fishers on the Kenyan coast and investigates the benefits 
of diversification as a livelihood strategy. Fisher households 
engaged in more economic activities than their non-fisher 
neighbours and the incidence of poverty among the fishers was 
no higher than among the general rural population in the re-
gion. Two types of income diversification with differing effects 
were identified – ‘earner’ and ‘activity’ diversification respec-
tively. The policy implications of creating alternative employ-
ment opportunities for fisher communities are also discussed. 
 
 
Introduction 
Kenya belongs to the bottom 20% of countries in the world in terms of eco-
nomic and human development (UNDP 2004). In 1997, about half of Kenya’s 
population (52%) was termed poor by national standards and the number was 
on the increase (Kenya 2001).1 Among the poorest regions of the country were 
North-Eastern, Rift Valley and Coast Provinces; with 64% of the rural popula-
tion in the latter termed as poor. Mombasa, with about a third of the population 
of Coast Province, however, had the lowest percentage of urban poor of 
                                                 
1  The poverty line utilized in this case was Ksh 1239 per person per month in the rural 
areas and Ksh 2648 per person per month in the urban areas (Kenya 2001: 13). For 
the rural areas this amounts to US$ 19.8 per person per month or US$ 0.66 per person 
per day. The exchange rate in 1997 was US$ 1.0 = Ksh 62.7 (Kenya 2003). 
256 Hoorweg, Wangila & Degen 
Kenya’s five major cities (Kenya 2001). This disparity between the rural and 
urban areas of Coast Province has been noted before (Ikiara 2000) and the 
reasons for poverty in the rural areas include the climate and poor agricultural 
conditions, a lack of employment opportunities and low levels of education. 
The backwardness of the rural areas is aggravated by the ‘ribbon’ type settle-
ment, meaning that most people live relatively far from the main economic and 
employment opportunities. Employment creation throughout the province has 
been recommended as a development priority (Masai 2000, Hoorweg et al. 
2000). 
Marine fisheries are one of the few economic activities that are to be found 
all along the coast and employ an estimated 10,000-12,000 fishers (Hoorweg et 
al. forthcoming). Including workers in support industries and household 
dependents, it is estimated that about 150,000-200,000 people out of a total of 
2.45 million in 1999 (~8% of the population) are dependent on the fishing 
industry. However, little is known about household incomes and the income 
composition of local fishers. The impression is that both vary greatly among 
and within fishing villages. On some parts of the coast fishers are regarded as 
the ‘poorest of the poor’, whereas in other areas they are considered well-off 
(Mwadime 1996). Furthermore, little is known about whether fishers have other 
resources and, if so, the nature of these resources and whether households are 
wholly or partly dependent on fishing. Income opportunities of fisher house-
holds differ greatly not only along the coast but also between ethnic groups due 
to geographical, social and cultural factors. 
Although fishers in developing countries are usually regarded as poor, in 
absolute as well as relative terms, little attention, is being given to fishers in the 
current poverty debate, according to Béné (2003, 2004) who distinguishes 
between endogenous and exogenous explanations of poverty among fishers. 
The endogenous explanation emphasizes low levels of natural resources and 
industry-related factors. Fishers are poor mainly as a result of the open access to 
resources and the influx of people into the fishing sector, both of which are 
contributing to economic overexploitation. The exogenous explanation consid-
ers the fishery sector in relation to other sectors of the economy and argues that 
one should expect a wage-equilibrium between the fishery and non-fishery 
sectors. But since fishers usually live in remote areas, this is often not the case 
and a lack of alternative employment is one of the key factors contributing to 
low standards of living. 
Kenya’s coastal and marine environments are threatened by naturally occur-
ring processes, the growing subsistence needs of the coastal population and 
increased economic activities (Hoorweg 1998). Examples of natural processes 
are coral bleaching, sea-level change and beach erosion. Growing subsistence 
needs are behind the over-harvesting of mangrove trees, illegal shell collecting 
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and intensive fishing. Increased economic activities are resulting in more 
sewage and waste disposal from tourist hotels, industrial pollution of the waters 
near Mombasa and siltation at river exits due to soil erosion up-country. The 
first national environment plan in 1994 listed many of these issues but efforts at 
‘integrated coastal management’ since then have been limited to the Mombasa 
and Diani areas (MENR 1994, McClanahan et al. 2005). 
Artisanal fishers also contribute to the degradation of marine resources as 
intensive fishing can affect the ecological balance and result in a loss of local 
biodiversity. Poverty has long been associated with the overexploitation of 
natural resources, and it was generally assumed that income improvements are 
needed among the local population to reduce the pressure on these resources 
(Ellis 2000). Destructive fishing practices, such as the use of explosives, seine 
nets and poison, can alter the terrain as well as the ecological balance of the 
reefs and the sea bed. Local fishers generally do not approve of destructive 
fishing methods since they are aware that this will ultimately lead to poorer 
catches. Indeed, nearly all fishers were concerned with the degradation of 
marine resources and mentioned declining fish catches (Hoorweg et al. 2006). 
Other reasons given by fishers included increased number of fishers, the gazet-
tement of no-take areas, bad weather (notably the heavy El Niňo rains in 
1997/98) and competing fisheries such as commercial trawling.  
Faced with dwindling resources and more competition not only from fellow 
fishers but also from tourism and human settlement, fishers have little choice 
but to adjust to the changing conditions. One alternative is to fish more inten-
sively, for example, by investing in vessels and gear, but this is beyond the 
means of most fishers. Another alternative lies in livelihood diversification, 
which means engaging in economic activities other than fishing (Allison & Ellis 
2001). Most fishers, in any case, do not set out in the windy and rainy season 
when the waters are too rough but use this period instead for other activities.  
Livelihood diversification is a widespread survival strategy among rural 
households in Africa (Ellis 2000). Most studies on household diversification 
have focused on farm households and pastoralists and less attention has been 
paid to fisher households. Diversification is generally expected to improve 
household resources, if not resulting in increases in income then at least result-
ing in a wider income spread, although other researchers consider specialization 
as the more efficient way of improving income. It is important though to distin-
guish between ‘activity’ diversification at the individual level, where the head 
of household has income from more than one economic activity, and ‘earner’ 
diversification at the household level, where a household has more than one 
income earner (Ellis 1999, Woodhouse 2002). 
Between 1999 and 2001, the RDM project studied income diversification 
among fishers on the Kenyan Coast, the pressure on marine resources and the 
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relationship between the two.2 The relationship between income diversification 
and pressure on marine resources is discussed elsewhere (Hoorweg et al. 2006). 
This chapter focuses on income diversification among fishers and investigates 
whether diversification is beneficial as a livelihood strategy. It addresses two 
main questions (1) how fishers’ incomes compare with those of non-fishers, and 
(2) how diversification affects the incomes of fishers and the incidence of 
poverty among them. 
Study area 
The East African coast stretches for 5500 km and includes the coasts of Soma-
lia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique. The Kenyan coast runs for about 600 
km from the Somali border in the north to the Tanzanian border in the south. 
The continental shelf is narrow except off Malindi and round the mouth of the 
Tana River (Obura 2001). The northern half of the coast (north of Malindi) 
consists of broad sedimentary plains, drained by the Tana and Athi-Sabaki 
rivers that bring extensive sedimentation from their agricultural and industrial 
hinterlands. The shoreline along the southern coast consists of rocky fossil coral 
cliffs, mangrove stands and sandy beaches. It is characterized by a continuous 
fringing reef at a distance of 0.1 to 1.0 km offshore that offers important fishing 
grounds for the artisanal fishers (Frazier 1993, UNEP 1998). The climate on the 
Kenyan coast is dominated by pressure systems from the western Indian Ocean 
and two distinct monsoon periods. The northeast monsoon prevails from 
November to March with relatively gentle seas and favourable fishing condi-
tions (the kaskaki season) whereas the southeast monsoon lasts from May to 
October when seas are generally rough and fishing conditions less favourable 
(the kusi season). 
The coastal population is of mixed origin (Middleton 2000), with the 
Mijikenda as the largest group. These agriculturalists used to live inland on the 
hilly coastal range but many have moved to the coastal strip over the last 150 
years. They are subdivided into seven sub-groups of which the Giriama are the 
largest. Since independence in 1963, many immigrants of up-country origin 
have also moved to the coast seeking employment in Mombasa and, more 
recently, in the tourism industry. The original inhabitants of the coastal strip 
                                                 
2  RDM is the acronym for ‘Resource Diversification and Management among Coastal 
Fisher-folk in Kenya’, a joint project by Moi University (Kenya), Ben Gurion Uni-
versity (Israel) and the African Studies Centre (the Netherlands). The project was 
funded by the Netherlands Israel Research Project under contract NIRP-97-145-7. 
Detailed descriptions of surveys, studies, methods and sample characteristics can be 
found in the project’s final report (Hoorweg, Degen & Wangila 2003) and a mono-
graph (Hoorweg, Wangila & Degen forthcoming). 
  Income diversification among fishers on the Kenyan coast 259 
were the Swahili and Bajun. The Swahili are regarded as the offspring of Arab 
settlers and the indigenous Bantu and inhabited the ‘stone’ towns, were in-
volved in trading and had political dominance. The Bajun are regarded as either 
an independent ethnic group or a sub-group of the Swahili and are considered to 
be fishers par excellence. Since the 1960s however, the Mijikenda have joined 
the fisheries in large numbers and now pose considerable competition (Glaesel 
1997).3  
Coast Province has six districts. From north to south these are: Lamu, Tana 
River, Malindi, Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale. The study area is situated in 
Malindi and Kilifi districts, roughly 125 km from Ras Ngomeni (the Ngomeni 
peninsula) to Takaungu Creek. For this study, four landing sites were selected 
that differed in their proximity to marine reserves and their potential access to 
employment in nearby urban centres (Map 10.1). Two sites were near a marine 
reserve, one with employment opportunities nearby in Malindi (Mayungu) and 
one without (Uyombo), while two of the landing sites were a long way from 
any marine reserve, one with employment opportunities nearby in Mombasa 
(Takaungu) and one without (Ngomeni). 
From north to south, the Ngomeni landing site is characterized by the 
absence of the fringing reef, open access to the sea, mangroves, mud flats and 
sandy beaches. The Mayungu landing site is a small cove surrounded by dry, 
rocky land, with the reef relatively far out to sea. Uyombo lies at the entrance to 
the Mida creek, a shallow estuary, large parts of which are dry during ebb tide. 
The Takaungu landing site has a steep rocky coast and is on a deep creek that is 
also dry at ebb tide. 
Method 
Data for the household survey were collected at the four landing sites by two 
research assistants and a field supervisor between October 2000 and March 
2001. The study sample comprised fishers (N=133) and non-fisher (N=80). The 
fishers consisted of two subgroups: firstly, a group of boat captains and inde-
pendent fishers who operate alone (N=83)4, and secondly, a group of crew 
members (N=50). Fishers were selected from the records of an earlier study of 
fish landings at these sites. The first step was to identify boat captains and inde-  
 
                                                 
3  Nowadays the fisher population consists of fishers who started out as fishers and may 
or may not have taken extra jobs, and others with land-based experience who started 
fishing as an extra activity. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between the two 
groups. This issue is further discussed in Versleijen & Hoorweg (2006).  
4  Independent fishers (N=26) mostly used small boats and are grouped together with 
boat captains in the text. 
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  Map 10.1 Malindi and Kilifi Coast with landing sites included in the study 
 
 
 
pendent fishers who had been seen regularly at the landing sites by the field 
assistants. Contact was made with the selected fishermen on the beach and 
visits to their homes were then arranged. During the visit, they were asked to 
identify the nearest household where the head of the household was not a fisher. 
The boat captains were further asked to identify the household of a regular crew 
  Income diversification among fishers on the Kenyan coast 261 
member living nearby. Since the selected fishers, crew members and non-
fishers were neighbours, this selection procedure ensured that the cases were 
matched for farming conditions and distance to employment opportunities. 
Household size is an important factor as it affects not only household needs 
but also the available labour pool. Consequently, viewing economic activities 
and livelihood strategies exclusively from the perspective of the household head 
is incomplete. The economic activities of wives and other household members 
need to be taken into consideration, although it would be wrong to assume that 
all income sources are pooled in one common household budget. 
The head of the household and his wife were interviewed in all the house-
holds (as was the fisher concerned if he was not the household head). The 
following areas of information were covered: living conditions, household 
composition, employment characteristics, farming activities, fishing activities, 
fish conservation and food consumption. In all cases, respondents were also 
questioned about the income of the head of the household from his various 
economic activities as well as the contributions to the household income by the 
wife and resident children and the activities in which they are engaged.5  
Results 
Heads of household were mostly younger than 40 (55.3%) and the majority of 
respondents were of Mijikenda origin (77.5%). There were more Bajun among 
the fishers (15%) than in the non-fisher group (5%). Demographic characteris-
tics showed only small differences between fishers and non-fishers. The aver-
age household size was 7.7 among fisher groups and 6.8 among non-fishers. 
Among non-fishers, 27.5% of the heads had no formal education compared to 
33.9% among fishers. The quality of housing and hygiene were slightly better 
among non-fishers than fishers.  
 
Economic activities 
The type and frequency of economic activities in households are detailed in 
Table 10.1, including the participation of different household members in 
fishing, agriculture, wage employment and self-employment. The last category 
consisted of activities that, in practice, varied greatly in type and importance. 
Among the fisher households, nearly all heads were involved in fishing. In 
about half of the fisher households, the heads were involved in farming, 
followed by self-employment and wage employment, the latter two together 
accounting for 18%. Among the non-fishers, none of the heads – by definition – 
                                                 
5  Originally, the question referred to adults in the household but there was only one 
case where this was not a grown-up child. 
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was involved in fishing; nearly all were either self-employed or involved in 
wage employment. In this group, half of the respondents were also involved in 
farming. 
 
 
 Table 10.1 Households with different members engaged in various economic  
activities (%) 
 FISHER (N=133) 
NON-FISHER 
(N=80) 
 Head Wife 
Other 
adults 
Head Wife 
Other 
adults 
Fishing 86.5 0.0 39.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 
Farming 50.4 40.6 29.3 51.2 30.0 20.0 
Self-employed 14.3 18.0 17.3 52.5 18.8 21.3 
Wage employment 3.8 0.8 21.8 33.8 1.3 25.0 
 
 
About three-quarters of the heads were married and about three-quarters of 
the wives reported an economic activity other than household chores. There was 
little difference between the fisher and non-fisher households in this respect. In 
30-40% of the households, wives were involved in farming; in about 20% of the 
households, they were involved in vegetable and food selling, plaiting makuti 
(coconut-leaf thatch) and other handicrafts.6 Other adults in the household usu-
ally consisted of grown-up children. In about 40% of the households, grown-up 
children were, like their fathers, involved in fishing. In 20-30% of the house-
holds, they were involved in farming; and in about 40% in ‘employment’ of 
some kind.7 In all, fisher households reported economic activities of household 
members more frequently than non-fisher households, particularly those of 
grown-up children. This is probably related to the larger household size of the 
former. 
Apart from fishing, farming was the most common activity reported in both 
groups. Almost two-thirds of the fishing households had farmland (Table 10.2). 
The non-fishers reported farmland more often and, perhaps more importantly, 
had plots that were larger in size than those of the fishers. The land was used to 
cultivate food crops that were mainly used for home consumption with little or 
none sold. Almost half the households cultivated tree crops and about a third 
                                                 
6  Fish trading, perhaps surprisingly, was not an important activity in the households 
surveyed except among the crews where 15% of the wives were engaged in fish 
trading or processing. 
7  The terms ‘employment’ and ‘employment activities’ in the text refer to self-employ-
ment and wage employment together. 
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sold part of their harvest. Approximately 10% owned cattle, 46% goats and/or 
sheep and 56% had chickens and/or ducks. Sales of milk and eggs were negligi-
ble. In general, non-fishers had slightly more farm assets than fishers.  
 
 
Table 10.2 Farming characteristics by study group 
 Fisher (N=133) 
Non-fisher 
(N=80) 
Farmland available (%) 64.7 73.7 
Average farm size (acres) 3.7 5.6 
Sale of food crops (%) 3.8 11.3 
Sale of tree crops (%) 33.1 38.8 
Sale of milk (%) 6.8 3.8 
Sale of eggs (%) – 2.5 
 
 
Only 10% of the respondents stated that their income was sufficient to feed 
their household (Table 10.3) and 15-20% said that they earned more than half 
the income they needed. In many households, however, the respondents re-
ported that they earned only half of what was needed and a quarter earned even 
less. The latter group of needy cases were more prevalent among non-fisher 
than among fishers (33% vs. 22%).  
 
 
 Table 10.3 Responses as to whether income was sufficient  
 to meet household needs, by study group (%) 
  Fisher (N=124) 
Non-fisher 
(N=72) 
Sufficient 11.3 9.7 
More than half of what required 17.7 16.7 
Half of what required 49.2 40.3 
Less than half of what required 21.8 33.3 
Total 100 100 
 
 
There was little difference between fishers and non-fishers in the number of 
households that received contributions from different household members. 
More than 89% of households had income from the head, 25-30% had income 
from wives, and about 20% reported income from ‘other’ household members. 
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In summary, the main difference between the study groups lies in the fewer 
economic activities among non-fishers, which can be traced to the absence of 
fishing as an economic activity in that group. 
 
Household income 
The total income of fishers was estimated at Ksh 1952 per week, almost 50% 
higher than the Ksh 1323 of non-fishers, which is a significant difference (Table 
10.4).8 The proceeds from fishing comprised 74% of fishers’ incomes; with the 
rest coming from farm sales (16%) and employment activities (10%).9 Income 
of non-fishers, on the other hand, depended largely on self-employment (48%) 
or wage labour (32%) and was spread more evenly. Income from agriculture 
was nearly the same as that of fishers and was relatively low, which agrees with 
earlier information on the extent of farming.  
 
 
Table 10.4 Household income composition by study  
 group (average; Ksh/week) 
  Fisher (N=127) 
Non-fisher 
(N=76) 
Fishing 1439 0 
Farming 305 262 
Self-employed 159 641 
Wage employment 50 420 
Total 
 (s.d.) 
1952 
(1156) 
1323 
(854) 
 
 
Earnings from fishing comprised a large proportion of the income in fishers’ 
households, with an average of Ksh 1439 per week. Non-fishers, on the other 
hand, had higher incomes from employment with an average of Ksh 850 per 
week (vs. Ksh 464), although this was only partial compensation and their total 
income was considerably less than those of fishers. From an income point of 
view, it is clearly unattractive to abandon fishing for land-based activities. This 
                                                 
8  Analysis of variance (N=187; dependent variable: household income; covariate: 
household size): 
    df F p 
  Covariates 1 7.19 .01 
  Main effect 1 15.27 .00 
9  The incomes calculated in this study do not include the value of subsistence crops 
grown for own consumption. If these had been included, the comparison with the 
general population would have been more favourable. 
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does not imply that diversification cannot be successful but that it can only be 
beneficial in combination with fishing. In conclusion, the answer to the first 
research question is that fisher households realized higher incomes than non-
fisher households and that the difference was mainly due to earnings from fish-
ing. 
With an average household size of 7.7 people, the earlier-mentioned house-
hold income of Ksh 1952 per week equals Ksh 1090 per person per month, 
below the national poverty line of Ksh 1239 per month (see Footnote 1). From 
these figures it can be calculated that 59% of fisher households fell below the 
poverty line. This compares with 64% among the rural population in Coast 
Province, as mentioned earlier. It is clear, therefore, that fishers do not fare 
worse than the province’s rural population in general.10 
 
Diversification 
Diversification among fishers occurred when the household was not dependent 
on only one income source. This lofty position was achieved in two ways. The 
first occurred at the individual level when fishers had more than one economic 
activity, which is referred to as activity diversification. The second occurred at 
the household level when other household members had incomes that contrib-
uted to household expenses namely earner diversification. Activity diversifica-
tion was more common than earner diversification (51% vs. 39%)11 and the two 
types occurred largely independently of each other (48% of the cases had the 
same score on the two indicators; 52% scored differently). 
To address the question as to whether diversification resulted in changes in 
income level or changes in income composition, the ‘single’ and ‘multiple’ 
livelihood scenarios were examined among fisher households. In the case of the 
activity diversification of the head of a household (Table 10.5), his income from 
fishing decreased by Ksh 250 per week but this was compensated for by income 
from farming and self-employment so that the head’s total income was slightly 
higher, although this was not statistically significant. Activity diversification 
clearly led to a greater spread of income but not to a substantially higher in-
come. 
 
                                                 
10  Willman (2004: 247) has argued that poverty is not only decided by level of income 
but that fishers are often looked down upon because of their poor education, bad diet 
and their low level of political participation. In the present study, the fishers’ group 
did indeed have less formal education but there were only small differences in diet 
and this was not to the detriment of the fishers’ group (Hoorweg et al. forthcoming). 
11  Non-fishers were not included in any further analyses. The 22 fishers that were not 
heads of households were also omitted from further analysis. The remaining house-
holds numbered 111. 
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Table 10.5 Head’s income composition by activity  
 diversification (fisher households;  
 average; Ksh/week) 
  Single 
activity 
(N=54) 
Multiple 
activities 
(N=57) 
Fishing 1607 1356 
Farming 25 283 
Self-employment 0 96 
Wage employment 0 14 
Total 
 (s.d.) 
1633 
(1019) 
1750 
(1018) 
 
 
 
Table 10.6  Household income composition by earner 
 diversification (fisher households;  
 average; Ksh/week) 
  Single 
earner 
(N=68) 
Multiple 
earner 
(N=43) 
Fishing 1469 1548 
Farming 157 324 
Self-employment 66 276 
Wage employment 3 44 
Total 
 (s.d.) 
1696 
(1071) 
2192 
(989) 
 
 
 
 Table 10.7 Household incomes by different types of diversification (fisher households) 
 
No  
diversifi- 
cation 
Activity 
diversifi- 
cation 
Earner 
diversifi- 
cation 
Activity 
& earner 
diversification 
Total 
No. of cases 32 (29%) 36 (32%) 22 (20%) 21 (19%) 111 (100%) 
Household income 
(average Ksh/week) 
1670 1718 2102 2286 1888 
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This was different for earner diversification (Table 10.6) where incomes 
from fishing were nearly the same among households of single earners and 
multiple earners. Among multiple earners, farming and self-employment were 
the main sources of extra income. Earner diversification led to higher incomes 
without a shift away from fishing. 
Table 10.7 presents the distribution of the two types of diversification in 
fisher households. In 19% of households, diversification of both kinds was 
present, whereas no diversification at all was found in 29% of households. 
Furthermore, 32% and 20% reported either activity or earner diversification. 
Households with both diversifications had the highest average household 
income, followed by households with earner diversification only, then activity 
diversification only and finally no diversification. Analysis of variance revealed 
that there were significant income differences because of earner diversification 
but not because of activity diversification. These differences were independent 
of household size.12  
In conclusion, the answer to the second question is that earner diversification 
resulted in higher incomes and that activity diversification added little to 
income levels but resulted primarily in changes in income composition. A 
follow-up question was whether the findings regarding activity diversification 
applied to all categories of fishers. The next section examines whether diversifi-
cation trends differed between boat captains and crew members.  
 
More about activity diversification 
There was little difference between boat captains and crew members in terms of 
total income. The two groups earned 91% and 79% of their incomes respec-
tively from fishing. Captains reported an income from fishing that was 15% 
higher than crew members. This was expected since boat captains were either 
boat owners or leased boats from tajiri (wealthy local entrepreneurs) and, as 
such, customarily receive a share of the catch. Crew members, however, had 
higher incomes from farming and self-employment and thus managed to earn 
the same total income. 
The income composition of boat captains and crew with different livelihood 
scenarios is given in Table 10.8. Boat captains who focused only on fishing had 
                                                 
12 Analysis of variance (N=111; dependent variable: household income; covariate: 
household size): 
   df F p 
  Covariate 1 2.47 .12 
  Main effects 2 2.31 .10 
  Activity diversification 1 0.01 .91 
  Earner diversification 1 4.59 .03 
  Two-way interactions 1 0.15 .70 
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the highest income from fishing, about Ksh 1740. Boat captains who had other 
economic activities averaged Ksh 1350 per week from fishing. Among crew 
members, income from fishing was also about Ksh 1350 per week, irrespective 
of whether they had other economic activities or not. The picture changed, 
however, when the heads’ total incomes were examined. These were not easy to 
interpret because trends differed within the sub-groups. Among boat captains, 
income from a single livelihood was higher than that from a diversified liveli-
hood. The opposite was true for crew members. It is likely that boat captains 
invested time in the repair and maintenance of equipment to be successful and 
needed time to organize fishing trips and make arrangements for the sale of 
their catch. These preparations were vital to the success of their fishing enter-
prise. If time were spent on other economic activities, then income from fishing 
would decrease accordingly. This was not the case for the crew. Diversified 
crews managed to use the remaining time economically, adding more than 50% 
to their fishing incomes with non-fishing activities and realizing the highest 
income of all groups. Crew members without extra economic activities, how-
ever, were in the lowest income group. 
 
 
Table 10.8 Income composition of the household head by fisher status and activity  
 diversification (average; Ksh/week) 
 Boat  Captains Crew Members 
 
Total 
 
(N=73) 
Single 
 Activity 
(N=33) 
Multiple 
Activity 
(N=40) 
Total 
 
(N=38) 
Single 
Activity 
 (N=21) 
Multiple 
Activity 
 (N=17) 
Fishing 1559 1744 1350 1357 1352 1362 
Farming 135 0 287 247 33 511 
Self employment 20 0 43 118 0 265 
Wage labour 0 0 0 5 0 12 
Total income head    
 (s.d.) 
1714 
    (934) 
1744 
   (1046) 
1680 
   (867) 
1727 
   (1067) 
1386 
   (770) 
2149 
   (1245) 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the livelihoods of fishers, based on a survey among 
fisher and non-fisher households living in the same vicinity. This means that the 
external variables of farming conditions and (distance to) employment opportu-
nities were matched. The study revealed that fisher households were engaged in 
more activities than non-fisher households and that they clearly had an advan-
tage and a broader resource base. Non-fishers had more farming assets but 
fishers also engaged in farming. Income figures supported the above observa-
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tions. Fisher households earned 50% more income than non-fishers, a difference 
that was due to earnings from fishing. Fishing was vital to the income of fisher 
households and, judging from the comparison with non-fishers, difficult to 
compensate for with other economic activities. Although non-fisher incomes 
were more evenly spread over different activities, their incomes were consid-
erably lower. 
Despite the relatively favourable position of fishers in their local communi-
ties, it is still possible for these communities near the coast to be poor, with 
income levels below those in rural areas elsewhere in Coast Province. This has, 
however, been shown not to be the case: the incidence of poverty among fishers 
was no higher than among the general rural population in Coast Province. 
Therefore, the view that fishers are destitute, among the ‘poorest of the poor’, 
are trapped in a hopeless situation and are desperate for other opportunities 
clearly does not apply here. The fishing sector is not an employer of last resort 
and income diversification is not a means to escape fishing but is rather an 
integral part of livelihood strategies. The other side of the coin is that non-
fishers will be attracted to fishing in order to improve their livelihoods, and this 
is indeed happening with the entry into the sector of many Mijikenda fishers 
(Versleijen & Hoorweg 2006). Nevertheless, it must be realized that many 
fisher households live below the poverty line and, as such, are part of the 
region’s general poverty problem. 
Earner diversification resulted in substantially higher incomes while activity 
diversification added little but resulted mainly in changes in income composi-
tion (although the latter still had higher incomes than the non-fisher). Few fisher 
households (29%) live without diversification of any kind, which confirms the 
importance of this income strategy. Earner and activity diversification can be 
regarded as different strategies, each with its own advantages and disadvan-
tages. Activity diversification means that the head can decide on how the in-
come is used but the income is limited by what that one person can earn. It is 
reasonable to assume that frequency of activity diversification decreases with 
age whereas the frequency of earner diversification increases with age. Wives 
can start to earn an income when the older children are able to care for their 
younger siblings. At a later stage, children can also earn money. Earner diversi-
fication means that the household has more income but the head does not have 
to put in any more work. The disadvantage from his point of view is that he 
does not have sole control of the income (although the wives and other income 
earners probably think differently). Still, it is likely that the wife will spend 
most or all of her earnings on household necessities. As for older children, they 
will probably get married and, therefore, contribute earnings only for a limited 
number of years.  
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There is not one clear-cut livelihood strategy that is better than the others 
and the choices for or against diversification are complex. Fishers have to make 
a number of successive choices based on their personal circumstances and 
preferences. The first choice is whether to operate as a crew member, an inde-
pendent fisherman or a boat captain. This choice depends on age, experience 
and personal initiative and has implications for possible income diversification. 
The second choice is whether to opt for income diversification or not, bearing in 
mind the extra effort that is needed and the changes in household relations that 
may result. It has to be realized that without diversification, more fisher house-
holds would sink deeper into poverty. For boat captains, it is better to concen-
trate on one activity, but for crew members it is better to diversify as they had 
the highest incomes.  
Next, a choice has to be made between ‘activity’ diversification and ‘earner’ 
diversification (or both) but, again, much depends on the personal circum-
stances and experience of the individual fishers. Relevant factors include 
employment history, family stage, level of education, personal preferences and 
opportunities. The choice for activity diversification depends primarily on a 
person’s level of education and personal preferences. Formal education may 
make it easier to find employment although its importance should not be over-
estimated as chance opportunities are perhaps more important. Earner diversifi-
cation, on the other hand, is very much dependent on household stage (namely 
whether there are grown-up children in the household), household size and per-
sonal ideas about the role of women in society.  
Many poverty alleviation programmes among fishers in developing countries 
over the past four decades have been based on the assumption that fishers are 
among the very poor (Béné 2004). Improving catches and offering alternative 
employment have been important elements in these approaches (Neiland 2004). 
The policy measures to combat existing poverty among fisher groups that are 
listed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of the Kenya Government 
(Kenya 2001) recommend improving infrastructure such as landing sites, access 
roads, potable water supplies, fishers’ shacks and electricity connections. These 
measures are aimed primarily at strengthening the processing and marketing of 
fish and there is no mention of creating employment opportunities outside the 
fishing industry for this group. Income diversification is certainly a means of 
improving the situation of fisher households. However, if employment opportu-
nities are to be actively stimulated by government measures, two aspects require 
careful consideration: type of employment and geographical distribution. 
Employment opportunities within the fishing industry are limited by current 
catch levels that, even in 1996, were already judged to be at maximum sustain-
able yields (McClanahan 1996). Employment opportunities outside the fishing 
industry will inevitably attract workers from outside the fishing community as 
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well. If new industries are situated near Mombasa they will not offer easy 
access for fishers living a long distance away. But if these new industries are in 
more remote areas and near the coast (to reach the fishers), then it is likely that 
outsiders will follow, seek accommodation locally and take up fishing for the 
extra income it provides. ‘New’ fishers usually fish near the coast around the 
coral reefs (Hoorweg et al. 2006) and this will most certainly increase pressure 
on this delicate part of the marine ecosystem, which is already under extreme 
pressure from various sides. 
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The MDG on poverty and hunger: 
How reliable are the hunger estimates? 
 
Wijnand Klaver & Maarten Nubé 
 
 
Two hunger related indicators are used for tracking progress 
towards MDG-1. The prevalence of people with inadequate 
food intake (undernourishment) is based on national food sta-
tistics, which are not very reliable in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
other indicator (prevalence of underweight among underfives, 
based on anthropometric surveys) appears to be more reliable. 
The measurement of height in addition to weight allows a more 
refined classification of anthropometric failure. A specially 
designed cross-tabulation (called ‘Anthro Table’) facilitates the 
inspection of the resulting interconnected prevalence data. An 
example from Kenya confirms the reliability of underweight as 
a sound overall indicator of child growth, while the prevalence 
of stunting (low height) remains a useful additional indicator 
that can help attribute any trends in underweight to chronic 
and/or acute undernutrition. 
 
 
Introduction  
The first of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger, with one of the targets being to halve the pro-
portion of people suffering from hunger by 2015 compared to the 1990 figure.1 
To measure progress, two indicators have been selected by the United Nations: 
the proportion of children under five whose weight-for-age is below the WHO 
                                                 
1  The other targets of MDG-1 are to ‘Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day’ and to ‘Achieve full and pro-
ductive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people’ 
(United Nations Statistics Division 2008). 
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cut-off point for undernutrition,2 and the proportion of the population whose 
food consumption is below minimum dietary energy requirements. In this 
chapter, the first is referred to as ‘prevalence3 of underweight in children’ or 
‘prevalence of underweight’ and the second is referred to as ‘prevalence of 
undernourishment among the population’ or ‘prevalence of undernourishment’. 
The first part of the chapter questions whether these two indicators are 
indeed measurable and reliable, and how they relate to each other, while the 
second takes a closer look at the first of the two indicators and considers how 
weight-for-age combines the effects of two distinct dimensions of child growth: 
growth in body stature with age, and fluctuations in body proportions. Each of 
these dimensions has its own indicator, namely the number of children with a 
height too low for their age, and the proportion of children with a weight below 
what would be expected for their height. Although the chapter focuses on the 
merits of these indicators for monitoring purposes, their relationship with 
indicators for other development targets and background conditions over time is 
an important issue. The monitoring of MDG targets should be combined with 
interpreting national trends appropriately, including attributing changes to likely 
explanatory factors such as the impact of different policies, economic opportu-
nities or constraints, and natural or manmade changes or disasters. This chapter 
takes a first step towards developing new reporting tools to allow a better ana-
lysis of the ‘prevalence of underweight’ indicator. 
Underweight vs. undernourishment: Measurement issues 
The hunger-related target of MDG-1 is being monitored using two indicators. 
The first is derived from anthropometric surveys among children under five and 
the second is based on statistics about food availability for human consumption. 
The chapter starts with information on the relationship between the two indi-
cators. This is followed by a brief overview of the procedure used to estimate 
the prevalence of undernourishment among the population and an assessment of 
the reliability of the prevalence of undernutrition using the results of successive 
anthropometric surveys that were undertaken over a relatively short period of 
time in the same country. Information is presented on the degree of stability of 
                                                 
2  The cut-off point used internationally is –2 Z-scores below the reference population 
median. 
3  A ‘prevalence rate’ (in %) describes the percentage of people in a given area who are 
suffering from a condition at a particular time. In epidemiology, this rate is distin-
guished from the ‘incidence rate’, which is the percentage of people in a given area 
who become ill in a certain period (e.g. one year). The monitoring of MDG-1 relies 
on prevalence percentages and not on incidence rates. 
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the results at a national level and the within-country distribution of under-
nutrition prevalence. 
 
The relationship between underweight and undernourishment 
The two indicators – prevalence of underweight and prevalence of undernour-
ishment – are generally seen to allow a monitoring of trends concerning the 
occurrence of hunger. As they measure different aspects of nutrition (children’s 
weight versus household per capita food consumption), the two indicators 
cannot be expected to give identical results. However, a positive correlation 
between the two is expected, with a decrease in the prevalence of undernour-
ishment accompanying a decrease in the prevalence of underweight in children, 
and vice versa.  
Figure 11.1 shows the patterns of change in underweight and undernourish-
ment in Sri Lanka.4 Between 1990 and 2002 there was a continuous decline in 
the prevalence of underweight among children and the prevalence of under-
nourishment in the general population. The two trend lines are similar in terms 
of slope but differ in level because the upper line refers to a percentage of 
children and the lower line to a percentage of the population. 
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 Figure 11.1 Trends in prevalence of underweight and  
 undernourishment in Sri Lanka, 1990-2002  
 Source: FAO (1999-2005), WHO (2006a) 
 
                                                 
4  The example given is of an Asian country, because production estimates for the staple 
food are probably more reliable there than in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sri Lanka the 
staple food is rice. As most rice is commercially traded, it can be better estimated than 
production estimates for home-grown/consumed food crops such as cassava in SSA 
(see below). 
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However, a more systematic analysis of the combined data available at a 
national level on prevalence rates of underweight and national prevalence rates 
of undernourishment reveals that the clear positive relationship shown for Sri 
Lanka is exceptional. Figure 11.2 shows the results of comparing the changes in 
prevalence rates of underweight and undernourishment for 27 African coun-
tries.5 For most countries, these changes were noted over a five to ten year 
period. If there had been a strong positive correlation between the two indi-
cators, Figure 11.2 would show a concentration of data points on or near a line 
running from the bottom left to the upper right quadrants. However, the results 
reveal a wide scattering of data, indicating that the relationship between change 
in underweight and that in undernourishment is only weak. The changes in 
prevalence of underweight and undernourishment for eight countries surpris-
ingly run in opposite directions (data points in the upper left and lower right 
quadrants). For individual countries, the direction and degree of change of the 
two MDG-1 indicators on hunger are far from similar and show poor correlation 
(P=0.175, Fisher’s Exact test). This casts doubt on the suitability and reliability 
of at least one, if not both, indicators. Although it is true that underweight is not 
only caused by inadequate food consumption but also by inadequate healthcare 
and caring practices, it is unlikely that the influence of such factors can fully 
explain the poor association between undernourishment and underweight. 
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 Figure 11.2  Changes over time in prevalence (%)  
 of underweight and prevalence (%) of  
 undernourishment in 27 African countries  
 (see Appendix 1 for national data) 
                                                 
5  The full data set on which Figure 11.2 is based is given in Appendix 1. 
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The prevalence of undernourishment 
Methodology to estimate the prevalence of hunger on the basis of food avail-
ability and consumption has been developed by the FAO and consists of three 
main components: an estimate of the national availability of food for human 
consumption; an estimate of the within-country distribution of food consump-
tion; and the setting of a minimum level of food energy requirements (in kcal).6 
The method is in principle well designed but also complex and highly de-
manding of data. One of the greatest problems is that the data required are either 
poorly estimated or not available at all. For this reason, this method has fre-
quently been criticized over the years (see, for example, Svedberg 1991, 1999, 
2000). Without discussing all the steps in detail and the data required to arrive 
at an estimate of the prevalence of undernourishment, one exception is made 
that relates to the first step in the procedure. This is the estimation of a coun-
try’s average per capita food consumption based on the food balance sheet, 
which is constructed following a so-called accounting method that makes 
estimates based on food production (marketed and subsistence), food imports 
and changes in stocks. All forms of non-food utilization are then subtracted 
from the total quantity of food available. This includes the usage of food for 
animal feed and as seed, food losses during transport and processing, and food 
exports. The balance of all these is considered to represent food availability for 
consumption by the population of the country concerned at retail level. The 
food balance approach leads to an indirect estimate of actual aggregate food 
consumption and does not account for any food losses between retail and house-
hold levels, nor within households. 
Table 11.1 shows the difficulties that can be encountered when constructing 
a food balance sheet and gives figures on the production and consumption of 
cassava in various African countries that were selected for their relatively high 
levels of cassava production and consumption. The table shows that between 
0% and 45% of national cassava production in the eight countries selected is 
reportedly used as feed, with estimates of waste varying between 5% and 35%. 
The resulting percentages available for human consumption in these countries 
vary from 45% in Uganda to 95% in Zambia. The percentages used can be seen 
to be rounded figures (with a precision of 5 to 10%). This reflects their very 
character: the percentages are generally only rough ‘guesstimates’. This means 
that, apart from errors in absolute estimates of root crop production, inaccura-
cies in the above estimates of food utilization for other purposes than human 
consumption have far-reaching consequences for national-level estimates of 
total energy consumption. In turn, errors in the estimates of total per capita food 
consumption strongly influence estimates of the prevalence of undernourish-
                                                 
6  One kilocalorie (kcal) corresponds to 4.814 kiloJoules (kJ). 
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ment. These, and various other problems associated with the FAO methodology 
for estimating hunger in the form of undernourishment (e.g. assumptions about 
the distribution of national food supplies among the population utilizing in-
formation on income distribution, and assumptions underlying the definition of 
inadequate energy consumption), cast doubt on the reliability and usefulness of 
the undernourishment indicator when assessing progress in the MDG-1’s 
hunger-related target. 
 
 
Table 11.1   Estimates of food and non-food utilization of cassava in selected  
 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1999-2001 
 
% of  
production  
used as feed 
% of  
production  
lost (waste) 
% of  
production 
available  
as food 
Food energy 
contributed by 
cassava in 
kcal/capita/day 
Angola 25 5 70 644 
Congo (DRC) 5 5 90 872 
Ghana 15 35 50 645 
Mozambique 10 15 75 637 
Nigeria 25 30 45 277 
Togo 0 15 85 386 
Uganda 45 10 45 295 
Zambia 0 5 95 251 
Source: FAO Food Balance Sheets (1999-2001) 
 
 
The prevalence of underweight and of stunting among children 
The main question here is to what extent information based on anthropometric 
surveys among young children provides reliable information on the actual 
prevalence rates of undernutrition, and therefore whether underweight preva-
lence can be considered an appropriate indicator in monitoring MDG-1. Unlike 
undernourishment, the measurement of underweight in children is relatively 
straightforward and involves collecting anthropometric information (age, sex 
and body weight) from a sample of children.  
Apart from the obvious requirement that anthropometric measurements are 
made and collected correctly, the most important condition for estimating a 
national-level prevalence rate of underweight is the representativeness of the 
sample. An empirical approach to assess the apparent representativeness of 
commonly used samples in nutrition surveys is the comparison of the results of 
two independent surveys in the same country or region that have been under-
taken relatively close together. Surveys held at the same time in the same year 
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are ideal. The following analysis uses the main determining factor of under-
weight, i.e. low height-for-age (stunting or chronic undernutrition), because it is 
generally held to be less affected by short-term fluctuations than low weight-
for-height (see Box 11.1). In standard nutrition surveys, the age ranges covered 
are either children under five or children less than three years of age. Thus, 
when the time span between two surveys in the same area is no more than two  
 
 
Box 11.1   Classifying growth in young children 
 
When a child is not growing well, s/he lags behind in the development of body dimen-
sions. The growth of a young child can thus be judged from the increase in his/her body 
weight and/or height over time. The resulting weight or height at any time is referred to 
as ‘attained growth’. Given the child’s age and sex, weight and height are converted into 
indices of attained growth: weight-for-age (WA) and height-for-age (HA) respectively. 
Body proportions are captured by a third index: weight-for-height (WH). When working 
out each of these indices, the growing child’s attained weight or height is compared with 
the expected values in a population dataset that is recommended for international refer-
ence purposes. On the basis of studies among a reference population in an environment 
where undernutrition has not been a public-health problem, experts have established 
tables and curves to describe the recommended distribution of growth values for refer-
ence purposes. The World Health Organization has established reference data for inter-
national use.7 Some countries use reference data based on their own research or bor-
rowed from other sources. 
WA is a composite index that combines the effects of two different biological pro-
cesses: growth in body stature (measured by HA) and fluctuations in body ‘fill’ (meas-
ured by WH). A child can, therefore, be underweight because s/he is either too short for 
his/her age or too thin for his/her height or a combination of both. WA alone cannot dis-
tinguish between the two processes and needs to be complemented by information on its 
components (HA and WH). Body stature8 at a given age is the result of the accumulation 
of linear growth since the child was conceived and a measure of long-term body growth. 
A below-normal value of HA indicates chronic undernutrition (stunting); this is the result 
of prolonged food deprivation and/or disease or illness. The other dimension of child 
growth is represented by WH. A below-normal index indicates acute undernutrition 
(wasting) and is attributed to concurrent or recent episodes of food deprivation and/or 
illness. 
                                                 
7  In 1983, the World Health Organization adopted international reference values for 
weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-height (WHO 1983) based on anthro-
pometric data collected in the United States by the National Centre for Health Sta-
tistics (NCHS). In 2006 the WHO published new growth standards for international 
use (WHO 2006b; WHO 2007). 
8  The method of measuring the body stature of a child depends on its ability to stand. 
For children under 2 years of age, stature is measured with the child lying down. The 
resulting measurement is referred to as ‘body length’. Children over two are measured 
standing upright and the result is referred to as ‘height’. The effects of gravity make 
the latter measurement about 1 cm less than the former. There are separate reference 
tables for length and height. The term ‘height’ is used in this chapter to denote length 
and height. 
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or three years apart, part of the targeted population segment is represented in 
both surveys. It is partially for this reason that, in particular for the anthropo-
metric height-for-age indicator, differences between successive surveys are ex-
pected to be relatively modest. Only over longer periods of time are significant 
changes and, hopefully, a reduction in undernutrition prevalence rates expected 
to occur.  
Figure 11.3 shows the stunting prevalences for twelve Asian countries. The 
time span between the successive surveys is at most three years and for most 
countries only one or two years. Results confirm the expectation of, at most, 
moderate changes in stunting prevalence between the two successive surveys. 
The biggest difference is observed for Yemen with a difference in prevalence 
between the two surveys of approximately ten percentage points. The informa-
tion presented in Figure 11.3 supports using anthropometry for monitoring 
undernutrition. It is also important to note that for some of the Asian countries  
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Figure 11.3   Prevalence rates of chronic undernutrition (low height-for-
age) between two successive surveys in 12 Asian countries  
(year 1 = earlier year, year 2 = later year) 
Source: DHS (2007), WHO (2006a) (see Appendix 2) 
Note: Prevalence rates of low height-for-age were not available for Malaysia and Indonesia and 
the rates shown are for weight-for-age. 
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the sample sizes were quite large (see Appendix 2), therefore increasing the 
likelihood that the sample estimates would be close to the true population 
values for the respective countries.  
Figure 11.4 provides a comparable analysis for nineteen African countries. 
The results concerning stunting in most of these countries were of a similar 
magnitude, although the differences were larger than in the Asian survey for 
several countries. The results support using the anthropometric indicator to 
assess undernutrition but in comparison with Asian countries, data reliability is 
probably somewhat weaker and careful use of the information is required. One 
of the reasons for the large differences between some of the surveys could be 
that sample sizes in nutrition surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa are smaller than 
sample sizes in similar surveys in Asia (Appendices 2 and 3). 
The present assessment of the reliability of the results of anthropometric 
surveys by comparing two successive surveys should be considered an ex-
plorative exercise. When two successive surveys yield markedly different 
results, this could be caused either by a real change in nutritional conditions or 
by poor and/or non-representative sampling frames. Similarly, when two suc-
cessive surveys give a similar anthropometric outcome, this is not proof that  
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Figure 11.4   Prevalence rates of chronic undernutrition (low height-for-age) 
between two successive surveys in 19 African countries 
Source: DHS (2007), WHO (2006a) (see Appendix 3) 
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representative sampling has occurred. Yet when for a large number of countries, 
such as those presented in Figures 11.3 and 11.4, two successive surveys give 
similar results, this adds to the credibility of the results. 
For a large number of Sub-Saharan African countries, the within-country 
distribution of stunting was analyzed. Figure 11.5 provides results from three 
successive anthropometric surveys at province or district level for Ghana and 
Malawi. The two figures illustrate the strengths and limitations of the currently 
available anthropometric data on undernutrition.  
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Figure 11.5 Within-country distribution of low height-for-age in  
 children in successive surveys in Ghana (1993, 1998,  
 2003) and Malawi (2000, 2004, 2006) 
Source: DHS (2007) 
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Figure 11.5 reveals a stable pattern of undernutrition for Ghana over a period 
of ten years that is prevalent in the country’s various districts, while under-
nutrition prevalence in Ghana is highest in the northern part of the country and 
lowest in the Greater Accra region. The pattern of within-country undernutrition 
in Malawi is less clear. Whether these differences reflect true changes in nutri-
tional conditions or are caused by a non-representativeness of the samples can-
not be determined and further information is needed for a meaningful interpreta-
tion of the results. 
The indicator of underweight prevalence has a good degree of reliability 
when it comes to monitoring MDG-1 on halving hunger and undernutrition. 
Data requirements are limited but caution should be exercised in interpreting the 
data with respect to the representativeness of the results at disaggregated levels, 
or when sample sizes are relatively small. The undernourishment indicator de-
rived from food availability and distribution is data demanding, subject to wide 
margins of error and appears to be less suitable for monitoring progress towards 
achieving MDG-1’s target of halving hunger between 1990 and 2015.  
The indicator of underweight dissected 
As height-for-age indicates the long term process of growth, perhaps prevalence 
of stunting would be a better indicator for monitoring MDG-1 than the pre-
valence of underweight. The reason is that the wasting component, which is 
implicit in underweight, might dilute or partially mask the effects of stunting. 
To investigate this hypothesis, the indicator of underweight now comes under 
the microscope for dissection.  
 
Weight-for-age and its components 
As mentioned in Box 11.1, weight-for-age (WA) is the composite result of 
weight-for-height (WH) and height-for-age (HA). The following schematic 
notation9 illustrates the logic of this interconnection: 
                                                 
9  In fact, the anthropometric indices are not obtained by a simple arithmetical division 
of W by A (or H) and of H by A, respectively, but by a much more complex proce-
dure involving the expression of an observed W or H in terms of its position com-
pared to reference values. The resulting anthropometric indices are expressed as Z-
score values: WAZ, WHZ and HAZ. The above notation is just for illustrative pur-
poses. The true WAZ is not simply obtained by multiplying WHZ and HAZ but is 
calculated in its own right. A Z-score value indicates how far a child’s observed value 
is above or below the median value of the international reference data for children of 
the same age (in the case of WA and HA) or height (in the case of WH). The distance 
of the observed value from the median reference value is expressed in terms of stan-
dard deviation units of the same reference population. The result has no measurement 
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W/A ≈ W/H * H/A  
 
For a group or sample of children, the frequency of individual results is ex-
pressed in terms of prevalence percentages: (i) the prevalence of underweight 
(i.e. children with a below-normal weight for their age), (ii) the prevalence of 
stunting (i.e. children with a height below normal for their age), and (iii) the 
prevalence of wasting (i.e. children with a below-normal weight for their 
height). The latter two partly overlap and some children are both wasted and 
stunted. Waterlow (1973) proposed a two-way cross-classification of the dicho-
tomy according to WH and the dichotomy according to HA. 
Table 11.2a shows prevalence percentages for Kenya’s recent Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS). In this example, 30.8% of the under-fives were 
stunted and 5.7% were wasted, but there was an overlap of 1.8% (wasted and 
stunted) such that the prevalence of children with normal height-for-age and 
normal weight-for-height was 65.3%. The much higher prevalence of stunting 
compared to the prevalence of wasting is a normal finding in nutrition surveys: 
 
 
Table 11.2a   Example of Waterlow’s anthropometric classification of children 
 
Waterlow’s classification 
 
Anthropometric category Wasted (WHZ<-2.0) Non-wasted (WHZ>=-2.0) 
Non-stunted (HAZ>=-2.0) 
Wasted, non-stunted: 
 
190 (3.9%) 
‘Normal’:* 
 
3190 (65.3%) 
Stunted (HAZ<-2.0) 
Wasted + stunted: 
 
88 (1.8%) 
Stunted, non-wasted: 
 
1417 (29.0%) 
Source of prevalence data: Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2003) (Measure DHS+ 2004).  
Notes: The nationally representative sample survey covered 4885 under-fives from 400 sample points 
(clusters) in rural and urban areas of Kenya. To obtain the numbers in the above table, cases were weighted 
using the sampling weights in the SPPS data file to correct for any differences in sampling probabilities. 
The anthropometric categories are defined by combinations of HAZ and WHZ above or below Z = -2. The 
figures refer to the number of children in that category and the percentage of all children is shown in brackets. 
Formatting: The shading is an indication of the severity of the condition: light shading is for either wasted or 
stunted, and darker shading is for both wasted and stunted. 
* This group may include children with values above the normal range (Z-scores>+2.0), which may represent 
overweight or abnormal height. When the term ‘normal’ is used in this chapter, it should be understood as 
meaning ‘not sub-normal’. In Waterlow’s classification, ‘normal’ means neither wasted nor stunted. 
                                                                                                                       
units, as it is obtained as cm/cm or as kg/kg. According to statistical theory, the 
‘range of normal variation’ of Z-score values is between -2.0 and +2.0. 
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the former is the accumulated result of a chronic process or trend, while the 
latter can be seen as the result of variation in this trend. Under non-emergency 
conditions, the prevalence of wasting is generally of a much smaller magnitude 
than the prevalence of stunting. 
The mean Z-score values for the four categories are shown in Table 11.2b. 
The mean HAZ of the two categories in each row of Table 11.2a can be 
verified, and although not exactly the same, they are quite close. In the same 
vein, the mean WHZ of the two categories in each column of Table 11.2a are 
almost the same. Interestingly, the mean WAZ in Table 11.2b can be seen to 
exhibit three instead of two levels: normal children (-0.4), those with only one 
failure (around -2) and those with a double failure (-3.6). This is consistent with 
the intensity of the shading shown in Table 11.2a. 
 
 
Table 11.2b   Mean Z-score values of Waterlow’s four nutritional status categories 
 mean HAZ mean WHZ mean WAZ 
Normal -0.56 -0.03 -0.40 
Wasted, non-stunted 0.05 -2.65 -2.10 
Stunted, non-wasted -2.90 -0.12 -1.85 
Wasted and stunted -3.08 -2.53 -3.64 
 
 
Waterlow’s classification invites questions it cannot answer about under-
weight children. Are all the wasted children underweight? Are all the stunted 
children underweight? And can there be underweight children who are not 
wasted or stunted? A more refined classification of undernutrition has recently 
been proposed by Peter Svedberg (2000), who extended Waterlow’s classifica-
tion with a third dichotomy based on WAZ. He proposed six different combi-
nations of the three anthropometric indicators, which he labelled A to F. Nandy 
et al. (2005) applied this classification to survey data from India and redis-
covered10 one combination that Svedberg did not mention (and which they 
labelled group Y).11 There are, therefore, seven possible categories based on the 
combinations of the three indicators (see Table 11.3).12 For ease of reference, 
                                                 
10  In fact, this classification was given in WHO (1983). 
11  This is the combination of being (slightly) underweight but not wasted (although 
almost) and not stunted (although almost). 
12  Cross-tabulating three dichotomies produces eight (=2*2*2) combinations. A 
theoretical eighth combination (“wasted and stunted, but not underweight”: WS) is 
empty, as the anthropometric values that should give rise to that possibility cannot 
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group labels are proposed here that are abbreviations of the category descrip-
tions. This has the added advantage that the number of digits in a label indicates 
whether one is dealing with a single, double or triple failure.  
Svedberg further proposed combining the prevalences of the various possible 
combinations of wasting and/or stunting and/or underweight into one ‘compo-
site index of anthropometric failure’ (CIAF), which is equal to 100% minus the 
prevalence of the group without failure (i.e. 100% minus Svedberg’s group A, 
labelled N in this chapter). The CIAF is always a higher figure than each of the 
prevalences of wasting, stunting or underweight. 
 
A new Anthro Table for Svedberg’s classification of anthropometric failure 
Svedberg’s classification is essentially an extension of Waterlow’s classifica-
tion, so we propose building a table in analogy with Table 11.2a but with the 
more refined classification in seven categories. This disaggregation implies that 
the mean HAZ and WHZ are no longer similar for groups within the same row 
or column. Therefore the result of each of the seven categories in Table 11.4 is 
given at the cross-section of its own row and column. 
The following analysis has again been done with the data set from Kenya’s 
2003 Demographic and Health Survey (Measure DHS+, 2004). The total 
number of underweight children (see the figures in bold) was 985 (20.1%) and 
the total non-underweight was 3,900 (79.9%). Table 11.4 is the Anthro Table 
that represents the frequency distribution of the seven anthropometric categories 
in its two-way (bivariate) layout.  
The columns are arranged from low to high mean WHZ values and the rows 
from high to low mean HAZ values, as in a two-way graph.13 The mean WHZ 
values are shown at the top of the columns and the mean HAZ values at the left 
of the rows. Categories that are on the same diagonal (W and S; WU and SU) 
have almost the same mean WAZ values. Their average is shown in the the 
lower right margins of Table 11.4; they should be read diagonally, as indicated 
by the oblique dashes. The mean WAZ values of the seven categories can be 
seen to follow a gradient perpendicular to the diagonal shown: highest (-0.3) for 
N and lowest (-3.6) for WSU. This elegant property of the Anthro Table is 
explained by the strong interrelationship between the three anthropometric 
indices discussed earlier. We propose calling a table with this special layout an  
 
                                                                                                                       
co-exist, at least not with the standard cut-off values of -2. As the cut-off values of 
WHZ and HAZ are relaxed, while keeping WAZ at -2.0, a point may be reached 
where group U becomes impossible and a new group WS will appear. 
13  Admittedly, the distances between the mean Z-scores of the rows and columns are 
not constant. In this respect, the Anthro Table is a schematic visualization and not a 
precise graph. 
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Table 11.3   Svedberg’s (2000) classification of children by categories of  
 anthropometric normality/failure, expanded by Nandy et al. (2005) 
Group 
name 
(Svedberg, 
expanded 
by Nandy 
et al.) 
New 
proposed 
group 
label 
(this 
paper) 
Description Wasting Stunting Under-weight 
A N 
No failure: Children whose 
height and weight are above the 
age-specific minimal norm (i.e. 
above –2 Z-scores) and are not 
suffering from any 
anthropometric failure 
No No No 
B W 
Wasting only: Children with 
acceptable weight and height-
for-their age but who have sub-
normal weight-for-height 
Yes No No 
C WU 
Wasting and underweight: 
Children with acceptable height 
but whose weight-for-age and 
weight-for-height are too low 
Yes No Yes 
D WSU 
Wasting, stunting and 
underweight: Children who 
are suffering from 
anthropometric failure in all 
three measurements 
Yes Yes Yes 
E SU 
Stunting and underweight: 
Children with low weight-for-
age and low height-for-age but 
with acceptable weight-for-
height 
 
No Yes Yes 
F S 
Stunting only: Children with 
low height-for-age but who 
have an acceptable weight, both 
for their age and their (short) 
height 
No Yes No 
Y U Underweight only: Children who are only underweight  No No Yes 
Impossible Impos-sible 
Wasting and stunting, but not 
underweight:  Yes Yes No 
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Table 11.4   Anthro Table of children and prevalence % by anthropometric category  
Waterlow categories ← wasted  non-wasted → 
    
  
Svedberg/ 
Nandy’s 
categories 
WU WSU W U SU N S 
   
  
 
mean 
WHZ -2.8 -2.5 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.0 0.5    
  
  mean HAZ                   
W 1.4     69 1.4%         
  
N -0.5          304862.4%   
mean 
WAZ 
  
WU -0.7 121 2.5%           
↓   
 n
on
-s
tu
nt
ed
 →
 
U -1.6       1422.9%       -0.3 
S -2.6             78316%   
WSU -3.1   88 1.8%           -1.2 
←
 st
un
te
d 
 
SU -3.2         63413%       
 n
on
-u
nd
er
w
ei
gh
t →
 
  
   
  
mean
WAZ → -3.6   -2.6   -2.2   
                ← underweight   
Source of prevalence data: Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2003) (Measure DHS+ 2004). 
Legend: The anthropometric categories are defined by combinations of HAZ, WAZ and WHZ above or below 
Z=-2. (For the meaning of the abbreviations, see Table 3.) Entries are arranged according to the category’s 
mean HAZ by mean WHZ values, as indicated in the margins.  
Formatting: The shading indicates the four categories of Waterlow’s classification: light shading is for either 
wasted or stunted (disregarding underweight) and darker shading for both wasted and stunted (and inherently 
underweight). Numbers and prevalence percentages of children who are underweight (only or in any 
combination) are in bold. The broken dashed line separates the combinations with normal weight-for-age from 
the combinations with underweight. As such, this line suggests combinations of WHZ and HAZ that have the 
same WAZ of -2. Underweight increases if one moves through the table from the upper right to the lower left-
hand corner in a direction more or less perpendicular to the broken dashed line. 
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Anthro Table. In such a table it is possible to indicate schematically where the 
dividing line between underweight and normal weight would run if it were a 
graph (i.e. at WAZ=-2.0). This line runs diagonally through the Anthro Table 
(see the line with broken dashes that runs from the upper left to the lower right 
corner of Table 11.4).  
The 88 children in the WSU category (with the darkest shading) in Table 
11.4 are the same as the 88 children labelled ‘wasted + stunted’ in Waterlow’s 
classification (Table 11.2a). This is because any child who is both wasted and 
stunted is also necessarily underweight (see Footnote 12). However, the reverse 
is not true: a child who is neither wasted nor stunted does not necessarily have a 
normal WA. In fact, the cut-off line for underweight (see the line with broken 
dashes) passes through the quadrant of Waterlow’s ‘normal’ children and carves 
out a small percentage of children (here 2.9%) who are ‘underweight only’ (U). 
The average WAZ value of the U category is somewhat higher than the WAZ 
values of the WU and SU categories but lower than for N, which is consistent 
with its position in the Anthro Table. 
In Table 11.4 it can be seen how the usual three (one-dimensional) indicators 
for undernutrition are related to Svedberg’s CIAF (see above). Its prevalence in 
this example from Kenya is 100-62.4 = 37.6%. The indicator underweight 
(WAZ<-2.0; here: 20.2% of the children) unfortunately ‘misses’ the 16% of the 
children belonging to category S and the 1.4% belonging to category W, but has 
the merit of including 2.9% of the children (U) that are missed in Waterlow’s 
classification. The combination of the wasting and stunting indicators (here: 
34.7% of the children) misses category U but does include W among the wasted 
and S among the stunted. The stunting indicator (HAZ<-2.0; here: 30.8%) also 
misses the U category (2.9%) and is ‘taunted’ with the 1.8% of the children who 
are not only stunted but also wasted. The wasting indicator (WHZ<-2.0; here: 
5.7%) misses the U category (2.9%) and includes the 1.8% of the children who 
are not only wasted but also stunted.  
If the CIAF were considered the best indicator of the true prevalence of child 
undernutrition because it includes all forms of anthropometric failure (here 
37.6%), Waterlow’s classification would be a good second (here 34.7%), 
followed by stunting (here 30.8%), underweight (here 20.2%) and lastly wasting  
 (here 5.7%). If the intention is to have the highest prevalence figure by not 
missing categories, their relative measure of success can indeed be judged from 
the above ranking order. However, this judgement in a way is not fair: wasting 
as an indicator of acute conditions is by its very nature usually a much more 
modest percentage than stunting. In this survey in Kenya, the prevalence of 
underweight is lower than the prevalence of stunting because the prevalence of 
wasting is relatively low.  
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A better criterion to judge the appropriateness of an indicator for monitoring 
purposes is how it reacts to change. One could say that using a composite index 
like the CIAF or the combination of wasting and stunting (or underweight for 
that matter) as an indicator would be more acceptable as wasting and stunting 
behave more similarly in terms of response to causal factors or of association 
with outcomes concerning health and performance. On the other hand, the more 
wasting and stunting behave differently, the more reason there would be to 
promote either of them in their own right as an overall indicator. Since stunting 
as a measure of chronic conditions is considered to be a better indicator of 
poverty and of the effect of sustainable actions to alleviate poverty, current 
consensus goes in the direction of promoting stunting as the preferred indicator 
for monitoring the progress of MDG-1 (SCN 2008). 
 
Using the Anthro Table to investigate other factors 
To address the above question, the differences in the seven anthropometric 
categories were investigated in terms of their score or performance on related 
factors, such as (i) possible causes or (ii) possible outcomes. A way of studying 
the association of child growth with another factor is to indicate the value of 
that factor for each of the seven anthropometric categories. Nandy et al. (2005) 
analyzed data from India and have provided graphs in which the X axis has the 
seven anthropometric categories arranged according to the number of anthro-
pometric failures (N: none; S, U and W: one, SU and WU: two; WSU: three). 
The Y axis shows the average value of the factor investigated for the children in 
each category.  
A similar analysis was done for this chapter using the DHS Kenya 2003 data 
set. In addition to a one-dimensional layout of the seven categories (as in the 
graphs by Nandy et al.), the two-dimensional character of the seven anthropo-
metric categories is accounted for by presenting the results of the association 
analysis in the form of an Anthro Table. 
The following sections give the results of two applications of the Anthro 
Table in investigating the association of anthropometric failure with other varia-
bles, i.e. poverty (as an example of a possible cause) and diarrhoea (as an 
example of a possible consequence). 
 
Anthropometric failure and poverty 
A factor that is one of the basic causes of undernutrition was analyzed. The 
Kenya DHS 2003 data set contains a wealth index factor Z-score for each child 
based on a number of household goods and assets. The mean of the wealth 
index scores is close to zero since the index is standardized for households to 
produce Z-scores (Rutstein & Johnson 2004). The Kenya DHS 2003 data set 
has a categorical variable derived from the wealth index, which divides the 
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population approximately in quintiles (20% bands of the frequency distribution 
of ordered values). The quintiles are labelled from ‘poorest’ to ‘richest’ but 
these terms have to be understood in relative terms. Figure 11.6 gives the results 
of the prevalence of the anthropometric categories by wealth quintile.14 The fre-
quencies in which the different anthropometric categories occur differ according 
to wealth quintile: there is more undernutrition with increasing poverty.  
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 Figure 11.6   Relative frequencies of the seven anthropometric categories by  
 population quintile based on the Kenyan 2003 household wealth index 
 Source: Kenya DHS (2003) (Measure DHS+ 2004) 
 
 
To gain further insight into the pattern of frequencies in Figure 11.6, the 
results of the poorest (first bar) were contrasted to those of the richest, which 
served as a reference group (fifth bar). The results are shown in a one-dimen-
sional arrangement according to Svedberg and Nandy in Table 11.5 and in a 
two-dimensional arrangement as an Anthro Table in Table 11.6. The prevalence 
percentages in the column of ‘non-N’ represent Svedberg’s Composite Index of 
Anthropometric Failure (CIAF): 24% among the richest group (indicated by 
Q5). Among the richest households, therefore, almost 1 in 4 under-fives are 
undernourished.  
The prevalence of all individual anthropometric failure categories as well as 
the CIAF are higher among the poorest (indicated by Q1), at the expense of a 
                                                 
14 The data were analyzed using SPSS software version 15.0. 
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lower prevalence in their N category. In the following analysis, for each of the 
two selected quintile classes the prevalence percentages are divided by the 
prevalence in the corresponding N category, which is used as the referent group. 
The ratio of two prevalences gives a measure known as ‘odds’.15 The odds of 
composite anthropometric failure among the richest households are 0.307: for 
every one undernourished child, more than three are well nourished. In the 
poorest quintile, the CIAF prevalence is 48% (almost 1 in 2), which gives an 
odds of almost 1:1 (0.926).  
The contrast in risk between the poorest and the richest is given by the Odds 
Ratio (OR) which is the ratio of the odds among the poorest and the odds 
among the richest. For the six failure categories combined (CIAF), the OR is 
3.0 (almost 1:1 divided by almost 1:3). In other words, the odds of being 
undernourished among the poorest is three times the odds among the richest. 
The ORs for the individual failure categories range between 1.92 for S and 4.90 
for SU.  
SPSS has a module for multinomial logistic regression analysis,16 which 
allows an investigation of the influence of covariates. Children’s age had vir-
tually no influence but their place of residence (urban/rural) did affect the odds 
of anthropometric failure. After correcting for type of residence (see the bottom 
row of Table 11.5), the influence of poverty on anthropometric outcomes be-
came more pronounced, except for the WSU category. Among the poorest, the 
odds of the CIAF categories combined are almost fourfold compared to the 
richest quintile.  
Table 11.5 shows that ORs are generally higher as one moves from single to 
double anthropometric failure, although the OR of WSU is not as high as its 
triple failure would lead one to expect compared to the double failure 
categories. The effect of poverty is surprisingly strong (OR=6.5) for children in 
the single failure category U (who are underweight but not [yet] wasted or 
stunted). Note that these children are classified as ‘normal’ according to Water-
low. They do not have the levels of stunting and/or wasting of the SU and WSU 
categories but the effect of poverty is at least as strong.  
While the prevalence percentages of the seven categories are shown in 
Figure 11.6 and in Table 11.5 in a one-dimensional layout, Table 11.6 shows 
 
                                                 
15  Odds are a ratio of probabilities: the odds in favour of an event are the quantity 
p/(1−p), where p is the probability of the event. 
16  The dependent variable in this analysis (anthropometric failure category) is a nominal 
variable with more than two categories. Logistic regression allows the contribution of 
a risk factor or of a set of risk factors in terms of the natural logarithms of the odds 
ratio to be estimated. Applying the natural exponential function to the regression esti-
mates gives the odds ratio. 
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Table 11.5   Poverty and anthropometric categories 
    Total WSU SU WU U S W 
non-N 
(CIAF) 
N (no 
failure) 
Q1 1202 42 223 45 46 203 21 578 624 Number 
Q5 841 10 47 12 10 109 10 198 643 
Q1 100% 3.5% 18.5% 3.7% 3.8% 16.8% 1.7% 48.1% 51.9% Prevalence 
% Q5 100% 1.2% 5.6% 1.4% 1.2% 12.9% 1.2% 23.5% 76.5% 
Q1  0.067 0.357 0.071 0.073 0.324 0.033 0.926 1.00 Odds 
Q5  0.016 0.073 0.018 0.015 0.169 0.016 0.307 1.00 
Odds Ratio Q1:Q5   4.29 4.90 3.87 4.78 1.92 2.05 3.01 1.00 
Odds Ratio 
(corrected 
for 
residency) Q1:Q5   3.60 5.77 5.74 6.49 2.53 2.74 3.80 1.00 
Source: Kenya DHS (2003) (Measure DHS+ 2004). 
Legend: W, WU, U, S, WSU, SU = anthropometric failure categories according to Svedberg and Nandy: 
combinations of wasting (W) and/or stunting (S) and/or underweight (U). N = category with no such 
anthropometric failure (see Table 11.3). Non-N = total of the six anthropometric failure categories. 
Q1 = poorest household quintile; Q5 = richest household quintile 
Odds = prevalence of children in the anthropometric failure category divided by the prevalence of children in 
the no-failure category N 
Odds ratio (OR) = odds among children in Q1 divided by the odds among children in Q5. Using the 
multinomial logistic regression module of SPSS, a corrected OR was estimated with type of residence as a 
covariate. 
 
 
the results of risk analysis in the same two-dimensional layout as in Table 11.4 
according to Svedberg and Nandy’s classification, with shading according to 
Waterlow’s classification. This presentation by way of an Anthro Table allows 
a differential inspection of wasting, stunting and underweight in terms of the 
strength of their association with poverty. The various anthropometric values 
are indicated in the margins (cf Table 11.4), while the ORs of Q1 compared to 
Q5 are given in the body of the table. Starting from the referent category N, 
mean WHZ can be seen to follow a decreasing gradient from right to left, mean 
HAZ from top to bottom and mean WAZ from the upper right to the lower left- 
hand corner of the table. There are three trajectories for inspecting the OR 
tendencies while moving from the referent group N to the anthropometrically 
worse WSU group: (i) through the upper left quadrant, i.e. passing through W 
and WU (the ‘wasting wing’); (ii) through the lower right quadrant, i.e. passing 
through S and SU (the ‘stunting wing’); and (iii) passing through the centre U 
(where both WHZ and HAZ are on the low side but are not yet below -2.0). 
Inspecting the results of Table 11.6 in this way shows that the ‘wasting’ and 
‘stunting wings’ have similarly increasing OR gradients: from 1.0 for the 
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Table 11.6   Anthro Table of poverty-related odds ratios for Kenya, 2003 
Waterlow categories ← wasted  non-wasted → 
    
  
Svedberg/ 
Nandy’s 
categories 
WU WSU W U SU N S 
   
  
 
mean 
WHZ -2.8 -2.5 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.0 0.5    
  
  mean HAZ                   
W 1.4     2.74       
  
  
N -0.5          1.00   mean WAZ 
  
WU -0.7 5.74           
↓   
 n
on
-s
tu
nt
ed
 →
 
U -1.6       6.49       -0.3 
S -2.6             2.53 
  
WSU -3.1   3.60           -1.2 
←
 st
un
te
d 
 
SU -3.2         5.77     
  
 n
on
-u
nd
er
w
ei
gh
t →
 
  
   
  
mean
WAZ → -3.6   -2.6   -2.2   
                ← underweight   
Source of data: Subset of the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003 (Measure DHS+ 2004), cases 
weighted: 1202 under-fives belonging to the lowest population quintile of the household wealth index (Q1: 
the ‘poorest’) compared to 841 children in the highest quintile (Q5: the ‘richest’).  
For legend and formatting, see Table 11.4. For the abbreviations W, N, WU, U, S, WSU and SU, see Table 
11.3. Odds ratio = odds among the children from the poorest household quintile divided by the odds among 
the children from the richest household quintile, corrected for urban/rural residency. Odds = proportion of 
children with a particular anthropometric failure divided by the proportion of children in the no-failure 
category N. 
 
 
referent group through 2.5-2.7 for the single failure categories to 5.7-5.8 for the 
double failure categories. This is surprising because higher odds ratios on the 
stunting side, in line with the accepted theory that stunting is more strongly 
associated with poverty than wasting, might have been expected. A second 
result (mentioned above) is that the U category (the combination of moderate 
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thinness and moderate shortness) is more strongly affected by poverty (6.5) than 
the double failure categories UW and SU (5.7), even if it has slightly more 
favourable WAZ values (-2.3 compared to -2.5). The third curious result is that 
the OR of the anthropometrically most unfavourable WSU category is nowhere 
near the highest of all. 
The multiplicity of failures (single, double or triple) is not necessarily a good 
guide and this investigation has tried to disentangle the effects of stunting, 
wasting and underweight. However, the WSU category is of no help in the dif-
ferential analysis of these effects because it is a combination of all three anthro-
pometric failures. The overall picture is that poverty tends to drive children out 
of the ‘no anthropometric failure’ category in the direction of underweight in 
general. Being underweight is then not only due to stunting (SU) but for some 
children it is rather due to wasting (WU) and, for other children, to moderate 
underweight (U). Thus the conclusion of the differential inspection of Table 
11.6 is that the data do not support the view that stunting was a better indicator 
than underweight in Kenya in 2003. Finally it is appropriate to mention that the 
situation in the referent group was not ideal. Even in the relatively wealthiest 
quintile, a sizeable proportion of under-fives (24%) suffered from anthropo-
metric failure of various kinds. 
 
Anthropometric failure and diarrhoea 
The second application of the Anthro Table investigated in this study concerned 
the relationship between anthropometric status and recent episodes of diarrhoea 
(namely in the two weeks before the interview). Binary logistic regression ana-
lysis was used to generate a model of the occurrence of diarrhoea as a function 
of the child’s anthropometric category.17 As the child’s age influences the 
result, this was included in the model as a continuous variable. The data were 
analyzed using SPSS software version 15.0. The output of the logistic regres-
sion is the set of odds ratios of having diarrhoea. The odds ratio is a measure of 
risk and expresses how many times the odds of having diarrhoea in one group is 
more than the odds of diarrhoea occurring in the referent group N. For instance, 
of the 3045 children in the referent group N, 448 had diarrhoea; the odds being 
448/(3045-448)=0.17 or one child with diarrhoea for every six without diar-
rhoea. Of the 68 children who were wasted only, 19 had diarrhoea so the odds 
were 19/(68-19)=0.38 or one with diarrhoea for almost three without diarrhoea. 
The odds ratio (not corrected for age) was 0.38/0.17=2.25 for the W category. 
                                                 
17  Because the dependent variable (diarrhoea) is a yes/no variable, binary logistic re-
gression was used here. To represent the independent variable (anthropometric cate-
gory), a yes/no variable was created for each of the six categories of anthropometric 
failure and for the N category (no failure). The latter was used as the referent group 
for the odds ratio, which in this analysis is a measure of the risk of diarrhoea. 
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After correction for age in the logistic model, the age-adjusted result was 1.80. 
In other words: wasted children were almost twice as likely to have had 
diarrhoea as those without anthropometric failure. Table 11.7 presents the odds 
ratios of diarrhoea for the seven anthropometric categories.  
The inclusion of underweight in this classification is useful as it shows the 
dynamics within three of the four categories of Waterlow’s classification: com-
pare WU to W, U to N and SU to S. The OR’s for the latter two pairs show 
what would be expected: a gradual increase in the odds of diarrhoea going from 
upper right to lower left in Table 11.7, i.e. with increasing undernutrition. How-
ever, being wasted without or with underweight (W or WU) increases the odds 
of diarrhoea almost twofold. It is doubled again when wasting occurs with 
(severe) stunting (WSU). Moderate stunting in itself (S) increases the odds of 
diarrhoea less (1.4 times). Moderate underweight alone (U) hardly raises the 
odds of diarrhoea, less so than the comparison of its mean WAZ values with 
those of W and S might predict. 
It can be concluded that the association with diarrhoea is stronger for mode-
rate wasting than for moderate stunting (i.e. when comparing single failure 
categories) but that differential effect is not evident among the double failure 
categories. The U category behaves differently from the previous poverty ana-
lysis: the risk of diarrhoea is only slightly increased. Judging by the mean WAZ 
of SU and WU, there may be a threshold effect, such that a doubling of the OR 
may occur somewhere at a WAZ around -3. 
 
The value of the Anthro Table  
Anthropometry is the method of choice for monitoring the attainment of the 
hunger-related target of MDG-1. The indicator prevalence of underweight is a 
combination of wasting and/or stunting (although some children are under-
weight without being wasted or stunted). It is important to look into the ‘black 
box’ of weight-for-age as the three anthropometric indices are closely inter-
twined. A combined analysis is possible and useful. A schematic table (Anthro 
Table) visualizes results according to the two-dimensional cross-classification 
of wasting by stunting, while also showing underweight. In this way it con 
serves essential information about all three anthropometric indices. It can be 
used both to visualize the frequency distribution of children and to analyze 
relationships with other variables. In particular it allows a differential diagnosis 
of wasting versus stunting. This Anthro Table was tested using examples of 
wealth and health data from DHS Kenya (2003) and the examples analyzed 
illustrate how the seven anthropometric categories allow a more refined analysis 
than Waterlow’s classification by carving out the interesting U category from 
the ‘normal’ children and distinguishing single from double anthropometric 
failures (WU versus W and SU versus S). It can thus be seen that poverty had a 
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striking effect on the U category, while that category was close to normal in 
terms of the occurrence of diarrhoea. The U category is useful to study the 
general gradient with underweight (from N to WSU) and to glimpse possible 
threshold effects. The multiplicity of anthropometric failures per se is not a  
 
 
Table 11.7   Anthro Table of the risk of diarrhoea (Odds Ratio) in Kenya (2003) in the  
 previous two weeks by anthropometric status category 
Waterlow categories ← wasted  non-wasted → 
    
  
Svedberg/ 
Nandy's 
categories 
WU WSU W U SU N S 
   
  
 
mean 
WHZ -2.8 -2.5 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.0 0.5    
  
  mean HAZ                   
W 1.4     1.80       
  
  
N -0.5          1.00   mean WAZ 
  
WU -0.7 1.79           
↓   
 n
on
-s
tu
nt
ed
 →
 
U -1.6       1.24       -0.3 
S -2.6             1.38 
  
WSU -3.1   4.38           -1.2 
←
 st
un
te
d 
 
SU -3.2         1.97     
  
 n
on
-u
nd
er
w
ei
gh
t →
 
  
   
  
mean
WAZ → -3.6   -2.6   -2.2   
                ← underweight   
Source: Kenya DHS (2003) (Measure DHS+ 2004) 
Legend: The anthropometric categories are defined by combinations of HAZ, WAZ and WHZ above or below 
Z=-2 (for the meaning of the abbreviations, see Table 11.3). Entries are arranged according to the category’s 
mean HAZ by WAZ values as indicated in the margins. For the number of children in the survey and 
prevalence percentages, see Table 11.4. The odds of diarrhoea in each anthropometric group are expressed as 
a ratio of the odds in group N (the referent group). These quotients are known as the odds ratio (OR). The 
ORs of underweight children (only or in any combination) are shown in bold. Light shading is used for 
underweight or stunting, while dark shading is used for the combination of underweight and stunting. 
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good criterion for predicting risk because the order between W, U and S or 
between WU and SU cannot be decided, nor can the possibly special character 
of the U category (in the middle of the table but constrained in Z-score values). 
Although the processes of wasting and stunting are considered to occur with 
a time lag (wasting preceding stunting), the growth outcomes are apparently 
more entangled in reality than has so far been realized and they tend to go hand 
in hand. Waterlow’s 1975 classification was based on the assumption that 
wasting and stunting are different processes and need to be distinguished by 
adding the measurement of height to weight and by calculating the two indices 
(HAZ and WHZ) in addition to WAZ. Since the early 1990s there has been 
growing recognition that a child’s weight and height growth go in spurts (Lampl 
et al. 1992). Results of a seasonality study in Kenya (Niemeijer et al, 1991; 
Hoorweg et al. 1995) found such spurts even at group level. The Svedberg & 
Nandy classification and the Anthro Table take these growth dynamics into 
account. The present study of the association with related factors suggests that 
the processes of wasting and stunting are intertwined and difficult to separate. 
Conclusion 
When monitoring MDG-1, the indicator of underweight prevalence among 
under-fives has a number of advantages over the undernourishment indicator. 
However, it needs to be classified according to three anthropometric indicators 
simultaneously to shed light on the issue of underweight versus stunting when 
analyzing long-term trends. The Anthro Table is a useful tool and adds value to 
a one-dimensional analysis. The analyses above confirm the reliability of under-
weight as a sound overall value of growth performance in children. The meas-
urement of height in addition to weight remains a useful recommendation but 
should not replace the prevalence of underweight by that of stunting in moni-
toring the attainment of the hunger-related target of MDG-1. It allows a better 
understanding of the reasons for a particular underweight prevalence or trend, 
and this, in turn, is important in evaluating and designing policies and pro-
grammes. Svedberg’s (2000) classification, which was amended by Nandy et al. 
(2005), is a fruitful inroad into deeper analysis with the specially constructed 
Anthro Table presented in this chapter. 
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Appendix 1 
Data for Figure 11.2: Percentages underweight and undernourishment in two 
subsequent surveys (with time spans of 5-10 years) for 27 SSA countries 
 Underweight 1)  Undernourished 2)   
 year 1 year 2 
delta 
under-
weight 
year 1 year 2 
delta 
under-
nourished 
year 1-year 2 
Cameroon 15.1 22.2 -7.1 32 25 7 1991-1999 
Chad 38.8 28 10.8 49 34 15 1996-2000 
Eritrea 43.7 39.6 4.1 68 73 -5 1996-2001 
Ethiopia 47.7 47.2 0.5 57 42 15 1996-2000 
Kenya 22.5 21.1 1.4 42 37 5 1995-2000 
Rwanda 28.6 24.3 4.3 34 40 -6 1991-1999 
Uganda 25.5 22.9 2.6 25 19 6 1996-2000 
Tanzania 28.9 29.4 -0.5 35 43 -8 1991-2000 
Angola 40.6 30.5 10.1 49 40 9 1996-2001 
Botswana 17.2 12.5 4.7 22 24 -2 1996-2000 
Lesotho 15.8 18 -2.2 27 25 2 1991-2000 
Madagascar 40.9 40 0.9 33 40 -7 1991-1996 
Malawi 27.6 25.4 2.2 49 33 16 1991-2000 
Namibia 26.2 24 2.2 20 7 13 1991-2000 
Zambia 25.2 28.1 -2.9 48 49 -1 1991-2001 
Zimbabwe 15.5 13 2.5 46 38 8 1995-1999 
Benin 29.2 22.9 6.3 17 15 2 1996-2001 
Burkina Faso 32.7 34.3 -1.6 23 23 0 1991-1999 
Côte d’Ivoire 23.8 21.2 2.6 17 15 2 1995-1999 
Gambia 26.2 17.2 9 32 27 5 1996-2000 
Guinea 29.1 32.7 -3.6 35 28 7 1996-2000 
Mali 40 33.2 6.8 27 21 6 1996-2000 
Mauritania 47.6 31.8 15.8 14 10 4 1991-2000 
Niger 42.6 40.1 2.5 42 34 8 1991-2000 
Nigeria 35.3 25 10.3 13 8 5 1991-2000 
Senegal 21.6 22.7 -1.1 23 24 -1 1991-2000 
Sierra Leone 28.7 27.2 1.5 46 50 -4 1991-2000 
1) Percentage of children below 5 years with weight-for-age < median -2sd of WHO/NCHS reference, source 
WHO (2006a). 
2) Estimated proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption, FAO (1999-
2005). 
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Appendix 2 
Data for Figure 11.3: Prevalence rates of low height-for-age (<median -2sd using 
WHO/NCHS reference) in children below 5 years 
 year 1 (%) year 2 (%) Period N year 1 N year 2 
Nepal  54.2 50.5 97/98-2001 17241 6409 
Korea DPR  45.2 38.6 2000-2002 4175 5232 
Yemen  44.6 51.7 1996-1997 3833 7501 
Bangladesh  44.6 48.5 99/00-2001 5421 71931 
Vietnam  35.9 36.5 1998-2000 12919 94469 
Myanmar  34.2 32.2 2000-2003 8081 5390 
Indonesia 1) 26.1 27.3 2001-2002 11693 74537 
Indonesia 1) 24.6 26.1 2000-2001 70602 11693 
Mongolia  24.6 24.6 1999-2000 4037 5784 
Sri Lanka  23.8 20.4 1993-1995 3067 2782 
Malaysia 1) 23.3 22.4 1993-1994 313246 317551 
Malaysia 1) 22.4 20.1 1994-1995 317551 344736 
Iran  18.9 15.4 1995-1998 11139 2536 
Thailand  16.0 13.4 1993-1995 11748 4178 
1) Prevalence rates of low weight-for-age instead of low height-for-age are given for Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Note: Survey pairs arranged in order of prevalence in year 1. 
Source: DHS (2007), WHO (2006a) 
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Appendix 3 
Data for Figure 11.4: Prevalence rates of low height-for-age (<median -2sd using 
WHO/NCHS reference) in children under 5 years of age 
 year 1 (%) year 2 (%) Period N year 1 N year 2 
Malawi  59.1 49.0 97/98-2000 6309 9322 
Mozambique  55.0 35.9 1995-1997 4586 2837 
Zambia  53.0 46.8 1999-2001 1095000 5784 
Madagascar  49.8 48.3 1995-1997 5049 3080 
Madagascar  48.6 49.8 93/94-1995 3131 5049 
Malawi  48.3 59.1 1995-97/98 3654 6309 
Tanzania  43.4 43.8 1996-1999 5344 2821 
Zambia  42.4 53.0 96/97-1999 5443 1095000 
Nigeria  42.0 38.3 2001-2003 4954 4789 
Niger  41.1 39.7 1998-2000 4022 4616 
Chad  40.1 29.1 96/97-2000 5664 5043 
Kenya  35.2 30.3 2000-2003 5917 5306 
Togo  34.0 21.7 1996-1998 3761 3260 
Central Afr. Rep.  33.6 28.4 94/95-1995 2310 2225 
Nigeria  33.5 42.0 1999-2001 8617 4954 
Kenya  33.0 35.3 1998-2000 4413 5917 
Ghana  29.9 22.4 2003-2006 3183 3166 
Guinea  26.1 40.9 1999-2000 2939 1457 
South Africa  25.4 22.8 93/94-94/95 3689 9807 
Egypt  24.9 20.6 97/98-1998 3328 3997 
Egypt  20.6 18.7 1998-2000 3997 10193 
Note: Survey pairs arranged in order of prevalence in year 1. 
Source: DHS (2007), WHO (2006a), Unicef (2007) 
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